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table of contents rather than an index of ~mes and 
subjects is the general practice in Latin-;\.lllericotn 
publications, and it is not an efficient use of time 
to recid whole volumes in the hope of finding somewhere 
a few paragraphs on Heidegger. Fortu~tely, some illdjor 
works have good indexes. The writer has made a fairly 
extensive search for references to Heidegger, dnd has 
found more than he can illdster clnd utilize. 
A serious problem is the evaluation of sources. 
In one's ovm country or in an enviro~ment where the 
investigator feels thoroughly at home, some names -1nd 
points of view are easily recognized as pcirtial, preju-
diced, or simply incompetent. In another l-1nguage and 
a different cultural environment, r~ture judgment on 
the value of sources is much more difficult. as the 
tourist is considered an easy mark for the charlatan, 
so in the present investigation there is the danger of 
false evaluation of source materials, on the basis of 
an author's fluent sVyle or high productivity, for 
example. There is a further da.nger. _,s the tourist 
gets a hurried glimpse of the main attrdctions in the 
land he vis its, without much redl underst:1nding, so the 
outside investigator, even in philosophy, may eclsily be 
content with a superficial view of contempor:1ry currents. 
Survey studies, like the present one, clre peculiarly 
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subject to this danger. To concentro.te on one r.:a.n would 
be to ':.ralk on firmer ground. The dissertation itself is 
the writer's best effort to recognize .c.nd surmount the 
difficulties mentioned. 
B. Reasons for the selection of this subject. 
In the second semester of the uc~demic year, 
1943-1944, as a student in the Boston university School 
of Theology, the v.Titer was first introduced to the 
study of Latin-.illlerican philosophy. The late Professor 
Edgar S. Brightman, then Chairman of the Depctrt::!ent of 
Philosophy in the Boston University G.raductte School, and 
for yectrs a student of Latin-"illlericun philosophy c.nd 
culture, gave for the first time an introductory course 
on this subject, to o. group of fifteen or ::wre students 
frolil various departments of tl:s University, includir.g 
sor.:e theological students vrho were plunning to spend 
their sur.uner vacation on a Viork project in i.:exico. 'l'he 
subject matter of the course was entirely novel to the 
writer at thdt time. The brief introductory study 
opened up r:any interestb.g possibilities for further 
investigcttion. 
4 
one or the most striking discoveries in this brier 
survey course on ~~tin-american philosophy was the close 
relation between the modern phenomenological movement 
in Germany and contemporary philosophical thought in 
La tin .• unerica. PhilosoPhical influences from Spa in, 
France, and Italy were to be expected, but to find that 
a strong, perhaps the central, current in contemporary 
Latin-American philosophy was of German origin was some-
thing of a surprise. 
Several years later, when the opportunity came to 
select a subject for a doctoral dissertation, the in-
fluence of German phenomenology in Latin-,unerican thought 
was an inviting theme. This subject, in its eutirety, 
was considered too extensive for the type or investigation 
required for a dissertation. It was necessary to select 
some particular phase of the general theme, and concen-
trate attention on a more limited subject. The choice of 
Heidegger, rather than some other representative of Ger-
man phenomenology, such as Husserl, Scheler, or Hartmann, 
was largely casual and superricial. It was necessary to 
make a selection, and one representative would be as good 
as another, to serve as a particular approach to the 
general phenomenological current or as an example of its 
influence in Latin-.~erican philosophy. 
5 
In part, however, the choice Wets based on the 
desire to investigate the least knovm and least tra-
ditional thinker of the group, the most radical depar-
ture from what, for the writer, was familiar Philosoph-
ical tradition. Perhaps this reason for selecting 
Heidegger can best be described as curiosity for the 
unknown and the unfamiliar. In any case, Heidegger 
was the choice of a given moment, without much serious 
thought on the matter. 
Afte~ the choice was made, and in the course of 
preliminary investigations, both of German phenomenology 
and of its influence in Latin-American thought, the 
selection of Heidegger has been confirmed. In the 
past two decades, existentialism, with reference to 
which Heidegger•s name is always mentioned, has become 
perhaps the most-discussed philosophical subject in 
Latin A.merica. In the Third Inter-.JD.erican Congress 
of Philosophy, held in IVJ:exico City in .Tanuctry, 1950, 
the existentialist movement was the subject of some 
twenty-two papers submitted to the Congress, ctnd the 
occasion for animated discussions. The influence of 
Heidegger is a living theme in Latin-American philos-
ophy at the present time. How long this influence 
will last, what will be its permanent contribution to 
the history of Latin-American thought and of philosophy 
6 
in gener~l, whether or not the thought of Heidegger 
will gain in popularity among English-speaking philos-
ophers, are all questions of interest, questions which 
indicate the timeliness of the subject under considera-
tion. 
c. Review of work already done in this field. 
In the particular, precise field of investigation 
as indicated in the title of the dissertation, little 
has been done. Patrick Romanell has included the in-
fluence of the German phenomenological school on Mexican 
1 thought in his Waking of the Mexican liiind. Scholarly 
articles and reports on contemporary Latin-.. cmerican 
philosophy have appeared in many uhilosophical jour~ls 
and in the Handbook of Latin American Studies (since 
1939). In most cases, some references are rrude to 
existentialism, in connection with which Heidegger is 
usually mentioned. 
The exposition of Heidegger•s philosophy can hardly 
be considered virgin territory for investigation. Many 
books and scholarly articles have dealt with Heidegger•s 
philosophy and with his place in the existentialist 
1. Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1952. 
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noveEent. Severill of his V.'orks have bsen translCJ.ted 
into English, dnd the English version of ciein und Zeit, 
translated by John Liacg_uarrie and Edward Hobinson, under 
the joint inprint of the Student Christiun i.over.1ent Press 
of London .c.nd Harper CJ.nd Brothers of l'Jev; York, is expected 
in 1961. 
The introductory statenents by Werner Broc_t:: in 
Existence and Being1 comprise more of that book than 
the material translated, und may be considered an intro-
ductory work on Heidegger. 
European thinkers vJho have published their doc-
toral dissertations on Heidegger include such names us 
.umemarie Vogt, Clement Hoberg, Johannes .mtonius Van 
der I,;uelen, Frw.nz Euth, and .1.lphonse de '"aelhens. Their 
published works are included in the bibliography of the 
present disserta.tion. In the United Sta.tes, doctoral 
dissertations on Heidegr:er alone or in comparison '.-lith 
other thinkers have been presented by i.:urjorie Glicks-
man [Grene] {Radcliffe College, 1935), Charles Lctlik 
_{Harvard University, 1937), Xurt Hoffl::Jan {Hurvard Uni-
versity, 1949), Fayez .~bdullah Sayegh ( Georgetovm Uni-
versity, 1950), Laria liargareta Stavrides {Columbia 
University, 1952), Donald F. Tweedie (Boston University, 
l. !::art in Heidegger, Existence and Being ( ed. ,Ierner 
Brock; tr. Douglas Scott, R. F. C. Hull, and -~an 
Crick)(London: Vision Press, Ltd., 1949). 
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1954), Laslo G. Vers~nyi (Yale University, 1955), and 
William H. Bossart (Northwestern University, 1959). 
Titles and -publication data for these works may be 
found in the bibliography. 
In Canada, Richard C. Hinners wrote his disserta-
tion (University of Toronto, 1955) on "Martin Heidegger•s 
Conce-ption of the lltlestion: •What Is the Meaning of 
To-Be?' in Sein und Zeit." 
The bibliography of this dissertation is an indica-
tion of the works used by the writer in the study of 
Heidegger. A brief statement of major dependence may 
be illustrative. In the first place, the writer is 
most indebted to Professor Jos~ Gaos, not merely for 
his Spanish translation of Sein und Zeit, his Intro-
ducci6n a El ser y el tiempo de ~nrtin Heidegger; and 
other published works which include numerous references 
to Heidegger, but also for his personal direction in the 
early stages of the writer's study of Sein und Zeit, in 
a seminar in El Colegio de Iii~xico, a research institution 
in Mexico City. Professor Gaos has seen only a small 
portion of the present dissertation, and that portion in 
its preliminary stages; consequently, he may in no sense 
be thought to have approved the work as it now stands, 
for which the writer accepts full responsibility. 
1. M~xico: Fondo de Cultura Econ6mica, 1951. 
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In the second Place, the writer has consulted 
frequently the interpretation of Heidegger by .... lphonse 
de Viaelhens. 1 Other authors whose interpretations have 
been particularly useful to the writer include I. M. 
Bochenski, Earl Lewith, and Fritz-Joachim von Rintelen 
in German, JUd.n David Garcia &.cca, .,.lberto ·v'tigner de 
Reyna, and EdUd.rdo Nicol in Spanish, and lliarjorie (Glicks-
man) Grene, J. Glenn Gray, and John Wild in English. 
The problem has not been a lack of material, but the 
difficulty in reducing an abundance of material and 
divergent points of view to a coherent interpret~tion. 
The investigation of contemporary Latin-American 
thought has been an important theme of the Inter-~rican 
Congresses of Philosophy. A few names dominate the pic-
ture. In the United States, the late Professor Brightman, 
Cornelius Krus~, and Patrick Romanell have kept before the 
philosophical public the fact that philosophy is not lim-
ited to nnglo-America. Francisco Romero, Risieri Frondizi, 
An1bal 3<1nchez Reulet, and Leopolda Zea have been the most 
influential students of "American" philosophy. "American" 
in this connection is not limited to any specific language 
or geographic area within America. 
1. Alphonse de Waelhens, La filosof1a de Ma.rtin Heidegger, 
segunda edici6n ( tr. Ram6n Ceffal) (:!vadrid: Conse jo Su-
perior de Investigaciones Cient1ficas, Institute Luis 
Vives de Filosof1a, 1952). 
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The Handbook of Latin American Studies, an annual 
publication by Harvard University, and various projects 
and publications sponsored by the Pan American Union, 
Washington, D.C., are attempts to promote cultural and 
philosophical co-operation among all the Americas, in-
cluding the four languages of English, French, Portugese, 
and Spanish. Among the scholarly journals, Philosophy 
and Phenomenological Research has presented many reviews 
of books by Latin-American thinkers, reports of the Con-
gresses of Philosophy, and several articles. An!bal 
Sanchez Reulet 1 s Contemporary La t in-_..merican Philosophy 
is available in an English translation.l 
Several research projects have dealt with Latin-
"'merican philosophy. Miss liionelisa Lina P~rez-.!lidrchand 
wrote a Master• s thesis on "A Critical Study of Some 
Currents of Contemporary Philosophical Thought in Latin 
America" (Johns Hopkins University, 1940). Two contem-
porary movements and four thinkers constitute the objects 
of her investigation. The movements are the University 
Revolution or Reform in Argentina in 1918, and the later 
Aprista reform movement, chiefly in Per~. The four 
thinkers are Rod6, Korn, Vasconcelos, and RaTa de la 
Torre. Miss P~rez-Marchand sees Haya de la Torre as 
"the man who best exemplifies the Latin-American thought 
1. Both Spanish and English editions are published by 
the Pan r~.merican Union, Yashington, D.C. 
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of our day" [1940]. Her doctoral dissertation, in Spanish, 
on "Two Ideological Stages of the Eighteenth Century in 
Mexico,"1 was written in Mexico, under the direction of 
Professor Gaos. 
Raymond A. Valenzuela, a native of Chile, vrrote his 
doctoral dissertation (Drew University, 1955) on "The 
Emerging Concern for Transcendent Values in Spanish 
American Philosophy." Valenzuela's work is an extended 
dissertation (489 pages), and constitutes an informative 
introduction, in English, to Spanish-American philosophy. 
Part I is an introduction to the history of Spanish-Ameri-
can philosophy, in the framework of four stages, including 
the domirutnt Scholasticism of the colonial period, a per-
iod of transition marked by eclecticism and the triumph 
of modernism, a third period of the dominance of positivism, 
and the contemporary scene of post-positivism, to which 
the author gives the title of his dissertation. Part II 
deals with Caso, Vasconcelos, Korn, and Romero as the 
foremost examples of the contemporary period. The influ-
ence of German phenomenologists, including Heidegger, is 
recognized, but is not a major theme in Valenzuela's work. 
There are no specific references to the influence of Hei-
degger apart from other German philosonhers. 
1. "Dos etttpas ideol6gicas del siglo XVIII en M~xico." 
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Carl Patton, Jr., wrote a dissertation (Boston 
University, 195?) on "The State and the Person in the 
Thought of Alberdi and Case." In addition to an exposi-
tion of the two concepts mentioned in the title, Patton 
gives a biographical sketch and bibliographical resume 
of each thinker, and concludes with agreements and dif-
ferences in their views. 
William Jackson Kilgore presented his dissertation 
(University of Texas, 1958) on "Alejandro Korn•s Inter-
pretation of Creative Freedom." 
Rigoberto Juarez Paz wrote a dissertation (Univer-
sity of Minnesota, 1958) on "Studies in Twentieth Century 
Spanish Philosophy." The writer has not read this dis-
sertation. The published abstract indicates that Spanish 
rather than Latin-American thought is his main theme. 
The present dissertation is an attempt to select 
from the contemporary scene of Latin-American philosophy 
those aspects which may be traced to Martin He idegger. 
Negative influence, or opposition to Heidegger, is also 
presented, although the main interest is in those thinkers 
positively influenced by Heidegger. The surveys by 
Risieri Frondizi, An1bal ~nchez Reulet, and Patrick 
Romanell, as well as the work done in doctoral disserta-
tions, have proved useful in selecting thinkers and in 
13 
securing bibliographical data. The writer has attempted 
to go beyond a dependence upon secondary sources, and 
to investigate LJ.tin-,unerican philosophy in the original 
writings of the thinkers whose views are discussed. 
D. Method of procedure. 
After this introductory chapter, the remainder of 
the dissertation will be presented in two main parts. 
Part I includes a brief sketch of Heidegger 1 s C<ireer 
and personality, an exposition of his major work, sum-
mary expositions of his minor works, and a summary in-
terpretation of principal ideas. These themes consti-
tute the four chapters of Part I. 
Part II also contains four chapters, which deal with 
the introduction of Heidegger to La tin .unerica, opposition to 
and criticism of his views, the positive influence of 
his philosophy, and an interpretative evaluation of 
his influence. 
A major methodological problem is the difficulty of 
any kind of measurement of philosoPhical influence. No 
mathematical or formal criterion will suffice, if appli-
cable at all. The similarity of concepts is no proof of 
influence. Direct quotation or reference is genuine 
evidence of influence, at least on the superficial level 
of repetition; but repetition, if superficial, is not 
genuinely philosophical. Philosophers often express 
their debts to others in the realm of ideas, in the 
form of quotations and references. Sometimes the 
ideas of another thinker become so much a part of 
14 
a philosopher's personal point of view that influences 
are not even consciously recognized, much less recorded 
in footnotes, and still less visible to a spectator. 
This dissertation illustrates some inherent tensions 
within philosonhical and educational methods. Detailed 
analysis and exposition are in constant tension with 
comprehensive summary and survey. Factual presentation 
and speculative interpretation are both necessary in 
a dissertation in philosophy, yet the two poles are 
often in internal tension. In academic terms, doctoral 
requirements illustrate the scientific, rather than the 
philosonhical, m. ture of the current "philosol)hy" of 
education, even in the "lepartment" of philosophy. In 
a figure of speech, it is a bit difficult to fly an 
airnlane in a mine. To dig gold in the sky is hard, 
too. But if the nature of man is to philosophize (to 
care about his world and his destiny) in temporal suc-
cession (Heidegger), then this dissertation will some-
tiEes descend into a mine and sometimes fly in compre-
hensive survey, in an attempt to overcome the limitations 
of a consistent method. 
SuZ 
KPM 
WM 
WG 
ww 
PLW 
EM 
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E. Abbreviations for Heidegger• s works1 
Sein und Zeit, erste HYlfte, sechste unver~nderte 
.A.uflage (Tlibingen: Neomarius Verlag, 1949). 
Kant und das Problem der Metanhysik, zwei te un-
ver&nderte auflage (branktUrt am Main: Vittorio 
Klostermann, 1951). 
Was ist liietaphhsik? :fUnfte durch Einle itung und 
Nachwort verme rte .A.u1'lage (Frankfurt am Main: 
Vittorio Klostermann, 1949). 
Vom Wesen des Grundes, vierte .1.uflage (Frankfurt 
am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1955). 
Vom Wesen der Wahrheit~ dritte Auflage (Frankfurt 
am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1954). 
Platons Lehre von der Wahrheit, mit einem Brief 
tiber den WHumanismus" (Bern: A. Francke .A.. G., 
1947). 
Einf'Uhrun~ in die Metaphysik ('I'Ilbingen: 
Niemeyer erlag, 1953). Max 
WHD Was heisst Denken? ('I'Ilbingen: Max Niemeyer Verlag, 
1954) • 
VA Vortrijge und .A.ufsatze (Pfullingen: GUnther Neske, 
1954). 
WP 
.:),B 
What Is Philosophy? (tr. William Kluback and .Jean 
T. Wilde)(New York: Twayne Publishers, Inc., 1958). 
English and German texts of was ist das--die Philo-
sophie? are presented on opposing pages. 
The ~uestion of Being (tr. William Kluback and .Jean T. W lde)(New York: Twayne Publishers, Inc., 1958). 
English and German texts of Zur Seinsfrage are pre-
sented on opposing pages. 
SZ Der Satz vom Grund (Pfullingen: GUnther Neske, 1957). 
1. Presented here in the editions used by the writer and 
in the order in which the works are discussed in Part 
I of this dissertation. 
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ID Identit~t und Differenz, zweite, unver~nderte 
Auflage.(Pfullingen: GUnther Neske, 1957). 
EHD 
EAB 
zweite 
: Vittorio 
Existence and Bei~ (ed. Werner Brock; tr. Doug-
las Scott, R. F.~ Hull1 and Alan Crick)(London: Vision Press, Ltd., 1949}. 
HOL Holzwe~e (Frankfurt am Main: 
mann, 950). 
Vittorio Kloster-
LUP Die Lehre vom Urteil 1m Psychologismus, ein krit-
isch-positiver Beitrag zur Logik; inaugural-Dis-
sertation, Freiburg (Leipzig: J. A. Barth, 1914). 
KBDS Die Kategorien- und Bedeutun~slehre des Duns Scotus 
(Tffbingen: J. c. B. Mohr, 1 l6). 
su 
DF 
Die Selbstbehau~tun~ der deutschen Universi~t, 
Rede, gehalten ei er feieriichen Uebernahfue des 
Rektorats der Universit~t, Freiburg 1m Breisgau 
am 27.5.1933 (Breslau: .Verlag Willelm Gottlieb 
Korn, 1933). 
Der Feldwe' (Frankfurt am Main: 
mann, 1953 . 
Vittorio Kloster-
AED Aus der Erfahrung des Denkens (Pfullingen: ~ther 
Neske, 1954). 
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CHAPTER I 
HEIDEGGER'S CAREER AND PERSO~L~LITY 
A· Religious background and development. 
Martin Heidegger was born in Messkirk, in southern 
Germany, in 1889, the son of a Roman Catholic sexton. 
His early training in home, church, and school vrccJ.s un-
doubtedly a contributing factor to his entry into the 
Jesuit Order as a novice. No details of his spiritual 
development are available to the writer, but the fact 
that he did not continue in the "religious" life, pre-
ferring instead the field of philosophy, suggests at-
titudes of open inquiry rather than the acceptance of 
an established system of thought (Roman Catholic Scho-
lasticism), and possibly of disillusionment in religion. 
Heidegger's strict separation of faith and reason, 
illustrated by his calling Christian philosophy a wooden 
1 iron, leads to the conjecture of an inner revolt, only 
partially expressed, against his own early training and 
his spiritual heritage. The whole trend of Heidegger•s 
1. EinfUhrung in die Metanhysik (TUbingen: Max Niemeyer 
Verlag, 1953), p. 6. Abbreviat~d, EM. Hereafter, the 
usual abbreviation for page (p.) will be omitted, ex-
cept when omission would cause confusion. 
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life and writings is against a closed system of thought, 
and against religious faith as an answer to philosophical 
problems. Heidegger is not a man of faith, in this sense. 
He is a Socratic investigator for whom nothing is beyond 
questioning. There are hints of disillusionment in Hei-
degger. Whether his disillusionment is purely an intel-
lectual matter, growing out of critical, speculative 
thought, or whether his critical thought is itself a 
product, at least in part, of a feeling of disillusion-
ment in his religious experience and spiritual develop-
ment, is a question which the writer can not answer. 
Merely to raise such a question is to approach the 
limits of respect for Heidegger as a person and as a 
philosopher. 
Even if it could be demonstrated that an experience 
of disillusionment in his religious life were a central 
factor in the motivation of his profound questioning 
and criticism of traditional solutions to Philosophical 
and theological problems, such a demonstration would not 
alter the validity of his philosophical position. 
The whole question is raised here, not only as a 
possible additional light on Heidegger and his philosophy, 
but also because the writer believes that disillusionment 
with a traditional, authoritarian religious philosophy 
and culture is a significant fact1r among many Latin-
~merican thinkers, and because Heidegger, both as a 
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person and as a philosopher, may have considerable in-
fluence in Latin-america as a symbol of an attitude of 
spiritual and intellectual freedom. 
B. Contemporary movements in German philosophy. 
Heidegger•s development in philosophy represents 
many influences.1 The influence of Neo-Kantianism 
through Rickert and Lask was dominant in the years of 
preparation and the attainment of his doctor's degree 
in 1914. The critical study of Duns Scotus represents 
the influence of Husserl's phenomenology as method, but 
not particularly as an idealistic philosophy of essence. 
Heidegger•s Probevorlesung indicates the influence of 
historicism through Dilthey and Troeltsch. l~ny terms 
in Sein und Zeit indicate a thorough acquaintance with 
Kierkegaard. The nature and extent of Heidegger•s de-
pendence upon Kierkegaard are moot questions, which lie 
beyond the scope of this dissertation. The influence 
of the German poets, Hilke and HBlderlin, is worthy 
of mention. 
1. An excellent discussion of Heidegger•s "authentic 
genealogy" may be found in .Tos~ Gaos, Confesiones 
profesionales (M~xico: Fondo de CUltura Econ6mica, 
tloiecc16n 1'ezontle, 1958), 57-59. 
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Heidegger worked with Husserl in Freiburg as an as-
sociate editor of the Jahrbuch fUr Philosophie und ph~­
nomenologische Forschung until 1923, when he went to the 
University of !VIarburg as Professor of Philosophy. ~ 
und Zeit was published while Heidegger was at Mar burg, 
but the fact that it was originally published in the 
Jahrbuch indicates close co-operation with Husserl. In 
1929, when Husserl retired at the age of ?0, Heidegger 
was elected as his successor in the University of Frei-
burg. Heidegger's contribution to the volume of essays 
dedicated to Husserl was Vom Wesen des Grundes, which is 
perhaps the most striking of all of Heidegger's works. 
Despite differing trends in their thinking, Husserl and 
heidegger worked closely together through 1929. During 
the years that followe~the discrepancies between their 
philosophical positions became more apparent, although 
there are, so far as the ~Titer has been able to deter-
mine, no published statements by Heidegger in criticism 
of his teacher and colleague. Heidegger's interpretation 
of phenomenology, both as a method and as a philosophical 
position, does not coincide with Husserl's views, so that 
Heidegger can hardly be classified as a phenomenologist 
in the strict sense of Husserl's system. Nevertheless, 
Heidegger, as well as Scheler and N. Hartmann, with their 
varied philosophical positions, is recognized as part of 
the phenomenological movement. 
In Latin America, Heidegger is seen as belonging, 
in a sense, to several philosophical movements. The 
influence of medieval thought, especially of Duns Scotus, 
relates him to the great metaphysical tradition of Ro-
man Catholic Scholasticism. Heidegger also belongs to 
the Neo-Kantian school and to historicism (Dilthey). 
He is a phenomenologist. Despite his objections, he is 
most freauently classified with the existentialists. 
Yet, strictly speaking, Heidegger does not belong en-
tirely to any of these schools. He is not a "follower" 
of Kierkegaard, although he does appreciate the latter's 
religious revolt against an intellectual philosophy of 
religion and culture, and he does utilize Kierkegaard's 
terms and ideas, although for a different purpose. 
Kierkegaard•s writings apparently influenced Heidegger 
most during the years immediately following the First 
World war, when the desperate social conditions and 
cultural attitudes in a defeated and bankrupt Germany 
mirrored all too well the philosophy of melancholy, 
frustration, despair, and revolt against system and 
tradition. 1 
1. Fritz Joachim von Rintelen, Philosophie der Endlich-
keit als Sniegel dar Gegenwart (Meisenhefm am Glan: 
Westkulturverlag Anton Hain, 1951) is a thorough 
study and criticism of the philosophy of finitude 
as mirror of the present age. 
c. National Socialism. 
Heidegger•s participation in the National Socialist 
movement was a contributing factor in his strained rela-
tions with Husserl. Heidegger was elected Rector of the 
University of Freiburg in 1933, and resigned after less 
than a year in the position. The rectorship of a German 
university is more an honorary than an administr~tive 
position. The chancellorship corresponds roughly to the 
presidency of a university in the United States. The 
rector represents the university on festive occasions 
and has considerable prestige. He is usually elected 
on the basis of seniority or outstanding achievement. 
Non-academic considerations, however, may easily 
intrude into elections for honorary positions in any 
university. In the early stages of Hitler's National 
Socialism, there could be little chance of an election 
on the basis of academic merit alone. The writer has 
very little information on this point, ~nd is not in a 
position to judge the nature and extent of national and 
university "politics" in that situation. 
The fact of Heidegger•s early capitulation to the 
Nazi movement may not be denied. Nevertheless, several 
factors tend to diminish the gravity of his co-operation. 
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The position of rector is a matter of academic prestige, 
not of administration. The election to the rectorship 
is not strictly a political appointment; it does not 
necessarily involve political or party responsibility. 
In 1933, when Heidegger was elected, the movement 
of National Socialism was not yet defined and recog-
nized for what it turned out to be a few years later. 
The future development of the movement was not clear, 
and many leaders in politics, education, and religion 
co-operated with Nazism as a promising development for 
Germany, despite some factors which they disapproved. 
Heidegger•s participation, at least as rector, was 
short-lived; to resign after having co-operated for a 
few months may have required more courage than to de-
cline at the outset, when the issues were not so clear. 
Heidegger•s resignation, however, was not a turn 
to any resistance of Nazism, but an ascetic retreat to 
Todtnauberg. 
The fact that occupation authorities suspended 
Heidegger from his teaching position and "de-nazified" 
him is an additional adverse judgment, but the pro-
nouncements of victorious military authorities on the 
"crimes" of the vanquished are not too convincing. 1 
1. cr. Arland ussher, Journef Through Dread (New York: 
The Devin-Adair Co., 1955 , p. 84, for a brief dis-
cussion of this point. Although Ussher condemns 
Heidegger for surrendering to the mob spirit of 
Nazism, he recognizes and appreciates the fact that 
Heidegger did not participate in "racism." 
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The fctct of Heide~:;ger•s relation to lJ..J.zisn hcts 
=orobably C.Lf:.:'"'ectod l1is influence in Lctti~ -i~:aerica in 
only 8.. fe•/.r thinkers . 1 .L!..rgentiniu.n sympathy -.-... itll Ger:·tl-iEY 
dictcttorship \JdS so:c;ev;hc;t cor:parable to ti:>o Per-onist 
r:;over:ent in __ ,xgentina. There '-"~Y be so;ce :Joliti c-J.l 
Gotives in the negc<tive reaction to Fe idee; er by _J.e-
jc1ndro Korn .md Frctncisco Romero. 
Other Latin-,uaerica.n nc.tions varied in t!:e e::tent 
of their opposition to Nazism, depen:iL:g perh&fE .l.S 
nuch upon the ir'timacy of their economic ..:.nd political 
relJ.tions with the United StJ.tes, Gre.;.t Britain, "'nd 
France, as upon the feelings of their ovm peo,Jle. The 
political us:Jects of Eeidegger 1 s cureer are nrobably 
overlooked more ec~.sily by Lcttin .c~neric.:ll~S t21c~.n by phi-
J_oso.')hers in the United Stutes. Politicc~.l fortunes 
rise and fall gyicc:ly and violently in L~tin _,noricu, 
ctnd tho right of asylum, :_,i th a neJ.sure oi' :Lor[;i voness, 
is a cherished institution. In senerctl, ti',o ~Jolitic&l 
rlisdee:ls of a n:'l.ilosopher c0.n be r:L1imized. 
1. Despite the intriguing na.ture of t~lis t.}Uostion., both 
for an un:ierstandir_g of He idegr;er c.nd :tor its licht 
on the Latir..-.d.Cleric~J.ll reo.ctions t~o l1im 8.S. a ~)eT:::8n, 
tho )olitical ~:~otives :Lor a.cce:ot:L:1g or rejectir~-€ 
~eidescer's philosophy ~ill not be directly consid-
ered in t~~is dissertation. 
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D. Professor and public lecturer. 
During the postwar years, Heidegger has resumed 
teaching and lecturing. Several books, which consist 
mostly of lectures, essays, and class-lecture series, 
have been published. Some of his lectures reveal a 
tendency toward impressionism in his public appear-
ances, illustrated by word plays and a kind of dra-
matic suspense in which the outcome of the lecture or 
essay may depend upon an unexpected turn in the thought. 
Heidegger is a popular lecturer, and knows how to 
take advantage of the German language and situation 
to stimulate interest in philosophical questions. His 
main themes are presented in a more popular style, with 
less profound creativity and innovation than three 
decades ago, but still very definitely to be classified 
as genuinely philosophical. The fact that his point of 
view and his relations to other thinkers are contro-
versial issues makes partisan attitudes, for and against, 
a matter of zeal. Sometimes the writer is inclined to 
believe that Heidegger delights in obscurity and word 
plays in order to stimulate thought--a gadfly for whom 
questions are more important than answers, a philosopher 
for whom the essence of Philosophy is to be on the way 
{Unterwegsein), rather than to reach fixed solutions. 
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E· Personality traits. 
The writer has not had the privilege of knowing 
Heidegger personally, and is not able to give a psycho-
logical description of the man. Yet, there are some 
personality traits which seem to stand out, as seen 
in his published works. Heidegger does not want to be 
classified. The philosouhical custom of classification 
dilutes the originality of a thinker. New ideas be-
come mere variations of old ones, and to think for 
oneself becomes simply to see and accept the thoughts 
of another. Heidegger seeks to avoid classification, 
and thus to preserve his originality in both senses 
of the term. His attitude on this point is so strong 
that it might be called an obsession to be unique. In 
the opinion of the writer, this is the profound meaning 
of the "proper" being of man; true individuality is a 
contrast to the "improper" one-among-many, to the crowd, 
to "herd morality." 
At its best, uniqueness, or radical individuality, 
is creativity, freedom, personality, life, struggle, 
care, interest, purpose, resolve. At its worst, Unique-
ness is contrariness, negativism, caprice, stubbornness. 
Both the best and the worst of individuality may be found 
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in Heidegger. His thinking is creative--sometimes so 
creative that it hardly makes sense, sometimes so crea-
tive that it reveals, for example, the profound problems 
involved in the definition of man as a rational animal 
or the image of God. Heidegger claims that he is not 
an existentialist. Kierkegaard•s existentialism is, 
for Heidegger, an ontical revolt against Hegel. The 
existenzielle philosophy of Jaspers is on a different 
plane from Sein und Zeit, according to Heidegger, because 
Jaspers does not deal with the question of being. The 
statement by Heidegger that the essence of Dasein lies 
in its existence has nothing to do with Sartre's exis-
tentialism, and Heidegger is not a humanist because 
humanism, of whatsoever kind it may be, does not think 
the essence of man high enough. 
Nevertheless, there are many points of agreement, 
where Heidegger•s thought is, at le~st for the impartial 
reader, hardly distinguishable from Kierkegaard, Jaspers, 
and Sartre. Heidegger•s vieww on time are similar to 
Bergson's, in the sense that both stress the quality of 
time more than any quantitative or mechanical concept 
of succession. Nevertheless, Heidegger does not want 
to be classified with Bergson. Instead, he classifies 
Bergson with aristotle, noting the difference between 
qualitative and quantitative succession. 
The obsession to be unique is a powerrul stimulus 
to creative thinking, but it can also cause thinking 
to go astray into mere unrounded assertion. Classirica-
tion does not establish real connections; it does not 
abolish dirrerences. But where there are real connec-
tions and similarities, classirication is very userul. 
In ract, without it, in some rorm, thinking is impos-
sible. A philosopher has the same obligation to show 
his dependence upon and similarities with other philos-
ouhers, as to point out the dirrerences. Heidegger 
excels only at the latter task. 
In addition to the obsession to be unique, Heideg-
ger is ironic in his philosophic inquiring. The irony 
or Socrates was that his questions presupposed a more 
proround understanding, if not more knowledge, of the 
matter being discussed than that of the person inter-
rogated. The irony of questioning is also illustrated 
in The <t,uerist, in which Berkeley merely asks questions. 
A series of profound questions, with an implied under-
standing of the possible answers, may constitute a 
strong argument. One of Heidegger•s main themes is 
the FragWUrdigkeit (question-worthiness, questionable-
ness, doubtrulness) of philosophical problems. The term 
is ambiguous. For Heidegger, the strict meaning is the 
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proper elabor~tion of a problem, such as the question 
of being, so that the problem may be made question-
worthy. The overtones, however, of doubt, of calling 
into question, or of the doubtful or questionable or 
problematic nature of the problem, are also present, 
so that the proper elaboration of the question about 
being also suggests that all possible solutions are 
called into question, that they are questionable or 
problematic. Heidegger's irony is that he proposes 
to erect a system, to find the meaning of being, on 
the basis of question-worthiness (questionableness). 
The answer to any question is a more precise or more 
profound statement of the question, and each answer 
is the starting point for another question and series 
of questions. 
This attitude in Heidegger--and it is as much an 
attitude or trait as it is a philosophical method--
might be considered synonymous with the relative and 
interpretative nature of all metaphysical knowledge. 
There are no demonstrable answers to basic metauhysical 
questions. Theism finally comes to rest upon some sort 
of faith, more or less supported by logical reasons. 
Heidegger rejects faith as a philosophical (ontological) 
solution, but he also rejects the contemporary alternative 
to faith, V~rhich is scientific positivism. The writer 
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likes to think of Heidegger•s philosophy as a doctrine 
of relativity in the realm of ontology. 'There are no 
absolutes and no axioms, no eternal verities, no ob-
jectivity of values, but only question-worthy (ques-
tionable) assumptions and interpretations of the evi-
dence. 
Heidegger•s attitude in his philosophy has been 
characterized as a "heroism of finitude 111 on one ex-
treme, and as pessimistic nihilism on the other. For 
the writer, neither heroic defiance nor pessimistic 
despair is characteristic of Heidegger. Instead, there 
is an irony in his agnosticism which may serve the cause 
of healthy-mindedness. Very little of Heidegger•s 
writing may be considered under the category of ethics. 
some passages, such as those on the proper mode of 
being oneself, could be considered as dealing with the 
problems of ethics. They could also be interpreted 
psychologically as guides to mental hedlth. Each man 
needs to face squarely the fact that he will die. He 
needs to resolve to be himself, to develop his own pos-
sibilities. 
1. Alfred Delp, Tragische Existenz. Zur Philosonhie 
?:..art in Heideggers (Freiburg: Herder Verlag, '1:935), 
83. 
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Heidegger is most himself when he asks ultimate 
questions about being, nothing, cause, reason, truth, 
and meaning. His irony might be characterized ~" tr .. e 
lack of an absolute, the lack of anything that is in 
itself beyond questioning, to such a degree that ques-
tioning itself, that is philosophy, becomes his absolute. 
For Heidegp:er, philosophy is not a system of answers, 
but an elaborate series of questions. 
CHAPTER II 
THE PHILOSOPHY OF HEIDEGGER IN SEIN UIID ~ 
A. Introduction 
1. The problem of Sein und Zeit. 1 
lvl!:trtin Heidegger is best known for his incomDlete 
work, Being ttnd Time. The first poJ.rt of the work VHS 
published as Volume VIII of the Jahrbuch fUr Philosophie 
und nhanomenologische Forschung, in 1927. It Wds dedi-
cated to Edmund Husserl, the editor of the Jdhrbuch and 
founder of the phenomenological school in philosophy. 
The work as planned was to include an introduction dnd 
two main poJ.rts. The two introductory cho.pters present 
the problem of the work, the method of investigC~tion, 
and the general plan. 
Part I deals with "the interpretation of DcJ.sein 
\n the manner of temporality and the explalldtion of time 
CIS the transcendental horizon of the question about being."2 
1. Sein und Zeit, erste H[lfte, sechste unver1nderte 
.Auflo.ge (Tlibingen: Neomarius Verlag, 1949). Ab-
brevid ted, SuZ. 
2. Unless otherwise noted, all translations in this dis-
serto.tion are by the writer, who haw used freely the 
Spanish translation, El ser y el tiempo, by Jos~ Gaos 
(M~xico: Fondo de Cultura Econ6mica, 1951). 
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The following are the three main sections of 
Part I: 
1. The ~reparatory fundamental analysis of Dasein. 
2. Dasein and tempgrality. 
3. Time and being.~ 
Part II was to have been an "outline of a phenomeno-
logical destruction of the history of ontology under 
the direction of the problematic of temporality. n 2 
The three main sections proposed for Part II are the 
following: 
1. Kant's theory of schematism and of time as a 
preparatory stage of a problematic of temporal-
ity. 
2. The ontological foundation of Descartes' "cogito 
sum" and the acceptance of mediev"-1 ontology in 
the problematic of "res cogitans." 
3. aristotle's treatment of time as the discriminat-
ing factor of the ph~nomenal basis and the limits 
of ancient ontology •. 
The published volume includes the two introductory chap-
ters and the first two sections of Part I. 
The incomplete nature of the work, despite the 
lapse of more than three decades, has encouraged specu-
lation about the reasons Vlhy Heidegger has not completed 
the nroject, and also about the possibility of some mod-
ifications in his nhilosophical point of view. 4 
1. SuZ, 39. 
2. suz, 39. 
3. SuZ, 40. 
4. In the letter "On Humanism" Heidegger has stdted why 
the third section of Part I has not been published. 
Cf. Chapter III of this dissertation. 
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Such specul3.tions are outside the scope of this 
dissertation, in the sense that the writer's task is 
to deal with the influence of Heidegger, und not with 
changes 3.nd possible future developments in his thinking. 
However, the incomplete nature of the work is in it-
self an influence on other thinkers, an influence which 
stimulates speculations. The investigation and inter-
pretation of this particular aspect of Heidegger•s in-
fluence will be touched upon in the discussion of his 
influence in general. For the present, the immediate 
task in this chapter is an exposition of the philosophy 
of Heidegger as contained in the published portion of 
his major work, beginning with the general purpose or 
central problem. 
1 
"The question of the meaning of being" is the 
theme of Sein und Zeit. In Heidegger•s own words, "the 
concrete elaboration of the question of the meaning of 
'being' is the aim of the following treutise."2 
1. SuZ, 1. Being, although not in the infinitive form, 
is the usual English equivalent of the German Sein 
and the Spanish ser. Richard C. Hinners has u~the 
hyphenated form, ""'""to-be." Cf. Hinners, "Martin Hei-
degger•s Conception of the Question: ''#hat Is the 
Meaning of To-Be?' in Sein und Zeit" (Toronto: un-
published Ph.D. dissertation, University of Toronto, 
1955). 
2. suz, 1. 
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According to Heidegger, the problem of being, 
or ontology, has been forgotten. It is no longer the 
central problem in philosophy; 1 it has been made trivial. 
Furthermore, the neglect of the problem of being has been 
so sanctioned that there are now strong prejudices against 
its philosophical revival. The necessity of reiterating 
the problem and of bringing it back to the center of 
philosophy can be shown by a discussion of the prejudices 
against it. 
In the first place, "it is said tha.t 1 being 1 is 
2 the most general and emptiest concept possible," But 
this prejudice, according to Heidegger, confUses the uni-
versality of genus or class with the generality of being. 
"The •universality• of being •transcends' all universality 
3 
with respect to class." For medieval ontology, being 
was a transcendens. Also, Aristotle recognized the unity 
1. Heidegger•s view is in sharp contrast to the position 
of Borden Parker Bowne: "The philosopher has no recipe 
for creation, and cheerfully admits that, if reality 
did not exist, he would be sadly at a loss to produce 
it. Being is a perpetual wonder and mystery, which our 
logic can never deduce. We aim, then, to tell, not how 
being exists or is made, but only how we shall think of 
it as it exists, or after it is made." Metanhysics 
revised edition (New York: American Book Co., 1910~, 9. 
2. SuZ, 2. Of. Bowne's "fallacy of pure being." 
3. SuB, 3. 
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of this transcendent universality, in contrast to the 
universality of the most inclusive class of objects, as 
1 
a "unity of analogy." But the nature of this trans-
cendent universality of being was not clarified by Aris-
totle, nor by the medieval philosophers, much less by 
Hegel, who defined being as "undetermined immediacy." 2 
Therefore, if it is said that "being" is the most 
universal concept, then it cannot mean that it is 
the clearest concept, nor that all further discus-
sion is unnecessary. 3 Instead, the concept of "being" is the most obscure. 
Heidegger's answer to this prejudiced objection to the 
problem of being is that the concept of being is differ-
ent in kind from generic concepts and the logic of classes. 
The meaning of being is what most needs to be made clear. 
The second prejudice against the ontological problem 
is the content ion that "being" is indefinable. Being is 
the highest possible, most inclusive universality, it is 
said, and therefore indefinable in terms of differentia-
tion within a more inclusive classification. This line 
of reasoning is correct, within the lliaits of the logic 
of classification. But being is not an entity (Seiendes), 
and cannot be defined by classification. 
Therefore, the kind of definition of entities, justified within certain limits--the "definition" 
of traditional logic, which itsGlf has its founda-
tions in ancient ontology--is not applicable to 
1. suz, 3. 
2. suz, 3. 
3. SuZ, 3. 
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being. The fact that being is indefinable does not 
do away with the problem of its meaning, but instead 
directly requires it.l 
The third prejudice against the problem of being is 
that it is supposedly a self-evident concept, so generally 
understood that it needs no philosophical definition or 
clarification. In collli'lon knowledge :'nd expression, it 
is said, we make constant use of the verb "to be," and 
"nothing further" is needed to understand Hhat we mean. 
But this everyday, common use of terms is not clear, and 
is re2lly a lack of understanding. It leads us directly 
to the problem of being. 
The fact that we already live in an understanding 
of being and that at the same time the meaning of 
being is enveloped in obscurity proves the basic 
necessity of re~terating the CJ.Uestion of the mean-
ing of "being." 
The appeal to the self-evident nature of being is a 
"doubtful procedure," especially for philosophers, whose 
business it is to investigate "the secret judgments of 
common sense (Kant) ."3 
The consideration of the above-mentioned prejudices 
not only makes clear that we have no :lnsv,'er to the prob-
lem of being, but also demonstrates the obscure and con-
fused status of the problem itself. The problem of being, 
as a question, must itself be developed. The development 
of the problem by Heidegger consists of a treatment of 
the formal structure of the question that asks about 
being, and its ontological and ontical pre-eminence. 
1. suz, 4. 
2. suz, 4. 
3. suz, 4. 
All questioning or inquiry has sane sort of pre-
vious direction given by ·what is sought. It is the 
attempt to know "what" so!'lething is or "what it is 
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like." The analysis of the formal structure of any 
question revec-.ls four formal aspects of inquiry: that 
about Vlhich something is asked (G€fragtes), to what 
(Befragtes)and to whom (Anfrae;en bei)the question is 
directed, and v1hat is asked (Erfragtes) in the question. 1 
In addition, every question or inquiry is a type of con-
duct of some entity, and a peculiar character of being. 
A question may be asked simply to be asking something 
(nur so hinfragen) or because it is a real problem. 
The question that asks about the meaning of being 
is discussed in the light of the fore,ryoing structural 
analysis. The inquiry has its previous direction, given 
by what is sought: the meaning of being. "end the vague, 
everyday, common understanding of being, taken as a given 
fact, is what gives direction to the inquiry. 
'ile do not know what "being" means. But if we ask 
""1'ihat is b8'1ii'g?" we already have for ourselves a 
certain understanding of "is," except that we can-
not fix conceptually what "is" means. •le do not 
even have the horizon, from which we are to grasp 
and fix the meaning. This average and vague under~ 
standing of being is a given fact.3 
But this vague, average understanding of being may be 
little more than verbal knowledge of a tel~. Its vague-
ness is a positive part of the given fact. Therefore, 
1. SuZ, 5. 
2. suz, 5. 
3. suz, 5. 
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it requires clarification. If the meaning of being can 
be clarified, then the average understanding of being, 
with all its vagueness and confusion, can be explained. 
Another aspect of the problem is the accumulation of 
traditional opinions and theories of being, which i"l.flu-
ence the average understarcding, without themselves being 
clearly recognized. Although only partially known, the 
meaning of being gives direction to the inquiry. "",/hat 
is sought in the question that asks about being is not 
completely unknown, although entirely incomprehensible 
at first." 1 
That about which the ontological inquiry is made 
(das Gefragte) is being, that which makes entities what 
they are, e.nd is the basis upon which entities are under-
stood. 
The being of an entity "is" not itself an entity •••• 
Being, therefore, as what is inquired about, re-
quires a peculiar kind of manifestation, which di~­
fers essentially from the discovery of an entity. 
The question of being is also U.."lique with regard to 
what is asked (das Erfragte). The meaning of being makes 
necessary special concepts. These concepts differ essen-
tially from those by which entities are understood. 
The question about being is not directed to being 
itself, but to entities. Entities are asked about their 
being. The difficulty here is to find, in the great 
variety of entities, that kind or type which can provide 
1. suz, 6. 
2. SuZ, 6. 
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a. true account of being. The ctpproc:.cch to the r;:e~ni:Jg of 
bcinc is ti1roush an "exempl.J.ry o:::tity." .ie, tl:s :~u;cJ.n 
and direct the ::no ... uiry, .j,nd the exe:::::.1lary entities to 
".'ihich the in::tuiry is r,nde and through ·,,chich the cnnro<>ch 
to being is possible . 1 "Therefore, the elcJ.boru:~ion of 
the question of bein,o; sic:nifies to : "'-':e truns·oc<.rer.t °Ci1e 
, •t th t 1 t'f-- ..L.. • • -i+ 0 bF-~-i~''P u 2 encl y-- a. o.s:,:s .1e g_uesclon--Hl +V'-' , ~ u. 
that the hur.-1n entity asks the ontologicc.l question is 
itself a characteristic ':ode of its beine;. 'Iile im .. an on-
tity, the an-Ilysis of •:1hich constitutes the -'-PcJroctch to 
ontology, is ccclled, by E:e id eg,c:er, Duse in. 'l'lle ne"'ning 
o:C the tern is "to be there" or "to e:xist." The tert: is 
b-J. ~ ic in ~~:e idegr~er' ,s )hilosophy, a. t 1ec-Lst j.21 the i'i.ret 
:o"rt, '.-rhicl: deJ.ls ·.·;i-ch the prepi.l.ratory fundu.r:ent,ll unal-
Dusein • .. ·.dth reearC. to ontology is one of t:1c princii_;Ll 
re~.--Sol!.s ':-,:-hy Fieidegcer, dos!)ite his objectic~1s, is often 
ci.l.lled un existentialist. 
l'oxt, tre :J.Uestion is ra.ised v;hether tl1is :orocedure 
is not u vicious circle. Eeidegrwr ,<ns·,·;ers by denyir.e; 
1. Cf. Bovme, ::etaphysics, 66: "Insteud, t:-cn, of inter-
preting pe~sona.J.ity fro. the side of ontology, r~ rruGt 
r& ther interpret ontology from. the 2 iCe of )cr.so~-:_:.ili ty .. 
Only personality is ctble to r~i ve coECr"ete ~:.:eG..ni:ns to 
those ontological ca. tegorie s by '::hich \'ie seek to inter-
)1ret being." Bmme•s persoEalistic d])l)roach is u.n elec-
tion made by the ~1hilosopher; Heideg:.er presents wsein 
us a loe;ically exclusive approach to the question of oeing. 
2. suz, 7. 
the legitimacy of the objection to circular proof. In 
the first place, the objection is a mere formality, of 
no importance in the actual situation of inquiry. 
Formal objections, which in the field of the inves-
tigation of princlples are always easily made by 
alleging an argument from "circular proof," are 
always sterile in1considerations on concrete ways of investigation. 
In the second place, the objection is invalid because 
the procedure does not seek a single principle to be 
used as an axiomatic basis from which all else may be 
deduced. Heidegger's method is not deductive. The av-
erage understanding of being, as a given fact, within 
which we human entities already find ourselves, is the 
starting point of empirical investigation, not the basis 
for logical deductions. 
Instead of a circular proof, there is present a 
special relation between the object of the inquiry, being, 
and the mode of being of the entity which makes the in-
quiry. This special relation merely means that the human 
entity must play a pre-eminent part in the determination 
of the meaning of being. The approach to ontology is 
through the analysis of Dasein. 
Heidegger proceeds to show the ontological pre-emi-
nence of the question of being. The analysis of its for-
mal structure has already shovm it to be a unique question. 
The question can be further clarified through a considera-
tion of its function, aim, and motives. Is the question 
merely speculative, or " ••• is it the most fundamental 
1. suz, 7. 
and most concrete guestion of all?"1 
Since being is not being in general or in itself, 
but always the being of entities, it might seem easier 
to start with one of the sciences and use its results 
in order to determine the meaning of being. But the 
fact is that lesser disciplines, with their aim of con-
trol by means of knowledge, are in serious crises with 
respect to their own fundamental principles. Even math-
ematics is in a crisis of fundamentals. Likewise, phys-
ics, biology, the historical sciences of spirit, and 
theology are in search of new foundations. The control 
achieved by these sciences is an expression of their on-
tological comprehension of the corresponding entities. 
But the fact that this ontological comprehension is vague 
and confused, as demonstrated by the conflicts of funda-
mental principles in the sciences, indicates that what is 
most urgently needed is not a new set of fundamentals for 
a given science, but an adequate conception of being which 
will serve as a basis for all the lesser disciplines. 
·what is needed is a foundation for the foundations of the 
various sciences. This need shows the ontological pre-
eminence of the question of being. 
Therefore, the question of being aims not only at 
an a priori condition of the possibility of the 
sciences, which investigate entities as such-and-
such entities and thereby already move in an under-
standing of being, but also at the condition of the 
possibility of the ontologies themselves, which are 
1. SuZ, 9. 
prior to the ontical sciences and serve as ~ounda­
tions for them. All ontology, however rich and how-
ever firmly grasped may be the system of cate~ories 
with which it is provided, remains fundamenta ly 
blind and a perversion of its proper aim, ~f it has 
not first ade uatel clar~fied the meanin of be~n 
and conce~ve 
tas • 
~ontological investigation itself, rightly un-
derstood, gives to the problem of being its onto-
logical pre-eminence over the mere acceptance of a 
venerable tradition and the furtherlnce of a prob-
lem which thus far has been opaque. 
Heidegger then seeks to demonstrate the ontical pre-
eminence of the problem of being. The sciences are ways 
in which Dasein conducts itself. But "scientific re-
search is not the only nor the first possible manner of 
being of this entity. Dasein itself is, in addition, 
distinguished before other entities. " 2 Dase in sta.nds 
out from other entities because it "understands" its ovm 
being, at least in part. It is possible for Dase in to 
understand its being; and this possibility is peculiar 
to Dasein, as distinct from other entities. 
It is proper to this entity that it has access to 
its being, with and through its being. The under-
standin of bein is itself a determination of bein 
o ~on o ase~n ~3s 
in ontolog~cal(ly). 
But "to be ontological(ly)" does not here mean to develop 
an exnlicit ontology. If we think of ontology as the ex-
plicit philosonhical discinline, it is better to desig-
nate this ontological character of Dasein as "pre-onto-
1. suz, ll. 
2. suz, ll. 
3. suz, 12. The undeclined "ontologisch" Bay 
as a predicate adjective or as an adverb. 
theses are meant to maintain the ambiguity 
be construed 
The paren-
in Enelish. 
logical." It simply means that Dasein, in addition to 
being an entity, is one that may understand its being. 
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In order to carry forvmrd the argument for the pre-
eminence of the problem of being, Heidegger gives a brief 
preview of t':le analysis of Dasein. In the nreview var-
ious technical terms are introduced. The being of the 
entity called Dasein is referred to as existence (Exist-
~). "The being, itself, to which Dasein can relate 
itself and in fact always does so relate itself in some 
way or other, we call existence."1 Existence is always 
the starting-point of Dasein's understanding of itself, 
but such existence is not abstract; it is always the ex-
istence of Dasein. The understanding vrhich Dasein has 
of itself as entity is called "existent" ( existenzie lle). 
This is an understanding of its ontical nature, Dasein 
understanding itself as an entity. But W"hat constitutes 
existence is not an ontical but an ontological problem. 
The connected whole of structures which constitute e:x-
istence is called "existentiality" (J;;xistenzialitet). 
The corresponding ontological understanding of til_;_., struc-
tural whole is called "existential" ( existenzial). 
Insofar as Dasein is determined by its existence, it 
may understand itself ontically, i.e., existently, only 
by presupposing an understanding of its existence. The 
latter, in turn, presupposes some understanding of e:x-
istentiality, that which constitutes existence. ~\nd the 
1. SuZ, 12. 
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understanding of existentiality leads us directly back 
to the problem of the meaning of being in general. In 
this way Heidegger demonstrates the ontical pre-eminence 
of the problem of being. 
Since the inquiry about the meaning of being may 
not be directed to being itself, but only to a selected 
or privileged entity with respect to its being, Heidegger 
makes the distinction between ontology in general and a 
"fundamental ontology," or existential analysis of Dasein, 
upon which all other ontology must depend or be founded. 
The argument for the pre-eminence of the ontological 
problem is summarized as follows: 
Therefore, the fundamental ontolo~y, out of which 
all others may i'1rst arise, must e sought in the 
existential analysis of Dasein. 
Dasein has, consequently, a multiple pre-eminence 
over all other entities. The first pre-eminence 
is ontical: this entity is determined in its being 
through existence. The second pre-eminence is onto-
logical: Dasein, on the ground of its being deter-
mined by existence, is in itself "ontological." To 
Dasein belongs with equal originality--as constitu-
ent of the understanding of existence--an under-
standing of the being of all entities not of the 
nature of Dasein. Dasein has, therefore, the third 
pre-eminence as ontical-ontological condition of the 
possibility of all ontologies. Therefore, Dasein 
has shown itself to be the entity to which, before 
any other~, the ontological inquiry should first be 
directed. 
In addition to the above, the existential analysis 
has its existent, i.e., ontical roots. To conduct onto-
logical inquiry is an ontical activity of Dasein. The 
ontical pre-eminence of the question of being is again 
l. SuZ, 13. 
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demonstrated. Chapter I closes with a brief summary of 
the proper approach to the problem of being. 
If the interpretation of the meaning of being becomes 
a task, Dasein is not only the entity to which first 
to direct the inquiry, but is, moreover, the entity 
which already is in every case related to what is 
asked in this question. The question of being, then, 
is nothing but the making radical a tendency of being 
which essentially belongs to Dasein itself, 1 that is, the pre-ontological understandlng of being. 
In the second introductory chapter Heidegger presents 
the double problem of the elaboration of the question of 
being, the method of investigation, and the plan of the 
work. The first part of the problem of elaboration of 
the ontological question is a general description of fun-
damental ontology. "The ontological analysis of Dasein 
(i~ the setting free of the horizon for an interpretation 
2 
of the meaning of being in general." It has already been 
shown that Dasein is the entity that provides an approach 
to ontology. What is still lacking is the proper approach 
to Dasein. The proper approach is ontological analysis. 
The difficulty in ontological analysis, however, is that 
Dasein, although ontically nearer to itself than to the 
world, ontologically is nearer to the world and farthest 
from itself. It has the tendency to interpret itself in 
terms and concepts gained from its interpretation of the 
entities among which it finds itself. 
The ontical-ontological pre-eminence of Dasein is, 
therefore 1 the reason why the specific const1tution 
of its be1ng--understood in the sense of the "cate-
1. suz, 15. 
2. suz, 15. 
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atruoture which be.1.oz18a to it-remains 
ool~Ot,.J,ea to to itaalt ontio-
ioally the tarthaat,1 Jm~lllt<olclgioelly not toreip. 
The aim ot ontologieal analyoia ia to disco?er the baaio 
oharaeteriatioa ot Daa•in• In traditional terms, these 
oheraoteriatioa would be called categories ot the natura 
ot man, but Haideggar reaer?ea the term categories tor 
knowledge ot the world and tbe nea•human entities in it. 
The structural obaraoterietioa ot Pt!!in are called ex-
iatantiala (bia!andal&tp)l The analysis needs to be 
ot such a natura aa to pemit l!!t.eain to exhibit ita own 
structural oharaotariatioa, ibherant in ita "everyday" 
(alltfsli!b) activity. 
Tbe kind ot app:roaeh and upoa1tion must rather 'be 
aeleoted ao that this entity oan show forth itselt 
by 1taalt. And indeed, it ia to exhibit this en• 
tity aa it ia in its average avef'-
In and exposition], no 
and but aaaant1al structures 
are to be sat forth, thoea whloh carry through as 
4etermlnant structures of beije in every manner of 
being ot the tactual DyeiD. 
Although tbe ana1ya1a ot Daeein is important, it 1a 
not the whole ot ontolosy, or ann ot the fundamental 
ontolO§ ot Jl!•iD• The task of the analysis 1a to ex-
hibit the bein« ot Danint to tine! the meaninc ot beinc 
11 a mora radical undertakblc. The meaning ot the beiq 
ot Daf!W 1a to be found 11!1 ita "t8111pora11ty" (Ze1tlioh-
DJ.1). 
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The analysis of Dase in is, however, not only incor:-
plete, but at first also urovis ional. It first 
makes conspicuous the beins of this entit:' ',;ithout 
any interpretction of its neBninf". It is, n:ther, 
to prepare the settins free of tLe ;1orizon :'or t:1e 
most oric;inal exposition of bein[ .... Ter:porulity 
is e::hibited as the neanin! of the being of Ue en-
tity nr. ich v1e cs.ll Das e in. 
Thus, the bc.sic structures of Dasein beco:n.e ~1odes of 
ten::pornlity. The pre-ontological U::ldGrstm:dirg of 
being, v,hich is a chc.racteristic of Dasein, has its 
basis in the cormnon concept of time, 'dhich, ir. turn, 
is founded in tem)ornlity. 
It is to be shmm that that fror;e ·.,·l!ich Dssein in 
cenerc 1 understands 2.nd explains s or'e t'~ ire; such 
as beinG, nlthough not exp1.icitly, is time. ':Chis 
must be brought to licht end be co!1ce i ved as the 
e;enuine horizor; of cell understandinc of beinr, rrnd 
every exposition of it. To Eake this cleccr rec:uires 
an oririnel eznlane.tion of tL"le as the horizon of 
the understandlno; ot be1ng, on tho bc:.sJ_s of temDo-
rality as the being of Dasein winch understc.nds 
belng.Z 
Tl1e common idea of tine :>.nd the traditicnal Dl1ilosoDh-
ical concept, doninc.nt from A.ristotle throuch Bergson, 
are to be ezplained as the bases for ontolocical inter-
pretati.ons. The central problems of ontology hAve their 
roots in the yhenonenon of tit;e. Te::-:poralit&t (not to 
be confused \':i th tenporality, ·.:hich is used to tr:1ns-
late Zeitlichkeit) is not a mere node of 1Jeinr; it is 
its chief characteristic. 
1. suz, 1'7. 
2. suz, 1 '7. 
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The f1.:.nd arentcl ontolosical problem of the inter-
pretat:lon of being as suer is, therefore, cor:ceived 
as the wor·king out of the ferrnorcclitlit of beint. ~n t~e exposition ?f !he .Probleus of' Temporah lit 
lS [;lVen for the flrsc t1ne the concrete ansv1er to 
the question thc_t s_sl-;:s about the r~:enning of beinc;.l 
Thus, to sllr"Jllarize the C.iscussion of ·-vr.le first lJrob-
lem of the elaboration of the ontolosical ~uestion, the 
ontolosic~-: 1 analysis of D2.se in revec,ls thAt t ir::e, in the 
corr~on rcecninc of the term, is the found2tion of its pre-
ontologica.l unden:t~nd inc: of being. Cntolocy is tte ex-
plicit devel::>pnent of the relction bet',een TePpor::lit1!t 
n 
end being.G The task, thus outlined in thia section of 
the intronuction, includoz fer ~·ore t:~,,,n t'12 ;-;ublished 
portion of Sein und Zeit. 
Tl:e :-:eco;1d )roble~.l of the elaborc:tion of the c~ue2tion 
of beinc is c~lled the ''destruction" of the history of 
or;tclc·cY· Dostr·uction in tl~is C':':se does not explicitl;)' 
J:;ec;n sor:etlling ne[;?.tive, eltlloush tl".e cor:Ton, ne,:·c.tive 
ne:::ni":g reTICJ.ins c;s nn i:·cplici t overtone in tte iatro-
ductory discussion. '![Jet is explicitly referred to is 
a sort of l1istoricul anclysis of ontolccic~l co~ce~ts. 
D8struction is the OIJDOsite of constl"Uction. It ;oec,,1s 
1. SuZ, 19. This is orother instance of the dif~iculties 
iPvol ved in transle t inc He icec;ger' s C:er:?,n. Te~porcl­
ity ( leitlic:llceit) refel"B to Dasein "'1/l. its be inc:; 
'l:e,-porclit!t refers to beinc; ln e:;enere.l. Te:c;pors.lity 
is the Enr:lish eq_uiv2~lent cf :)oth ter:.~s, so fe.r t:_s 
lCt!10UC'~GE is cor..cerr.ed, :yut RGidet;ger's ~-·-ec~:Ln.ic~.l '.J.s::::.c;e 
req_uir8s ·t,·;;o t~crns, not one. Tel-'.:::;or<....lit: is l.]_sf·,::;_ to 
trc·nslate Zeitlichkeit, · .. hich is ·cccecl it;·: :~.;;.cl: ,-reater 
"'r'enu~nc·' ·r1·~~ T;""Jor·1l"t"t ;,1 tl·;e --Ju'·l'p'·e" PO~'-·o··; ·" 
-'- '1 v_,__ ~ ...,_l .• -.L~. ,__, .l. -·- a ..... _ _ .:.. '-' .. -.ll u . .-' .1. LJ __.__ __ '-.L 
Sein 1.:.nd Zeit. · 
2. li"Und;:_-l,:or/c(·.I or..tol.Jc::r iz )_ ~.r:.ely -~--~~s ·3.eveloprJ.r'_ t of ·L.21e 
rel,.tio:~s iJet•,;een te':)or -.lit~- and e:v-)_ste;-ce (:L:";iGtcnz). 
51 
to take apart what has been constructed, in order to see 
the original elements. Tradition tends to blind us to 
its own origins, G.nd to suffice of itself. Destruction, 
in this case, means to exar'line traditional ontological 
concepts in order to trace their evolution back to the 
original structural characteristics of Dasein. 
If there is to be won for the question of being 
itself the transparency of its own history, then 
it is necessary to loosen the hardened tradition 
cmd to t0ke off the coverings produced by it. He 
understand this problem as the destruction of tile 
traditional stock content of anclent ontolo~y, 
carried on under the direction of the uestion of 
bein@, to the orlglna experlences, ln w lC were 
won he first, and since then directive, deter-
minations of being ••.• The destruction does not 
seek to bury the past in nothin[';ness; it has a 
positive aim; its nee:ative function re::a.ins :iB-
plicit end indirect.I 
Because of their inport:mce, Heide:';;c:er selects 
Kant, Descartes, and Aristotle for the plan of the de-
struction, and in each case the problem of time is the 
basis for the analysis. Kant failed, in his treatment 
of schematism and of tir'le, to gain a new position apart 
from tn,ditional ontological conceptions, because he 
avoided the problem of the ontological analysis of the 
subjectivity of the subject. Likewise, Descartes did 
not give the definition or characterization of ~ as 
the b2sis for cogito. Res cogitans for Descartes was 
the .!U!.§. of medieval philosophy. Its fundamental, tem-
poral character \Jas not made clear. Aristotle ':m.s the 
first to give a clec.r interpretation of tlire, in the 
1. SuZ, 22-23. 
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common understanding of that term. Aristotle's inter-
pretation has dominated all subsequent ontology, in-
cludinc; Bergson's concept of time. 1 The central pur-
pose of the destruction of the ilistory of ontology is 
to give a concrete treatment of the problera of being. 
2. Heidegger's phenomenological method. 
Tk, remainder of the introduction is an explcllte--
tion cf phenomenology o.s the nethod of investigation. 
Phenomenology is to be understood, first of all, as a 
r:ethod and nothing r:ore. 
The manner of treatment of this question is the 
phenor-ienolor;ical. 'dith that this treatise does 
not ~ive itself over to a "point of view'' nor to 
a "movement," because phenomenology is neither of 
these o.nd can never become such, so long as it 
understands itself. The expression "phenomenology" 
signifies pd.limrily a concept of method. It clwr-
e.cterizes, not the material "what 11 of the objects 
of philosophical research, but the "~" of it. 2 
The phenomenological method can also be expressed in 
the maxim, "to the things themselves" (zu den Sachen 
selbst) .3 It may be objected that such an obvious s_p-
proach needs no special name, since it is a part of all 
scientific investic;ation. Heidege:;er's irnrnediate aim is 
to define this prelir:inary concept (Vorbep;riff) of phe-
nomenology in order to illustrate the procedure of 
·und Zeit. The superficial comparison of phenomenology 
1. SuZ, 26, 
2. SuZ, 2$. 
3. suz, 27. 
vvith such terms as theology, biology, sociology would 
lead to its definition as the science of phenonena. 
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But the s im2.1s.ri ty is 2.1 together superficial. A more 
profound investigation of the me~nings of the two Greek 
roots is necessary, and then an interpretation of their 
];)eaning uhen combined in a single term. 
The concept of phenomenon (~tA/ V ~/!EI/()V) is der i vcd 
from the Greek verb flf.fVt:rr0fl(!, which means "to show it-
self." A phenomenon is Hha t shows itself. r/~<tYe<rgKI, in 
turn, depends upon the simpler verb form, /~< / vw, related 
to !ws, light, that in which something "can becooe visible 
in itself." "Therefore, the !:leaning of the expression 
'phenoLlenon' is to be fixed as thHt -,Jlich shows itself 
in itself, that which is manifest • .,l !3ut l'henomenon may 
also have different meanings. Entities may show them-
selves in various ways, even to the extent of shov.'ing 
what they in themselves o.re not. Hence the :Gleaning of 
phenomenon as "to seem" (Scheinen). 8omething "seems" 
to be good when really it is not. Heidegger accepts and 
uses the term in the primary, positive sense. The nega-
tive sense is secondary. Confusion of meanings is to be 
avoided. A third me&ning of phenoLlenon is "appearance" 
or "mere apuearance" (blosse .O:rscheinung). This meaning 
is even further removed from the primary, positive and 
basic meaning "to show itself in itself." ll.ppearB.nce is 
1. SuZ, 28. 
54: 
the showing of symptoms, symbols, indications, sic;ns, 
etc., which refer to somethi;1g \1hich does not show it-
self. Appearance is different from seeming. To seem 
is for something to show itself as it is not. To ap-
pear (appearance) is to show what is not itself. 
Appearance as apnearance "of something" does not 
mean, therefore, for sor::tething to show itself-;--
but that something that does not show itself an-
nounces itself through something that doef show 
itself. To appear is not to show itself. 
Despite the negative character of appearance, its real 
foundation is the positive meaning of phenomenon, since 
something, although not the thing in question, must 
:ohow itself in order that there may be appearances. 
The positive meaning of phenomenon is always presup-
posed in appearances. Therefore, appearances must be 
interpreted by means of phenomena, but phenonena may 
not be underctood in terms of appearances. Other mean-
ings of appearance, such, as "si.sple appearance" and the 
appearance which conceals rather than revesls the thing, 
are related to a_JJpearance in general and silllilarly de-
pendent upon the positive concept of phenomenon for their 
interpretation. 
Appearance and seeming are themselves founded in 
different ways in phenomenon. The entangling mani-
fold of "phenomena," which are designated by the 
titles, phenomenon, seeming, appee.rance, mere ap-
pearance, may be untangled only if from the start 
the concept of phenomenon is understood as that 
which shows itself in itself.2 
1. SuZ, 29. Erscheinen iste1n Sidh~hieht-Zeigen. 
2. SuZ, 31. 
The foregoing investigation has shovm only the 
formal concept of Phenomenon. The material nature or 
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content of phenomenon is another problem. If the for-
mal concept is applied to sensible entities, then the 
result is phenomenon in the conmon or vulgar sense. 
"But this conrrnon concept is not the phenomenological 
concept of phenomenon."1 The phenomenological concept 
of phenomenon, for Heidegger, is the application of the 
formal concept to being. 
The concept of logos literally me3ns speech (Rede). 
But speech, in turn, must be defined. The later meanings 
of logos, such as reason, judgment, concept, definition, 
ground, and relation, only complicate the problem. 'i.'hat 
is needed is the basic meaning, and the other meanings 
can be understood as derivatives. This basic meaning 
is "to let see" (sehen lassen). 
AlyPs as speech rather means the same as ~'1,\..,<t~ to 
make manifest that of which speech is "speech." 
Aristotle has made ~his function of speech More)! " 
exPlicit as ~17'~~K1Ve4"BIC~ ••• Speech "lets see" r:~-1TO 
•.• that itself o which it is speaking. In speech 
(!Krrtitf~t«is), insofar as it is genuine, what is 
said is to be obtained from what is spoKell"'about, 
so that the speaking coiiiiiiUriicaticn makes manifest 
and thus accessible to another, in what is said, 
that about which it2speaka. This is the structure of )!.!ros as k!rrffKI'ris. 
Heidegger next proceeds to illustrate the dependence 
of' derived meanings of logos upon the basic concept, "to 
let see." "Letting see" means that the entity is open, 
l. suz, 31. 
2. SuZ, 32. 
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that direct knowledge of it is possible. Truth (Jahrheit) 
has to do with the openness (Erschlossenheit) of being, 
in the sense of the possibility of a direct percention, 
sensible or intellectual. 
"True" is in the Greek sense, and ).ndeed morl'l orig-
inally than in the sense called A"Y" s, the «_{r$>zrri.r, 
the plain, sensible perception of something •••• In 
the purest and most original sense "true," that is, 
merely discovering, so that it can never conceal, is 
the pure r" elv, that perception which simply looks 
at the s~nplest determinations of being of entities 
as such • .L 
The truth of judgment is secondary. Logos as reason, 
ground, or relation depends upon logos as "letting see." 
The combina.tion of the basic meanings of phenomenon 
and logos gives the priraary concept of phenomenology. 
The expression phenomenology may be formulated in 
Greek as )..(yeo' Ttl. p<~.Jrof.ev<1.; but J.trtiiV means 
di.rr"d{)((vetriJfll,t: that which shows itself, as it shows 
itseif forth from itself, by letting itself be seen. 
That is the formal meaning of the investigation 
which has the name, phenomenology. But this ex-
presses nothing other than the previousl~ formu-
lated maxim, "to the things themselves." 
This definition of phenomenology distinguishes it at 
once from such disciplines as theology, biology, etc., 
since the latter terms include the material content or 
"what" of the investigation, while phenor.1enology is a 
method of approach, having to do with the "how" of' the 
inquiry. In the vulgar sense of phenomenon, then, phe-
nomenology means any investigation of sensible entities 
1. SuZ, 33. 
2. suz, 34. 
57 
which uses the method of letting those sensible things 
show themselves, of letting themselves be seen. Phe-
nomenology, using the phenomenological sense of phenom-
enon, is the same methodological approach, but to the 
being of entities rather than to the entities as such. 
Being, then, just because it is hidden or concealed, 
just because it is distinct from all entities, is what 
needs to show itself. 
Phenomenology is the manner of approach to that 
which is to be the theme of ontology, and is the 
manner of determination which demonstrates it. 
Ontology is ~ossible only as ~henomenolOSY· The 
phenomenolog1ca! concept of p enomenon s1~nifies, 
by that which shows itself, the being of entities, 
their meaning, their modifications, and their 
derivatives. And the showing itself is nothing 
arbitrary, much less something like an appearance. 
The being of entities can least of all be something 
"behind"1which stands something else "which doesn't appear." 
There is nothing "behind" phenomena in the phenomenolog-
ical sense of the term. But what should be a phenomenon, 
what should show itself, may not be manifest. It may be 
simply undiscovered; it may be buried, that is, covered 
or hidden after once having been discovered; or it may 
be changed or disguised. The task of phenomenology is 
to gain access to the phenomenon and set it free from 
all that prevents it from showing itself forth in and 
by itself. 
At this point Heidegger makes the distinction be-
tween phenomenal (ph&nomenal) and phenomenological 
1. suz, 35-36. 
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(ph~nomenologisch). 
That which is given and is explicable in the kind 
of occurrence of phenoMenon is called "phenomenal;" 
hence the speaking about phenomenal structures. 
All that which belongs to the kind of demonstration 
and explanation and which constitutes the conceptu-
ality re~uired in this investigation, is called 
"phenomenological."l 
In brief, the data are called phenomenal, v1hereas the 
interpretation of the data is phenomenological. Since 
the interpretation depends upon the data, and not vice 
versa, the phenomenological method needs phenomenal data 
in order to proceed. But phenomena, in the vulgar sense 
of the term, i.e., sensible entities, are not capable of 
showing themselves forth as they are. ;'/hat is needed is 
a phenomenon that can show forth its being. Thus, the 
consideration of method, like the previous consideration 
of the structure of the ontological question, leads di-
rectly to the need of an exemnlary entity for ontological 
investigation. 
This same phenomenological method may be called 
hermeneutical, in the sense that it is an interpreta-
tion of the common self-understanding Hhich Dasein has 
of its being. "Phenomenology of Dasein is hermeneutics 
in the original meaning of the word, according to which 
it signifies the business of interpretation."2 Herme-
neutics may also be understood as the "development of 
the conditions of the possibility of all ontological 
investigation."3 
1. suz, 37. 
2. SuZ, 37. 
3. SuZ, 37. 
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Using still another terminology, Heidegger refers 
to his method as one that deals with being as a trans-
cendens. The truth sought in the phenomenological inves-
tigation is transcendental, i.e., it is not the truth 
about entities, but the truth about being. The truth 
a 'lout being is >:hat needs to be uncovered. "Phenomeno-
logical truth (open-ness of being) is transcendental 
truth;'l Discursive reason, which is commonly used for 
the knowledge of entities, gives way to a direct intel-
lectual perception of being through the open-ness (Er-
schlossenheit) of the being of Dasein. 
The conclusion of the discussion on methodology is 
that phenomenology and ontology are the method and con-
tent, respectively, of philosophy itself. 
Ontology and phenomenology are not two distinct 
disciplines which belong, among others, to philos-
ophy. Both titles characterize r-hilosophy itself 
as to object and method. Philosophy is universal 
phenomenological ontology proceeding from the her-
meneutics of Dasein, which as the analytic of ex-
istence has fastened the end of the guiding thread 
of' every philosophical question to that out2of 'Nhich it originates and back to which it returns. 
The first section of Part I of the proposed plan 
deals with the preparatory fundamental ana.lysis of Da-
~· This first section contains six chapters, which 
treat, respectively, the task of the analysis, being-in-
the-world in general, the worldliness of the world, being-
in-the-vrorld as personal and as one-among-many (who is 
1. SuZ, 38. 
2. suz, 38. 
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in the vrorld?), being-in u.s such, and c:..tre ciG the being 
of Dasein. 
B. The "~nalysis of Dasein 
l. 'The ta.:•:k of a preps.ra.tory anal;rsis cf lli•:ein. 
In reality, Chapter I continues the introduct:.on. 
1l1he entity, the analysis of vt!.:.ich is our t,.:.~s~:, is 
in every case ourselves. The be}nc of this entity 
is in every case nine. In the be i.ng of tl':: is e1:ti ty 
it rel~tes itself to its being. .-1.8 c:_,_tity of t~is 
being it is surrendered to its oYm being-reL,cive-to. 
Bein~ is thut with vriich, in every c""se, tlcis entity 
itse f is concerned. 
Two things folJ.ov.r fran the above. E,irst, "the 'esse~~ce' 
of t:tis entity lies in its being-relative-to."2 The terr: 
''existence'' {Existenz) is reserved for the "essence'' of 
"' Da.se in. '"I'he 'essence' of Do.se in lies in its e~·:istence. " 0 
T:1e trudi tional term "existentia" refers to the nanner of 
being of non-hUlllan entities, for v;hich ~:e idegeo:er chooses 
the exprc:c'sion, being-present ( Vorha.ndonsein). In the 
second Dlace, the beiEg of Dasein is alv;ays personal or 
individual, ::s repro sented in the use of tLe personc..l 
·Jronouns. "The being with Yrhich this entity is conc:'rned 
in its be int; is in every case nine. " 4 ·• further ch"rctc-
teristic of the fact that this being is in every c~se Line 
is thut my being is proper or in:proper, i.e., strictly 
l. SuZ, 41-42. 
2. SuZ, 42. 
3. SuZ, 4. <· 
-"- . 
4. SuZ, 42. 
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my own or not strictly mine. Dasein elects its pos-
sibility--in reality it is its possibility--in one of 
two possible modes, proper or improper (eigentlich oder 
une igentlich) • 
The entity, respecting which in its being this same 
being is at stake, relates itself to its being as 
its ovm possibility. Dasein is in every case its 
possibility, and it does not merely "have" this 
possibility as a property, such as something pres-
ent. And since Dasein in every case essentially 
is its possibility, this entity can in its being 
"elect" itself or win itself; it--can lose itself, 
or never win itself, or only "seemingly" win it-
self. It can have lost itself or not yet have won 
itself only insofar as, in its essence, it is pos-
sible for it to be troter, that is, to be its own 
self for itself. T ewo modes of being of authen-
ticity and inauthenticity--these expressions are 
selected in the strict terminological sense of the 
words--are grounded in the fact that Dasein in gen-
e~al fS determined through its character of being 
m1.ne. 
The distinction between proper and improper (or authen-
ticity and inauthenticity, as translated above) does not 
characterize the latter as "inferior" or less real. These 
modes have to do with the manner in ·Nhich Dasein elects 
or becomes its own possibilities. 
Dasein, according to the preceding brief analysis, 
is a special kind of entity, not to be confused with 
entities that are non-human. The analysis of Dasein 
seeks to set forth its existence. The formal meaning 
of its existence is that Dasein determines itself out of 
1. SuZ, 42-43. In this quotation the German phrase "urn 
geht" is translated "is at stake," rather than "iscon-
cerned with," as it was rendered in two former instances. 
One of Heidegger's main themes is that in living, life 
itself is at stake. The being of Dasein is itself in-
volved; its characteristics or properties are secondary; 
what really matters is its own possibility. 
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its ovm possibility, and in some way understands its 
being. The clue to the ontological problem is the in-
terpretation of this fact. But this fact nust be taken 
as it is, in its indifferent, primal, regular character 
(zun~chst und zumeist). This everyday indifference is 
the average character of Dasein. 
This indifference of the everyday-ness of Dasein 
is not a mere nothi~, but a positive phenonenal 
character of this enity. Out of this manner of 
being and back into it again, issues all existing, 
as it is. We call !his everyday indifference of 
Dasein averageness. 
The distinction between existentials and caterories 
corresponds to the difference between Dasein and non-
human entities. The existentials refer to the struc-
tural characteristics of Dasein; the categories refer 
to the structural characteristics of non-human entities. 
Together, existentials and categories define the charac-
teristics of being, the former with respect to "who" and 
the latter with respect to "what." 
In the succeeding paragraphs Heidegger proceeds to 
distinguish between existential analysis, as outlined 
above, and the other, superficially releted, disciplines 
which deal with Dasein: anthropology, psychology, and 
biology. The relation is merely superficial, according 
to Heidegger, because these sciences, as well as other 
types of philosophy, really do not treat the ontological 
l. suz, 43. 
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problem of being a person. :?or exa~,ple, Descartes 
treats the cogito but not the ~ of l1is famous dictum. 
The .§.1!E as such is the real problem, 2ccording to Eei-
deg.-er. Tems such as subject, soul, consciousness, 
spirit, end person, or even life and nan, are to be 
avoided, because they tend to take the place of a real 
analysis of the beint; of Dasein. i>ll of these tents, 
o.nd the philosophies vrhich exploit t;i.em, overlook the 
ontological problem contained in them. Dilthey and 
Bergson, D.ccord in(~ to He ideg~;er, dec 1 ,,i th lJhilosophical 
anthropology. 
Along '/lith Dil they and Bergson, all tendu::c ies 
tov<'ard "personalism" which nre influenced by then, 
and all tendencies toYraro ']hilosoc:>hicc,l &nthro-
-pology share these limitations. rot even tl;e "ost 
be.sics.lly racl.ical c.nd transparent phercorwnolor;ical 
interpretation of personality arrives at the1a~llin­sion of the question of the be5rc of Dasein. 
Even Busserl and Scheler, despite their efforts to dis-
tinguish persons fron things of nature G.nd to give a 
cert&in unity ~nd uniqueness to persons, still do not 
get bej .:J''ld traditional concepts, chiefly E<ncient and 
Christie.n, of the being of persons. Traditional 3l,thro-
pology ca.rries 1.:ith it tvro preconceived notions of the 
being of man. Cne of these notions is the "rational 
c_nirnal," ir.. \·~hich anirle_l life is the b.:_se <-..n6. re 2.son 
the superior endownent. But the being of both 2 spe cts, 
as nell as the being of the mixture, is quite obscure. 
l. suz, 47. 
The other notion is theological, and defines the essence 
of ''an &s his rel2,tion to God or his likeness to ( if,;age 
of) God. .But r;an' s being as euch is not l\efined. ;;odern 
anthropolocy, y·ithout e;etting free fr01;1 the traditional 
concepts, has added more not ions, such as res coci tlins, 
consciousness, and the connection o:L e:::perience, without 
coming closer to the problem of the beine; of uan. 
Psychology finds itself in the smne di:?ficulties as 
anthropology. The anthropological tendencies within 
psycholory c:re well-known. And biology, in general, is 
in no better condition to provide the answer to the onto-
logical question. In ti!.is v.ay, Beidegger sets forth the 
distinction between his own ontology and all psychological 
and anthropological philosophies. In similar foEhion, 
Heidegger distinguishes between ethnology and existential 
analysis. Ethnology, like anthropology, does its work 
by the aid of certain preconceived notions about man's 
being in general. He idegger also v;arns against r..is taking 
the everyday character of Dasein with vrhat is considered 
"primitive." The primitive aspects of human life lTY be 
more sinple and may be closer to the phenonena of life, 
that is, less involved in interpretations, th,cm Gore com-
plex and highly civilized forms of life; but existential 
an&lysis is not a secrch for the "primitive." 
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2. Being in the world. 
Chapter II of the first main section of Sein und Zeit 
is a description of "being-in-the-world" ( in-der-',felt-
sein) in t;eneral. Three things of inportm1ce are pre-
sented in this brief chapter. First, being-in-the-world 
must be conceived as a structural characteristic of Da-
~· On t11e basis of ti1is characteristic the other as-
peats of Dasein are to be interpreted. 
These characteristics of Dasein, hoviever, must be 
seen and understood a priori on the basis of the 
structure of bei:-tg which VIe co.ll being-in-the-world. 
The correct beginning of the analysis of ¥asein 
lies in the exposition of this structure. 
In the second place, being-in-the-world is a unity 
or a structural Vlhole, even though it may be analyzed. 
The compounded expression, being-in-the-world, 
alresdy indicates, in its coinage, tha.t by it is 
neant a unitary phenomenon. This prima.ry finding 
must be seen in its wholeness. The indissolubility 
into constituent parts that may be assembled does 
not exclude a nultiplicity of constitutive struc-
tural moments of this structure. The phenomenal 
finding indicated by this expression warrants, in 
fact, being considered from three points of view. 2 
The principal features of the analysis of being-in-the-
world are considered in the succeeding chapters, but the 
unity or wholeness of tj:1is structural chare.cteristic of 
Dasein must not be explained away in the course of the 
anal~rs is. 
Another general characteristic of being-in-the-
world is its negative relation to the pseudo-science 
Bnd the pseudo-problems of epistemology. Being is prior 
to knowing. Being, being-in, and beinr;-in-the-world are 
1. suz, 53. 
2. SuZ, 53. 
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more fundamental than knowing, since "knowing is a 
mode of being of Dasein a.s being-in-the-world •••• 
Knowir..g is a manner of being of being-in-the-v10rld."l 
Being-in-the-world must not be conceived as the tradi-
tional subject-object relation. Being-in-the-world, 
as a structural characteristic of Dasein, eliminates 
the false problem of bridging the chasm between an in-
ner subject and an outer world as object. The subject-
object relation would also be a false interpretation 
of being-in as such, which is one aspect of being-in-
the-world. Existential analysis has nothing to do with 
epistemology. Instead, "knowing is a mode of Dasein, 
a ll'.ode which is founded in being-in-the-world."2 
3. The worldliness of the v10rld. 
The worldliness ( 'deltlichke it) of the world is the 
theme of the succeeding chapter. The world is one of 
the moments or elements of being-in-the-world, and as 
such requires analysis. The first task, according to 
Heidegger, is to go beneath the superficial meaning of 
world as a world of varied and distinct objects, in order 
to gain access to the world as a phenorlenon in the phenom-
enological sense. This phenomenon should show forth its 
being and the structure of its being. 
1. SuZ, 61. 
2. suz, 62-63. 
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The traditional method of investigation is to con-
sider the world as made up of things: things of nature 
end things of value ( "wertbehaftete" Dinge). But in either 
case the ontological problem is merely shifted to another 
term. In the case of the things of nature, nature itself 
ought to be defined cntologically. But "nature is itself 
an entity, which takes place within the world and becomes 
discoverable in different ways and stages."1 Nature is 
on a different plane than the phenomenon "world." The 
additional problem of value does not aid in the solution. 
the innerworldl 
erpreta ~on of he 
"war as sue • n o ~n s o approac c the 
"ObJeCt~ve be~ng," "world" is already, end indeed 
in different ways, "presupposed."2 
dorld is not the determination of innerworldly 
entities. It is not a subjective Norld of each Dasein. 
The problem of the vrorld is the problem of the worldli-
ness of the world in generaL World depends upon world-
liness. 
"Worldliness" is an ontological concept and means 
the structure of a constitutive moment of being-
in-the-world. But we know this as existential 
determination of Dasein. Hence, worldliness is 
itself an existential. If we inquire ontologically 
about the "world," then we by no means relinquish 
the thematic field of the analysis of Dasein. 
Ontologically, "world" is not a determinat~on of 
those entities which essentially Dasein is Q£1, 
but a ch8racteristic of Dasein itself.3 
1. SuZ, 63. 
2. SuZ, 64. 
3. suz, 64. 
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Heidegger distinguishes four separate meanings of 
the term "world." 
1. World is used as an ontical concept and then 
TI'e,,ns the total of entities which can be present 
within the world. 
2. ;Iorld functions as an ontologica.l term and s ig-
nifies the being of the entities n~qed in no. 1. 
Lnd indeed "world" can become the title of a region 
which encompasses in every case a r-.anifold of en-
tities; for example, world signifies, in speaking 
of the "world" of the mathematician, the region of 
the possible objects of mathematics. 
3. Furthermore, world can be understood in an 
ontical sense, not just as entities, which Dasein 
essentially is not and which can take place v1ithin 
the world, but as that "in which" a fact u .al Dasein 
"lives" as Dasein. dorld has here a pre-ontologlcal 
existent meanmg. With this, there are again dif-
ferent possibilities: world means the "public" we-
world or the surrounding world of "one's own," the 
neA.rest (domestic) surrounding world. 
4. World designates, finally, the ontoloe:ical-exis-
tential concept of worldliness. ''forldliness itself 
is subject to modification in the actual structural 
wholes of separate "worlds," but it encloses in it-
self the a uriori of worldliness in general. Ter-
minologically, we claim the expression world for 
the meaning defined in no. 3. If sometimes it is 
used in the first-named sense, then this meaning 
will be indicated by the use of quotation marks. 
The inflection "v1orldly," then, means terminolog-
ically a TI'anner of being of Dasein, and never such 
entities as are present "in" the world. lie call the 
latter world-belonging or innerworldly.l 
The title of the chapter may be understood in the 
light of the foregoing definitions. Horld is an ontical 
term; worldliness is ontological. Both must be inter-
preted in the lie;ht of Dasein. The trouble with tra-
ditional ontology is that it has overlooked the exis-
tential worldliness of the world, and has attempted to 
1. SuZ, 64-65. 
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preted ~ftsr t~e nanner of t~i~gs. 
·.Jitl: rf;G"Jcct to thr:: proble:: af .:..n or:t--·:Jocj_c.:.o.1 _~_n;:Ll­
ysis of t~1e y,rorldlines.s of tie ~.- :::;rlc1 tr....;.dit:Lo:~.c~l 
~v~ltGloc·\1--.. -if l•t c:~r->C! tlln -,.-,f".~.hlnr :..:J..t --ll--'··;0...,.,. __ ,,~ -lr. ~w -'-- '-''• ,..._ 1 .._,_,_,.._.. -•'-' .:-·-'-''-' '-'·• ---'---- ---...V'-''-' .J.J.. a bli~<'I ::tl~ey. 
3oide0;~er reverses the order. 
te:r~::s of Di.i:::ei!'l. 
:Sei~1B-in-the-"~;,·or ld c..:;.nd conserluer:tl::r ths ';.'o:rld ._,.::; 
"~:tell, :·.·i thin t:.:e :C:ol'izon of 0..ve·r._._~~~e everyd:.;.~.r-n.ess 
a.s tl:1e nearest ::LJ.nner of being cf D-1ssin, is to 
heco·'"8 -'-he t,~c"""e o~ the --..,·1-crcol"c- 2 c) J.: 1_,,_.:. ,i__:.._:::.:..l .L _ - ~.l...C.:...:.C_J ..:.- '·' • 
sGls ction, r~ot ~~:ncct cf 
D~2ein, but of dny such dSDect ut ~11. The \'orld, t~:c 
Tl1e surroundirJ.g '.'iorld is the i~L.cec1idt.~c'. environ .e:c.t 
of' Dc.se i:n.. 
uter~t~:i__l~: (Zcuce), of t~int3s used by D.i.se~Ln in o;1e v.'~ cr 
l SuZ, 65. 
2, •. suz, 66. 
3. Cf. RJ.l)h Bu.rton Perry, Present ?hi:1.osc:·:~-::.ic...;.l rrs~dCJncis~3 
(~:·e 1:.~ '!ork: Longr::tlns, Green d..l1d Cor-:JJciny, J. 912.), for a 
criticism of the ide~listic e:;{,loitc.ltio~--. of t:C~o cc;o-
centric :>re6.iccl.l'ent. 
7C 
' ut~:;:-~s:::_l is e:=;s"'-~:t:Llll.y t so:.~et~:1inc ~r. or:',cr to •.•• t "_,___ 
But 
never 3D. i.solc..:.ted Ut3n.S j_l; it is ::_Ja.rt of 0.. ·.:.rh~)lc of uten-
sils. 
toto.li ty, to~_:.r-J.rd 0.. systen of rel:.::ttio?1s or refere!'.ccs. 
The kiLd of being of thi~gs or utensils is ~~elr 
Clcctive1y, the 
ordr:r to ... , H or 
l. 3uZ, 68. 
2. Cf. ~;o~"-r~ Do··."ey, Tocic: ~'he T~1sor~,,- oi' I:G:-_-:_ir)·· C 2'-:,T "!or~::: 
E~:o~~·.:r:~ ~-'~clt .J.nC_ Co:·~:)d.!ly, 1238), for ._;_ si~·::.il'"""r Joi_~--t of 
yj_-3·:;- -j_:;~_:. rcr;·,-:·ect to t::-:c uri.::~-1.cy of -:J:'-~c-~ic-:.1 or :~nstru­
:·_;cnt,;.l co:~.urc21-~·:·:sj_on. 
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References, for Heidegger, are concrete relations. 
-"-bstract relations have no rr:e&ning until concrete ref-
erences provide it. The categorial structure of uten-
sils is constituted by the totality of its concrete ref-
erences. 
Being-in-the-world means to live in an environment 
of things to be used, to form part of tl"e total system 
of references. 
Being-in-the-world, according to the foregoing in-
terpretation, means the unthematical, circm1spect 
merging in the references which are constitutive for 
the at-hand character of the whole of utensils • .L 
The world in vrhich Dasein "is" is a system of references. 
Dasein understands or comprehends these references, first 
in a practical way in the use of things, and also in a 
theoretical vmy. Dasein acconplishes the latter by un-
derstanding first its ovm practiCal comprehension of 
things and its comprehension of its mm being in rela-
tion to things. The ability of Dasein to make and to use 
references is the basis for its being-in-the-world. Ref-
erences are for things their conditions; and the ultilnate 
in a series of conditions of the usefulness of a thing 
may be found in something "for the sake of" (um-willen) 
Dasein. 
The pr:L"'llary "for v;hich" is a "for the sake of." 
"For the sake of," however, always affects the 
being of Dasein, which, in its being, is essen-
tially concerned with this being itself.2 
1. suz, 76. 
8. SuZ, 84. 
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Things, then, are understood, both practically snd theo-
retically, through the activity of Dasein. Thinc:s are 
zuhanden or vorhanden, according to t.;ce ~,ne>ctical or 
theoretical ae,nner in which they are referred to by 
Dasein. Categories are structural characteristics of 
things as vorhanden. dorldliness, on the contrary, is 
an existential, and a condition of the possibility of 
the categorial knowledge of things e.s present ( vorhanden) .1 
If the above scheme is spoken of as a system of relations, 
it should not be forgotten that for Heideg~er relations 
(references) must be concrete and inherent, not abstract 
or mathematical relations added by "thought." 
Subdivision B of this chapter is a criticism of Car-
tesian ontology. It is Heidegger's demonstration of the 
charge that traditional ontology moves in a "blind alley." 
To start vlith things and to interpret the world as res 
extensa means to be forced to abandon the ontological 
quest for the meaning of being as such. 
The considerations about Descartes should have 
made clear that neither the apparently self-evi-
dent starting point of the things of the world, 
nor the orientation of the presumably strictest 
knowledge of entities guarantees the winnin.;; of 
the ground upon which the first ontological con-
ceptions of the world, of Dasein, and of the inner-
worldly entities are to be found pheno~enally.2 
The discussion of space and spatiality is a partie-
ular application of the general scheme already adopted. 
1. SuZ, 88. 
2. SuZ, 101. 
If we say that things exist in a real space, we are 
following traditional patterns and moving in a blind 
73 
alley. TlJe location of things in a spatial, surround-
ing vmrld is possible because Dasein is spatial in its 
comprehension of things. Spatiality is one of the most 
peculiar modes of being of Dasein. "Dasein, however, is 
'in' the world in the sense of the familiar caring-for 
relations with the entities encountered within the vmrld."l 
The two principal characteristics of this spatiality are 
distance (Bntfernung) and direction (Ausrichtung). Both 
are existentials. The former term describes Dasein in 
its activity of overcoming separation, farness, or lack 
of connection, but not primarily in the physical sense. 
Dasein makes contacts with things, refers to them, and 
thus discovers their farness or separation and over-
comes it. The word is understood in an etymological 
sense as un-far-ness (Ent-fern-ung), and means the remov-
al of separation. Dasein is spatial in the sense that it 
discovers and uses entities (utensils) in its surrounding 
v:orld. Distance, as an existential, is the capacity of 
Dasein to overcome both physical farness and all lack of 
concrete reference. The other main term, direction (~­
richtung), also an existential, refers to the activity of 
Dasein in orienting itself in a concrete situation, as, 
for example, to the left or the right, or among familiar 
objects in a dark room. "Direction," as a characteristic 
1. SuZ, 104. 
of Dasein, is a priori, prior to all objective oirec-
tions or orientations. 
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The conclusion of the discussion of spatiality is 
sirople: Dasein is spatial. 'l'he a priori spa.tiality 
of Dasein makes possible the discovery of space in the 
surrounding world. 
Snece is not in the sub,ject 1 nor is the ·world in space. Space ~s rather "~nr tne world, ~nsofar as 
beinr;-in-the-world, which is constitutive for Dasein, 
has disclosed space. Space is not found in the sub-
ject, nor does the subject treat the world "as if" 
it were in a space, but the "subject;• Dasein, under-
stood ontologically, is spatial. .'.nd since Dasein 
is spatial in the way just described, snace shows 
itself as an a -eriori. This title means no such 
thing as a prel~~nary belonging to a subject which 
first of all has no world, and \ihich produces a 
space out of itself. The a priori here means: to 
be prior to the haupening of space (as region) in 
the actual hapnening of e£tities which are at hand 
in the surrounding world. 
The traditional question of the objective reality 
or subjectivity of space is avoided by Heidegger. dhat 
is needed, according to him, is not a new defense of 
either side of the traditional dilenm<l, but a new ap-
proach to the whole problem. The spatial character of 
Dasein provides the needed approach. The subjectivity 
or objectivity of space is a pseudo-problem. The space 
of things is discovered through the spatiality of Dasein. 
The discussion of space and spatiality gives concrete 
meaning to the more general treatment of v1orld and world-
1. suz, 111. 
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liness. Being-in-the-world is, in part, the worldliness 
of Dasein. Other aspects of being-in-the-world are dis-
cussed in succeeding chapters. 
4. Being-with and one-among-many. 
Worldliness and the v10rld, as aspects of being-in-
the-world, are Heidegger's way of expressing some basic 
relations of Dasein to its non-human envirom1ent. In a 
similar way, the chapter on "Being-in-the-world as being-
with and being-oneself" is Heidegaer's explanation of 
the relation of Dasein to its human enviroll!uent. The 
references to the hu.'llan environnent a.re just as much a 
part or mode of being of Dasein as are its references to 
the world of things or utensils. 
The individual nature of the being of Dasein is 
reaffirmed. "Dasein is the entity which in every case 
I myself am; its being is in every case :mine."1 Hei-
degger rejects the idea of a basic ego or self which 
abides through changing states and actions. To accept 
this theory would be to interpret Dasein as a thing-sub-
stance, to regard its manner of being as non-human. The 
idea of an ego which I always am and a non-ego which is 
always opposed to me is a too-hasty solution of the prob-
lem. The ego may lose itself in what it is not. In this 
sense, the non-ego is a kind of being of the ego itself.2 
1. SuZ, 114. 
2. SuZ, 116. 
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If understood in this sense, the ego is not some abiding 
substance or self, but is Dasein as existing, the "who" 
to be analyzed. It is Lmportant to keep in mind that in 
the given situation there is no subject apart from an 
objective world, nor is there a self or ego apart from 
others. 
The clarification of being-in-the-world showed that 
there "is" not first of all, nor is there ever given, 
a mere subject without a world. And finally, there-
fore, there is likewise n~ first-of-all, isolated 
ego given without others. 
The objection to treating the self as a mode of being 
of Dasein is that by so doing the substantiality of the 
self is lost. The objection, Heidegger says, is based 
on the idea that the self must be interyreted as a thing, 
as something present, rather than as existing. "The •sub-
stance' of man is not spirit, as the synthesis of soul 
and body, but existence."2 
Just as the problem of the world was resolved by an 
ever-enlarging system of references, beginning with the 
surrounding world, so the problem of "who is in the world" 
must begin with the nee.rest aspects of the human environ-
ment. The world of things or utensils is ~Ctlso a world of 
other Dasein, in the sense that things have their refer-
ences to others. Being-in-the-world is social in tl1e 
sense of being with others, all having similar existential 
1. suz, 116. 
2. suz, 117. 
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relations with the world of things. All o:i' the things 
to which I may refer also have their references to others. 
Being-in-the-world is a joint enterprise or a concomitant 
relation of ::)asein with others. The relation of "with" 
should not be interpreted after the m&nner of things, 
but as an existential, a characteristic of Dasein. The 
relatio11s are not spatial in the traditione.l sense, but 
may be considered as spatial in the existential sense, 
in which spatiality is a characteristic of D'lsein. 
Being-with, as a basic characteristic of Dasein, 
serves to distinguish in two ways the being of other 
human entities from the world of things. In the first 
place, their being is distinct from that of things; it 
is like mine. In the second place, other hUL'la:n entities 
are not to be treated as things, as l'l.ere instrUI'lents or 
utensils. They are cared for in a different sense than 
things. Things are objects of care in the sense of being 
used, managed, or taken care of (Besorgen). Human entities 
s.re cared for ( FUrsore:e l .1 There are various ways of 
caring for others, both positive and negative. l:ve:n the 
lack of care for someone may be considered a mode of caring 
for others. 0ne real problem of caring for others is the 
question of substitution vs. respect for their liberty. 
If in ce.ring for someone all his cares e.nd interests are 
1. suz, 121. 
taken care of for lllia, his individuality is sacrificed 
to the substitute who ceres for hlia. In carjng for others, 
on the other hend, there can be a :n.ore objective relation 
in v1hich freedom is respected c::1d nc.ink:ined. The sub-
stitutionary caring-for rel:'.tions:1ip is reu.lly 2. tyj)e 
of domination. The other type is anticipatory ~nd lib-
ero.tive. There may be all sorts of col::birntions of these 
two e:xtreue ncethods of caring for others. 
Another probler.1 of being-with is the kno·11ledge of 
others. For Eeidegger, :mov1ledge of other selves (in 
traditional terms, vvhich IIeidegger never uses) is pos-
sible because of the originally comprehsnsive ncture of 
Dasein. Since Do.sein is an understo.nding entity, it may 
understand other entities like itself. 
The openness of being-there-nith others, "'hich be-
longs to being-with, means: in Dasein's under-
standing of being, there is already present t:w 
understc:nding of others, since the being of Dasein 
is being-with. This understanding is, like under-
standin,g: in c;enerel, not 2 kno·;rledc;e which c:ror;s 
out of knowing, but an originally existential roan-
nor of being, which first nakes possible knoYring 
and Jmov-'ledge ,1 
:'ceidegger objects to bo.sinr: tho knowledce of other selves 
upon empathy (l!.inftlhlung) or projection (relation to a 
"6ouble"). The psychic fncts of enpnthy r;~d projection 
c:.re not the root of being-,,Jith, i.e., the rel~tion of 
Do.sein to otl1ers, but are really nodes of thEO latter. 
1. suz, 12J-124. 
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is first ~oossibJ.e or: the b:.J.sis of t>c 1cLttor ---'-~c~. is 
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Tl"l3 an.-:-..J.~_ysis ~t.:::;.s s!J_o~.:-.n th-~t br;i:'!_u:----~ith is -:.:..n cxis-
ter::_t}.0.l co:nstj_tue::_1t of bei:Lg-i~--~he-·:.::y::-J_d •.•. =·-·:1EO-
::'-:::' -.;.2 Dasein is in r::eneral, ~it :1'--'.::-;: t~l.C ..J..:1nt-;:-:_~ of 
~ r-_ '-nr• f ~ r--::';.'.'-"h -~._., -1-l ,::;,.._., ~ OulHt'~ 0 08l?lz-j-;,,lu~;.- ........ ;._Ql.J.l1v.L'• 
I~ be:L~1f: ·:;ith other~:: DJ.sein is not :f"i:'st o:L' -....J_l J.ll 
O r>_e- .:::·· __ Q'"_r_, __ ·_ ;n-r -i c: .-·vo·--,,. '"c. 
- ~- --- ,,_._.._.._,; ' -'-' _._ '-'·· '-'-' .'J' 
i::.cJ ividua.Jity in t~~e i:::..Derso:::-_1,1 0:rou) is not the su..ue 
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corrJ"lon, thcct neither is the proper r,lOde of being one-
self. In brief, for Eeidegger, true individuality is 
not given in everyday expel' ience ; it r:ust be a ch ie ved. 
The improper mode of being is ch'lr::c.cter ized by the 
do•ninr:.tion of individuality oy the inpersonr>l "public" 
or one-among-many, by the levelling doun of all origi-
nality and individuality to such an "aver::cge" th,,t the 
public Cfl.n not be surprised or shocked. Individuality 
is lost in the de-personalized social ''"'tss. The one-
among-many is everyone, yet no one in particular. 
The "v1ho" is 
self c:nd not 
The 11 \iJl!..o" is 
not this one or that one, not one's 
one's oYm e-nd not the sum of ,,11. 
neuter, the "one."l 
The reason that this :code of beinG is i~:proper is that 
individual responsibility for personal attitudes and 
decisions is lost, is confused nnd obscured by the dom-
inating social attitudes. The individual is no longer 
himself; his feelings &nd attitudes are not proper, i.e., 
not re2lly his ovm, but a confused replica of tl:e "public." 
Hevertheless, the ir,1proper mode of being is not to 
be condernned l,nd thrmm out entirely. Such a node of being 
is possible only because of the existential charecter of 
Dasein. Therefore, the ii.cproper node of beinr: distincuishes 
Dasein from things. Furthermore, the improper, COiDHon, 
1. SuZ, 126. Perhaps tl1e ir:personal cr indefinite use 
( v.i thout specific reference) of the pronouns "they" 
end "everybody" v;ould best explain Eo idegger' s :1eaning, 
as in the cor:ll"on introduction of c;_ run:or, "They say ..• " 
or "J!;verybody' s saying •.•• " 
81 
avera.t;e, levelled ':ode of being oneself is the st~rting 
:Joj,nt, given in everyday ezistence, fron '.;hich Dcisein 
nay develop its individuality. The ir::proper Lode of 
beine; precedes the achievenent of true inclividuality in 
the :oroper mode of beil2g. True individuulity is achieved 
by freeing oneself fro!'! the col!fused, avere1ge, tctken-for-
grar: ted, everyday existence. 
The proper mode of beir oneself does not rest on 
an exceptional state o the subject, detached 
from the "one," but is an existent ;1:od ification of 
the "one" as something essentia11 y existentieil.l 
In brief, the proper n:ode of being oneself is a result 
of individual initiative, o.n achieve;;,ent won from the 
com: •on, average, :ir!1proper uode of being. 
5. In-being as such. 
'fue e:dstential-ontological e1nalysis of Dasein con-
tinues in Chapter V with a discussion of in-bei:1g as such. 
Heidee;cer rembds his readers that the uim of the analysis 
is not a philosophical unthropology, but a fuJ2de1Lental 
ol2tology. 1:!undar:'l9ntal ontology is o.n attEr:::pt to find a 
satisfdotory approach to ar a basis for a gel2era.l ontology. 
It is not, however, a search for a single first princi,Jle 
fron ,,,rhich ull else I1ctY be logically derived. The concept 
of "e1Udl originality" (GleichursprUnglichkeit) sug;,:ests 
ti1e co-ordinate nature of exist8'1tials. 
1. suz, 130. 
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The phenomenon of egua.l originality of the consti-
tutive ~aments has often been disregarded in ontol-
ogy in consequence of an unrestrained methodological 
tendency to demonstrate that everything has its ori-
gin in a simple "basic principle. nl 
The whole tenor of Heidegger's thought is opposed to a 
strictly inferential system. Dasein itself, perhaps the 
one concept most basic to his thought, at lea.st in ~ 
und Zeit, is not a first :<;Jrinciple fror;1 which all else 
may be derived. Dasein finds itself in a v;orld of things 
already present and ready to be used; it also is canst i-
tutive of that world through its ovm peculiar worldliness 
anil spatiality. Da-sein literally means "to be there," 
or there-ness, but existential analysis does not derive 
conclusions from the nere fact of being there, rnuch less 
from the fact of location as "here" or "there." Instead, 
there (~) means the disclosure or openness of being (~­
schlossenheit) which is characteristic of Dasein. "The 
expression 'there' :r!e[Cms this essential openness .••. Da-
se in is its o·aenness. n 2 
The analysis of in-being as such is divided into 
two main subdivisions: the existential constitution of 
"there," end the everyday being of there, including its 
fallen state. The three basic exister.tials of Dasein as 
a state of being there or open are findingness (Befind-
lichkeit), understending (Verstehen), and speech (~). 
1. SuZ, 131. 
2. SuZ, 132-133. 
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In traditional terms these existent ie.ls would be cA.lled 
categories, but Heidegger reserves the traditional ter~ 
for things present (Vorhandenen). The enphasis upon 
existentials as distinct from categories is precisely 
in order to avoid the consideration of Dasein e.s a thing. 
Furthermore, existent ials must not be confused vlith the 
traditione.l properties. Things have properties, but ~­
sein is or exists in various modes or ways. An existential 
is a vray or mode of being, not a property added to a thing 
or a substance already present. 
Findingness (Befindlichkeit) refers to the emotional 
nature of Dasein. In ontical terms it is mood, spirit, 
humor. Dase in alvrays finds itself in some mood or psychic 
state. A given mood may be replaced by another, but never 
by a complete absence of mood or psychic condition. Even 
a completely serene or tranquil state is a definite con-
dition. Thrown-ness or "ject-ness" (Geworfenheit) and 
fac~ity (Faktizitgt) are terms which Heidegger uses to 
explain findingness. We find ourselves in a given con-
dition; v:e are throvm ( jected) into situations; the de 
facto conditions of our life May not be denied or overlooked. 
Dasein is not an empty substance to which properties are 
added, nor an empty container into which qualities are 
poured. Dasein always finds itself in some mood, feeling, 
or state, just as it is always in the world. Fear is an 
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self-finding. The c;~oice of feJ.r is si:,nific~nt, sircce 
::roLll1ded in fe...1.rfulness; being-in-the-vTorld is fe:..-~rful. 
D~sein is ~rr~id of j_t=elf • 
. ore CJ.reful scrutiny luter in the ~mrk, since it is 
Lore ~To::cund .:.~.nc1 less definite thun f'::-;0..r. Fe-..-..r, ,:;.s here 
anulyzed, is 2 prel~~indry reference to the discucs~.0~ of 
dl'"''.Ji_:,d .-J.s the -~.:eu.ns of discover inc tho :rund.0.2 .ental r;,_;_tu:re 
of Dilsein ir: nossib2lity. 
-- " ' ' . (" ' h ) Unc.er:: C;J.TIC.l::1g vers't8 _en , us an e~iste~ti~l, is 
of Oeir:..g of Dasein, 1:tGich for::-:.s th8 c;round of w..11 ~:l"lOI:'l-
lod,e, e:: •l::mcJ.tion, '"nd ir,tcrnret.J.tion. D._;soin is un-
derst,_~ndir_e :i.r: the Sf;nse that be inrs L-:.J..y be r) is closed or 
on en to it. To underst,.:lcl. is to be "'ble to st--end b fore 
J. ttL1g ( e iner Sa.che vorstehen ~:1:bncn) • TJnoerstcmcc ing is 
ci project (Entwurf) of Da.sein, in \ii1ic:1 it is its O'.'!Tl 
possibility. This possibility is not like th~t of thincs, 
th ... ~t is, not yet re:J.l -ind ~ever necess;J.rj_ ly so; iT'.stcG.d 
H is Hs m."Il Deculicir possibility (eir;ene 3einkol;':en). 
l:'nderstJnd.ing is the existe~!.tj_:.J.l [)sing a=- the ~~ro_0er 
~:;ossibilit:r of Dasein itself, so thc.1t, indeed, t:::Jis 
bein.r; o£ens in itself the ·.,·hc~.t o'!: its bcinr; •.•ith 
i tc,elf. · 
1. suz, 144. 
Understandirtg has to do vrith nossibilities. In the 
world of utensils understandin»; finds things service-
E5 
able, uEeful, applicable, etc. But even more irlporta.nt 
than possibilities of things are the peculiar, possible 
modes of being of De.se in, vvh i ch are not to be inter-
preted after the manner of things present (Vorhandenen), 
Understanding is fundamentally the capacity of Dasein 
to be open to itself, to have access to its own possi-
bilit;ies of being. Interpretation (Auslegung) is " ••• the 
elabor.ation of the poss ibilit ie s projected in understand-
ing. ,l Understanding is the foundation; interpretation 
is a superstructure. Interpretation Rbrays involves pre-
suppositions, such as prepossess ion (intention, Vorha be), 
preview (foresight, Vorsicht), and pre-concept (anticipa-
tion, Vorgriff). L!;eaning is not something added to beirtg, 
but is the openness of the being of Daseirt itself. 
The concept of meaning comprises the formal scaf-
folding of that vrhich belongs necessarily to y;llat 
understf'.nding interpretation articulates. Eeaning 
is that characteristic of aroject, structured through 
re ossess1on rev1ew an re-conce t unon wh1ch 
somet 1 ecomes un ers an a e as somet ln • 1nce 
understandlng and ln erpre a lon constl u e he exis-
tential comprehension of the beinc of there, meaning 
must be conceived as the fomal-existential scaffold-
ing of the openness -,.hich belongs to understandirtg. 
Meaning is an existential of Dasein, not a property 
\rhich adheres to an entity, lies "bellirtd" it, or is 
suspended somewhere as a.n "in-between reslm." Only 
Daseirt "has" meaning, insofar as the openness of 
belng-in-the -world is "fulfillable" through the en-
tities that Ll?cY be discovered in that o':lenness. Onl;z 
Dasein, therefore, can be meaningful or meaningless.~ 
1. suz, 148. 
2. suz, 151. 
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"~ proposition {i~ussage) is ec derived fonn of inter-
pretation. "Insofar :J.s the proposition (the 'judgn:ent•) 
is grounded in ccnderster.ding snd represents '' (erived fonn 
of executing an interpretation, it~ 'has• a meaning."l 
lTopos i tion, for He idegger, s igaifies, pr ira&r ily, exhibi-
tion (Aufzeigung), which corres)londs to the ori;:inal mean-
ing of logos as "letting see." In the second place, and 
as a derived meaning, proposition signifies predication 
( Pr~dikation). 1cll predication is dependent upon exhibi-
tion, the primary meaning of proposition. T;1e thir~ l:'.ean-
ing of proposition, related to both the prir:1e.ry and sec-
ondary meanings, is com'lunication or speakiq; out (bi!-
te ilung, Hera us sage). If all three ~lccmin.gs are corr,bined, 
a proposition rr:ey be ucfined e.S " ••• communicatingly deter-
mining ex hi bit ion. nZ "'ccording to He idegg,,r there ere all 
desre,~s of nixture of purely practical, original under-
standing and theoretical, derived or abstracted, proposi-
tions o.bout ti:linp:s present. Just as interpretation is 
less original than understanding, so propositions :1re 
still less original than interpretations. 
Speech (Redel is another existential, equE11y orig-
inal ;vi th findingness end u~Jderstanding. Language is 
one step removed, and rests upon speech, just as ir.ter-
pretation rests upon understanding. '''l'he existential-
l. suz, 154. 
2. SuZ, 156. 
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ontological foundation of languae;e is speech . .,l 0pee ch 
is the original or basic mode by which findingness ccnd 
understanding are expressed. 
The finding state of understanding of being-in-the-
world expresses itself as saech. The significance-
vtho~e of the s~ate of' unders anding ge~s an o-eror-
tun~ty to sveaK. ;;ords accrue to meanlngs. HO'feVer, 
words as thlngs are not supplied -.. itll r:'ecnings .2 
One of the most interesting features ~1bout EeideE:c:er's 
view of speech is that it i!!cludes both ]leering and si-
lEmce. These forns of speech are especinlly significant 
in the discussion, lccter in the book, of t':1e voice of 
conscience. 
As existential structure of the openness of D~,sein, 
speech is constitutive of the existe:"ce of nqseu1. 
1'o hear and to be silent belong to speech as pos-
sibilities. In these phenomena the constitutive 
function of speech for the exis~entiality of exist-
ence first becomes fully clear. 
Heidegger's suggestion tha.t poetry may have a uniy_ue 
significance for existential ontology is interesting. 
"The communication of the existential possibilities of 
findingness, i.e., the disclosing of existenc:!e, can become 
a proper aim of 'poetic' speech."4 
The everyday being of "there" cmd the fallen con-
dition of Dnsein are considered as average, common, regu-
lar, irupersonal (das lv~an), everyday features of Dasein. 
1. suz, 160. 
2. SuZ, 161. 
3. SuZ, 161. Existentiality (Existentialit~t) refers to 
the totality of existentials. Unfortunately, English 
usage is very confusing. Existential, as noun and ad-
jective, are used by this writer and by J. 'Nild for the 
same concepts as existentialistic and existentiality in 
d. Brock and li. "yschogrod. iiorks about Eeidegger by 
these authors are listed in the bibliogra.phy. 
4. SuZ, 162. 
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Eeidegger vnuns agAinst taking his analysis in a norsl 
or cultural sense. The aim of the discussion of the im-
personal one-among-many ( das l,Ian) is purely ontological.1 
Talk (Gerede), curiosity (Neugier), -::.nd =bio-uity 
(ZweideutiGkeit) are characteristics of the everyday char-
acter of Dasein as it finds itself in the '::orld. Talk 
knows everything, but in a second-hand way, without the 
basis of direct, personal intimacy nith the openness of 
being. Speech is the original expression of Dasein in 
its proper or authentic mode; talk is the expression of 
the impersonal one-among-many, the improper mode of being. 
Curiosity is the restless, fleeting pas:oage from one thing 
to the next, from one interest to another, without stop-
ping to gain intimate contact or a genuine understanding 
of anything. Ambiguity is the inability to disti!lf:uish 
the proper from the improper mode of being. This ambi-
guity might be interpreted as the confusion of genuine 
understanding with the common opinions of nha t "every-
body" says • 
The fall (Verfallen) of Dasein is the comprehensive 
term Heidege,er uses for the everyday mode of being. The 
reader is warned that fall does not imply a ne(':ative eval-
uation of the everyday character of Dasein. -~thou~h the 
fall is an improper mode of being, still it contributes 
1. SUZ, 167. Despite He idegger' s warning, many reG ders, 
including the writer, believe that the discussion 
necessarily involves a critical attitude toward ac-
cepted moral .qnd cultural cond itior,s. 
toward the constitution of the being of Dasein, as a 
positive phenomenon from vvh ich the _:)roper n;ode of being 
may be achieved. The fallen state of Dasein is not a 
fall from a pristine state of purity nor is it a lamen-
table moral condition th<et mil"ht be overcome in a higher 
state of culture. The fall refers to the loss of indi-
viduality in the impersonal one-emong-nany. The fall 
may be characterized by temptation (Versuchur$), tran-
quilization (Beruhigm?g), alienation (~ntfremdur$), and 
entanglement ( SicllverfM€jen). Dase in is tempted to lose 
its individuality, its proper mode of being. It tran-
quilizes or pacifies itself by conforming to accepted 
standards of what constitutes the good life. Dasein is 
alienated in comparing itself v;ith reuote cultures ~md 
the synthesizing of all knowledge into a presUL:lptuous 
universal understanding. In characterologies and typol-
ogies Dasein becomes entangled in "self-analysis." 'rhe 
precipitative movement of the fall of Dasein is compared 
to a whirlwind. 
Despite all these apparently negative considerations, 
Heidegger makes positive use of the discussion of the fall. 
Dasein exists factually.,. throvm into its possibilities. 
The fall illustrates this factuality. It is proof of the 
possibility of being in the world. 
However, if we hold to the already-mentioned struc-
ture of the being of Dasein as being-in-the-world, 
then it becomes obvious that the fall as a manner 
\?0 
of being of in-being represents rather the ~ost 
elementary proof for the existentiality of Dasein. 
The fall is concerii:8d vlith nothing but the uoss ~­
bility-of-beirg-in-the-world, although in the mode 
of impropriety. Dasein can fall only because it 
is concerned with the understanding-find~ng being-
in-the-world. Inversely, proper existence is not 
something which is suspended above the falling 
everydayness, but is existe£tially only a modified 
apprehending of the latter. 
The fa.llen state of Dasein is its average, everyday 
character, in which individuality is lost in the iroper-
sonal one-CJmong-many. True individuality or the proper 
mode of being is an achievement w1:tich must be won out 
of the improper mode. 
6. Care, the being of Dasein. 
In Chapter VI of the first main section Heidegger 
emphasizes the unity and totality of bei!Jb-in-the-world, 
through an exposition of care as the being of Dasein in 
its totality. The world, who is in the world, end being-
in in general have been presented as elements of this 
structural whole; the unitary aspect is not to be built 
up out of separate elements, but is found in care, the 
being of Dasein. 
The phenomenon of dread (.~gst) is the apuroach to 
care, because in dread is found the most far-reaching and 
most original possibility of the openness of Dasein in 
its being. In dread Dasein is brought before itself and 
1. suz, 179. 
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is made accessible in its being. Dread reveals care as 
the being of Dasein. Fear, a derived mode grounded in 
the original, more ba.sic phenomenon of dread, has a close 
relation to dread. Both are a flight ( :flucht) froi:J. some-
thing because of something. Both are related to the fall. 
What is feared ( das 1iovor) is a determined, thre Jtening 
entity in a given condition. That for which there is 
fear (das Worum) is a determined possibility of Dssein, 
or a given danger. In dread, however, what is dreaded 
(das ',/ovor) may be described as "nothing at all." ,;hat 
is dreoded cannot be localized. It is so nenr that it 
takes your breath away, yet it is nowhere. Fror,J the 
standpoint of innerworldly entities, it is indeed nothing. 
Still, it is not a pure nothing ( das 1'Tichts), but Dasein 
itself as beine;-in-the-world. "That before which dread 
drea.ds is being-in-the-world itself. nl That for which 
there is dread (das '.'iorum) is similarly no determined 
possibility or given ds,ncer; it is D~::sein itself as being-
in-the-world. Dread is not characterized, like fear, by 
some possible misfortune; what is at stake is the possi-
bility of any &n!l <'11 fortune, good s.nd bad alike, the 
very possibility of being-in-the-world. In this sense 
dread brings Dasein to account with reGard to its most 
proper, most real, and most individual possibility. Da-
~ is brought face to face vri th its own existence. 
1. SuZ, 187. 
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Dasein finds itself inhospitable (unheimlich); it does 
not feel at home ( nicht-zuhause). In dread Dase in is 
faced with the res;Jonsibility of its O\iTI being, vlith 
regnrd to its n:ost radic&l possibility. Dread, which 
is the phenomenon of Dasein encountering itself in its 
n:ost re.dical possibility, opens the way for a consid-
eration of care 'lS the total or unitary structure of 
Dase in. 
Care, the being of Dase in, is defined ~-s "already-
being-ahead-of-itself-in-( the-world-) as being-together-
with (entities encountered within the world) ." 1 Care 
(Sorge) is to be taken in a strictly existential-onto-
logical sense, as defined, not in its ontical sicnifi-
csnce as to take care or to be careless, etc. 
Each element in the definition demsnds clar ifica-
tion. Being-ahead-of-itself (sich-vorweg-sein) refers 
to Desein in its being concerned (es geht um) with it-
self, with its own possibility. In its being, Dasein 
is related, not to soaething or sor:1eone outside itself, 
but to its ov:n most individual possibility. Alrendy 
( s chon) refer·s to the factuality of e:xi2tence. D'lse in 
is thrown; it finds itself s.lready existing. 'leing-
to;;:;ether-nith (Sein-bei) refers to the fallen condition 
of Dasein, in v:hicll it flees fron itself ~.nd atte.r::pts to 
1. SuZ, 192. ".:Oich-vorv:eg-s chou-se in-in-( der-•ielt-) als 
Sein-bei (innerweltlich begagnendeB Seie!lden)." 
lose itself in the i:::personal one-among-many and the 
nworld" of thi!:gs. The interprete.tion of cc~re is not 
to be understood as ~ primo cy of the pre ctic.:l over 
theoretical conduct. Both theory (The or ie) ··.nd prac-
tice (Prc:xis) u:ce founded upon care. Like>;ise, the 
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2ctte:1pt to r,:c:d:e cc.re dependent upon a specic-1 Pctivity 
or -function, such .s.s -.,..ill, desire, iEclinc,tion, or :L:1-
pulse, is ec c.dst2,ke. These l2ttor are •ll grounded in 
c&re. In Vlill co.re is involved as e. totality. In de-
sire the aspect or E!Oment of being a'1ead of or before 
itself (sich-vorweg:;-sein) is dordnant. In inclination 
the csnect cl' being-to~;ethcr-with (sein-bei), 0 nd tLe 
correspOJ:ding fullen condition of Dasein, r.re prir.l1ry. 
I:..pulse is c.lso an il"'1})roper :'"'lode of bei:1c, bu.t :Jn_sein 
is never pure L""PU~se. Tl,e beine of Desein is CG.re; 
tl::eory, prectice, ·.;iE, des ire, inclin?.tion, a.nd in:;Julse 
are grounded in ce.re. 
1"1ainta in.s -'· ·~ --V.llV 
interyretation o: bhe bei:lg of D--::.sein ss cc;.,re is r...e\-/, 
t:re correc~IO':'ding o:1ticc.l interpretrction is reelly old. 
A verifi.c tion '.:hicll Heic1egr_er uses for t~.is e;·i:ctcntio.l 
interpret~tion is celled ~~e pre-ontological self-inter-
prets.ti~on (voro"ltolorische Selbst:mslegung) of :Uesein. 
To be sure, this pre-vntologicc.l verific::tion iE :<.ot i1 
Etrict proof; its validity is "only 1iistorical." .L::e 
si,.nifica1ce of )re-ontologicel evidence is t;;Lt it is 
not ourdenec Lith erroneous philosophical coLcept.s; it 
is "original" (ursprtinglich). -'he specific pre-onto-
l::>c;ical evidence is s fable :c~cout tlle oric_in of :'l--lll. 
prose version, ~ s quoted by ::eidegcer. 
0:;_1ce ~•ten c2.re crossed a river .s~e s ~~-.·~ so1.:e eurtll 
containiq; cL"y. l'v!usi.r;r, si~e too:c: '' --Jiece of it 
~,-,c. i.Jegan to r,old it. ;:nile she thinks to :1ers0lf 
c:bout -.. l10..t she has l.::c~-~e, Jupiter ::1p}ro:~ clles. ·.=:·;-, .. re 
-~el~s Lin to bestow spirit upon t:1e 1wdeled piece of 
cl:::y. Jupiter glc.Clly ncrees. 3ut '..L.e;::-_ core .•.irohed 
to give her miLe to her creation, JuT'iter forb2de 
her ccoing so, <~nd demonded that t:1e cre~ture be given 
l!is name. !llile CPre e.nd Ju~Jiter disputed over the 
nome, earth (Tell us) also rose U:? nr:.d ,:en ted her 
mme conferred upon the creature, s ir:.ce slie J, ~ d given 
to it a niece of her body. The vrrs.nc;lers took .3aturn 
for their judge. Lnd Srcturn gave t;,Gm tile foll:Yding 
sentence, '-'~1TJc·rently just: "You, Jupiter, because 
you have given tlle spirit, shAll receive it at his 
death; you, Earth, because you hqve granted tllc ~ody, 
shall receive the body. But because Co.re fir·st cave 
form to tt.is be in[", nay Ghe posse cS Lin so lcrcg :.s 
he Jives. ,\..'1d since there is a dispute about tl!e 
name, let :1im be called 1 homo, 1 for he is n:ade of 
ec.·.rth (humus) ."1 
cie idegger.1 s cownents on the fable, lil:e the story 
itself, are both interesting and significar:.t. Tllis pr·e-
ontological testi."'!ony gains "- GpeciBl si.;nifica.nce 
through t-l1e fc•ct thfl.t it not only sees ceire "-" tlnt to 
v.'tich Dase in belongs "for a lifetime," but olso in the 
fact thet this primacy of cere c1pTJears in connection 
. ith the •nell-known conception of r£n 2s the co·m~Jound 
formed out of body ( ec:rth) c..nd spirit. Cura pr:iJc1a firait: 
1. SuZ, 198. Cf. John -,ifl\1, ;:;T:';'h:-'TT:C::-'h'fa:::::l'Ol~e:=,n:.,ric-:e:,--,o;;,r::,"::.:::E:::x:..:i:..:s:..t;:.;c;,:n;;.t,.;:i;;;d.::l:..:i:.:s:.:::m (Bloomington, Ind.: Indiana Urn vers 1t:i Pre r;s, , 
for another translation. 
this entity has t~(-; origin of its beinc i!"'_!. ca:::·e. Cura 
tonout, qua.r:tdiu vixerit: the entity 1.dll r:.ot be rele.lsed 
:f'ro! this oric;in, 'Jut '.•ill be :J.eld fdst, und doninc:tcd 
by it so long ciS this entity "is in the ··,orld." 3eirg-
in-the-~:lorld hu;:; the bci21g-like std.e:l:o ( soinsnd.ssiee 
Pr11rcung) of "care." This entity gets its hane (hoLo), 
not 'i.ith regard to its being, but with respect to t~1e.t of 
nhich it is mctde (hu..YJ.us). That in l'thich the "orit;i!J.-J.l" 
being of this cre.J.turo 1:1o.y be seen is riven in the sen-
tence of Saturn: "tin1e. n The pre-ontologico.l dc:fi:1ition 
of the essence of man, as ex~oressed in the :._;_yth (a tern 
not used by Hoidege;er for the story), orovidos an udv"'nco 
insir:ht into the 11unner of being vrhich doninc:.tes ::lan• s 
tet::)oral conduct in the vorld. Care is thlC being of Da-
sein. Cars dominates nan's te:-:rooril.l pJ.sc.J.~:e t::1rough the 
y;orld. Cure is basic to everything that Dasoin. is, even 
to all tha. t Dase in ca.n be ( se in~:~nnen) • 
In the renuining parCJ.u~raphs of the e::is ter.t ial 
analysis of Dasein {the first na.in section o::' the ·.;ror:c) 
E:eidegger rela.tes his findings to two traditional philo-
so-o' ic.J.l :oroblens: re.:clity and truth. In the discussion 
of reality ~~eidegger relates h:l.s vievr to re<ilis;~-, LJ.nd ide-
a.lism, ·ith see cia.l reference to the :)Toblen of the "ex-
ternal 'dorld," and to "being-in-itself." Since the "nrob-
len" of the external vmrld preaupnoses a su':>ject in iso-
9G 
la t ion from the supposedly "external" '.:orl d, tlle pro !Jlem 
itself is an L"';lpossible one. It is a pseudo-problen, 
according to Heidegger. The real problem is to free 
ontology fron the prejudices involved in the attenpt to 
prove the existence of the e:::terncl 'i.·orld. 
The "scandal of philosophy" does not consist of 
the fact that up to now this proof [of the exter-
nal world) is still lacking, but in the fact that 
such proofs are ap;ain and again expected snd at-
terapted .1 
The problem of the externe_l world arises out of the 
fallen condition of DP.sein and the tendency to inter-
pret its understanding of being after the manner of 
things present (als Vorhandenheit). In his criticism 
of reelism end idealism, l~eidegger gives ideAlism credit 
for one i:c.sight--"that being can not be e):plained through 
entities. " 2 Rer;.l ity is grounded upon innerworldliness 
(Innerweltlichkeit), innerworldliness upon the lJhenomenon 
of world. The phenomenon of world is a structursl :uoment 
of being-in-the -world, Hhich is, in turn, an aspect of 
care as the bein{'; of Dasein. "Reality-consciousness is 
itself a mode of beiiJf-in-the-world. ~.11 problems of the 
external ;·10rld come back, of necessity, to this basic ex-
istential phenomenon."3 
The discussion of truth follows rmch the same pattern 
as the consiclerations on reality. The tn,ditional concept 
1. SuZ, 205. 
2. SuZ, 207. 
3. SuZ, 211. 
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of truth as correspondence (Uebereinst~~aung) or agree-
ment is vigorously criticized ond placed in a secondary, 
derived relation to the b~sic phenomenon of truth as a 
mode of being of Dasein. The verification of a propo-
sition, such as, "The picture on the Hall hOJJ.<>s crooked," 
(Heideg[!;er' s exa.;nule) is carried out \ihen the entities 
involved show themselves (sich zeigen) as they are; they 
let themselves be seen (sehen lassen) by the discovering 
(entdeckendsein) Dasein. "To be true (truth) means to 
be discovering. nl But, to proceed, "the existential-on-
tological foundations of discoverinr: first shovv the r::ost 
original phenomenon of truth ." 2 This most original phe-
nomenon of truth is the openness (~rschlossenheit) of 
Dasein. This openness ma.y 8.lso be characterized by its 
thrownness (Geworfenheit), in that the openness of Dasein 
is factual. /1.s a project (Entwurf) the proper openness 
( e igentliche Erschlossenhe it) is the "truth of existence. " 3 
The fallen condition of Dasein is characterized by un-
truth (Unwahrheit), closedness (Verschlossenheit), and 
coveredness (Verde ckthe it) • Consequently, when Dase in 
is considered in both its proper and i~proper modes of 
being it is both "in truth" and "in untruth."4 In its 
fallen condition Dasein flees from its proper mode of 
being in order to lose itself in the "world" end the im-
1. suz, 219. 
2. suz, 220. 
3. SuZ, 221. 
4. suz, 224. 
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personal one-o..rc.ong-ma.ny. In the improper ; ode of being 
truth becomes a m<itter of the agreement of judgnen'cs or 
propositi0'1S >Jith objects v;hich are present (vor!~c-J.ctden). 
Truth, for Eeidegrc:er, is fundamamentdlly the openness of 
Dasein. 
Openness 
There is 
essential mdllner of being of Dcisein. 
onl so fdr and so lono as Dase~n 
el.ng, 
being 
Truth is bound up with being, and one is just as basic 
or original as the other. 
The being of truth stcJ.nds in originul com:ection 
v1ith Dctsein. "md only because Dasein, as consti-
tuted through openness, i.e., understctnding, is, 
can something lil:e being be understood in generu.l; 
only because Dasein is is it possible to understctnd 
being. There is being--not entities--only so far us 
there is truth. cmd truth is only so far and so long 
as Dase in is. Being und trii'E'h "ctre" equally original. 2 
C. Dasein and Ter,lporality 
1. Being unto death. 
The second Bain section of 3ein und Zeit is entitled 
"Dasein and TerLporality" ( Ze i tlichkei t). l'he existentiCJ.l 
analysis of Dasein in the first section l'i"-S inco:·:ulete 
in two respects: it failed to show Dctsein in its proper 
:~code of being; it also failed to show the totality of 
Dasein, viith regard to its incomplete character. In fact, 
Heidegser suggests than any serious atte>pt to gru.sp the 
1. SuZ, 226, 227. 
2. SuZ, 230. 
totality of Dasein, not merely in cross-section, as 
care, but including its tenporal aspect, is doomed to 
failure. It is open to question "r:hether an or ir inal 
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ontolot:ical interpretation of Dasein must not shipv.Teck 
on the manner of beint; of tte thematic entity itself ."1 
Dase in is unfinished business. Dase in is incomplete. 
So long as Dasein is, there is still sonething 
outstanding to it, something ".'.rlich it can and 
will be. But the "end" itself belongs to "iihat 
is outst~:,~ding. The "end" of being-in-the-world 
is death. 
An existential concept of death is needed to grasp the 
tot~:lity of Da.sein. 
Two fundamentGl ch&racteristics of D.c;sein are &1-so 
characteristics of death: death, like Dasein, is always 
mine; in death, as in Dose in, the bein" of Dasein is at 
stake. Strictly speaking, no one can die for another, 
i.e., "no one can take from another his dying. n 3 
Every Dasein must take upon itself in its time 
its own dying. Death, in so far as it "is," is 
essentially mine in every case. .And indeed it 
signifies a unique possibility of being in which 
the being of its own Dasein is absolutely con-
cerned.4-
Death as an existential phenomenon is a uni1ue, proper, 
individual possibility of Dasein in which its very being-
in-the-·world is at stake. Heidegger distinguishes bodily 
death or the loss of ore;211ic life (Verenden) from death 
a.s an existential phenor,lenon ( Sterben). 
1. suz, 233. 
2. SuZ, 234-235. 
3. SuZ, 240. 
4. suz, 240. 
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Dec:.th is the "end" of Dnsein, not in the sense in 
which rain ends or a road ends or in the fulfilrlent of 
an end (purpose) or as the loss of life of others, but 
as a manner of being of Dasein. In trw existentic,l-
o!ltological sense, dectth is a E.ode of beirtg of Dasein, 
towards its o·.m CJOssible iEoossibility. "Death is a 
::-oode of being vrl1ich De.se in tnkes over e.s scan as it is. 
'Just e.s soon as a :nan comes to life, he is old enoupl1 
to die.'"l Death, in the existential sense, is not so 
I!'UCh a ff1ct <:.s a possibility. The existential inter-
CJretG.tion is not especially concerned ·:~itl· de.~th ~'>S a 
fact. Death as a possibility of Dc.sein is extreme 
U!usserst), absolute ( schle chthinnig), proper ( e igenst), 
ir-referable (unbezUglich), c:nd insurmountable (unUber-
holbar). Death is an :Luminence (Bevorstand); it is the 
object of dread. 
Death is a possibility of being .:nlcn in every 
case ':L.sein itself i1as to tCJ.ke over. In uo':t!l 
there lS lrJminent to Dasein its o·,m rost )roper 
possibility of being. In this possibility Dcceein 
is absolutely concerned •:.·ith its o1'm bei"1g-in-the-
world. Its de<:..th is the possibility of not-being-
able-to-be-Dasein-any-longer •••• Deeth is the pos-
sibility of the c•.bsolute impossibi.lity of Dcsein. 
So death unveils itself o.s the nost oroper, lrref-
erable, insurmountable possibillty.~ 
In the everyday-ness o:C one-a.:mong-r,any ;Jasein 
flees from this possibility, 2nd is te~1pted to cover 
1. SuZ, 245. Eeidegrer's reference for the quotetion 
is n s follows: Der 'cker~w.n.n o:us Bl:ilmen, hrsg. v. 
"'· Bernt und K. Burde.ch ( Vor,l Llttelc~lter zur .-wforrt&-
tion. Forschu:1c;en zur Geschichte d0r deutschen Bild-
ung, hrsg. v. K. Burdo.c...':l, Bd. III, 2. Te il) 1917, Kp. 20, 
s. 46. 
2. SuZ, 250. 
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or hide its :_)roper rel:c.tion to death. D:;sein constcntly 
attempts to pecify itself j_n relation to deatL .:.tll the 
thought that altLou::;h "everybody dies" (l,"an stirbt), it 
is "not yet" for me. Thus, Dasein is alienated (ent-
frendet) from its proper possibility. 
The existe:->tio.l interpretc.tion of deoth is found 
in the certc.inty but undetermined "vihen" of dying. 1'i1e 
empiriccl certainty of death is a very l1igh degree of 
probability--so high that no one has doubts about the 
matter. But a type of certainty that is higher than em-
pirical is found in the existential interpretation. By 
expository definition, or because of its very ncture, 
DP.se in may die at any moment. By chs:r-e ing the bas is of 
the argument, Heidegger seeks to make the certainty of 
death apodictic. This ca:1 be done only by abandoning 
all nttcmpts to deter2ine the "when" of dee.th, for "when" 
is a matter of empirical calculation. Deeth is "certain 
and, therefore, undeternined, i.e., possible everJr GO-
ment • .,1 The existential interpretation of death is the 
"being unto death" (Sein zum Tode) of Dasein. 
Being unto death as a proper mode of being of Da-
~ is not specifically to have a rit;ht attitude tovrard 
d8ath or to be prepared for death or even to expect 
de2 th in some way. Being unto death is e:;rounded in 
care, in the sense that care, the being of Dase in, is 
concerned with possibil_ities. Being unto Jeccth is pos-
1. SuZ, 258. 
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sible precisely because Dasein is ahead of itself (ill£,-
vorweg-sein). Being unto death is a running forward 
( Vorlaufen) into the proper, irreferable, L'1surmountable 
possibility of Dasein--its own impossibility. Thus, 
being-unto-death solves the problem of gr:::sping the being 
of Dasein in its totality. To be sure, this totr,lity is 
not a sum of component parts nor an empirical total of 
all possible cases; it is a totality reached by a type 
of logical definition. By definition, Dasein is being-
unto-death, i.e., in ordinary terns, finite. Death is 
not an external occident that ends life; it is inherent 
in the very nature of Dasein. Also, Dasein is "freedom-
unto-death" (Freiheit zum Tode), because running forward 
into death means to accept finitude, i.e., being-unto-
death, as the proper, irreferable, insurr~ountable pos-
sibility of Dasein. Gaos suggests the phrase, "~ 
specie individuationis "Jer nortem" as a characterization 
of the proper mode of being, but in order to avoid the 
intellectualism of specie, changes the phrsse to "~ 
potentia individuationis per mortem," which is more in 
2.ccord v1ith Heidegger' s activism .I 
1. Jos~ Gaos, Introducoi6n ~ 
Ivhrtin Heide~ger M x co: 
oa, .c .. l95l)., 6 : He idecger would object even r~oTCJ 
strenuously to the phrase used above by the writer, 
"by definition." Heidegger does not use the term, 
"a.podictic," with respect to the certainty of death, 
but he does :1ention a type of certainty "hie;her than 
empirical." 
2. Conscience and resolve. 
Conscience and resolve are rel8teJ ~llenomenc:, by 
means of Vih ich Dase in, being first and :ctost ( zun§.chst 
und zumeist) in the improper node of one-a"l.ong-rcany, 
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is able to achieve the proper mode of being. Conscience 
( Gewissen) provides testimony that the proper Llode of 
being is an ontical-existent (existenzielle) possibility 
of Dasein. 'rhe neglect of the proper mode of being is 
what leads to the fall, and soMe means is necessary in 
order that Dasein may bring itself back out of the in-
personc:.l one-among-raany ( sichzurUckholen a us dem :r.:an). 
Dasein is lost in its everyday-ness, and needs to find 
itself in the proper way. Conscience am resolve c.re 
the means by which Dasein achieves its proper possibil-
ity of be ing-tL.'lto-death. 
Heidegger expressly warns that the discussion of 
conscience is a "purely existential undertaking with a 
fundamental-ontological purpose."1 The discussion is 
not concerned with biological or theological interpre-
tations of conscience. Neither is conscience, as here 
considered, a moral (i.e., ontical) matter. Conscience 
is a mode of being of Dasein, in which something is dis-
closed, in 'ilhich something is to be understood. 
Although "conscience is a mode of speech, ,.Z it is 
not a voice in the sense of v1ords or spoken sounds. 
l. suz, 268. 
2. SuZ, 269. 
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Nothing is nctue.lly said. "Conscience snec>ks properly 
and constantly in the mode of silence." 1 It is a call 
(!illf). Conscience culls to, or invokes ( das Beredete, 
£..1:J.., Angerufene) Dasein in the aanner of the one-among-
many itself (!C:an-sc:lbst). Conscience calls (Aufruf) 
Dasein to its proper possibility of beinc itself. The 
what of the CA.ll of conscience (was ruft) is "strictly 
speaking--nothing."2 Conscience is the call of possi-
bilities. 
Dasein is not only the hearer of the silent call 
of conscience; it is also the caller (Rufer). "In con-
science Dase in calls itself. n3 However, conscience is 
not a mere soliloc;.uy, for "the call cones out of me and 
yet upon me." 4 The caller is, indeed, Dasein, but in 
its dreaded inhospitality to the everyday mode of being. 
Conscience reveals itself a.s the call of care: 
the caller is Dase1n, dreading 1tself in the 
throvm-ness (already-being-in ... ) about its pos-
sibility of bein,r:. The called-to is just this 
Dasein 1 co.lled unto its proper possibility of bemg (aheeo-of-itself). And Dasein, throul_;h 
being called to, is called upon to come out of the 
fall in the impersonal one-among-many (already-
being-with the cared-for vlorld). The call of con-
science, i.e., conscience itself, has its onto-
logical possibilit;r in the fact tgat Dasein, in 
the ground of its being, is care. 
The positive function of conscience lies in its 
revelation of the ne.ture of care, the being of Dasein. 
1. suz, 273. 4. suz, 275. 
2. SuZ, 273. 
3. SuZ, ~75. 
5. suz, 277-278. 
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Conscience reveals the basic state of "beinp indebted" 
( schuldig sein). The Ger!:lan '•''ord, Schuld, r,eons both 
debt and guilt (sin, crL"le, fsEl t, or blame). A s mi-
lsr usere in Enclish is found in the Lord's Prayer, 
"Forgive us our debts." Heidege;er•s interprete.tion 
forbids the tre.nslation of Schuld as guilt, elthough 
the overtone of noral fault remains, esnecially when 
related to conscience and to the freedoi::. cmd responsi-
bility of choosini:! bet-;reen proper and i;-::proper modes of 
beinf'. To be indebted, existentially, is not to h:lVe 
an outstrmdinr: fimmcial obligation; it is not r::.oral 
responsibility for a fault or some evil act; it is not 
a privation or deficiency of the good. All of these 
conmon phenonena of debt (or guilt) refer to our every-
day existence in the norld with others .:.nd in tile v10rld 
of utensils. The existential concerJt of debt refers ·t;o 
nothing as the ground of possibility. '"Ihe formal exis-
tential idea of 'indebted' v:e deternine, therefore, as: 
being ground for a beir.e:; determined throuGh 8. not--i.e., 
being ground of a nothingness. nl This nothirt;ness, hovi-
ever, hss its explam:tion. Dasein cclv:Jys e:rists RS a 
thrc.m entity, in -,;hich the entity lo.e::s behind its pos-
sibilities. Dasein always is one or onother possibility, 
but in be in? one it is not and ce.nnot be others. Thrown-
ness !!8 ce ssarily irrpli8s tel[, t many 1JOSS ibilit ies are not 
1. suz, 283. 
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realized. The "not" of "notr"i.n<;ness" is tl:'e logic3l L"-
possibility of realizi:'{; all possibilities. In the ·:,hr·o\m 
d . t . f' • ~ . • 1 • ' 0 ' • ' 1 t . con l lOl'l o..: eXlSulnt;, ln 1Hl1::;_cn rreeclom lS TJ1:e e ec lOll 
of possibilities, there f~e other )02sibilities rot c~osen 
c·nd vJlic::1 could not also hPve been chosen (>'icl1tg:ew1!l:lt-
haben und Nichto.uch·.;1!hlonk1lnnen der ecncceren) . 1 
ln the structure of tilrov;nness as ·,,ell .~s in t':"t 
of project lies essentic:lly & notl:L:JgEess .... 
Co.re itself is in its essence ·Jerr"ce::_t6G. throu.;:l;_ 
3.nd throuch b;)T nothinr;ness. Co.re--the be in[; of 
Dcsern--r:.eans therefore as tlu'o·,,Tl pr0joct: being 
"She (negative) ·:round of nothir:c;ncs~. _:lnd ttrt 
~eL:.ns: Dc.zein ~-C· :::uch is i~:.deOted .c.:; 
Tlle cc~ll c:f conscic.LLCe, ---1"\e.,.. U..:'dc-'r-stcn:-: bv D~C,'e;n 
•• - ~.. .J. -..; -- ....._ ,) - •• '- ,J.. ' 
:nGebtecinE.ss. :r~eidecgel' c?.lls ti1is "',i~ll to ~-lc .... ~e con-
s c ie:'lce" ( Ge\'liPsen-h8.ben-v,-ollen) • nTo under2t .. :nd tl:e C'" 11 
means to will to have conscience ."3 This doe3 1, c __ , , r 
to desire a "good conscience," but sir;'O.ifies, in sic-pler 
l8.nguage tllc•.n l:eidegger uses, the s.cceptc.nce of radical 
finitude in all that Dc;sein is and docs. 
Heidee;cer ):roceeds to e~plain t.:_-:e co~ ~.-:_en ir .. tcr r-1re-
t2tions of cor:.science as ~~dificetio~s hicl1 Arise out 
fou.r r-\r·i:-J.ciJcl objectio:;1s to l~is theory of cor· science. 
Conscience is ccL:"lonly understood as cr·itic~l rcther 
l. SuZ, 285. 
2. SuZ, 265. 
3. SuZ, G68. 
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than positive, ::.c relc:...tive to c;necific ::lets r~ ... t_~~-er. t:tE:.n 
)er ience but '";r;_ly i:nd. ir·e ct ly i:.1. be inP P c .such, :-~ nd o.s 
bein~ good or b~d, clc~Lr cr re~orseful~ Il! sener~l, 
·.·ithout coing into details' it ~c,o_~r Ut! stPtc;c) t:,. t Lei-
degooer's L.llS'.jer t.o tlie::e objGctions is ti:.Pt lle is :J.ealinc; 
• .. ith conscience em the level of e:dsto:tci~'l c.r.s.l;,~is .:c:o.d 
ontoloey, not ~.1-t.ll conscience us s. soci~_l or :·,_o:":-=.1 :;.>he-
y-.~.onenon. In p-~~rticulo.r, conscience i:: t::ls ~-or~::l s0nce 
~eeks to lose it self in the i·•personccl onG <c ong -n:ny, 
-'•'1<'1 chus to hi•.le ·LlJe e:xistoEtial sic·nificcmce of con-
science. 
"U.nderstc_ndir.~g of the cu.ll of con.scierJ.ce ~·~~_(l_ of ~J~i~_g-
indebted. Like tho c~ll of consciorycs ~nd t~e .ill to 
1-c<: .. ve conscience, it is o. silent ~wde of speech. He solve 
is a rr:ode of' trut~1, i.e. , of t2e oyenno cs of Da se in. 
B8solve is Dosein "sileEtly projectiY:c; itself, p.ra:1cred 
scb··eigene, a~cstbereite Sichent~erfen ~uf d~s ei~enste 
.:ichu.ldiG"sein) . 1 iiesolve is t~1e :-1ost orit;inc;l truth c·f 
D;csein, because it is in the proper ~o-'lc of bein,.... .:ce-
solve e):ists only i:1 connection '.,ith tlle u::.Jderstc._nc.~i;~.'--: 
cc::tcJ projecting octivities of Dasein. The situation ;:•ro-
vides the ''where'' for ~osein to project itself. In the 
l. suz, 297. 
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limit-situation Dasein resolves to :--,cce1;t its indebted-
ness. This is the S2L1e as the proper ccode of being \Uto 
t~e end or unto deatll. :1esol ve is 71 unO.eretsnrl ing beino: 
unto the em1, i.e., run<<ing forwa.rd into death . .,l i{e-
solve is Desein projecting it:oclf into its sbsclutely 
certain possibility, i.e., de~th. ~es0lve is uot dn 
cttek;:lt to over·cor.1e death i':'. any '.oc.y, b'J.t to rllvesl or 
unveil this extreme possibility. Resolve destroys the 
o.ttec:pts of the i1Tpersonal one-a:·wng-r.wny "co cc"lcecl 
0ei'.th. I:esolve is illusionless (illucionslos), sober 
( nUchternen) u:tderst:mding. ~ 
3 • •remporu.l i ty. 
Te·1porality is introduced by :J:eidesL~or ~·.s a ne:•.ns 
h( 
of understanding tl1e neanir.g of care. c~re is t''e being 
of ::Ja.sein, but care itself' !:lUst be Jet·~er u:::1derstood. 
Cere m.c,r.ifllsts itself ordin&rily o.s the care of thincs 
(Jesoreen) or the care for others (?Ur.sorT,e). Cere us 
such rdt:ht be defined as care for oneself (:Jelbstsor;:;e), 
but this v10uld be only G. tautoloc;y. ::o·.1ever, tile ex-
pression docs le"'d tc- the probler1 of tlle connection be-
tv;een care G.nd selfness (Selbstheit) c.nd to the n11ture 
of the latter. Tlle "I" of everyday speech ,_nil the "sub-
ject" of traditional 1}]:,ilosophy are both related to the 
i"lpersonal one-among-;:umy, in ·;1hicl:c the or ir: inal, e:x is-
1. SuZ, 305. 
2. suz, 310. 
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tential selfness is hidden. Kant Ps.de a lon{': step 
tovrard a real insight into the problem, accordir'" to 
u -~ h h , . "t d .ueluegr-~er, YVJ.. en .1. e ...~...llD.l e the ap~lication of the cste-
cories to the realm of phenonenc.l cJ<perience, but he 
slipped bs.ck into the ·<;r&ditionc.l conception of ~ 
cogitans when he chars.cter ized the thinking subject as 
the logical subject, or thact v;hich binds tocetller the 
phenonena of experience. The result is a subject iso-
la ted fro'c! the v:orld, confronted vdth the problem of 
l:ow to account for the "external" vrorld from v:hich it 
is separated. For Heidegger, selfness (3elbstl:eit) is 
defined in relation to care, the beiE,; of Dasein, And to 
resolve. Gelfness is reves.led in tl:E ontolocical struc-
ture of resolve. 
':'lHct is needed to carry forward the qm~stion of the 
:meaning of care is some basis or horizon u.:;:·on v:hich care 
cPn be understood. I.:eaning (~) is the "',Jhereupon" 
(das ':loraufhin) th:J.t J:'Ltkes possible an understandin['!:. 
J,~eaning signifies the v;hereupon of u,e primary 
project, on account of Vlhich somethinf" can be 
conceived in its possibiJity of beinr- ,,hat it 
is. Projecting opens possibilities, i.e., 11vhat 
makes possible •••• The projected is the being of 
De.sein .:ma_ incleed open in that v:hic:1 constitutes 
it as proper possibility of bein~ ,_,;hole. The 
':,"hereupon of projected, open being, so constituted, 
is thP.t -,Ihich ~2kes possible this very constitution 
of beinf" c.s care. The question about the me :en ir-,g 
of care inquires: what nakes Jossible the totalit 
of the articulr.ted s rue ura care ln 1e 
unity of its varied members~ 
1. SuZ, 324. 
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W-eaning is provided throue;h the projecting CJctivity of 
Dssein. The meaning of the being of Da.sein is "Dasein 
itself Wlderstand ing it self. "l 
The ansvier to this quest for a. vantage point (a 
whereupon) from Hhich to understs.nd the possibility of 
care, he., of the being of Dasein, is tenporcclity 
( Zeitlichkei t), which Heidegger also characterizes as 
original time (ursprUngliche Zeit). 
Care is essentially ahead of itself ( sich-vorweg), 
and, consequently, projects itself into its possibili-
ties. In this •·ay it reveals the approach of the fu-
ture. Dasein cmles into its ovm possibilities, and 
especiE>.lly into its proper possibility, death. Care 
is "already" (schon) in the world, which :c.eans that it 
is (in English, has) been (gewesen). So long as Dasein 
is, it is being-been (r;ewesend). As soon as Dasein no 
longer is, it "has been," i.e., it becorccs a thir'g that 
v;as present in the ps.st ( Ge;w.ngenhe it). Care is toe;ether-
with (sein-bei} the v.orld of others and of innerworldly 
entities. Dasein is thus in the :node of being present 
(gegenw1!rtigen}. Ter1porality is the unity of this triple 
structure: being been-presenting-approach ( e:ewesend-
2 gegenw1lrt igende -Zuku.'lft) • The term Zukunft must be 
translated "future," and will from no•·• on be so trc:.ns-
lated by tlle writer. But Heidegger definitely uses the 
l. SuZ, 325. 
2. SuZ, 326. 
111 
term as a noun derived from the verb, zuko=en, v1i1ich 
rreans to come to, to approach, to rec.ch, to be due, or 
to belong to. Future, for Eeidegger, means to apnro~ch 
itself (auf sich zukomnen lassen). .i!'uture is related to 
running forward into possibility, or the apnroo.ch of the 
one proper, irrefero.ble, o.nd insurm.ountable CJossibility, 
death. The future for Dasein is the apnroach of the fi-
nal possibility. Temporality is the unity of this artie-
ulated structure of care. Past, present, and future in 
the c omrnon unde rsto.ncl ing of t i"f'.e rerna i.n so separ,· ted, 
accordiD£ to Heidegger, that it is impossible to con-
struct a unity out of the three elements. Past, present, 
and future, subjective and objective time, irmnanent and 
transcendent tirne--all of these alike are rejected by 
He idegger c.s inadequate conceptions of time. Te"'porality 
itself !"LlY eaeily be rrisconceived as an entity ( Jeiendes); 
it is better to speak, not of tempore.lity, but of te,,1pori-
zations (Zeitip;ungen). "Temporality 'is' in general no 
entity. It is not, but temporizes itself" (zeitigt sich). 1 
This leads to the characterization of temporality as ec-
static, or outside itself ( ausser-s ich) . "Tenporality is 
the original 'outside-itself' in and for itself." 2 The 
three ecstasies of time are future, been, and present. 
Although the three ecstasies s.re essentic.lly a ur;ity, as 
ecstasies the future is of primary i-":portance. 
1. suz, 328. 
2. SuZ, 329. 
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J"ust as ce.re is being-unto -death, so ter-1poro.lity, 
es the mesning of care, is likewise related to its own 
end. Temporality is finite (endlich). The argument 
for the finitude of original time is chiefly the fact 
that the future closes or finishes the possibility of 
Dasein, end thus opens the possibility of nothing. 
The affimntion of the finitude of temporo.lity 
(original time) gives rise to the problem of "objective" 
ti.rne. He idegger nffirns the legit irnacy and a positive 
answer to the questions about a time th11t "goes farther" 
than Dase in and o. future out of v:hich will come an un-
limited nanifold of things (unbeschr!lnkt vieles) . 1 But 
the possibility of an "objective" tL>Ie as suge;ested in 
these questions "contains no objection to the finitude 
of original temporo.lity." 2 
Its finitude !'leans not primarily o. ceasing, but 
is D charo.cter·istic of tenporiz;:otion itself. The 
orieinal and proper future- is the "unto itself" 
to itself, existing as the insur:ncunt'1ble possi-
bility of nothingness. The ecstatic choracter of 
the origino.l future lies just in the fact t~,:cit it 
finishes the possibility of being, i.e. 1 it is it-
self finished rtnd c.s such it makes posslble the 
resolved existe!'t understanding of nothingness. 
The oricinal and proper appronching-u'lto-oneself 
is the Ne ~ning of existing in the proper nothirw-
ness.3 
The discussion of temporality U"J to this Doint is 
sm:IDJarized in four theses, 2s follows: 
l. suz, 330. 
2. suz, 330. 
3. suz, 330. 
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Tir;1e is originally e.s terc,porizat ion of te'>eporGlity, 
as that ";Thich r12.kes possible tl1e constitution of 
the structure of care. Temporality is es:oentially 
ecst&tic. Temporality tem:c>orizes itself ori&:ine.lly 
out of the future. Original tir;Je is finite)_ 
These four theses characterize tl!e "ter,Jporal" inter-
pretction r'zeitliche" Internrctation), sccordinp, to 
;,hich ter.1porality provides the where upon, the horizon, 
or vantage point, fro)Tl which the entire and proper being 
of Dasein may be grasped. T~<porolity must be grasped 
8 nd held fast. Then, e.nd only then, -ilill it be possible 
to develop the derived conceptions, such •~s everyday-
ness (All tliglichkeit), historicity ( Ges cllichtlichkei t), 
the ·tirae of innerworldly things (Innerzeitie;keit), the 
common underst'lnd ing of ti:-:1e, r.nd so fo:tth. The pro-
posed third ·1ain section of Sein m1e Zeit, entitled 
"Zeit und Sein," would sup;Josedly hcve been an inter-
pretation derived fro!'! t:1e origine.l tenpor:•lity. In 
fact, the rem<?,ininc che.pters of the published portion 
of the work <ne largely devoted to the relfltions between 
this origins.l, finite ter-_porality to three derived cor.-
ceptions of time: everydayness, historicity, ccn!' the 
cornnon concept of t:Lme. 
Temporality, olthou0;h a unity, c11LS ;:n articulated 
structure. The various ezistentials J.k_ve tl1eir r8spec-
tive te;:~Jornl ecstasies, even thouch ~:,,--. ur'ity of tern-
pornl i ty is invol vod. in es.cf~ of therrt. 1..Tnderst'1n::1 ir~ 
1. SuZ, 331. 
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tel'lpori?es itself }riraarily in the future, either' in 
the proper 'Jode of running forward i-:tto dc21th or tl:e 
bprojJer ::'.ode of e:xpe ctancy. Findi':1t;ness, · .. lcicL i:ces to 
do chiefly ~ith mood and psychic condition, tL~porizes 
itself pr:in;arily in tho "been" ecstasy, eit:10r in the 
proper mode of re iter:::.t ion ( ,dederholurw) or 'Che j'~ Jro;Jer 
"'Ode of ob1_jvion (Ver:;:essen;l.sit). The fC'llen condition 
cf Dasein terporizes itself chiefly in the pros3•ct, usu-
ally in t~e ir:proper '".ode of being present in tLo cease-
less, inordinate desire for novelty and the state of 
beins v•ithout :.; residence or stopPing pls.ce (.;ufeEti , ·'-j_ lJ .~-
losigkeit). "'·o1vever, even in the fcllen st:::.te, Desein 
::ay cor.;e to 2 pro)er gresent, in the moment ( -~Ufjenblick), 
in ·.:hich the l:Lit situB.tion cones clec:rly into focus. 
':pee ch is G•"ounde,l in 'Ghe unity of temporality, ,-,nd no 
cussion es follows: 
Understanding is rrounded prir.1aril~' in tl-•.8 future 
(rurmint; for,,crd or being expectant). Findingness 
temporizes itself pri;:narily in the been (I'eiter-'l-
tion OI' oblivion). T;w fall is ter.1::;or::;.lly rooted 
0')r~cr'ily in the present (presenting or noment). 
Feverthele;cs, untlerstanding is iE co very casE "being 
been" present. Hevertheless, findinfness tet·cporizes 
itself as "Pl"esentinc" future. I;evertheless, tl1e 
present 11 r:.rises" ov_t of or is supported b:t a future 
that is "beine: been." Tl:ereby it beco:nes visible 
tlwt: tet:JTJOre.lit,- tem orizes itscl::" as a whole in 
ever! ecs asy, 1.e,, 1n ""e ecs'Gc\ 1c urn y o · ne 
coi"D~ete tew oriz::ttion of tem orc-,llt'- 12 c rounded 
1n every cc.se o ::1 l y o · t.J.LC s"L~ruc me~ vr o e 
of existence, factuality, and the fc.ll, t:'lc.t is, t:1e 
un1ty of the structure ci care.! 
1. suz, c:5o. 
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'4 • Everyda.yness. 
In the pro.ctical c:,ctivities of dc:ily livircg Dasein 
forc;ets itself and loses itsslf ii' its c,;ork, in tlle m·:1-
agement of things as instruments. :0'orgetting itself and 
letting itself conform (bev:enden lassen) to a workaday 
world are improper ter1porizations of :Jasein. In the 
change of point of vievr from the prs.ctical use n:r>d r1an-
agement of things to the contemplation of thera as merely 
present T':'.P.y be seen the origin of science. T:i.1ine;s at 
hrmd (Zuhandenen) becoue things present (VorlnJC.denen) 
VIi th the change in the point of vie vi from v;ll ich they are 
considered. The SGllle harcmer Yihich is too heavy for the 
task at h<1ild may also be considered apart from the v1ork 
situation as an object llavir.g "he2.viness" or weight 2.s 
a property. Science is a secondary "lodif icat ion of a 
more original ,;:>r~ctical, managing cor1prei1ension of things. 
Eeidegger' s me.in objection to traditional ontology is 
that the knovdedge gained in abstract conter~plation by 
a spectator subject, separated frm: its v10rld, inevitably 
reduces its objects to things present ( Vorllandenen). 
-.nwt science needs, according to Heidegger, is to recog-
• 
nize that it is a r.wdification of a :TlOre original, pro.c-
tical, "handling" knowledge of things, and that science 
depends upon practice just as much as practice requires 
adeqUa. te theory. In general, the chc:crif;e from prRctice 
to theory is a different point of view frorQ v1hich to 
consider the same entity. TI1e modification results 
from the fact that "we look et the er.countered thine: 
c.t hand in a 'new' way, as smuethine present."l The 
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most important part of science, then, is thematization, 
i.e., the foTilE,tion of an articulated system of concepts. 
Thematization is >:hat gives objectivity to science and 
its objects. "Thematization objectifies."2 Objectivity 
is not sorwthing Dasein finds in the things it encounters; 
it is a product of Dasein. The objectification >::hich is 
characteristic of natural science presupposes transcend-
ence, v1hich, in turn, is grounded in the ecstatic ne.ture 
of temporelity. 3 
Two things, in the opinion of the v1riter, are of 
sDecial inportance in Heidegger's account of the trccns-
cendence of the '.JOrld. The first is the ecstatic nature 
of temporality; the second is the finite nature of ten-
porality, or the fact that it has a "horizon." Tenpo-
rality is ecstatic; it is outside itself; it extends it-
self. In similar fashion the vmrld is Dase in, in its 
temporality, beyond itself, outside itself, extending 
itself. Transcendence is another nane for the ecstatic 
character of te!".porality. The unity of sicnific:cmce 
( Bedeutsa.'llkei t) constitutes a world; world is a caec:ning-
1. suz, 361. 
2. SuZ, 363. 
3. The problem of the transcendence of tile world is one 
of the most difficult parts of He idegger' s philosophy, 
and, consequently, subject to varied interpretstions, 
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ful set of references, all havint their roots in care, 
the being of Dasein, or in temporality. 
Insofar as Dasein te:r;porizes itself, a world also 
is. '.!ith regard to its being as ter::porolity, Dasein, 
!Bmporizing itself, on the ground of the ecstatlc-
horizontal constitution of ter:pors.lity essel'tially 
is "in a \,urld." The ':;orld is neither pref'ent nor 
at hand, but temuorizes itself in temporc,lity. It 
"is" "there" with the outside-itself of the ecstas;j.es. 
If no Dasein exists, neither is any Forld "there. nl 
The horizon of temporality provides the "whereupon" 
from which a world can be disclosed, i.e., made open, 
and upon which the very possibility of a world depends. 
The existent ial-tem. oral condition of the ness i-
bL l - o e wor les lll em o-
ra l y as ecs a lC unl y 
horizon.2 
The horizon (Horizont) of temporality refers to its lin-
ited character, i.e., its finitude. Temporality can be 
a unit, a whole, only on the basis of its finitude, and 
this horizontal unity (a unity provided by horizon} is 
a prerequisite to the "objectified" or transcendent world. 
"Bein,s P"rounded in the horizontal unity of ecstatic tem-
porality, the 'lmrld is transcendent. n 3 The problem of 
the objectification of the world c.nd of the innerv10rldly 
entities encountered within it c2cn be solved only by 
reference to the ecstatic-horizontal temnorality i11 which 
transcendence is founded. He idegger ant icipo. te::: the 
chcrge of subjectivity, and ansv~ers it as follows: 
1. suz, 365. 
2. suz, 365. 
3. SuZ, 366. 
If the "subject" is ontologically conceived es 
existing Dasein, whose bcil'.g is grounded in tem-
porality, then it must be said that the world is 
"subjective." This "subjective" world, hm;ever, 
as te>r:porc.lly-transcendent, is tten "more ob je c-
tive" thc;.n any possible"bbject ."1 
T'J.e spatiality of Dasein is likewise crounded in 
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the ecstatic-horizontal unity of ter:1pornlity. "Dn.sein 
takes in space--literally."2 Direction 'md distance 
E·.re not mech~nical, but are characteristics of Dasein 
and its being-in-the-world. Distance (.c;ntfernung--
un-far-ness) signifies the activity of De.sein in its 
bringiEg things "near" in the sense of interest or con-
cern. 
Everydayness (Allt!!glichkeit), fron v.hich a full 
chapter of Sein und Zeit gets its title, is discussed 
specifically in a brief concluding section of the cha.p-
ter. Everydayness has to do Vlith the "how" (das ::ie) 
of existing, not vlith the content of life. "J>veryday" 
means the dominant I;J.ode of a lifetime, not a sum of all 
its days nor any kind of counting by neans of a calendar. 
The expression, "fir-st and rr,ost" (zun!lchst und zuc;;eist) 
characterizes everydayness. "First" means the way in 
which Dasein lives its public life v1ith others; "most" 
does Iiot necessarily mean alvrays, but "o.s a rule." There 
may be brief periods of domination over everydayness, in 
e r.wment (~mgenblicl;:), but only for a aoment (fUr den 
Aur;enblick) • J:verydayness my never be done m;sy v.ith 
completely. 
l. suz, 366. 
2. SuZ, 368. 
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5. Historicity. 
The chapter on "'l'e1:porality c1nd :~istoricity" is 
lCJ.rcc;l:r a discussion of tile tc::::::JOrality of Dasein ·:.·ith 
re :ooct to its beginning (birth) and its exte~sion 
"betvmen" birth and death. ;'istorici ty is bJ.sed u:oon 
te~::Jorctlity. The ne[\.:tive side of the Sdj,,e thesis is 
that Dasein is not ter:::Joral because it is "in history," 
but is historicul becauce it is bCJ.sic .. lJ.y te;,::ooral. 'I'he 
chapter c1lGO contdins a :iiSCUSSiOn of 'Jorld-history u.nd 
critical, corrobor&tive refere!!ces to the theories of 
Dilthey und Count Yorck. 
The discussion of birth, death, "'nd ·,;hut li:s "be-
tv;een" then is, in ti1e opb.ion of the nri ter, Es ideg:·er' s 
way of stating th,tt birth ctnd death ..;.::e not e:xterr:dl 
l:iJ~i ts iEYJosed u·oon hu.n;an life, but <:Ee co11s ti tuti ve of 
its nct·cure. 'l'he unity of life re:1uires both birch "'nd 
death. 
The fdctual Dasein exists beir.g-born, und heine-
born it dies alreudy in the sense of beiYJ['; W.'1to 
o.ec.th. Both "ends" eJ.nd their ,.between" are, so 
lor.p us Do.sein fa.ctually exists; und they are, 
a.s is only possible, on the beJ.sis tha. t che being 
of Dase in is care. In the unity of throvnmess und 
the fleei~G orrunninc-forv1a.rd bsinc unto death, 
birt~ ,:nd death "hang ~og~ther" in the :fort of 
DaseJ.n. .cs care, Daseln l2 the "bet•:reen," 
The co!mection or conti .. :uity (ZuscL.:r:!enilclllg--hunp:ing 
toF:ether) of life is grounded in ter.:ooru.lity. .lh.tt hap-
pens (das Geschehen) in te~.1porality l:iay be spoken of a.s 
1. SuZ, 374. 
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l"ovint;ness (Bev,e,tb_eit) or extension (.c;rstreckune). 
Lovingness is distbe;uished from the motion (Bewegung) 
of entities uElil:e Dasein. 
The :"'lOVincness of exi.st·sn.ce is !'_ot !Y':Jtic:n of so~1e­
thing present. It deter~ines itself out of the ex-
tension of Dasein. Tb.e specific T"_ovincrless of the 
exten~ed extend1nc-itself ve call the hapuenin~ 
of bsse1n. The q_uest1on e.bout the "contJ:n_ult;.' of 
D0se1n 1s t::e ontological problem of its h~T·'"Jerin[;. 
The li:yinc free of the structure of l:unneni;:r 9nd 
its e::isteLtic:.l-teuporsl conditions of possi'6ility 
s i,?Tify the ':.rin]_ ing of an or:tclot:ic~.l und erstr:nd ing 
of liistoricity. 
Historicity (Geschichtlichkeit) is rootecl in · .. ,Lot hap-
'0ens (Geschehen), i.e., in the tenpor2lity of Do.sein. 
Le idec,ner stc_te s t":c c;_ in of the d. is CL::.~ s ion ? s fo llo;_:., s: 
( vulp:'lre Verst~ndnis) to refer to tte co1:.:-:on understand.-
( irmer·.e1tliche) ec,tities . 
.sidere'Qle le.cl: of precision i:-1 the LR8 c-.L' t,~rL.s. Tn 
the first plc.cG, the science of L.i~tory C=i.::tor ie, for 
ity ( :-c:cchicht1 iche Wirklicc~'::eit). Clut even history in 
1. Su7,, 375. 
2. dUZ., 376. 
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t~1i3 ,_,~t .:r :·,; ZE tcs at least four possible meanings: 
1. what is past, as an event that belongs to history; 
2. what comes out of a past, i.e., as e,n or it; in, o ue-
coming, a development; 3. -.lhP 'c is human or related. to 
the h\l:'l'-'.'1 in ti7'1e, EJ .g~, culture; ~.:1':1_, 4. tr2i'ition. 
HeideJJer ~L~lyzes in co!~e det~il the first of 
these r:en.nings, in nn ·?.tteL_:pt to clarify the C02'1.c·:;_:.-;t of 
history. 
object is still present. Its post-ness liss in t:;e :r~ct 
ttc.t the -,;orld to ,.,'~:Ceil it oelong0l1 :-s a pert is no lonGer 
the "1Useurc. pi<:JCe belo;,Ged is a '.,;orlcl OiJject.ifieli uy Dac:eil1. 
D2sein itself is ~ever ~~st, because ''~·-st'' refers to 
things. Dasein is been. D~:sein is i:listoric~_l (.-ssc1;icl:t-
2ra ·,Jorld-;;istar ical ( .:slt-cescilichtliche). Tl1e letttcr 
i$ c:. secondJ.r:;, ~erived concept. The ~Jrlinc:ry l-~~-.storicity 
of Dasein nay :J.lso be s:pol~en of 2s its free:loEl :Lor dec:tll, 
its fate ('icLicksal) or individuc,l G.c;:otiny. Sociul des-
tiny ( Geschick, for T:eiclegger) is the hcc::•neJ~ inc of Dr:se:i.n 
v.ith others (t~it€;esche:1s:1). lndividuc~l fate or (;._:_stiny 
(Schicksc..l), TllliC~l is c.lso proper historicity, is r:~de 
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possible by proper tedpor'llity. De~th, debt, conscience, 
freedom, .md finitude, o.s they e.re u~·ited in cc~re, c:re 
:-11 chRrzcteristics of t:1e entity t~1c:.:.t is ori[-_in~--.llJ;-- l:Lis-
tor ical. Finitude S.:Y1Jec.rs to 1oe "~..-.c·.J;',....".-'1'7ou" il" '!l."t~r·•r '-' '.:.. ~+ J_ ......... ~-' -- ;_ l '--' '--' " ' 
of firjte freejoL: c;nd the finite te~~_:Jorelity V1hicL T"'ll:cs 
destiny possible.l 
Reiter?tion ( ,;iederholung) is tLo proper Fode by 
Y'hich D12sein deals ••:ith its "been." l•1.t just beca.use 
reiteF.t:on is c. proper node of bein,", it is grcunded 
yrincipo.lly in the future, in tl:e projectin[; of ~;:.:_sein 
int:; its ::;ost j!roper }lossibility. 
I' is tory :;s 12 :::ode of being of D:.1.se in l;.:-s its root 
so essentiAlly in the future t!ie:c death CiS the 
charo.cterized possibility of Dnsein tin·ov.;s t>~ 
rUIL't1 ing-forl.'iard sYiste11ce bc.ck onto its f.::-;ctual 
thrO\fl1ness, ~~n(l so fiTst crc..nt 8 tc beenness 1-Es 
proper )rL:2.cy i:: the historicGl. "ProDer oeiTit) 
lil:to death, i.e., the finitude of teo::nor:1lity, 
is the lost .:-round of the historic1t. of U?..sein. 
D::tsern does not .crrsc eco211e nls orlCEc l:n rel er-
ation, but because it, :;s tempor::tl, is historical, 
it cru1, reitei''-J.ting ~tself, to.ke _possession cf it-
self in its llistory.G 
·.:orld-history, although be.sic~.lly rooted ir. the 
historicity of Dasein, represents an irr,)roper or .::': llen 
D::se in is concerr.e d ... itll the Horld of t:tings "nd o:'.' others. 
others r.s i~cs unity \iith Dasein or tLe \mrld of things-
1. SuZ, 384,385. 
2. SuZ, 386. 
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at-hu.nd and th:L">gs present. In dny c:1se, 'Jorld -history 
has to do vii th tho fallen, improper, everydccty c Ee of 
Dasein as carine:-for-others _,_nd tu..'dng-care-of things. 
The science of history (Historic) is possible be-
cause the historian is Dasein, and, conse1uently, his-
torical reality is open to him. 'I'he scironce of :cistory, 
in all its activities and investigdtioo,s, "presunoosos 
the historicity of the e:-:istence of the historian. "l 
The science of lcistory is not a mutter of recordinc or 
re:oeatinc facts; it is concerned o .. 'ith .oossibEity. 
Eeither the individua.l fctcts nor the universal lav!S 
dre the objects of the science of history. 
Feither the events thu.t hdp~oen only once nor J. 
universal sus:oended over them is its thene, but 
the factudlly existing, been possibility. This 
is not reiterated as such, i.e., properl:r under-
stood ds historical science, if it is converted 
into the· :oaleness of a suprJ.tenpare<l r.:odel. Only 
factual, proper historicity, dS resolved indi vid-
Udl destiny, is able to open the becn-ti1ere history 
so thctt in reiterdtion the ":o ·vrer" of the -,)ossible 
strikes into fccctual existence, i.e., it co:-.1es 
upon it j_n its futurity.2 
The science of history temporizes itself out of the 
future. 'rhis grounding of the science of his tory in 
the future "nd in the realm of possibility guar~ntees, 
for ::eidegc:er, the only Vdlid objectivity such u 
scie:r.ce cCin have. 
Heidegger refers to the nork of iiietzsche, Dilthey, 
1. SuZ, 394. 
2. SuZ, 395. 
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anQ Count Yorck in the field of the science of history. 
The reference to nietzsche calls attention to tLe triple 
but unified nature of the science of history, G.s sug-
gested by Nietzsche. The reference to Dilthey is con-
cerned v.ith I-Ieidegger's appropriation of the hermeneu-
tical method. The correspondence of Count Yorck with 
Dilthey is quoted at length by Heidegc-er, in order to 
show that the Count insisted upon a sh2.rp distinction 
between the on tical ?nd the historical, or, in He idegger 1 s 
terminology, between the tenrporal existence of Dase in &nd 
the being-present of contemplated objects (Vorh<:mdensein). 
6. The common coCJcept of time. 
The "t:ine" of inneraorldly entities is a derivation, 
accordinn: to Eeider;zer, from, ori~inol tcnyorality. Like 
the innervmrldly entities .nd the "/Orld to v,hich these 
entities belong, this "time" is an objectification of a 
basic, oric;inal te::rrporization of Dasein. De.se in is con-
cerned vlith "time," in the s2ns e tl:at it has time for this 
or that 2.ctivity, it takes, uses, 'lnd loses tine. The 
cwJ'lon concept of time ( vulgMre Zeitber,riff), I:eideg"'er 
seeks to der10nstrate in the final chapter of Sein und Zeit, 
is the result of abstrs.ction End levelling (l:ivellierui:g) 
of originc,.l temDorality. "The common concept of tiMe owes 
its ori::dn to a levelling of original tine."1 
1. suz, 405. 
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Dasein in its fallen, everydciy st-ite tc;_kes c.~re of 
(Besorgen) things and cares for (FUrsorge) others in the 
v.'orld. The conE::.on underste1:-cding of t L1e is based U~)on 
these caring activities .:.1nd the "tir:.e" necessuri1y in-
valved in them. T'nis "time" of Dasein• s cctres nay be 
characterized a:= date-able ( datierbar)' stretched c~~­
spannt), public (ver13ffentlich), and v:or1dly (.ieltzeit) • 
.iill analysis of date-ableness (Datierbctrkeit) shm1s 
that events, cdres, and interests are fir2t a Llcitcer of 
references in Dasein, such as, "at thut tir:e, nhen ... ," 
"now th't " or "then "'hen 11 J._ ,., ' a • • • ' - ' . ,. • • • • De1te-ableness is the 
reference of succession through Dasein, to other eveEts, 
conditiO''S, instrur:·ents, cares, and interests. DJsein 
lives in a v:orld of instrunents or utens j_ls ( Zullc;ndenen), 
und has its own basic reb.tions to t'.le te:':Joral references 
involved in their use. These ter:tuoru.l references, uccord-
ing to Eeideg.:~er, are more bu.sic them calendars ~nd '::c-tches, 
even 'lore bc.sic thc:.n the scientific, objective (cind there-
fore more u.bstrctct) cons idert.~.tion of time. In f,"ct, the 
levellinB of all "now, that" references into tJ. series 
without qualitative differences is 0recisely one of the 
stens in the creation of the com on conce'Jt of tir.;e as 
..:in infinite series of "nows." 
l'he second chc1racteristic of the "tine" i>J.vol ved in 
Dasein's cures is its stretchedness (G€s:rx.mntheit). This 
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stretchedness is rooted in the extended nature of ec-
static temporality. "Then" r.1eans during bree.kfast or 
last summer. "How" !'leans this evening or while we eat. 
Time to do something or tL'1le for some event refers to a 
sitwJtion, end the time in question is stretched, en-
during. The stretchedness of this time also hc~E' its 
c;aps or discontinuities. The gaps are not s dismember-
ment (Zerstrfickelur£), but a mode of opened, ecstatically 
extended tempors.l ity. Dase in has time for so!'le things 
?nd not for others; Dasein takes tine for this snd that, 
or loses time in meaningless, unresolved activity. Da-
sein can take or lose time only because its ovm temporal-
ity is limited, beco.use a "time" is allotted to it. 
Dasein, fr:ctually throvm, can "take" time end 
lose it only'""oec•~use to Dasein, as ecstaticolly 
extended temporsli ty, a "time" is allotted, along 
with the there-openness, grounded in temporality.l 
Dasein exists factually viith others, :mCI the date-
2.bleness of its ovm ti.ue is constc.ntly rel<~ted to the 
titrres of others. Through calculation 2.nd ti:-Je-rockoniag, 
Dasein, in its everydayness, :'T!akes time public. Public 
time (Clffentliche Zeit) is based upon the thrown.necs of 
Dasein, upcn the fact that Dasein exists, =c fallen, in 
a world of cares. In its cares, Dasein necessarily cal-
culs.tes its time, because its time is linited. 
Because Dasein essentially exists as falling and 
thrown, it cares for and interprets its tir.e in the 
Tiode of a calculation of time. In this mode the 
1. SuZ, 410. 
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"proper" Juulic-ation of time ter::porizes itself, 
so tlwt it ""USt be said tho.t the throl'mness of 
Dasein is the e;round for the f3ct that there "is" 
public hme .1 
This "public tir,e" is the ti:,1e in vrhich occur and are 
encountered innerworldly entities. Thus, the entities 
within the world "s.y b8 spoken of e.s in!'.ertenporal 
( inner ze i tie;) • 
The transition fro;u public time to '.'lorld tir.:te 
(Weltzeit) is made by reference to prir.:titive rmd nod-
ern Cllethods of telling :.nd calculating tL,;e. The sun 
as an instrUlllent is 2. universal clock, first in the 
sense that it rn.r:cs the tiJ,:e for 1':ork. In additio'1, 
hcT.'ever, its regular return into the sky ·Lich coen have 
in common is, fol' Heidet;ger, another indicction of the 
finitude of ori~inal time. 
C<>rine makes use of the s.t-hand clw.racter of the 
sun v:l1ich gives licht J.nd heat. The; sun d2.tes t:1e 
tir.:te interpreted in caring. Out of tLis dPtill{; 
there gro"~xs the "Elos t na turnl" neasure of tir!le, the 
day. And because the tempor2lity of DaseL'1, v/.1ich 
iws to take its tir.:te, is finite, its dRys also are 
already counted.2 
The day :Cormed by the sun's passace thro·,,c;h the s~cy r"e,.::ns 
tir.:te for the day's v:ork, for caring. T:1e cay is a tine 
to.... T:lis referential nature of ti:ne, t:m;ever, is pre-
cisely s. char:?,cteristic of the '.rorld, grounded in ··:orld-
lines:s, or -::;:1e sie;nificc..nce of A ,·,.'hole of references. 
1. SuZ, 412. 
2. SuZ, 413. 
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,., ld t. 
. rOT - lllle , consequently, he.s the ss~e rL,lation to teu-
porelity as world bos to Yiorldlin"ss. 
Publicized tbe reve<>ls •.,ith t:lis in-order-to 
reference, the structuTe ~:~-hich ~,'G :-:a de knov.m. 
eRrlier ~s si5nificance. Significance constitutes 
the -, orldliness of' the 1:orld. ?ublici:zed time, as 
tine-to •.. , has essenti~lly tho c;u:a·:ccter of world. 
There fore, ;e c~ ll the time ,;h ich rcnl:e s itself _;JUb-
lic in t'Je tec1;ooriz tion of to;:--,ornlity the 1Jorld-
t:L.'1le. T'J is is do Fe :1ct be cause it, c:s an inner-
~dlv 8"'•~ it" l'" ·'TP"ent - -~·' cl· l't Cc•'' never be V1;Dr.L _,; __ v __ ,y, .__ .,_.1 ,__,.._, , ,, __ ..L __ ._ .... d.l .~.~ , 
but because it belongs to the '.IOrlc1 i'1terpreted in 
the e:xiste:•tial-ontoloc'lcetl sei!:::e ,1 
World-tiE:e is t'ce ti~•e within ·::':.icl: :'.•me;:;_·· orldly entities 
are eEcm:.ntere:L Presenting is t::G "'"'-)ori:zatior; of ten-
]Orc•.lity L1 -.-:.ict ·,·or;_c-time is f;TOU!1ded. 'Nor.:Cc-ti:·e ::~s 
"tl1e s .. u.:e trdnsccc.:rclence as the wm·ld. n2 ::Lt is nat "ob-
jective," as being in itself; ncit]ccr· !_c it so.bj:ctive, 
as appearing in a .:<.·bject. 
same 
WorE-tine is "more objective" t::.• .. : cev8ry 1)0Ssible 
object iJec:-uso it, :•.s 'c'J.e corJdition o:o tlle possibil-
ity of inner\·,orldly entities, i:o .l.coa:Iy in every 
ccc:;c ecstatic:J.lly-hor-;:z;o,:tally "objectified" along 
with the opennecs of the -,;orld •....• o:tJ.d-tirce, how-
ever, is c~l so 't.J., ... ore sub j8 ct ive 11 th:=-n every possible 
subject because it, riP"htly uu'Je"'stood c:c t:,e ;,tecning 
of care, 'oLe be in[" of the factua Ily exictL-'G self, 
te_kes part in J.~aking this baing :pc):._.~:~ible :: .. t ::ll. 
uTit1:e"' is neitb2r 1)resent in the 0 Subject 1: nor pres-
ent in t:1e object, neither "within" nor "outside," 
urJCl "is" "prior" to eve-:y subjectivitJ ~nd objec-
tivity, becE.use it l'Gpresents t:1e condition of tl1e 
possibilit~ even for t::.is "prior. n Tl'~cn docs it l1.c.ve 
a "being"?V 
The question cf 'che "being" of tiJ:rre r·u.ns into the 
limits.tior.s :_nn G.ifficulties r-2 pre b le:•1 of the 
1. suz, 414. 
2. suz, 419. 
3. SuZ, 420. 
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relation of truth and being. The third, 'lll-ir.morLmt, 
nain section of Sein und Zeit was to have b·3en <.J.n an-
svrer to this question. In any case, Heidegg8r concludes 
the discusei.on of Ylor1d-ti.r.e by etati::tr, tlldt it consti-
tutee the innertcl.!1JOI'd.lnees of the ,,·mrld of thio-e:s ett-
hcind ,.ind things present, dnd that it has its ground in 
te::.noral i ty. 
The conr-·on understandi.ng of tine grov;s out of the 
thooretic<.J.l consider:.:.tion of world-t:i.rle or inncrt8I"1JO-
ralness. The basic ::ode of tesnorizcttion of \iorld-t:L'e 
is the present. The concrete now of an e::isting fuse in 
is a nov1 that may be dated in relation to other Celres. 
It is a now thdt is stretched to include durdtion, or 
tine enough to do so:::ething. The levelling or abstruct-
all nov1s alike and to nlace them in a connected series. 
The comn:on concept of time is a success ion of noHs, in 
which everything occurs, in which things are preeent 
(vorhanden). Date-ableness (in relation to a specific 
experience of Dasein) and significance (~udlitative dif-
ferences) are lost in the levelling of 1mrld-tine into 
a series of nows. The series is uninterrupted ~nd VIith-
out gaps, in order to l"lake the series consister.t. md 
finally, the nost :i.rJ;nortant fe""ture of the con-,mon con-
cc·0t of tL:1e is its infinity; there is no sto::rJinc;-:olace 
for the scriss. "If the chc.ra.cter of tiL~e is he.~.d pri-
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marily ond exclusively to this series, then fundamentally 
neither bee; inning nor end CP.n be found in it as cuch. ,l 
The atten'Jt to think the series through to its ercl neces-
sarily fails, =nd time is conceived as infi,_ite. 
A further characteristic of t'1e co~1mon understanding 
of tir:e is its irreversibility. :wt ti.!.:e as e. series of 
nm;s '.·:i thout qu::lity or duration provides 1~0 ex)lane.ticn 
for "che ir:reversible character of the series. On the 
other hand, o.ccording to Heidegger, t!1e finitude of tem-
porality, '."ith its definite limits, provides a ground for 
irreversibility. 
The Lrr.poseibility of a reverse h:.s its crG··-'nn in the 
origin of ~oublic ti:1e out of temnorality, in .1hich 
the tem.porization, primarily i!l the future, ecsta.t-
ically "goes" to its end, indeed, in such a way that 
it already "is" unto the end.2 
The derived nature of the comnon concept of time, 
hov;ever, does not mean that such a concept is to be re-
futed s.nd cast aside. "The common representation of tir_:,e 
has its natural rir;ht." 3 The co=on concept belongs to 
the everyday, fallen condition of DaseL'1, and is, in a 
sense, a necessary derivation. The very fact of its de-
rived nature justifies, for Eeidec:;ger, his speRking of 
te1:1pore.lity as original time. 
Heideg.:cer presents briefly some referer;ces to the 
views of time in Aristotle, Hegel, o.nd in :Jergson (in E. 
l. SuZ, 424. 
2. SuZ, 426. 
3. SuZ, 426. 
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footnote}. Aristotle's interpretation of tjBe, accord-
ing to lieidegrer, was principally oriented to nature, 
end is co:npared to 'dorld-t:il~e in Eeidegp:er 's sense. 
r:ego 1, also, ircluded :c. is cor.s ide ret ion of tine in the 
philosophy of nature. For Hegel, time is tC-1e "ne§:ation 
of the negation" or "intuited. beco;~1ing." T:L":le serves 0.s 
a hi<";her stace, in ,;hich the negativity of sDc:·.ce is ne-
e;ated. T:il11e is a stage in the ceaseless pro("ress of 
spirit. Heidegger maL:tains that P:egel 's explan,,tion 
of vrhy spirit "falls into time" is obscure. 3ut Iiei-
degger also utilizes Hegel's vmrk, by rr.ffirni!'[ thst 
Hegel's attem::>t to show the connection bet'/IGen snirit 
:md t jne reve"lls an oric;inal relationship betv;een them. 
The footnote reference to Bergson sto.tes chiefly th.ct 
Bergson's vie·a of time as duration is an attmpt to over-
cor:1e the lack of que_li ty in the series of novJs. ,._'hereas 
Aristotle's view nicht be described as quc.ntitative sue-
cess ion, lieidegger de scribes Bergson's durot ion E~s QUali-
tutive succession. 
The cone l'c:tding paragre.ph of Se iE und Zeit is a re-
emphasis u~on the prelininary and fundanental (i.e., 
found ine} nature of v1hat has been done • 
The exposition of the constitution of the being of 
Dasein remains, nevertheless, only a ·,;a~. The goal 
lS the elaboration of the problen of belrl£ in general. 
••• Philosophy is universal pheno;.<r.molofiCnl ontology, 
proceedine: fran the heri<ceneutics of Dasein, '::hich G.s 
the unalytic of existence has fostened the end of the 
guiding thread of every philosophical quest ion to that 
out of vrhich it originc:.tes and to \':hicll it returns.l 
1. SuZ, 436. 
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Even the basic difference betvl8cm :9c.sein and things, 
e.g., reality, is "only the begin_nir,g of ontolo;ical 
problems, nothing, however, \dth nhich philosophy can 
be satisfied."l Ancient ontology ·;·orked riith thing-con-
cepts, a.nd the dan,;;er of trerctinf" consciousness as a 
thing has lonp: been recognized. He idegger asks so··1e 
significant q_uestions, as an indice.tion of whcct could be 
expected in the succeeding main section of the work. 
Only \Jhat does it r1ean to make a thing (of con-
sciousness)? Out of vrhat does it originate? 
'.lhy is being "first" "conceive"d" out of things 
present and not out of things at-hand, v;hich lie 
still closer? ·.Thy does this making & thing [of 
consc~ousnessJ come again and agr,in to dominance? 
Hovv is the being of consciousness tositively struc-
tured, so that r.1aking a thing of i renains unsuit-
able to it? , •• How, in general, is a disclosin(" 
understanding of being possible according to Dasein? 
Can the question be ansv;ered in goinc bo.ck to the 
orir:inal constitution of beL of Dasein which under-
st~:mds belng? • , • s .ere a way th'lt leads from 
original time to the meaning of being? Is time it-
self reve2Ied as horizon of being?Z 
Heidepger' s use of sL.cilar rhetorical quest ions as 
a menns of introducing earlier chapters of Sein und Zeit 
leads one to the conjecture that at the time of writing 
these questions Heidegger expected to ammer them affir.l-
atively, v;ith supporting analysis an:l argunentation. ~'.n 
interpretation of his stateii,en t a bout the reason for not 
co'"!JletinP: and publishing the remainacr of the projected 
work belon[,;s to the discussion of ;'ieide&:er's letter, "On 
Humanism. n 
1. SuZ, 437. 
2. suz, 437-438. 
CH.::.PTER III 
THE PIULOSOPHY OF JIEIDEGGER IN i._n OR ':iOHKS 
Heidegger•s minor vrorks have been published over a 
period of approximately forty-five yetirs. His disserta-
tion ctnd Eo.bilitcttionsschrift preceded dein und Zeit by 
1aore than a decade, and are of interest for the light 
they throw on the development of his thou·ht prior to 
his main Ywrk. Several brief •vorks on metaphysicul 
themes appeared in 1929. Lectures ctnc essays were pre-
pared e<nd presented in the 1930's; some of this muteriul 
;;;as not published until ti decade or nore letter. Recent 
publications include collections of essilys and lecture'S', 
as well as classroom lecture series. In com.parison v:ith 
Sein und Zeit, his other works are minor in extent ~nd 
have more particular aims, that is, are less systematic 
in aim, ul though not ninor in philosophicul :innortance. 
The development of Heidegger•s thought in the pcist 
three decades and the variations in his concents and ter-
rc.inology have given rise to nuch discussion about d "turn" 
in his position. It is not the purpose of t;1Jis disserta-
tion to emphasize or criticize the c:banges in Ecider;ger•s 
views. 1 
1. Cf.,:Karl L~w~t~1, .H~idegge:rz, De~ker in dUrf~irer. lei~ 
(F~a.nkfurt ar., diJ.n. S. FJ.scher Verlag, .l9u3 , for a 
critictil study of Feidegcer's development. 
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For the purpose of expos it ion in this chaptc'r, 
Ecidegn;er 1 s :minor ·,vorks will be clds::ified into four 
,.,a in groups, as follm1s: .-1.. ·/forks thctt are pri:m..crily 
I'letc:physicul, B. Works on aesthetics ctnd poetry, c. 
·ororks on the history of philosophy, a.nd D. ::iscellan-
eo us vmrks. In severcll instdnces, a e;i ven work would 
fit quite satisfactorily into more thctn one group. In 
fdct, the v1hole classification is sonewhat arbitretry, 
In the light of' Heidegger's insistence tha.t the onto-
logical question is basic for all of his thoucht. 
~Yi thin each group, the order of pre sentctt ion is ac-
cording to the tiBe of publication, except in those 
Cdses in which cha.nges were introduced in later edi-
tions of' the Sili'lle v:ork, for exd.ll!ple, the additions to 
·vas ist L:etaphysik? 
.-1.. ';'forks that are primarily met,nhysical 
1. Kdnt und das Problem der l:!etaphysik. 
The book on K,mt and the Problem of I.:etaphysics 
na~ first published in 1929, and the second edition, un-
changed except for a brief' additional preface, apneetred 
in 1951. ccccording to the preface to the first edition, 
the core of the bool< was first presented in lectures in 
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the academic year 1925-1926. The interpretation of Kant's 
Critique of Pure Reason grevr out of Heidegger's work on 
the second, unpublished portion of Sein und Zeit. In the 
general nlan of Sein. und Zeit, the interpretation of Kant 
was to be the first main section of Part II, which was 
called the "phenomenological destruction of the history 
of ontology." 1 The volume on Kant would supposedly have 
been incorporated in the "destruction," had the nlan for 
Sein und Zeit been comnleted. It should be noted that the 
"destruction" supnosedly had a positive aim, as a kind of 
<) 
analysis of whA.t has been constructed."' Heidet-P"er's pur-
nose is not specifically to prove the falsity of the his-
tory of ontology (including Kant), although it l'lU.St be 
admitted that Heidegger does regard his ovm vwrk as an 
overcoming or a surpassing of all previous metanhysics. 
The problematic nature of Heidesr;er's relation to 
Ka.nt and his interpretation of Kant's vmrk is interesting 
and il'lporto.nt. Heidegger's interpretation of Kant, and 
esnecially of the Critioue of Pure Reason, is not an at-
tempt to clarify the truth of Kant's doctrine, but rather 
an attempt to use an interpretation of Kant's thought ex-
perience, in the l)rocess of \Jriting the first edition and 
changin,cc it for the second, as an illustrative basis for 
1. SuZ, 39. 
2. Cf. above, p. 50. 
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Heidee-ger' s ovm theory of fundamenta.l o;ctolor,y, or the 
ret:c:nhysics of Dasein. In the brief preface to the sec-
ond edition (1951), Heideg('er recognizes the validity of 
criticisms of his "violent ,.l inter:pretat ion of Kant. Ee 
also states, in that preface, th2t the defects and mis-
takes of this vrork have become clear to hi.m in the course 
of later thour,ht, but tha.t he refuses to rcdci footnotes, 
postscripts, and clarifications, and thus to turn the 
book into a "patchwork."2 For the reader of today, who 
would like to lmow precisely 'Jhich pc-,rts of the vrork, 
1•.•h ich specific ideas c>.nd interprets t ions, He idep: ·,er nov: 
classifies as defects or mistakes, an occasional foot-
note would be most welcome. The "violence" of his in-
terprete.t ion of Kant is also admitted. However, even 
vrithout this aclrrrission in the prefs.ce to the second edi-
tion, the careful roader coul.d easily note, from both the 
content &nd the s"Jecified aim of the discc:;.ssion, tL~'t 
I:eidep:p:er is 'lot expouncl.ing Kant. Instead, he is trans-
posin,q: so::1e of Kecnt' s ideas into his own system of thouc;ht, 
and, most of 211, he is exrur_ining some of K~Jnt'c:: Q;··cic 
i~:eas outside the limits of the Ke.ntian system. z::oecif-
ically, Heidec.r-er treats the Critiuue of rure Reason as a 
foundation for metaphysics by exploitinr: certe.in differ-
ences betw·een the first and second editions of the Critique 
and by interpreting Kant's "power of iJr,ardnation" (..£inbild-
1. KPJ,\' 7. 
2. KPM, 8. 
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une;skrnft) as a common root or source of the two Kantian 
sources of knowledge (sensibility snd Uc1c1crst£mc i'1P-:). 
Perhaps the ;:wst "violent" aspect of Eeider:p:er's in-
terpretation of Kant is the reference of knowledp-e to 
Heidep:aer's concept of ontology. K2nt's question R.'::Jout 
the possibility of knowledp:e is interpreted as the pos-
sibility of ontologice.l knor:ledge (imov-rledge of beinr:, 
for He idegger) • The significance of Kant' s "CoDernicB.n 
revolution" is the.t it forces ontology to the center of 
thought. Instead of the common interpretation of Kant, 
that objects must confonn to the subject, HG idegr:er in-
terprets the revolution as requirin,o: that ontical know-
ledge conform to ontological knowledse. 1 
The two principal ideas v:hich form the recurrinp: 
theme of thG book are finitude nnd transcePdence, both 
being strictly relevant to man as knov1er of being. The 
essence of human knovling is to be finite, to be lirrlited. 
The lirnits are not externally r:;iven, but belong to the 
very nature of knowledge. Infinite knowled::e is nrac-
tically another term for creation, in which being and 
knowing are ide:J.tical, because there is no receptivity, 
no limit, in infinite knowing. The Kant i8n ide a of re-
ceutivity in intuition (perception) is interpreted not 
as vvhat is given in sensory experience, but fro!lt th.e on-
tological point of view th&t all finite knowledre is in 
l. KFl.I, 26. 
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some sense given, i.e., involves receptivity. Thus, 
knov.ring is proof of finitude. In similar fashion, the 
cn~cents of objectivity, deduction of the categories, 
pure synthesis, apperception, schematism, time as pure 
form of sensibility, und transcendence (in various con-
nections) are interpreted as indications of the finite 
nature of knowing. 
The other recurring idee, is trans ccmdence, 8Dd 
He ider:ger' s mean :'ng for this term do!'l in<" te s throur:hout. 
Transcendence, for He idegr:er, is both subjective and 
objective. The transcendental object is nothing, i.e., 
no entity. Tromscendence is orig:inal truth, beyond the 
realm of entities, which ma.kes possible the unveilinl': of 
being and the revelation of entities . 1 Heidegr,er centers 
nlUch of his attention around the tr.~nscendental povrer of 
imagination. He raises the question whether Kant thought 
of two or three sources of knowledge. The three sources 
are intuition (sensibility), povrer of marincetion, and 
understanding (concepts of apperception). To the first 
and last correspond, respectively, the transcenil.ental 
aesthetic and the transcendental loeic of Kant's system. 
But the power of imaeination, accordinp: to Heidegger, has 
no corresponding place in Kant's system. Eeidegf'er re-
lates the imagination to synthesis, synopsis, intuition, 
and concepts, and arrives at the conclusion that imagina-
1. KPM, 115. 
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tion is a possible single ori~inal source of the other 
two sources of knov:ledc,;e, as v:ell as the ground of the 
possibility of their synthesis, in Kant 1 s first edit ion 
of the Cri t ioue of Pure Reason. But this discovery was 
for Kant, according to Heidegger, a revelation of the 
abyss (Lbprund )1 v;hich makes possible metaphysics on the 
most re.dical bas is. It was a step up to the unknown, up 
to pure transcendence, up to nothing; and E:ant retreated 
:rrom such a possibility. The second edition of the Cri-
tigue is more systematic; understanding, in its sponta-
neity, takes over the functions of the imaeination. The 
second edition is more loeical, more systeJ!lBtic; it is 
less radical, less original, ao a foundation for meta-
physics, accordiw, to Heidegger. In the first edition, 
through consideration of the imagination, Kant bep:an to 
unveil the subjectivity of the subject of h.-nowing, in 
finitude and transcendence; but Kant retreated from his 
own discovery, and did not carry it through to the end. 
Heidegger's interpretation emphasizes what hapuened in 
Kant, rather than any theory Ke.nt propounded, as the most 
important lesson to be learned. 2 
Heidegper comments on the three famous Kantian ques-
t ions, and adds a fourth. ilhat can I know? •ihat ought I 
to do? ;/hat may I hope? These are auestions that involve 
finitude. Each question implies a lL~it: something that 
1. KPM, 153. 
2. KP!'Il, 194-195. 
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can not, oupht not, or may not. Each question, in one 
sense, proves finitude. Nevertheless, for Heidegger the 
relation is not derivative proof, but a matter of the un-
veiling or revelation of the essence of finitude. The 
questions reveal the finitude of the querist. Van is 
not finite because he asks these questions; on the con-
trary, he asks these ouestions because he is finite. 1 
The three questions find their common root or origin in 
the fourth: "'i•hat is man?" 2 The finitude and transcend-
ence of man are the foundation of metaphysics (fundrunental 
ontology). 
The task of fundrunental ontology, i.e., of oroviding 
a foundation for all ontological knowledge, is an inter-
pretation of man's finitude. Heidegger devotes some con-
cluding paragraphs to a summary of various concepts that 
are elaborated in Sein und Zeit, and to their relation to 
the main theme of the interpretation of Kant. All of these 
concepts, such as care, existence, dread, conscience, debt, 
death, essentia :end existentia, finitude, transcendence, 
being, entities, and nothing are given their interpretation 
as parts of Heidegger's system of thought, as presented in 
Sein und Zeit. One of the most interesting suggestions, al-
though undeveloped, is that there is being only in relation 
to finite existence. 
1. KPM, 196. 
2. KPM, 187. 
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Existence, as a manner of being, is in itself 
finitude, and as such is possible only on the 
ground of an understanding of being. There is 
and must be something like being only where fini-
tude has become existent.l 
Heidegger concludes the volume with a long series of 
thought-provoking questions. 
2. Was ist Metaphysik? 
The lecture entitled, "What is Jli:etaphysics?" was 
first given on July 24, 1929, at the University of lTei-
burg. It was also published in 1929. A postscript was 
added to the fourth edition in 1943. An introduction 
was added to the fifth edition in 1949. It seems to the 
writer most convenient to consider the three parts in 
the order of their publication, rather than in the order 
of their presentation in the complete, printed text. The 
original lecture is also divided into three parts: the 
development of a metaphysical question, its elaboration, 
and its answer. The lecture does not deal with metaphysics 
as a whole, according to Heidegger, but with a definite 
metaphysical question, although every such question nec-
essarily involves the whole of metaohysics. 
Two characteristics are always involved in meta-
physical questioning. The first is the whole of meta-
physical problems; the second is the questioner. "Meta-
physical questioning must be placed in the whole and out 
of the essential situation of the questioning Dasein. 
1. KPM, 206. 
We ask questions, here and now, for ourselves."l Science, 
as investigation in any field, is analyzed by Heidegger, 
to set forth certain features of such investigation. In 
the first place, science refers to entities. Science 
involves a world-reference (Weltbezug). In the second 
place, this world-reference to entities is an attitude 
or position freely selected by the human investi<"ator, 
in which the entities to be investigated direct the in-
ouiry. The thing to be investigated has the first and 
last word; objectivity is the attitucl.e chosen by the in-
vestigator. In the third place, what hapPens in the sci-
entific activity carried on by man is an invasion of man 
into entities, a breaking-into (Einbruch) entities in 
such a way that the entities can break open (auf-brechen), 
to show forth what and how they are. Mun himself is one 
such entity among others. Science, as an activity of 
Dasein, always deals vlith entities. 
That to which the world reference is directed is 
entities themselves--and nothing else. 
That from which every [scientific] attitude takes 
its direction is entities themselves--and nothing 
further. 
That with which investigating explanation hapnens 
in the break-into is entities themselves--and beyond 
thell'., nothing. 
How remarkable--just when scientific man obtains 
certainty about what is most his ovm, he speaks of 
an other. Only entities are to be investigated--
nothing else; entities alone, and further--nothing; 
solely entities, and beyond them--nothing.2 
1. VlM, 22. 
2. ViM, 24. 
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This nothing that lies beyond the realm of' scientific 
investigation, beyond all entities which science investi-
gates, is urecisely the topic of the lecture, ",lhet is 
Metaphysics?" "\'/hat about this nothing?"l Is it a mere 
accident that we do, and must, speak of' it? Is it only 
a manner of speaking? Science answers such a question 
by saying that science deals with entities. Science 
knows nothing about nothing, and does·mt want to know 
anything about it. Nevertheless, science makes use of 
nothing, and in so doing lays clain to ,-.rhat it throws 
away. 
In the attempt to f'ind out what nothing is, thouv.,ht 
runs into contradictions, precisely because thinking is 
essentially, always, thinking about something, about en-
tities. Nothinr;, then, must be the negative or the denial 
of' the totality of' entities. "§or nothing is the nega-
tion of' the totality of' entities, the absolute not-entity."2 
The next step in the discussion is the auestion of' logical 
priority. Which is more basic, nothing or ne1wting? 
Is there nothing only because there is the not, i.e., 
negation? Or is it the other way around? Is there 
negation and the not only because there is nothing? 
That has not been decided, not even, as yet, raised 
up into an explicit question. We af'firm: nothing 
is more original than the not and negation. If this 
thesis is valid, then the possibility of negation as 
an act of' understanding, and vlith it understnnding 
itself', in some way depends upon nothing.3 
1. WM, 24. 
2. '1\M, 26. 
3. WM, 26. 
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The next question is how to encounter this nothing. One 
method would be to negate completely the totality of en-
tities. But then there is the problem of our capacity--
because of our finitude--to r,rasp the totality of enti-
ties, a totality in itself and all at once. Even sup-
posing that such a concept were possible to the imaf':ina-
tion, the nothing gained from the net:ation of it would 
be only an iroatsined nothing--distinguished from the real 
nothing. And if the real nothing contains no distinc-
tions within itself, then it can't be distinguished from 
the nothing that is merely imagined. Yet the imagined 
nothing is not what is sought. The attempt to find 
nothing by negating the totality of entities is "funda-
mentally impossible ,"1 The attempt to find nothing by 
way of "finding oneself in the midst of entities in the 
whole"2 is another possibility. 
In the mood of boredom (Lan,;:eweile), all entities, 
including ourselves, become indifferent. Such boredom 
reveals entities in the whole. Joy (]'reude) in the pres-
ence of a loved one is another mood that may reveal en-
tities in the whole, i.e., entities as a whole viithout 
attention or focus on a particular entity or a mere part 
of the whole. In any case, such moods as boredom and joy, 
in revealing entitie-s in the vlhole, conceal nothing, the 
object of the search. Dread (Angst) is the mood that 
1. WM, 2?-28. 
2. WM, 2?. 
reveals nothir.g, precisely because it does not involve 
entities. It is a mood that goes beyond this and that 
ond every determined entity. The essentia.l i,~~ossibility 
of defining the object of dread is ,,hat r,12ckes this mood 
revelatory of no thine:. Dread reveals nothing, i.e., 
no-entity. 
In dread we are suspended. More nrecisely: dread 
causes us to be suspended, because it ~akes enti-
ties in the whole slip away. It lies in the fact 
that we ourselves--these entities, men--slip away 
in the midst of entities, along 11ith them,l 
As soon as the moment of dread is r;one, we say: "What 
we clret'lded 2nd v;hy we dreaded, was 'really' nothing. 
Indeed: nothing itself--as such--was there."2 
Although the mood of dread reveo.ls nothing, the 
nothing so reve-aled is no entity, no object as such. 
Dresd does not provide a concept of nothing. Neither 
does dread take e.vray all entities so that nothing is 
encountered as WhCJt is left over. The nothi!lf, reached 
by these nethods is dependent upon, is derivGd fron the 
facts of negation, denial--anything negative. But Eei-
def(!'"er's position v.rith respect to priority is the other 
way around. Nothing is basic; negation, denial--in short, 
everything ner;e.ti ve --is a result of ">nd dependent unon 
nothing. "nothing itself nef(ates."3 In dread the ab-
solute difference bet1'leen entities 2nd. nothing is re-
vealed. 
1. c;IJ,j ' 29. 
2. Wl1!, 30. 
3. 1i"ill' 31. 
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Only in the bri~ht ni@~t of the nothing of dread, 
there arises the original openness of entities as 
one such: that there are entities--and not nothing. 
This additional phrase, "and not nothing," however, 
is no supplementary clarification, but the prior 
making-possible of the revelation of entities in 
general. The essence of the oriP:inally ner:Rting 
nothing lies in the fact that it brings Da~sein 
first of all before entities as one such [entityJ.l 
Dasein is able to relate itself to entities, both to 
other entities and to itself as an entity, because it 
proceeds out of the revealed nothing. 
Da-sein means: state of being held into nothing. 
Holding itself into nothing, Dasein is in every 
case already beyond entities J.n the v'hole. This 
being-beyond entities we call transcendence. If 
Dasein were not transcending in the ground of its 
essence, i.e., if it were not held into nothing 
in advance, tl!en it could never relate itself to 
entities, and, consequently, not even to itself. 
Without original revela~ion of nothing, no being 
oneself and no freedom. 
This is, for Heidegger, the ansvrer to the question about 
nothing. nothing is Vihat makes possible the revelotion 
of entities; it is not a counter-concept to entities, 
but belongs to essence. "Nothing's negating hapnens 
in the being of entities."3 
imother VJay of putting this same result is to affirm 
the finitude and tnmscendence of Dasein. Finitude means 
that Dasein has nothing as an inherent characteristic of 
its beiP~. Nothing " ••• reveals itself as belonging to 
the being of entities. " 4 'rranscendence is the character-
izing of Dasein in its going beyond entities in the whole, 
1. WM, 31. 3. WM, 32. 
2. Whl, 32. 4. WM, 36, 
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holding itself into nothing. Heidegger accepts Hegel's 
statement that pure being and pure nothing are the same, 
but for a different reason. He~el's reason, according 
to He idegger, was the immediacy and indeterminate nature 
of both. For Heidegger, being and nothing belong together 
"because being itself is in essence finite 2nd reveals 
itself only in the transcendence of Dasein, which holds 
itself out into nothing. nl Heideg,c:er 1 s version of the 
traditional assertion, ex nihilo nihil fit, is "ex nihilo 
omne ens gua ens fit." 2 Nothing is inherent in the very 
nature of entities. 
The "why" of metaphysical questioning is made pos-
sible by the revelation of nothing. Man is by nature 
metaphysical; man inquires beyond entities into their 
why, their possibility. Such transcending inouiry, be-
yond entities, is possible only because Dasein is finite. 
Nothing is what makes possible metaphysics. The basic 
question of metaphysics, growing out of the discussion 
of nothing, end vrith which Eeidegger closes the lecture, 
is as follows: "Why are there entities at all and not 
rather nothing?" 3 
The postscript (1943) is Heidegger•s defense of the 
lecture against misinterpretations and criticisms , and, 
consequently, a clarification of the nature and import 
of its central theme, nothing. The first clarification 
1. VIM, 36. 
2. WM, 36. 
3. Will, 38. 
148 
is that the lecture is an attempt to go beyond metaphysics, 
if metaphysics is defined as the truth about entities, or, 
more precisely, the history of the truth about entities. 
If metaphysics, like a universal science, deals with the 
truth of entities, then the aim of the lecture vras to find 
the ground of metaphysics, i.e., not merely the "_;ruth about 
entities, but to go beyond that to the truth of being and 
the being of truth. Heideg(ier insists on the purely onto-
logical character of the subject under investi~ation, and 
the validity of the distinction between being (0ein) and 
entities (Seiendes). 
There are two sorts of difficulties, according to 
Heidegn·er, in following the thought of the lecture. The 
first is the enigmatic nature of the subject itself--
nothing. The second is the lack of ability to think, 
or, often, the lack of the will to think. He idegger sum-
marizes criticisms under three headings. The lecture is 
nihilism, a "philosophy of nothing;" it is based upon a 
negative mood, and is, therefore, a "philoso'Jhy of dread;" 
it is opnosed to logic and exact thought, a_nd, conse-
quently, is a "philosophy of mere feeling. ,l 
The distinction between being and entities is re-
peated. The investigation of entities, in science, for 
example, never finds being. The absolute other to en-
tities is nothing, the not-entities. "But this nothing 
essences s.s being."2 Being is vrhat gives to entities 
l. WM, 41. 
2. WI.:, 41. "Aber dieses Nichts vrest als das Sein." 
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their VTurrcmt to be. Nothing is the v ..est roo::1ine ss 
~Wei trttw:;ig!ce it) of being. 
'.iit':out ;~eing, ·.·rhose abys::.ml but 2t! 11 undeveloped 
essence nothL1g tr'.insrdts to us in re"-1 dread, ull 
entities '.'!01-'ld re;;:ain ire bei:cgles•"ncss. Only this 
[beinglessness], as the abandon:.ent of beine, is 
not again a nepative nothing, :orovir1 e'\ tlnt t!',ere 
belonr,s to the truth of being thco Lcct that being 
Yl_cver essences v:ithout entities, u.nd that tl1e::c·e are 
never eYltities v.•ithout being.l 
.,1'Jp . .cently the thought is either thctt e2:.U.ticos c...re endmied 
nith being through nothing, or thut being creates entities 
out of nothing. 'I'he relations betv:een being ,,nd !1othing, 
and the way in which they co-operute to ·Jroduce •,ntities 
or to Drovide entities YJith being, c1re not clear, ut leust 
to the v.Ti ter. In any case, Heidegcer affin1s thcit r,<.J.n 
ctlone, through dread, is able to e:z:Jerience the Eystery 
thut there are entities, and to ask Vihy. "Only nc;n anong 
all entities, cal1ed by the voice of being, GX1)eriences 
the wonder of all wonders: that the::·e w.re entities. n 2 
Suci: is Eeidee_:ger's dllswer to the charse of nihilisn. 
'11he criticism that the philoso:Jhy of dredd cuuses 
il~d ifferen ce G.nd ,:,_;ev..~-:ens the viill to a.ct is ;,~e t by st-.... t ing 
thdt the <.1i.J:l of the lecture is not to nrovide a "heroic 
philosophy, n 3 but to think about being. If drec'.d is seD-
arcJ.ted from its connection v!ith nothing, t!',on it ,:,<y be 
1. VIi:, 41. 
2. Wi.:, 42. 
3. Cf. Alfred Delp, Trdgische ~xistenz. 
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studied and classified like other moods. In short, 
Heidegger clairJS that dread is not selected e.s a mood 
for empirical study and description, but as the unioue 
mood which reveals nothing. As a mere psychic state 
it has no more i_nportence for TJhilosouhy than Gny other 
mood. 
To the criticism that the lecture is opnosed to 
lo~ic, Heideg~er srants that the lecture is opposed to 
the domination of thought by a strictly inferential logic. 
But such logic is "only ~ interpretation of the essence 
of thinking."l The exactness or precision of such a 
logic is no guarantee that it is adequate to think being. 
According to Heidegger, no quantitative or calculating 
logic is able to grasp the essence of man. "Essential 
thinking" {wesentliche Denken--real thinking) is the term 
Heidegger ~ives to the kind of thinking which, "instead 
of calculating entities with entities, squanders itself 
in being, for the truth of being. " 2 For exai'lple, sacri-
fice (Opfer) and giving thanks (Bedanken) are possible, 
not because of a calculating lor:ic, but because nan is 
capable of thinking the truth of being. 
Were there not at times a hidden thinking in the 
essence-p:round of historical man, then he would 
never be capable of c;iving thanks, supposing that 
in all deliberation and in every giving-thanks 
there must be a thigking which incipiently thinks 
the truth of being. 
The calculation of the utility of a sacrifice deforms 
1. v'IM, 43. 
2. ViM, 44. 
3. WH, 45. 
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the very essence of sacrifice. The essence of sacrifice 
lies beyond the realm of a logic of calculation. Sacri-
fice is a step beyond entities on the way to being. 
"Sacrifice is the departure from entities on the way to 
take care of the favor of being."1 
Poetry is another example of a kind of thinking 
which goes beyond calculating or strictly inferential 
logic. Poetry and essential thinking are alike in that 
practical results and productivity are not the criteria 
of their validity. The charge that the lecture is op-
nosed to lor,ic, and that, as a "philosophy of feeling," 
it endangers the exactness of thouc:ht and the cert::'iinty 
of action, is countered with the SU@'p,estions just f'iven. 
Giving thanks and poetry are related to essertial think-
ing; supposedly the former make use of the latter, al-
thoug.h essential thinking is no mere instrurr.ent for them. 
Near the close of the postscript Heidege>:er refers 
to nothing as the veil of being. "Nothing as the other 
to entities is the veil of being. Every destiny of en-
tities has already been incipiently completed in being."2 
The postscript closes with a quotation from Sonhocles. 
The foreword ( 1949) to the lecture, "dhat is Eeta-
physics?" begins with a quotation from Descartes, jn which 
philosophy is compared to a tree. The roots are metaphysics; 
the trunk is nhysics; and the branches are other sciences. 
:L. VIM, 45. 
2. wrv;, 46. 
lf2 
Heidegger ce.rries the comparison one sten further, a.nd 
asks what is the soil in which the tree grows. The soil 
{ground), in v1hich the roots of the tree of Philosophy 
g:row, is "the truth of being. .,1 Insofar as r.~etaphysics 
deals with entities, it can never rea.ch the truth of 
being. If metaphysics is understood as dealing Y.'i th 
entities, then the aim. of the lecture, "dhat is ~''eta-
physics?" is to overcome metaphysics, to go back of 
metaphysics to its ground, to that out of vrhich l'!eta-
nhysics arises, the truth of being. Sein und Zeit was 
a preparation for this task. Metaphysics, so understood, 
does not even ask the question about the truth of being. 
It is concerned <"lith entities and '::ith truth in the form 
of propositions. The surpassing of metaphysics is not 
really against metaphysics, but only a~ainst its pretense 
to be the last Hord. For He idegger, truth is the ur:con-
cealedness or openness of bein~, rAther than correct prop-
ositions. 
Whe.t is metaohysics? as a question, ce>n be iPter-
preted as, why does nen have to forr:o:et be inc; in his think-
ing. The need to forr;et being is perhaps "the most neces-
sary of all necessities for thou~ht." 2 In this coCJ.nection 
Beidegger comments on the sirmificance of certain terns in 
Sein und Zeit. Dasein Has there mmd, not in its re,ular 
:r1eaning of existence, roCJ.lity, or objectivity, bvt as a 
1. '!fl:i, 8. 
2 • VI1J, 12 • 
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tern to desir;note "both the relation of 11ei::-w to the 
essence of rmn and also tlls essentisl reL,tion of ·c:an 
to the O!lenness ('there') of being."l DAsein is no 
mere substitute for the term, conscbusness (.i3ewusst-
sein). :..;:xistence (:c;:xistenz) vras used exclusively for the 
beine of man, for the essence of Dasein. :C::xistence mcE,ns 
"to st2nd within t;le openness of being" (_Innestehen in 
der Offenheit des Seins_). 2 Tl,is ir:-standingness (_:,.n-
sU!nc"ir l:eit) is a condition peculiar to man cnd his ex-
istence. Rocl~s, trees, horses, an;:els, and God e,re, but 
do not exist. Fan alone exists, oncl by tLic is ,:e ,.nt 
that "man is t:-J.Gt entity whose beinr, is clistin;~uished 
in being ... nC. fror~ being, t:1rouch the st"ndinv-oDen 
stand inp:-wi thin the unconcealedness of boing ... :~ Con-
sciousness is seconde.ry, and Cl.epends upon in-stc.ndinp,-
ness. Selfness is likevrise a secondE.ry, uependent char-
acteristic. 
Being (dein) is the same as tL~e (Zeit), in the 
sense that both refer to raea:1ing ( ;:,il~~) and to truth 
(Nahrheit), rather thon to the presence (.JlHesen) of 
objects ur to becoming ( .ierden). 1.:eto~1'lysi·cs ·.'le'lls 
vlith the truti'. of entities, usually in one of t'"io forns: 
either the nost universal L;c.tures of t1l8 vrhole of enti-
ties, or the whole of entities in the sense of tr~e 1o • ' l.l.l{:r.t-
est entity, i.e., God. In any case, mete;:>hysics deale 
1. ,~--Jl~:I' 1 cz ...:..o.) • 
2 • vV]I,; ' 14. 
3. ... 111·.~' 15. 
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with the repre:oenting (Vorstellen) of entities as enti-
ties. Heidegger's fuECla:nentel ontolors Yras an attempt 
to ecco::l<llish a transition (Ueber£:anr) from tr8.ditional 
netaphysics to the truth of being. The lecture, ".;hat 
is MetE:physics?" vras an attempt to carry out the dis-
cuss ion fron: the point of view of notl,ing, i.e., not-
entities. Tl:e question, v;hy entities nU:er the.n nothing, 
IQeans, why do entities have preferential treatment in 
metauhysics, nc:ther tlw.n nothing, i.e., not-entities. 
'/lhy is it that nothL"lg does not essence? ",;}lich is nore 
enif'J'12 tic, th'lt there .~re entities or th2.t there is 
being?" 1 
This introduction to the printed lecture supposedly 
helps to clarify IIeider;c;er's termir.olor':,', not only in 
the lecture itself, but also in the !"ain v·ork, Sein Ulld 
Zeit. For the '.'.Titer of this dis sertc tion, at leClst·, 
the introduction of new terms and the shift ill eynphasis 
from Dasein as tei.LJorality and ·;mrldliness to the "wonder" 
that being, or nothing, esser'ces in some way or other to 
nroduce entities, are siBnly additional difficulties in 
trying to understand V!hat Heideg<"er ::leans. T:1e postBcrirJt 
end introduction to Heidegger's lecture on mete.physics 
are more than sir.tple clarifications; they represent a 
developing point of view in his thir:kL11g. 
1. iil!il' 21. 
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3. Vom 'de sen des Grundes. 
The essay entitled, "On the Essence of Ground," 
vms published in 1929 as one of a rrou:o of' contributions 
in honor of Husserl. In a brief' preface to the third (1949) 
edition of the essay ( Le., as a seuarate nublication), 
Heidegger explains the close relation between this essay 
and the lecture entitled, "·ahat is l!Ietaphysics?" They 
were written at the same time, and both have to do with 
the problem of negation, although in different aspects. 
The preface to the third edition is as follows: 
The essay, "On the Essence of' Ground," orif;inated 
in the yern 1928 at the same time as the lecture, 
~~'•/.hat is I.:etaphysics?" The latter considers nothing; 
the former treats ontological difference. 
Nothing is the not of' entities rmd therefore the 
being \ihich is learned about from entities. Onto-
lor:ical difference is the not betVTeen entities and 
being. But just as the not in relation to entities 
is no nothing in the sense of' a nihil ner:ativum, 
neither is difference as the not between ertities 
end being merely the created form of' a distinction 
of' understanding (ens rationis). 
That negatinr; not of nothing nnd this ner·ating not 
of difference are certainly not alike, but the same 
thing, in the sense of that which belongs toaether 
in the essencing of the being of entities. This 
sameness is v-rhat is 'Wrthy of thought, in that both 
~Titings, intentionally kept separate, attemnt to 
bring it into closer consideration, without being 
able to do so. 
How would it be, if those who consider the matter 
finally vmuld begin to takl up this same thing, 
after vraiting two decades? 
In the introductory paragraph Heidegper states that 
the term, "ground," (Grund, which may also be translated 
as cause or reason) has to do with the what, the that, 
1. NG, 5. 
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and the truth of being C•ias-sein, Dass-sein, Wahr-sein). 
Aristotle's four causes, Leibnitz's principle of suf-
ficient reason, and considerations of the problem by 
Crusius, Schopenhauer, Kant, and Schelling are mentioned. 
Transcendence is singled out as the uroper sphere in v:llich 
to consider the question of the essence of ground. The 
three divisions of the essay are: "the problem of ;;round; 
transcendence as the sphere of the question about the es-
sence of Ground; of the essence of ground." 1 
The idea tlnt everything has its {:r,round (cause or 
reason) or, necsatively stated, that nothing is nithout 
ground, is a common presupposition both of l)opular thought 
and of philosophy. T'ne idea is often considered self-
evident. But the nature or essence of ,--round is not 
clenr. Even Leibnitz•s principle of sufficient reason, 
a_c cording to He idegger, is not clear, in the sense that 
it may be considered either as a loeic8_l or a metaphysical 
princiule, or as both. The principles of identity 2nd 
contradiction are also mentioned, nith recard to the 
reason or e:round of their validity. Then, with several 
references to Sei'1 und Zeit, Eeidecger goes into the ques-
tion of nre-predicative truth as oPenness (l!:rschlossenheit) 
of Dasein, the discovered truth (:;:;ntdecktheit) of things 
present, ana. the unveilednews (EnthUlltheit) of bein,<c 
throuc;h Dasein. Pre-ontolosical understandiiJF of being 
1. -.,JG, g. 
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(vorontologische SeinsverstMndnis) is nentioned, alon~ 
with the distinction betvreen ontical and ontolor:ical 
truth. The idea of "ont0logical differor.ce" is the 
"distinction of being froB entities."1 The ground of 
this ontological difference is the transcendence of 
Dasein. Consequently, the problem of ground turns into 
the problem of transcendence, because the latter is 
what makes possible both intentionality ccnd the inner 
possibility of truth. Being, truth, and ('round are all 
involved in the problem of transcendence. Therefore, 
transcendence is the proper province in which to discuss 
the question of the essence of ground. 
Transcendence meGUs to go beyond, to cross over, 
to surpass or surmount. The transcendence of Dasein 
is not a mere spatial matter, for Heideccc;er, but it does 
make possible spatial transcendence. The problea is only 
falsified by thinking of it in the fram.evrork of subject-
object relations. Nevertheless, Kant's treat1:1ent of sub-
jectivity was an iirrportant step in the history of the 
problem. Transcendence is selfness (3elbstheit); it is 
Dasein. Transcendence is not a subject goin~; beyond it-
self to an object; it is being-in-the-vrorld, in the midst 
of entities (imaitten des Seienden), relating itself to 
them. World in the common, pre-philosonhical sense is 
the totality (.Allheit) of such entities. Bei~-in-the-
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world is not apnearing or being present as an entity 
in such a world. Being-in-the-world requires an onto-
logical concept of VJorld. Such a concent of world de-
pends upon the constitution of Dasein. The key phrase 
for the phenomenon of world in this essay is "entities 
in the whole" (Seiendes im. Ganzen). 1 
After making a number of significant conmen ts on 
concents of world (cosmos, :mundus, and Welt) in Parmen-
ides, Anaxagoras, Hera eli tus, the New Testarnent, St. 
Augustine, St. Thomas, Leibnitz, Crusius, and Kant, 
Heidegc:er presents his ovm concept of v:orld as entities 
in the whole. 
·v~holeness must not with that be conceived expressly; 
its belonging to Dasein can be veiled; the extent of 
this v.chole is cha.n£!:eable •••• The pre -co nee i vine;- com-
prehending understal1d ing of this wholeness, ho·:rever, 
is transcendence to the world ...• World as wholeness 
"is" no entity, but that out of which Dasein r:ives 
itself to signify entities, to which, as well af! to 
world, Dasein can relate itself •••• The beinv of this 
en~ity cgasefn). is concerned v;ith its ossibilit of 
be1ng. ase1n 1s sue a 1 ex1s s ~or 1 s sa e •••• 
However, that for the sake of '>'.'hich Dasein exists is 
itself. World pelongs to selfness; Vlorld is really 
Dasein-related.G 
1. Brock, in his introduction to the four essays in 
Existence and Being, translates this phrase "v;lwt-is 
in totality." It ssems to the writer that Brock's 
interpretation (althoue;h not necessarily the transla-
tion) is untenable, on the b8.sis of u,e discussion in 
the essay on ground. The present tr·.mslation of' Seiondes 
as entities considers the Gernan ·:.-ord as a collect1ve 
term, and so the Enelish ')lural is more convenient. Ganze 
l'lay indeed mean totality, but since Heider:fer specifically 
uses the term Allheit (sum of all 1 totality) for a con-
cept of world wh10h he opnoses, ic seems more satisf,ctory 
to use the term, whole. This problem is closely rel"ted 
to the discussion in Sein uhd Zsit of sirmificance (Be-
deutsGEcke it) and the whole of conforr-i ty ( Bevmnd tnis-=-
ganzhei t ). 
2. ~~G, 37. 
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Heidec:;<:>er insists that these stateP!ents have nothiEg 
to do vlith egoism in ethics or solipsism Gs a uhilosophy. 
Nevertheless, if Dasein is considered as subject and other 
entities as object (a false statement of the ontoloryical 
uroblem, according to Heider;ger), then the •. ,orlcl on such 
8 b9sis would be subjective .1 I!!deed, Ds.seic:. is c:rorld-
forming (;ieltbHdend); ~asein "lets a •:.•orld haunen" ( •ielt 
l='eschehen lll:sst) •2 Transcendence is Dasein, r:oirw beyond 
iteelf to other e1c.tities, maki.ng •Jossible :ell revelation, 
unveilinp, and discovery of entities. Trc.:lscel'.df,nce, for 
Heideg~er, is !lot a flir:ht fron G. subject to reAlistic 
objectivity. It has nothing to do •.1itll the transcendence 
of .modern Protestant dielectical theolor;y. It r.ives 
neither a uositive nor a. negative ansHer to 0!1e problem 
of the existence of God. 
Tro.nscendence is freedom, c.nd f'reec1om is "tr•e origin 
of ground in r:eneral. Freedo:m is fn.edom urt o ground. " 3 
Freedo!Cl is the c;round u:Jon •.Jh ich Duse i.n can let a - •orld 
v:orld. ".10rld never is, but v;orlds." ~·reedo•r: is :'rou:Id-
inr: ( das Grtl.nden) • The three ways or rcoc'ks of r-roul"cd ing 
1. -.IG, 38. 
2. WG, 39. The Geronan verb, lassen, "Cay F.e~n either to 
let or to cause (to lisve so~;ethlng done), • .. her:. used in 
connection nith ('.nother infinitive. In "letting a world 
hapnen" or "letting entities be" DE_sein may "cause" them 
just as much as it "lets" ( ;1ernHs or suffers) thee (to) 
be. In the onL1ion of this 'iiri.ter, Heidoe:p:er's "lettinc::-
be" must not be tho;Pht of as a realistic objectivity of 
things. 
3. -dG, 44. 
4. W'G, 44. ";felt ist nie, soedern weltet." 
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2.re instituting ( Stiften), tal:i)1_g foot in:: ( Boden-neh:non), 
<>nd foundin[S ( Bor:rtindon). Tho usual C<el'YctRn terns ~or 
c2uso, occ:<sion, origin, reason, evidence, ''1'0. proof are 
not mentioned, oxceiJt to Clony the.ir v~liclity for tho on-
tolor:ical, transcendent conceiJt He idew·er atte!J'1'1ts to 
eXTJOUnd. 
Instituting (Stiften) is the first ~ode of ''TOnndinc, 
but not first either in c terr'Jcral or 8 lopicRl sense. 
All three ~odos tnke 0lace in a tem:ooral unity; no ':'ode 
is a lorical priority fro:·1 •.;hicl'c t11e others l'lA.Y be 4.e-
rived. Instituting is tl'e Jrojectinc of Dasein's "for 
the s::d:e of." It is projecting in the ~.idst of en~~~-ties. 
It is v:crlCJ )reject ( ,,eltentvmrf). It is beinp in tune 
':iith or in accord ':lith c~3stimrnt) tlce Dro.jGctsCJ '·orli', 
Tf' kine: foot ins ( Boden-nebJI!en) is the so cond noil.e of 
t~rounc'ling. In its projectin(', Dasein .··.oos into (oinc;eJtt) 
entities. It projects itself into possibilities. Th1t 
just be ca.use of tl'e factuality or thro,mness of this Dro-
jecting, other possibilities are withdrawn (antzogen) 
from Dasein. l'rojectinr: is sv;inging-over snd v:ithdrcvring 
at the s=e time (tlberscl'.•;;inFcnd-entzi~lend Z1.L.11all. :Pro-
jecting into one <ossibility ne~,ns vcitllcJ.rcvling fror;; otl1ers, 
because the freedom of Dasein is finite. Pro,iecting ''<S a 
mode of r:rouuJinc; is l)articipo.tion (~in••enonlTcenheit) in 
entities. 
The third mode of t::rotmdirr is fm;r1d inc (Be -'Ttlnden) • 
FoundinE: c'.oes :not '11ecm, :for Eeider;e;er, ontical proof' (Be-
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weisen). It is not a !'latter of givir,n; reasons for thea-
retical pronositions. Founding has to c1o vdth the onto-
lordcsl r,;uestion of the lJossibility of' askinc 'Nhy in <·en-
eral, in tl:J.e sense of tronscendental.possibility. It is 
not the v1hy or reus Jrt of ony til inc; or event; it is the 
ooss ib ili ty of a skin!': Yihy in ccny way at 8.11, in ;C'eneral. 
It is the "tro.ns cendental ground ine;; of ontological truth. ,l 
Such groundinp; is illustrated in the ouest ion, "'.'Tr:y, in 
• • r; 
ceneral, sonethlng and not :1othmg?"~ This ontolor:ical 
e;rounding has its orip:in in the finite freedom of U:: sein. 
The three nodes of r:rouncl. e.re equcolly original 
{e;leichursprUnglich) e.nd are a unity. "The e:osence of 
ground is the trnnscendental originatin.c: threefold dis-
uersion of r-roundinc in world-uro.ject, Nrticiuction in 
entities, ?.nd the ontolo:~ical founding of entities."3 The 
unity of ground is the unit:r of freedom, or of finite 
tempor<:llity. "Freedol:l is the orip;in of the st2tec.~ent of 
ground. n 4 "Freedom is the ground of ground. 115 But free-
dom is merely another term ::"or the tre.nscendence of Da-
sein, or, ac;ain, its finitude. "The essence of the fini-
tude of Dasein unveils itself', however, in transcendence 
as the freedom unto r;round." 6 
The essay on the essence of ground is Reidepp-er's 
attenpt to think the concept of difference through to its 
ultimate li;ni ts in the nature of truth and being, possibil-
1. 'dG, 49. 4. ~:TG' 51. 
2. ',/G, 48. 5. ~/G, 53. 
3. WG, 50. 6. ,iG, 54. 
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ity -1nd ter.ipord.lity. In the opinion of tho writer, 
the finitude of teF::oorali ty is, for He idee;e;sr, the 
ultimC\te limit of ground (including cduse -<nd reason}. 
Ground is uossible in truth and being beco.use Dc1sein 
is free, transcendent, finite. 
4. Vom Wesen der \lcihrheit. 
The nublic lecture intitled, "Of the Essence of 
Truth," Yro.s first delivered in 1930, but not nublished 
until 1943. In general, the aim of the le ctm·e is to 
criticize the truditiono.l concent of truth as corres-
pondence J.Ed to gdin a nore original con cent of v.·hd. c truth 
is, of wha.t makes truth possible in its essence. 
The concept of truth as corresnondence or ~gr8ement 
(veritac: est adaequatio rei et intellectus} Lmy mean 
either the corresnondence of thing with knowledrze or of 
!:nowledr;e with thing. The correspondence of thought to 
thing (knowledge) is the usual way of st~ ti.ng the )roblem; 
but the correspondence of thing to objective thought is nre-
sup-:losed; it is assumed thd.t the thing is in agreement with 
its essence d.nd that knowledge of the es,-:ence is ':nowledge 
of the thing. In Christian theology, as 1J.eideg.~er under-
stu.nds it, the corres:oondence of credted elctity v;ith the 
divine idea of the entity provides tte basis for the cor-
res:oondence of hillldn idea v1ith created entity (thing}. 
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If the problem is thought through without reference to 
the system of a divine order of creation, then it be-
comes the problem of the inner possibility of corres-
pondence, or the question of the truth of essence itself. 
The knowledge of anything is usually understood as 
a proposition, judgment, or relation in which the "what" 
or "how" of it is affirmed. The problem of the essence 
of truth is the problem of what makes possible such af-
firmations, commonly known as propositions. The question 
of the truth of a proposition, according to Heidegger, is 
secondary to the question of the adequacy of truth, as 
essence, to its object. "Truth is not originally resi-
1 dent in the proposition." Truth as correspondence or 
correct proposition is possible only on the basis of a 
ground for the inner possibility of the relation between 
the thing and its essence. 
Heidegger finds this inner possibility of ground in 
freedom. Freedom is being free to the revelation of what 
is open in entities. Freedom is what makes possible cor-
rectness as a relation. Freedom is the essence of truth. 
The setting-itself-free for a binding rightness is 
possible only as being-free to the revelation of 
something open. Such being-free points to the es-
sence, as yet unconceived, of freedom. The open-
ness of relation as the inner making possible of 
correctness is grounied in freedom. The essence 
of truth is freedom. 
To make freedom the "essence" of truth is to invite the 
criticism that the objectivity of truth is surrendered 
1. ww, 12. 
2. ww, 12. 
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to the arbitrariness and subjectivity of the human sub-
ject. The fact that untruth, the opposite of truth, 
which includes falsehood, misrepresentation, lies, and 
deceit, is generally accepted as human in its origin 
confirms the notion of an eternal and unchangeable es-
sence of truth which rules "over" man. 
Freedom, for Heidegger, can not be a property added 
to the essence of man. Man does .mt "have" or "possess" 
freedom; on the contrary, freedom possesses man, in the 
sense that freedom makes history possible. Nature has 
no history; man does have, precisely because he is free, 
The essence of freedom is a participation in entities. 
This participation is introduced in the phrase, "letting-
be" (sein-lassen). Letting-be is not the negative act 
of letting something alone by leaving it, nor the nega-
tive attitude of indifference (GleichgUltigkeit) or neg-
lect (Unterlassung). Letting-be means just the contrary; 
it is entering into (Sicheinlassen auf), an engaging in, 
or participation in entities. 
Letting-be is participation in entities. To be sure, 
this participation is again understood not merely as 
the management, preservation, cultivation, and plan-
ning of entities either encountered from time to time 
or sought out. Letting-be--namely, the entity as the 
entity that it is--signifies to participate in some-
thing open and its openness, of which every entity 
partakes, and which every entity brings along with 
itself. Western thought in its beginning conceived 
this "open" as -rVr. otk.'l~eK, the unconcealed. If we 
translate &>.>fG>f,K by "unconcealedness" instead of 
"truth," then this translation is not only "more 
literal," but it also contains the order to think 
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about the usual concept of truth in the sense of the 
correctness of the proposition and to think it back 
to that still unconceived (essence] of unconcealed-
ness and unconcealing of entities. Participating in 
the unconoealedness of entities does not lose itself 
in them but develops into a stepping-back before 
the entities so that they may reveal themselves in 
what they are and how they are, and so that the rep-
resenting assimilation may take its criterion from 
them. This letting-be exposes itself to the entities 
as one such and transposes all relation into the open. 
Letting-be, i.e., freedom, is in itself ex-posing, 
ex-sistent. The essence of freedom, caught sight of 
on the way to the essence of truth, shows itself as 
ex-posing into the unconcealedness of entities,l 
Freedom is participatingness (Eingelassenheit), ex-posing 
(Aus-setzung), ex-sistence (Ek-sistenz), in the uncon-
cealing of entities. Ex-sistence is not being-present 
(Vorhandensein) in the manner of thing-entiti~s, but is 
the human existence (Existenz) of Dasein in its peculiar 
quality of transcending itself into nature and history. 
Freedom is man's transcending nature, in the sense that 
man engages in the unconcealing of entities. Man's free-
dom is his participation in the revelation of things be-
yond himself. Freedom, in this sense, is more basic than 
essence itself. Man, in his freedom or by his nature, 
produces essence; man essences (~). 
Freedom, understood as the letting-be of entities, 
fulfils and completes the essence of truth in the 
sense of the unconcealing of entities. "Truth" is 
no characteristic of the correct proposition, which 
is asserted of an "object" by a human "subject," 
and then "valid" somewhere--in what realm, no one 
knows--but truth is the unconcealing of entities 
through which an openness essences. In truth's 
openness, all human conduct and its attitude are 
expos!d. Therefore, man is in the mode of ex-sist-
ence. 
1. ww. 14-15. 
2. ww, 16. 
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The use or the term, essence, as a verb (~) is, in the 
opinion of the writer, Heidegger•s attempt to show that 
freedom is more basic than the realm of essence itself. 
Man, in his rreedom, reveals the openness of entities 
and creates essences. Truth as essence is a product of 
man's revelatory rreedom. 
Heidegger's discussion of the relations of truth to 
untruth as a not-essence (Un-wesen) and as a counter-
essence (Gegen-wesen) is extremely difficult to follow, 
at least for this writer. Both truth and untruth, as 
falsehood and error, belong to the realm of truth. A 
false proposition is corrected by contrasting it to a 
true one. But ir truth is not originally a matter of 
propositions, then untruth as what lies outside the realm 
of the essence of truth must not be merely a false essence. 
Since, for Heidegger, the basic or original nature 
of truth is an unconcealing, or a human revelation, the 
whole realm of what is beyond the openness or unconcealed-
ness of entities is the realm of un-truth, i.e., as not-
essence. This is the realm of mystery (Geheimnis), or 
pre-essencing essence (vor-wesende Wesen). 
The proper not-essence of truth is mystery. Not-
essence here signifies --still not fallen away to, 
essence in the sense of the universal (k"'~"o'v yc- ~- r- s), 
of its possibilitas (making possible) and of its 
ground. Not-essence is here the essence pre-essencing 
in such a sense.l 
l. ww, 20. 
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Heidegger rejects the anticipated interpretation of this 
problem as a paradox, because paradox has to do with the 
conflict of opinions (~, Meinung). The problem lies 
"in the not-yet-experienced realm of the truth of being 
(not primarily of entities)."1 
The counter essence (Gegenwesen) of truth is not 
to be found in error (Irrtum) as a false judgment or in-
correct proposition. A false proposition is only one 
way of erring, and, for Heidegger, a very superficial 
way. The basic counter essence is erratic, errant con-
fusion (irren, die Irre), 2 which is man's incessant 
hustling and bustling, being driven from one customary 
activity to another, passing by and avoiding the basic 
mystery. This confusion, as the counter essence of truth, 
"belongs to the inner constitution of Da-sein."3 Out of 
this fundamental confusion arise the basic errors of life, 
in practice, attitudes, and decisions, as well as the 
superficial errors of judgment and false knowledge in 
philosophy. Man is subject to the rule of mystery as 
well as to the oppression of confusion. In man's resolve 
to mystery, the question of the essence of truth is asked 
"more originally."4 The essence of truth involves the 
truth of essence; the ground of this involvement leads 
to the problem of entities in the whole, and, thus, to 
1. ww, 20. 
2. WW, 22. To the writer, Heidegger•s exposition and use 
of this concept are reminiscent of the biblical descrip-
tion of original chaos, in Genesis 1: 2. Cf. EAB 398 
n. 26, for a different translation and an excelle~t ' 
statement of the problem of translation. 
3. ww, 22. 
4. ww, 23. 
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the question of the being of entities, or metaphysics. 
The problem of the essence of truth becomes the meta-
physical problem of the truth of essence, i.e., or the 
adequacy of conceptual knowledge to solve the ontological 
question of being as distinct from the problem of entities. 
Heidegger concludes the lecture as follows: 
The present endeavor leads the question about the 
essence of truth beyond the confines of the accus-
tomed boundary in the ordinary concept of essence 
and helps in the consideration of whether the ques-
tion about the essence of truth must not be at the 
same time and first of all the question about the 
truth of essence. In the concept o:f "essence'" 
however, philosophy thinks being. The leading-back 
of the inner possibility or the correctness of a 
proposition to the ex-sistent freedom of letting-be 
as its "ground," and, likewise, the pre-interpretation 
or the beginning of essence of this ground in con-
cealing and in erratic confusion may indicate that 
the essence or truth is not the empty "generality" 
or an "abstract" universality, but what, self-con-
cealing, is unique in the once-[occurringl history 
of the unconcealing or the meaning of that which we 
call being and which for a long time we are accui-
tomed to think of only as entities in the whole. 
One paragraph of the notes to the lecture was pub-
lished :for the first time in the third edition (1954) of 
the printed essay. This paragraph is a kind or summary 
or the entire lecture. The introduction of a new term, 
~. in addition to Sein, leaves the writer no choice 
but to translate ~ as be-ing. 
The question about the essence of truth arises out 
of the question about the truth of essence. The 
:former question understands essence first in the 
sense of what-ness (quidditas) or thing-ness (reali-
tas), truth as a character of knowledge. The ques-
1. ww, 25. 
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tion about the truth of essence understands essence 
verbally and means by this word, still remaining 
within the representation of metaphysics, be-ing 
as the ruling difference between being and entities. 
Truth signifies lighting-concealing as the basic 
feature of be-ing. The question about the essence 
of truth finds its answer in the statement: the 
essence of truth is the truth of essence. One-Bees 
easily, according to the comment, that the state-
ment does not merely invert the word order and seek 
to awaken the appearance of a paradox. The subject 
of the statement, in case this fatal grammatical 
category may still be used at all, is the truth of 
essence. The lighting-concealing is, i.e., lets 
essence, the correspondence between knowledge and 
entities. The statement is not dialectical. It 
is, in general, not a statement in the sense of a 
proposition. The answer to the question about the 
essence of truth is the saying of a turning within 
the history of be-ing. Because lighting-concealing 
belongs to be-ing, be-ing appears in the beginning 
~~ ~~isli~~t~t~= ~~1~:~~1ng removal. The name 
Heidegger•s purpose in this lecture seems to be to 
show the derived, secondary nature of conceptual know-
ledge (essences). Man, in his freedom, essences, i.e., 
freedom itself is the ground of essence. Man lets es-
sence (l!sst wesen), i.e., man, because of his nature 
and need, participates in the creation, not merely the 
discovery, of a valid realm of essences. Truth is orig-
inally an unconcealing of mystery. Man participates in 
this unconcealing, because being and entities are open to 
him. The formulation of this openness or of this revela-
tion into concepts is the secondary, but nonetheless valid 
and necessary, concept of truth as the correspondence of 
thought and thing. 
1. ww, 26. 
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5. Brief Uber den Humanismus. 
Heidegger•s extended letter, "On Humanism," was 
written to Jean Beaufret, of Paris, in answer to some 
questions in Beautret•s letter of November 10, 1946. 
The questions by Beaufret arose out of the French trans-
lation of the lecture, "Plato's Theory of Truth," with 
its reference to humanism. In that lecture Heidegger de-
fines humanism in terms of metaphysics. Consequently, 
the overcoming of metaphysics, which was Heidegger's aim, 
would also imply the overcoming of humanism. Beaufret's 
questions provide Heidegger an opportunity to clarify 
his position with regard to the existentialistic humanism 
of Sartre, the humanisms of the Renaissance and Christian 
thought, and, in general, the many labels applied to Rei-
dagger's philosophy, such as existentialism, nihilism, 
irrationalism, godless atheism, this-worldly positivism, 
negativism, and subjectivism. Heidegger's letter provides 
unequivocal affirmations about his thinking with respect 
to all these problems. The letter also helps to clarify 
Heidegger•s conception of being, as distinct from all en-
tities; but the positive characterizations of being are 
much more difficult to grasp than his rejection of the 
epithets commonly applied to his thought. 
The import of the entire letter might be summarized 
as Heidegger•s characterization of his own thought as an 
attempt to overcome traditional thought patterns, and to 
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achieve a new way of formulating the problems of thought. 
The new way is really old, according to Heidegger, because 
it was indicated in some pre-Socratic thought, prior to 
the formulation of traditional patterns of concepts, logic, 
actuality and potentiality, existentia and essentia, sub-
stance, and causality as "philosophical" problems. Heideg-
ger•s complaint against "philosophy" is that the manner of 
conceiving the problems is in itself the determining or 
limiting factor in selecting one of the possible answers. 
The manner of asking the question limits the answers that 
are possible. This is the substance of his complaint that 
thinking ends when men become occupied with philosophy. 
Philosophy is a fish out of water, and may be dis-
sected into logic, physics, and ethics, for example. But 
what is needed, according to Heidegger, is to put the fish 
(thinking) back into its element (being), where it can 
live and move, rather than simply be analyzed into pre-
supposed problems with presupposed answers. In this sense, 
Heidegger's thought is opposed to humanism, just as it is 
opposed to metaphysics and to logic. Heidegger is opposed 
to the technical interpretation of thought; he is opposed 
to all humanisms which define man by the use of non-human 
categories. 
sartre•s interpretation of existentialism as humanism 
and as the priority of existence over essence providestwo 
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excellent opportunities for Heidegger to explain what he 
has in mind. Various meanings of humanism are analyzed 
by Heidegger in this letter. In the early Roman state, 
humanism meant the social environment and culture of Rome 
as opposed to barbarian customs. The Renaissance, usu-
ally thought of as humanism, was a return to the humanism 
of Roman culture, and of Greek culture as seen through 
the Roman tradition handed down to the West. The human-
ism of the Renaissance is opposed to the in-humanism of 
medieval Scholasticism. There is also a humanism in 
Goethe and Schiller, in Marx, in Sartre, and in Christian 
thought. Heidegger affirms that all of these humanisms 
are alike in the sense that they all define humanism by 
reference to something that is itself non-human, such as 
an interpretation of environment, of nature, of the world, 
of world ground, of history, or of economics. "Every hu-
manism is either grounded in a metaphysics, or makes it-
self ipto the ground of a metaphysics."1 Instead of de-
fining the essence of man by a determination of man's 
relation to being, all humanism& define man by a deter-
mination of entities and man's relation to them. In the 
first humanism, which was the Roman, according to Heidegger, 
the essence of man as a rational animal was presupposed. 
Metaphysics has continued in this same manner, thinking 
man first of all in terms of what is not human, i.e., 
1. PLW, 63-64. 
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animal nature. First, what is animal, and then what is 
human is added on. Metaphysics proceeds in this way, 
and, consequently, can not arrive at the truth of being 
and the relation of being to the essence of man. Man 
is more than, or, rather, he is essentially other than, 
an organism; hence, biologism, with its dependence upon 
physiology and physiological chemistry, can never be ade-
quate to define the essence of man. The whole question 
of the essence or man and his relation to being (not to 
entities) must be reformulated, according to Heidegger. 
The reformulation involves a surpassing, an overcoming, 
of metaphysics and of humanism. 
The question of the priority of existence over es-
sence receives from Heidegger a similar answer. In Sein 
und Zeit it was affirmed that "the •essence' of Dasein 
lies in its existence."1 But this affirmation, Heidegger 
insists, has nothing to do with the relations between 
existentia and essentia, or actuality and potentiality. 
The latter problems were not under consideration. Kant 
represented existentia as the objectivity of experience; 
Hegel represented existentia as the absolute subjectivity 
of the self-know·ing Idee; Nietzsche conceived existentia 
as eternal repetition. The question of the existentia 
of man was left open in Sein und Zeit, 2 
Sartre's statement that the fundamental proposition 
of existentialism is the priority of existence over es-
1. PLW, 68; SuZ, 42, 
2. PLW, 68-73. 
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sence is a reversal of the traditional (since Plato) 
metaphysical dictum that essence is prior to ezistence. 
"But the reversal of a metaphysical statement remains a 
metaphysical statement."l With this sentence Heidegger 
places Sartre within the metaphysical tradition, whereas 
Heidegger's own aim is an overcoming of this tradition. 
Heidegger denies any valid connection between Sartre's 
existentialism and his av1n thought about existence (Exis-
~) as presented in Sein und Zeit. "But the main 
proposition of •existentialism' has not the least in 
common with that assertion in Sein und Zeit."2 Heidegger 
is opposed to humanism, because humanism, whether in 
Sartre's thought or in other types of thinking, has still 
not experienced the real dignity of man; humanism has 
not set the humanity of man high enough. Just as meta-
physics needs to be overcame by thinking being rather 
than entities, so humanism needs to be overcom.e by think-
ing the essence of man in relation to being, rather than 
defining man in terms of the non-human, i.e., nature, biol-
ogy, economics, divinity, history, or world. The essence 
of man is to be thought in strictly human terms, with 
reference only to being; the nature of man must not be a 
derivation from anything non-human. 
Heidegger admits his opposition to humanism, to logic, 
1. PLW, 72. 
2. PLW, 73. 
175 
and to metaphysics. But this opposition is an attempt 
to 'reformulate the problems of thought in a more orig-
inal way; it is an attempt, he claims, to get behind or 
beyond the traditional methods of stating the problems. 
The main results of his work, as Heidegger interprets 
the opinions of his critics, may be summarized as fol-
lows: over against humanism, an in-human barbarity; 
against logic, the arbitrariness of impulse and feeling; 
against reason, irrationalism; against values, against 
God, against metaphysics, and in favor of this-worldli-
ness, of godless atheiem, of nihilism, of nothing, of 
"phenomenological destruction" of metaphysics. In an-
swer to these charges, Heidegger denies the relevance of 
the epithets. He is opposed to the domination of thought 
by the forms of logic, and he questions the validity of 
logical system to think the being of man. Heidegger is 
opposed to values because values, in the traditional 
sense, imply subjectification. He wants to think being 
originally rather than to subjectivize entities as values. 
"Being-in-the-world" and "worldliness" are not moral char-
acteristics of man; neither are they meant to deny any 
possible reference to another world beyond this one. Such 
a question was not under consideration in Sein und Zeit. 
World is not the physical world, but refers to the open-
ness of being. 1 The questions of man's life in another 
1. Of. above, p. 68, for the four meanings of world in 
Sein und Zeit. 
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world and or the existence or God were not discussed; 
they remain undecided. Heidegger maintains that his 
thought leaves open the question or theism vs. atheism. 
He is neither theistic nor atheistic; but he does claim 
that the problem or his thought, i.e., of being, is prior 
to the problem of theism. 
Only out or the truth of being may the essence of 
the holy be thought. Only out or the essence ot 
the holy is the essence of deity to be thought. 
Only in the light or the essence of deity can there 
be thoucllt and spoken that which the word "God" is 
to mean:l 
In the light of his incomplete system, Heidegger claims 
that the discussion or theism or atheism in that system 
is premature. In similar fashion, Heidegger explains 
that his thought is an attempt to think more originally 
than "logic," "physics," and "ethics;" it is an attempt 
to get behind the distinction between theory and practice, 
in order to overcome the materialism of technical thinking 
and the pragmatism of expecting effective results. 
The negative results of Heidegger's letter are ex-
tremely clear. He denies the popular epithets applied to 
his thought, and repudiates all real connection with "exis-
tentialism." The positive contributions of the letter have 
to do with the characterizations (approaches toward defini-
tions) of being and of the essence of man. The language 
ot the letter is figurative and suggestive, but often enig-
matic. Thinking is a kind of activity, but not the kind 
l. PLW, 102. 
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that produces effects. Its performance or accomplish-
ment is to bring something into the fullness of its es-
sence. This something is being, and the task of thinking 
is to accomplish or to complete (vollbringen) being into 
its relation to the essence of man through language 
(Sprache). Language is the house of being, the dwelling 
where man lives. Thinkers and poets are the watchmen, 
the caretakers, the guardians of this dwelling. They 
watch over or care for the accomplishment of the revela-
tion of being.l Thinking is not first made effective in 
action, but is itself a kind of activity, the simplest 
and highest kind, because it deals with the relation of 
being to man. If we are to think being adequately, then 
"we must free ourselves from the technical interpretation 
of thinking."2 Thinking need not justify itself scientif-
ically; to do so is to surrender the essence of thinking. 
For the strictest thinking is not necessarily exact think-
ing, but rather the thinking that remains in the element 
of being. 
Being is what makes thinking possible. But this 
making possible is not merely potentiality as contrasted 
with actuality; it is not the existentia of thought as 
opposed to the realm of essences. The possible (das M6s-
liche) and possibility (M~glichkeit) are rooted in being 
1. PIJN, 53. 
2. PLW, 54. 
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able (verm~gen) and in liking (m~gen). Possibility is 
rooted in the bestowal of essence (Wesenschenken), in 
essencing in the source of something (etwas in seiner 
Her-kunft "wesen"), in letting something be (sein lassen). 
The latter phrase is somewhat ambiguous, since the word 
"lassen" may mean either "let" or "cause." Heidegger•s 
meaning seems to be that of enabling or capacitating 
rather than non-interference.1 The possible is not an 
abstract, empty possibility, for Heidegger, but the con-
creteness in which being essences. Possibility is sepa-
rated from its meaning in traditional thought, and is 
given a sort of creative function. 
If I speak of the "quiet power of the possible," 
I mean not the possibile of a merely represented 
possibilitas, not the potentia, as essentia of an 
actus ot ex1stentia, but being itse!r, Which, want-
1Di'to, may capacitate thinking and therefore the 
essence of man, and consequently, man's relation 
to being. To capacitate something signifies here: 
to preserve it in its essence, to hold it within 
its element.2 
Being is what makes thought possible. Being is 
made articulate in language. Man is the shepherd and 
caretaker of being, but not the maker of being. Man 
may be neighbor to being. The lighting (Lichtung) of 
being is the "there" (~) of Da-sein. What, then, is 
being? Being is not God, not world ground, not entities. 
Being is what is nearest, yet farthest from man. Being 
is it itself (Es selbst); being is the lighting (Lichtung) 
1. cr. above, p. 159. 
2. PLW, 57-58. 
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which reveals; being is the relation which holds existence 
to the ec-static essence of man and which collects into 
itself the place of the truth or being in the midst of 
entities.1 Being is the "dimension of the ec-static of 
e:x-sistence."2 Being is the "it" of "it is" or the "there" 
(!!) of "there is" (Es gibt). Being is what warrants or 
imparts truth. "Being is absolute transcendence."3 
The other positive contribution of this letter is 
a further characterization of the essence of man and his 
essential relation to being. The negative aspects of the 
letter, i.e., Heidegger's denial of existentialism and 
traditional forms of humanism as inadequate to his own 
conception of the essence of man, have already been men-
tioned. In this letter Heidegger extends the idea of 
ecstasy, used first in Sein und Zeit with respect to tem-
porality, to the existence of man. Existence (E:xistenz) 
becomes ex-sistence (Ek-sistenz). The ecstatic essence 
of man, his ex-sistence, is his "standing within the truth 
of being."4 "Ex-sistence is the name for the determina-
tion of that which man is in the destiny of truth."5 To 
say that man ex-sists does not mean that man is real; "it 
answers the question about the •essence• of man."6 The 
ex-sistence of man is the substance of man. This affirma-
tion means the manner or mode in which man in his essence 
1. PLW, 77. 4. PLW, 69. 
2. PLW, 79. 5. PLW, 70. 
3. PLW, 83; SuZ, 38. 6. PLW, 71. 
180 
is present {anwest) to being. Man ecstatically stands 
within the truth of being. Man is the shepherd, the 
caretaker, the neighbor of being. Man cares for being 
in two senses: he takes care of being and he cares about 
being. Man brings the truth of being to expression in 
language. The essence of man is his ecstatic ex-sistence, 
his intimate relation to being. 
An additional item of great interest in this letter 
is Heidegger•s explanation of the reason why the remainder 
of Sein und Zeit was not published. The all-important 
third section of Part I was held back because Heidegger 
found language inadequate to express the turn from "Being 
and Time" to "Time and Being." 
Here the whole turns around. The section in question 
was held back, because thinking in adequate saying 
failed this turn and with the help of the language 
of metaphysics did not succeed. The lecture, "On the 
Essence of Truth," which was thought and delivered 
in 1930 but was first published in 1943, gives a cer-
tain glance into the thinking of the turn from "Being 
and Time" to "Time and Being." This turn is not an 
alteration of the standpoint of Sein und Zeit, but in 
it the attempted thought first reaches into the place 
of the dimension out of which Sein und Zeit is experi-
enced and, indeed, experienced from the basic experi-
ence of the forgetting of being.l 
6. Eintuhrung in die Metaphysik. 
The series of lectures entitled, "Introduction to 
Metaphysics," was given in the University of Freiburg in 
1935. The book is a revised version of the lectures, and 
1. PLW, 72. 
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was published in 1953. The clarifying notes prepared 
at the time of the lectures are marked by parentheses. 
Those added in later years are distinguished by brackets. 
All notes and bibliographical references are included in 
the body of the text, rather than in footnotes. 
The title of the lectures, "Introduction to Meta-
physics," is ambiguous. The ambiguity is consciously 
recognized by Heidegger, and, therefore, in a sense is 
intentional. The main purpose of the series is a dis-
cussion of the problem of being, as understood within 
the framework of Heidegger•s own thought. The lectures 
begin with the question posed at the conclusion of ~ 
ist Metaphysik?, "Why are there entities at all and not 
rather nothing?"l The thought moves to the problem of 
being (Ch. I), and the discussion has to do with the 
grammar and etymology of the word, being (Ch. II), the 
essence of being (Ch. III), and the supposed limitations 
of being in contrast to becoming, appearance, thinking, 
and the ought (Ch. IV). The final chapter is more than 
half the volume. The "introduction" is to Heidegger's 
doctrine of being. But metaphysics is also used in the 
sense of traditional metaphysics, which, according to 
Heidegger, is concerned only with the problem of entities 
(Seiendes) rather than the problem of being {Sein). In 
this sense, the "introduction" is to the forgetting of 
1. EM, 1; WM, 38. 
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being, a forgetting which characterizes, for Heidegger, 
the history of western philosophy from Plato to the pres-
ent. The general point of view of the lectures is that 
of Sein und Zeit, i.e., the primacy of the problem of 
being, the doctrine of truth as the openness (Erschlossen-
heit) of being, and the understanding of being peculiar 
to man (Dasein). Heidegger rejects the charges of sub-
jectivism and existentialistic nihilism. 1 
Chapter I begins with the question of the "why" of 
entities. One of the most interesting parts of the dis-
cussion is the contrast presented between faith and phil-
osophy. Faith in Biblical revelation gives the answer to 
the question of the "why" of entities as God and his crea-
tion. God himself is the uncreated Creator. All other 
entities are products of his creative activity. Conse-
quently, the question of the "why" of entities in general, 
including both God and his creation, may not even be asked 
within the bounds of faith. To ask the question is to 
abandon faith. If philosophy is primarily concerned with 
such a question, then it is foolishness (Torheit) to faith. 
"A 'Christian philosophy' is a wooden iron and a misunder-
standing. n 2 
Consideration of the question of the "why" of entities 
leads necessarily to the prior question of being. The 
distinction between being and entities (Sein und Seiendes), 
which is basic to all of Heidegger's thought, leads to the 
1. l&, 22' l55. 
2. liM, 6. 
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problem of the supposed emptiness, indefiniteness, and 
futility of being as a concept (Bowne's fallacy of pure 
being). Baing as such, in contrast to entities (or be-
ings), is almost, if not exactly, the same as nothing. 
Logic itself furthers this interpretation, through the 
inverse relation of the extension and comprehension of 
terms. Being is the most universal in its extension, 
and the most indefinite :in its content. The remaining 
chapters are, in a sense, Heidegger 1 s attempt to give 
content to the most indefinite but universal concept of 
being. 
Chapter II deals with the grammar and etymology of 
being. Sein is the infinitive form of the verb. As a 
verb form, the infinitive means the indefinite with re-
gard to person and number. The infinitive is an abstrac-
tion from various conjugated forms of the verb. In this 
sense, "I am" is equivalent to "my being" (me in Se in) • 
".Am" (bin) and "is" (ist) are grammatically more basic 
than the abstracted form of the infinitive used as a sub-
stantive. The varied forms of the verb "to be" (~) 
are, according to Heidegger, dependent upon three stems 
in German, with similar, but incomplete, corresponding 
stems in Latin and Greek. The basic stems in German are 
~. ~. and wesen. Their basic etymological meanings, 
for Heidegger, are, respectively, to live (leben), to rise 
(aufgehen), and to stay (verweilen). These root meanings, 
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however, have been lost in later usage. The verb "to 
be" (sein) has retained only its most abstract meaning. 
Chapter III deals with the problem of the essence 
of being as a universal category. Being is indetermin-
ate or indefinite, and yet it is always understood def-
initely, in particular instances. Without the assump-
tion of being, speech would be impossible in any sense. 
The fact of man's understanding of being is a necessary 
condition of being human. '.t'ime and being are hUc11an 
phenomena. Because of its uniqueness, being may not be 
compared with anything else. No other category (basic 
principle) can be set beside being. As a word, being is 
in a class by itself, distinct from all other nouns and 
verbs. Being is no thing, no entity. Yet every entity 
"is" in some sense. Heidegger gives several examples of 
the use of "is" in different senses. In each case, he 
says, being is opened in a different way. He infers 
that being is not an empty word or fallacious concept, 
but must have definite meaning. 
Chapter IV is entitled, "The Limitation of Being." 
In this final chapter Heidegger presents four contrasts, 
or rather four attempts to compare and contrast being with 
other concepts: being and becoming; being and appearing; 
being and thinking; being and ought. Each of these four 
distinctions is a step toward the definiteness of being. 
Each is a necessary distinction, i.e., something more than 
merely a mode of expression. 
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Under the heading, "Being and Becoming" (Sein und 
Werden), Heidegger presents brief interpretations of 
Parmenides and Heraclitus, with the conclusion that both 
of them say the same thing. The traditional opposition 
of Heraclitus's "all flows" to the doctrine of being in 
Parmenides is rejected. Heidegger interprets becoming 
as an appearance of being, and in this way subsumes the 
first distinction under the second. 
"Being and Appearing," or, more precisely, "Being 
and Seeming," (Sein und Schein), is the heading of the 
second section of the chapter. There is a hidden unity 
of being and appearing. Appearance has a double meaning. 
On the one hand, appearance shows forth the real. On the 
other hand, appearance is not the real; it hides the real. 
Appearance becomes unreal show, and even deception in the 
moral sense. For Heidegger, the important aspect of ap-
pearance is its relation to being, i.e., that being shows 
itself or presents itself in appearance. The discussion 
is similar to the treatment of "phenomenon" and the dis-
tinction of appearance and seeming in Sein und Zeit.l 
The appearance of being is its openness or unconcealed-
ness, which is, for Heidegger, original truth. Truth be-
longs to the essence of being, because being necessarily 
appears in its unconcealedness. The appearance of being 
1. cr. SuZ, 28-31. 
and its relation to truth may also be found in the root 
meanings of 4ofot. commonly translated "opinion." Heideg-
ger finds four meanings for &&~~: glory, view, appear-
ance (show), and opinion. The four meanings are, in a 
sense, successive stages in the separation of appearance 
from being. The more appearance is separated from being, 
the more it becomes mere show or opinion. Appearance as 
the unconcealedness or truth of being necessarily belongs 
to being. Being and appearance, like being and becoming, 
is only a relative distinction, never an absolute one. 
The discussion of appearance includes a lengthy reference 
to Fragment 4 of Parmenides, which Heidegger uses for the 
discussion of three wayw, to being, to nothing, and to 
appearance. The conclusions on the three ways are as fol-
lows: 
The way to being is unavoidable. 
The way to nothing is inaccessible. 
The way to appearance is continually accessible and 
well-traveled, but avoidable.l 
The section on "Being and Thinking" ( Sein und Denken) 
is the most extensive and most difficult of the four. The 
whole section is largely an introduction to logic and meta-
physics in the traditional meanings of those terms. For 
Heidegger, the movement of history is not primarily prog-
ress, but a strong break-through at the beginning, and 
then decline. In this sense, the distinction between 
being and thinking is Heidegger•s account of the fall of 
1. EM, 86. 
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logic and metaphysics from their pristine concern with 
being to their traditional concern for correct ideas or 
representations. Heidegger is opposed to the domination 
of thought by traditional logic. He refers to Leibnitz, 
Kant, and Hegel as three great German thinkers who also 
sought to overcome logic in its traditional form. Heideg-
ger investigates the etymological roots of ).,6yos, and finds, 
back of the usual meanings of reason and word, the idea of 
collecting (sammeln). This usage is attributed to Hera-
clitus, and Heidegger so interprets >.oyos in several frag-
ments. The saying, "all flows," is interpreted as meaning 
that "the whole of entities is thrown, in its being, hither 
and thither from one opposition to another; being is the 
collectedness of this unrest which makes oppositions."1 
Reference is made to the statement by Parmenides that 
"thinking and being are the same." The usual translation 
is rejected, and in its place Heidegger translates the frag-
ment as follows: "Perception and being reciprocally belong 
together."2 This interpretation, according to Heidegger, 
necessarily involves speech and, in consequence, the being 
of man. Man must be understood in accordance with Greek 
conceptions, rather than the usual, later ideas of western 
thought, such as personality. According to Heidegger, the 
early Greek conception of man is "the most inhospitable" 
( das Unhe imlichste) • 3 This "Greek" definition of man is 
1. :Fld, 102. 
2. :Fld, 111. 
weise und 
3. ])d' 116. 
"Zusammengeh~rig sind Vernehmung wechsel-
Sein." 
taken from "Antigone," by Sophocles. This inhospitality 
is man's Da-sein, or the fact that he stands in the in-
evitability of death. 1 The being of man is inherently 
bound up with the problem of being. The connection of 
being (Sein) with man's being (Dasein) is what gives 
rise to fundamental ontology. The unconcealing or re-
vealing of man's being, of his relation to being, and of 
his understanding of being, is the original meaning of 
f.oyoi as collecting. The essence of speech lies in this 
original meaning of Aly~s, although the origin of speech 
remains a mystery. 
The fall of logic from the original meaning of Aoy8S 
is the change from truth as unconcealedness to truth as 
correct representation in propositions. Logic as propo-
sitional truth gives rise to the distinction between ~­
istentia and essentia, i.e., existence and essence in 
their traditional meanings. Ideas are first used to char-
acterize being; next, the ideas are set over against being, 
in the contrast between being and thinking; and, finally, 
ideas take the place of being to such an extent that the 
ideas are more real than the being they are meant to char-
acterize. Metaphysics becomes chiefly a doctrine of cate-
gories. The downfall of truth as unconcealedness gives 
rise to truth as correctness.2 Thinking is no longer the 
truth of being in the sense of depending upon being. 
1. EM, 121. 
2. EM, 145. 
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Instead, thinking becomes the foundation for being it-
self. Heidegger uses a diagram to illustrate the rela-
tions of being to becoming, appearance, and thinking. 
Becoming and appearance are on either side of being, 
and depend upon it. But thinking is placed below being, 
and the dependence is one way or the other, according 
to the type of thinking involved. 
The fourth. distinction, "Being and Ought" (Sein und 
Sollen), is illustrated in the diagram by placing ought 
above being. The distinction indicates an attempt to set 
an Idea of the Good (Plato) or the realm of values or of 
wholes over,against the realm of entities, which is the 
realm of being in traditional metaphysics. Thinking, in 
the form of the idea or ideal of what ought to be, is set 
over against being, and becomes dominant over being. 
He idegger refers by: .name to Kant and Fich te • He does not 
mention Lotze. Then he speaks with particular emphasis 
against the theory of values as Platonic Ideas which are 
valid rather than existing. Although no name is mentioned, 
the criticism is obviously directed against the theory of 
Nicolai Hartmann. 
Heidegger's chief conclusions from the discussion 
of the four distinctions may be summarized as follows: 
none of the four distinctions is really basic to the 
question of being, except on the plane of traditional 
metaphysics. Being is always the central problem, ac-
l\?0 
cording to Heidegger, in the sense that even the dis-
tinctions belong together in same sense. What is sepa-
rated from being and put in contrast to being, still 
"is" in same sense. 
Being, in opposition to becoming, is abiding. 
Being, in opposition to appearance, is the enduring 
model, what is always the same. 
Being, in opposition to thinking, is what lies at 
the foundation, what is present. 
Being, in opposition to ought, is what always lies 
before as already-realized or not-yet-realized 
ought-to-have-been. 
Abiding, always the same, being present, lying be-
fore--all sa7 basically the same thing: constant 
presence: ov as DlJfl"ia<.l 
For Heidegger, these traditional distinctions of meta-
physics may all be resolved. The basic distinction, 
which is central to ontology in Heidegger•s sense, is 
the distinction between being and entities. The question 
about the nature of being is intimately connected with 
the question of the essence of man. Da-sein, as the 
being of man, must be the basis and the approach to the 
dis closure of being. 
7. Was heisst Denken? 
The series of lectures entitled, "What does it mean 
to think?" was given in the University of Freiburg in 
1951 and 1952. The material appeared in book form in 
1954. The individual lectures are numbered, e.nd the 
introductory remarks of each lecture period are printed 
l. EM, 154. "Constant presence" is used to translate 
"st!ndige Anwesenheitl" despite the possible confusion 
with "being present" Vorhandenheit). 
separately. Since these introductions are more than 
recapitulations, because they contain much that is not 
in the text proper, it is easier to follow the order of 
the lectures as read, rather than as they appear in the 
printed text. Page references at the close of each lec-
ture and ea.ah "transitionJI' clearly indicate the proper 
sequence. The series contains ten lectures of the winter 
semester of 1951-1952, and eleven given in the summer 
semester of 1952. The contents of the lectures are mainly 
concerned with Heidegger•s own views in relation to the 
history of philosophy. The first part is largely devoted 
to Nietzsche. The second part begins with an analysis of 
the question posed in the title, followed by definitions 
of terms, and then presents Heidegger•s interpretation of 
a fragment from Parmenides. Many etymological all us ions 
to Greek and German roots, uncommon meanings given to 
common terms, and unexpected turns of thought make the 
lectures difficult to follow in detail. Heidegger•s ex-
planation, which implies some justification of the dif-
ficulties, is that thinking is inherently more difficult 
than reading the newspaper. This inherent difficulty 
lies in the unfamiliar simplicity of thinking, in con-
trast to the complexity to which modern man has become 
accustomed .1 
1. WHD, 145. 
Thinking may be learned, according to Heidegger, 
only by the process of thinking, by being on the way, 
l\'2 
by paying attention to what is to be considered. The 
thing most to be considered (das Bedenklichste) is that 
we still do rot think. Science does ntt think; philoso-
phizing is not thinking. "There is no bridge from sci-
ence to thinking, but only a leap."l Logic is not 
thinking, because logic is a science. Heidegger ex-
plicitly denies that his separation of thinking from 
logic, science, and philosophizing is another voice of 
pessimism to be added to the concert of those who speak 
of a sick Europe and a decadent culture.2 Heidegger re-
jects pessimism, optimism, and indifference between the 
two, because his aim, he claims, is not to evaluate. He 
objects to controversy, because it is no help on the way 
to thinking. 
A large portion of the first part of the lectures 
is devoted to Nietzsche, in consideration of his doctrine 
of the superman. Heidegger interprets the doctrine as a 
transition, as a bridge, as a transcendence. The "last 
man," which means, for Heidegger, man as the animal that 
thinks by representation (das vorstellende Tier), is to 
be transcended. Also to be transcended is the spirit of 
vengeance, interpreted as the counter-will against the 
passage (passing, Vergehen) of time. The doctrine of 
1. WHD, 4-5. 
2. lllorberto Boqbio givesr a forceful presentation and criti-
cism of existentialism as a philosophy of decadence, in 
The PhilosoDhy of De cadent ism (New York: l.:acrlillan, 1948). 
superman is the transition to redemption from vengeance 
and to eternal recurrence of the same. The most impor-
tant feature of Heidegger's interpretation of Nietzsche 
is the insistence upon the metaphysical, rather than moral, 
nature of the problems and doctrines. Vengeance is a meta-
physical doctrine, according to Heidegger. Redemption 
from vengeance and the. doctrine of eternal recurrence are 
likewise metaphysical. The doctrine of superman is meta-
physical rather than moral or anthropological; it is basic 
to metaphysics, to the theory of being in the traditional 
sense.l Thinking, consequently, may be learned only in 
relation to the problems of being. Thinking is the rela-
tion of the thinker to being. To learn to think is to be 
on the way to the relation to being. 2 
The second part of the series of lectures, corres-
ponding to the summer semester, begins with an analysis 
of the question, Was heisst Denken? Four questions or 
problems arise out of the analysis. The first is the 
meaning of the word, thinking. The second is the tradi-
tional doctrine of thinking. The third is how to think 
essentially, hov; to think well, how to think rightly. 
The fourth is what calls us or commends us to think. 
This fourth question is basic, according to Heidegger, 
and gives the meaning of the title, through the meaning 
of the verb, heissen. Heissen commonly means, to be 
1. WHD, ?3. 
2. WHD, 75. 
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named, to name, to call; often it signifies, to mean, to 
say, as in das heisst, which is equivalent to, that is, 
in English. But Heidegger uses the term here in the sense 
of bid or command. He also inserts "us" (~) as direct 
object (explicitly not indirect object), so that the 
question reads, "What bids us to think?"l The question 
then becomes a problem of the nature of man and his rela-
tion to being, for thinking is a human activity. 
The meaning of the word, thinking, is related in-
timately to several other German terms, but these terms 
are not used in their most accustomed senses. Thinking 
(Denken) is thanking (Danken), in the sense that thanking 
is the consideration of what is given, i.e., gift; thank-
ing is thinking about what one has, what one is, and the 
most enduring gift is our essence. Thanking is thinking 
about the gift of life itself. The highest and proper 
way to thank is to think. Thinking is also remembering 
or calling to mind (An-denken), if remembering is under-
stood as the collection or vmoleness of thinking rather 
than simply remembering something that is past. In this 
sense, remembering is as much concerned with the present 
and the future as with the past. Thinking is memory ( Ge-
dMchtnis) in much the same sense, i.e., as preserving, 
taking care of, being in charge of, having custody of. 
Memory is the opposite of Heidegger•s forgetting (Verges-
1. WHD, 85. "Was heisst uns denken?" 
senheit), which is letting the question of being fall 
into oblivion. Thus, memory becomes practically equiv-
alent to consideration of the problem of being, or to 
reiteration (Wiederholung) in Sein und Zeit. Heidegger 
refers to etymological roots of mind (GemUt) and soul 
(Seale) in relation to the meaning of thinking. Never-
theless, Heidegger states that the etymological allusions 
are not definitive, but only hints as to the nature of 
thinking. Thinking, as a word, means the essential con-
nection or togetherness (Wesenszusammenhang), which may 
be spoken of as thanking, remembering, memory. 
The traditional doctrine of thinking is found in 
logic, with its propositional relations of subject and 
predicate. Logic is saying something about something. 
The unity or connection of subject and predicate is just 
the chief problem, as is easily seen in considering 
self-contradictory or meaningless propos it ions. Heidegger 
uses as an example, "The triangle laughs." Logical propo-
sitions have double or multiple meanings, and, consequently, 
logic turns into dialectic. Here the example Heidegger 
selects is, "God is the absolute." The meaning changes 
if the emphasis is shifted from subject to predicate or 
vice versa.1 Logic is the representing of something ~ 
something, or saying something about something. The "as" 
and the "about" constitute the problem of representation. 
1. WHD, 101. 
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Logic is the correct name for the traditional doctrine of 
thinking, according to Heidegger, because it expresses 
the propositional, representing form of thinking. The 
fourth question, about what bids us to think, becomes 
more difficult when it is considered in relation to the 
traditional doctrine of logic. It then becomes the prob-
lem of what makes traditional logic dominate thinking. 
The question is not historical in the sense of a science 
of history (Historie), but in the sense of historical 
reality (Geschichte) or destiny (Geschick). The consid-
eration of the destiny of thought in logic refers back to 
Parmenides, to a fragment that is prior to the domination 
of thought by the propositional form of representation. 
The final six lectures in the series are devoted 
almost entirely to consideration of the Parmenidean say-
ing, "It is necessary to say and to think that being is."1 
After dealing with every Greek word in the sentence and 
with possible German terms for translating the various 
possible meanings in each case, Heidegger comes to the 
conclusion that the duality or two-ness (ZWiefalt) of 
being and entities (Sein und Seiendes) is what makes it 
necessary to think. The basic feature of thinking is 
not grasping or fixing in concepts, but is making ques-
1. WHD, 165. "N~tig ist zu sagen und zu denken, dass das 
Seiende 1st." It should be noted that being, in the 
usual English translation of the fragment, as given 
here, is Heidegger•s term, Seiendes, which has been 
translated "entities" in this dissertation. 
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tion-worthy the relation between perceiving and speaking. 
The duality of being and entities is found in the parti-
cipial fo~ in grammar. But grammar is rooted in thought, 
not thought in grammar. The participation of entities 
in being (Teilhabe des Seiendem am Sein) presupposes a 
duality of entities and being.1 Thinking is paying at-
tention to this participation, is going beyond entities. 
Thinking is being on the way of transcendence from enti-
ties to being. If ~eta" of metaphysics is interpreted 
as "transcending," then thinking is both metaphysical and 
metalogical.2 Thinking, according to Heidegger, is riP~t 
thinking When it goes beyond technique, science, calcula-
tion, logical propositions, and traditional philosophy. 
It is right thinking when it is question-worthy. It is 
right thinking when it is on the way of transcendence 
from entities to being. This is the answer, as understood 
by the writer, to the third of Heidegger's four questions. 
Essential thinking, right thinking, is thinking about be-
ing, not a descriptive, calculating, propositional thinking 
about entities. The fourth question has already been an-
swered. The duality of being and entities is what bids 
us to think. 
1. WHD, 135. 
2. WHD, 135. Of. also, WHD, 101. 
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8. "Die Frage naoh der Teohnik."l 
The lecture on, "The ~uestion about Technique" 
(Technology), was presented 1n November of 1953 in Munich, 
in connection with a series on, "The Arts in a Technical 
Age." It was first published in the Yearbook of the Ba-
varian Academy of Fine Arts, and is included in the col-
lection, Vortr!ge und Aufs!tze. 
"The ~uestion about Technique" is a discussion of 
the essence of technology, and begins with the common 
philosophical concept of technique as a means or instru-
ment of human activity. Heidegger affirms that the in-
strumental, anthropological concept of technique is cor-
rect, but not true. The nature of instrumentality is the 
problem. Instrumentality is discussed in relation to the 
Aristotelian theory of the four causes, but Heidegger re-
jects this interpretation as unenlightening. The four 
causes are modes of occasioning (Veranlassen) or of being 
responsible for, being guilty of (Verschulden). 
Heidegger interprets instrumentality and technique 
as poetic revelation, as unconcealing (Entbergen). He 
uses the word Ge-stell, but specifically repudiates all 
of its common meanings, such as stand, frame, rack, tres-
tle, and pedestal. The terms used to characterize Ge-stell 
are likewise difficult to define in any precise way. Ap-
parently Heidegger has in mind technique as the poetic 
1. VA, 13-44. 
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unconcealing of hidden truth. Destiny, freedom, and 
danger are also used in the discussion. The essence of 
technique is not itself technical, but lies in a differ-
ent realm. The common meaning of essence (quid, Was-heit) 
is also rejected. Essence is considered basically as a 
verb, and is synonymous with enduring (wHhren) and the 
permanent (das Fortw!hrende). Thus, the conclusion of 
the discussion seems to be that the permanent essencing 
of technique is to be found in poetic, artistic mystery. 
"The more we consider, by asking questions, the essence 
of technique, the more mysterious becomes the essence of 
art."l 
9. "Wissenschaft und Besinnung."2 
The lecture on, "Science and Reflection," was deliv-
ered in Munich on August 4, 1953, and published in Vor-
trl!.ge und Aufsl!.tze. It is a dis cuss ion of the essence of 
science, and presents specifically the way in which a 
consideration of the essence of science necessarily goes 
beyond the limits of science as such. Science is defined 
as "the theory of the real."3 The lecture contains an 
extended philological discussion on many terms common to 
science and philosophy, such as theory, real, cause, ef-
fect, object, objectivity, truth, and meditation. Theory 
and real, as presented in the definitions, necessarily 
1. VA, 44. 
2. VA, 45-70. 
3. VA, 47. 
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involve each other. The experience and definition of 
objectivity are what constitute the real. Modern sci-
ence conceives objectivity in terms of the subject-ob-
ject relation. 
Heidegger examines physics, psychiatry, history, 
and philosophy as examples of modern science. In each 
case there is something inevitable (Unumg!ngliche) which 
governs the science. The objectivity of nature is the 
inevitable for physics; the inevitable for psychiatry is 
Dasein in which man ex-sists; for historical science 
(Historie) the inevitable is what happens (Geschehen) 
in history (Geschichte); for philology the inevitable is 
language (Sprache). The sciences are not in a position 
to represent themselves, to define their inevitables. 
In each case the inevitable is inaccessible to the sci-
ence concerned. 
The state of the matter (Sachverhalt) is the non-
apparent source from which science takes its rise, as a 
stream flows from its source. The attempt to define 
this source or state of the matter is the return of 
thought to its home in question-worthiness (Fragwftrdig-
~--also, questiona~ility or doubtfulness). Reflec-
tion (Besinnung), which is defined as entering into 
meaning (auf den Sinn einlassen), is presented as that 
which puts us on the way to a place of residence, i.e., 
2Cl 
it the writer grasps Heidegger•s meaning, reflection is 
a necessary step toward the solution of the problem of 
the essence of science, Reflection promises to open the 
doorway to a new age, after the passing of the age of 
representation (Bildung). "The poverty of reflection 
is, however, the promise of a wealth, the treasures of 
which gleam in the splendor of that which is useless, 
which may never be miscalculated,"! The way to the es-
sence of science is through a kind of reflection that 
goes beyond the calculating and utilitarian aspects of 
science. 
10. WUeberwindung der Metaphysik."2 
The essay on the "Overcoming of Metaphysics" is a 
collection of notes written from 1936 to 1946. Two 
portions of the collection were published in connection 
with artistic publications. The essay is one chapter in 
Vortr!ge und Aufs!tze. The essay is a collection of 
varied themes, all with a relation to metaphysics. Hei-
degger presents in summarized form many of his criticisms 
of "philosophy" and traditional metaphysics. He is op-
posed to theory of knowledge, which substitutes certainty 
for truth; to the subject-object relation, which forms 
the basis for objectivity; to the oppositions of~s'and 
~ught:' of being and value; to the domination of entities 
(Seiendes) and the abandonment of being (Seinsverlassen-
~. VA, 70, 
2. VA, 71-99, 
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heit) in metaphysics; and to technique, defined as cal-
culating, technological control of all aspects of life 
and thought. 
The last of these objections is the most important 
for this essay. For Heidegger, metaphysics comes to a 
conclusion, to its end, in Nietzsche's will to power and 
the will to will. The will to will is the final stage 
in the development of traditional metaphysics. In this 
stage the will to will is correct but not true. The 
superman (Uebermensch) becomes identical with the sub-
man (Undermensch). The rational of the rational animal 
becomes identical with the animal. Heidegger finds an 
example of the completion of metaphysics in modern war 
and preparation for war (peace between wars). All risks 
are calculated; all efforts are directed toward security; 
all men, all energies, all possibilities, and all thinking 
are considered with regard to their utility in the attempt 
to gain certainty and security. A man without a uni-form 
(same double meaning in German as in English) is unreal; 
he does rot belong. 
The overcoming of metaphysics is Heidegger•s plea, 
not only for independence and variety of thought, but also 
for a kind of thinking that goes beyond technical, mechan-
ical calculation and control. Metaphysics is identified 
with certainty rather than truth, with calculated control 
rather than the risks of freedom and individuality, with 
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correctness rather than creativity. Heidegger pleads 
for the overcoming of metaphysics. 
11. "Was heisst Denken?"1 
The lecture entitled, "What does it mean to thir&?" 
was given over the Bavarian radio in May of 1952, and was 
first published in the periodical, Merkur. The radio lec-
ture; as published in Vortrase und Aufsatze, is almost 
identical with the opening portions of the series of lec-
tures bearing the same title and published as a separate 
volume.2 The lecture contains many stimulating suggestions 
about thinking; it is poetic and artistic rather than sci-
entific or strictly logical, both in content and in method. 
The lecture includes many semantical allusions, which are 
not exactly puns, but are obviously word plays. 
Thinking requires an interest, a liking (mOgen), in 
order to be able (verm6gen) to think. Science is not 
thinking, but calculation. There is no bridge, but only 
a leap, from science to thinking. Proof (Beweisen) is 
showing (Weisen) or referring, alluding to (Hinweisen). 
Thinking is closely linked to love. We learn to think 
by being in the proper element, just as we learn to swim 
by leaping into the stream. The element of thinking is 
the being of entities. We think in representation through 
logic, but such thinking is still not in its proper ele-
ment. Proper thinking is a sort of intellectual perception 
1. VA, l29-143, 
2 • Of. above • 
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( Vernehmen, yo€ ivl • It is a leap into the dark, into 
being, into the presence of being present. Being appears 
as presence (Anwesen). We still do not think properly, 
so we ask what it means to think. 
12. "Bauen Wohnen Denken."1 
The lecture entitled, "Building Dwelling Thinking," 
was delivered on August 5, 1951, in connection with a 
series of discourses on ~an and Space." The lecture is, 
according to the opening statement, an attempt "to think 
about dwelling and building."2 The basic concept to be 
defined is dwelling; building and thinking are dependent 
upon dwelling. Building is first thought of as the means 
to an end (dwelling). Through a series of etymological 
allusions, Heidegger connects and practically equates 
building with dwelling, and then relates dwelling to the 
being of man. To be a man is to be an earth-dweller, to 
be mortal. To dwell means (by allusions) to cherish and 
protect (hagen und pflegen); man's dwelling on earth is 
to cherish and protect his own finite being. Building 
also means both culture and edification. Both of these 
latter terms have multiple meanings. Heidegger•s conclu-
sions from all these allusions is that the being of man 
may be thought of as dwelling (man's mortality on the 
earth) and as building. 
1. VA, 145-162. 
2. VA, 145. 
~~05 
Man's building is exempliried in a bridge; but the 
bridge is conceived as something rar more extensive than 
a mere physical structure resulting from man's constructive 
efforts. The bridge is what binds together into a unit 
the "four," which are earth and heaven, mortals and di-
vinities. The original unity of earth and heaven, divin-
ities and mortals, is found in dwelling, building, and 
preserving (Schonen). The bridge is what unifies and 
collects the four, and, at last, lets men "as mortals, 
come to the other side."l The unity or the four, as 
found in the bridge, is a thing. The thing provides an 
origin for space. The thing locates a place, and spaces 
arise out of places. The limit is not where something 
ends, but where it begins. Abstract space contains no 
places or things.2 
A technique of construction is not adequate for 
the essence of building. The essence of building is 
letting dwell (Wohnenlassen). Dwelling, in turn, is 
"the basic feature or the being, according to which 
mortals are. "3 Man 1 s being is found in his dwelling; 
man is, as an earth-dweller. 
13. "Das Ding • "4 
The lecture entitled, "The Thing," was delivered 
before the Bavarian Academy of Fine Arts on June 6, 1950, 
and was first published in the Yearbook of the Academy in 
1. VA, 153, 3. VA, 161. 
2. VA, 156. 4. VA, 163-185. 
206 
1951. The principal concepts discussed in the lecture 
are nearness, thing, and world. Nearness is not a matter 
of physical distance; it has to do with concern, with in-
terest, with involvement. The thing is what gives mean-
ing to nearness. "The thing things. ,l Heidegger selects 
a pitcher as his example of a thing. He explores the 
essence of the thing (pitcher) as emptiness (das Leere), 
without which a pitcher would have no meaning, without 
which it could not be a pitcher. Then he alludes to the 
idea of pouring as related to pitcher, and then to pour-
ing (libation) as sacrifice. The emptiness of the pitcher 
is not adequate to think the essence of the thing. The 
thing is, like the bridge in "Bauen Wohnen Denken," the 
simple unity of the "four," earth and heaven, mortals and 
divinities. The collecting of these four is what makes 
the essence of the thing. "The pitcher essences as thing. 
The pitcher is the pitcher as a thing. But how does the 
thing essence? The thing things. Thinging collects. n2 
The essencing of a thing is what worlds a world. 
The world essences, in that it worlds. This means: 
the worlding of the world is neither explicable 
through any other, nor can it be grounded in any 
other. This impossibility does not lie in the fact 
that our human thinking is incapable of such explana-
tion and grounding. Rather, that the worlding of the 
world can not be explained or grounded rests upon the 
fact that anything like causes and grounds remains 
unsuitable to the worlding of the world.3 
Just as the thing things, so the world worlds.. The thing 
gives a oneness to the four. "The thing things world. n4 
1. VA, 172. "Das Ding dingt." 3. VA, 178. 
2. VA, 172. 4. VA, 179. 
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The world is secondary to things. Things make a world. 
In similar fashion, things condition man's existence. 
Man is be-thinged, conditioned (Be-dingt). 
14. Was ist das--die Philosophie? 
The lecture entitled, What Is Philosophy?1 was 
given by Heidegger as an introductory statement to a 
philosophical discussion, in Cerisy-la-Salle, Normandy, 
in August of 1955. Several ideas on the introduction 
to philosophy are presented in a popular style. Phil-
osophy is to philosophize rather than to learn something 
about philosophy. 2 The word, philosophy, and the nature 
of philosophizing go back to the Greeks and their under-
standing of philosophy. The question, What is philosophy? 
turns on the understanding of the "what" of Greek termi-
nology. Consideration of this problem leads to the ques-
tion of the relations of being (Sein) and entities 
(Seiendes). What is the being of entities? is the basic 
philosophical question. 3 The analysis of langua~e is a 
clue to the nature of philosophy. Philosophical discus-
sion is not the presentation of a fixed program or sys-
tem, but seeks to open up questions. 
1. What Is Philosophy? (tr. William Kluback and dean T. 
Wilde)(New York: Twayne Publishers, Inc., 1958). 
English and German texts are presented on opposing 
pages. Abbreviated, WP. 
2. WP, 21. 
3. WP, 55. 
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The lecture is a popular presentation of several 
of Heidegger's ideas on the nature of philosophy and 
philosophical tradition. It represents nothing of 
singular importance in the development of Heidegger•s 
thought. 
15. zur Seinsfrage. 1 
The 'i,uestion of Being2 is Heidegger's contribu-
tion to an anniversary volume in honor of Ernst JUnger. 
JUnger contributed an article, on a similar occasion in 
3 1949, for Heidegger, entitled, "On the Line." Heideg-
ger reciprocated with, "On 'The Line.'" The ''Line," in 
both instances, is the concept of nihilism. For the 
small, published volume of Heidegger's essay, the title 
was changed to indicate something of the thought content. 
The titles of the two letters are interesting, because 
of their obvious similarity. 
The German preposition, Ueber, may mean on, over, 
above, or, about, or beyond. JUnger wrote about going 
1. Zur Seinsfrage (Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Kloster-
mann, l956). Abbreviated, zs. 
2. The4uestion of Being (tr. William Kluback and Jean 
T. W lde)(New York: Twayne Publishers, Inc., 1958). 
English and German texts are presented on opposing 
pages. Abbreviated, r~B. 
3. Ernst JUnger, "Ueber die Linie," in walter F. otto, und 
andere,.Anteile Martin Heide er zum 60. Geburtsta 
(Frankfur or o K os ermann, 0 , 45-
284. 
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beyond nihilism, and used the title, "On (beyond) the 
Line." In what might be called a cordial reply, for 
there is every indication of a friendly exchange between 
the two thinkers, Heidegger wrote about nihilism, and 
used the title, "On (about) •The Line.•" The tenor of 
Heidegger1 s essay is that nihilism must be understood 
before it can be transcended. Heidegger rejects the 
application of the concept to his thought. Consequently, 
insofar as JUnger's argument that Heidegger goes beyond 
nihilism means calling Heidegger a nihilist, the reply 
may be considered a criticism of JUnger. 
Heidegger rejects the goal of a "good definition 
1 
of nihilism." The attempt to define is a submission 
to the dominance of logic over thinking. Instead, 
Heidegger believes that clear definition stifles think-
ing, and is at best only a negative gain in the approach 
to entities. Nihilism is the conclusion or completion 
of the negative road to entities, and nihilism has 
meaning only within the realm of entities. The question 
of being is another matter. Being can be thought only by 
giving up the language of metaphysics. It is of the na-
ture of nihilism to disguise its nature., Heidegger 
seeks to identify nihilism with metaphysics in the tra-
ditional sense, and to associate negative conclusions 
1. Q,B, 38. 
(the road to nihilism) with the kind of thinking that 
is dominated by logic and definition. 
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Nevertheless, Heidegger does partially define some 
terms. Transcendence, for example, may be thought of 
as man's transcendence to a world, as the relation of 
this world to another, or to the highest, supreme en-
tity (hechste Seiende), God. Heidegger•s intention is 
to think back into the question-worthy (das FragWU!dig), 
out of which being may be thought. This means, if the 
writer understands Heidegger correctly, to think into 
being without passing into the customary pattern in 
which being is the object of thinking. If being is 
allowed to become an object of thought, then the sub-
ject-object relation has again become dominant over 
thinking. To avoid thinking of being or about being, 
as an object, is the problem. The aim is to think 
into being without objectifying it. 1 
Heidegger suggests a new language symbol: ~ 
~. This is his continuing struggle against the 
category of substance, against logic and definition. 
Thought almost inevitably makes a substantive of any-
thing it reaches. Heidegger wants to keep ~out 
of the clutches of the subject-object relation. 2 
1. The "it" of this sentence illustrates the inevitable 
tendency to resort to substantives. 
2. ~B, 80-82. 
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The four points of the crossed diagonal lines have a 
positive meaning, for which he refers the reader to 
some of his essays in the collection, Vortr~ge und 
Aufsatze. The "four" which are united by the crossed 
lines are earth and heaven, mortals and divinities. 1 
Nihilism can be overcome, according to Heidegger, only 
by overcoming the limitations of met~physics, by over-
coming the forgetting of being. 2 
16. Der Satz vom Grund. 3 
In the academic year, 1955-1956, Heidegger gave a 
lecture course in the University of Freiburg on "The 
Statement of Ground." The course consisted of thirteen 
hour-long lectures. The book was published in 1957. 
Excerpts from the series were used for a lecture which 
was given in the Bremen Club on May 25, 1956, and again 
at the University of Vienna on October 24, 1956. a few 
brief editorial changes and comments are included in 
the printed text, within brackets. 
"Nothing is without ground" is the basic form of 
the proposition or statement of ground (cause, reason) 
1. cr. VA, 172. 
2. ·~B, 90. 
3. Der Bats vom Grund (Pfullingen: GUnther Neske, 1957). 
Abbreviated, SG. 
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which Heidegger examines. He explores just about all 
possible meanings of the negative and positive forms 
of the proposition and of the words. Also, he even 
takes up the different meanings involved in the change 
of accentuation or key (as in music). ~othing is 
without ground" can also be heard as, ·~othing is 
without ground." The change from one to other possible 
meanings is a leap (~, Sprung) from the affirmation 
of cause, reason, and ground, as in Leibnitz, for any 
and all entities (Seiendes), to the entirely different 
question of being (Sein). The leap becomes, for Heideg-
ger, another means of dealing with the limitations of 
discursive reason when applied to the ultimate questions. 
The superficial structure of the book is simply 
etymological allusion. Each word is examined in its 
variant meanings, some of which have little if any con-
nection with logic and philosophy. But, despite the 
far-fetched digressions, there is a kind of unity in 
the whole presentation. Heidegger calls into question 
the validity of reason itself, the basic, implicit faith 
of man in the rationality of all things. Heidegger agrees 
with Hegel, and all thinkers, in the view that rational 
consistency is no guarantee that anything is. Heidegger 
insinuates, throughout the book, that the lack of con-
sistency is no ground for denying that a thing is or 
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could be. Such a view is not explicitly stated, except 
in the question, What is the reason tor reason? and the 
answer, The principle of reason (cause, ground) is itself 
1 
without reason (cause, ground). 
The thought patterns are worked out in greater 
detail, but the subject matter of the lectures is the 
same as his study of ground, Vom Wesen des Grundes, in 
1929. Referring to that work, Heidegger says that it 
still stands, is still correct, but that it led to er-
roneous interpretations. 2 The underlying unity of 
Heidegger•s considerations is the attempt to call into 
question the validity of logic in its application to 
reality. He tries to push back the limits of philo-
eophical inquiry into a realm where discursive reason 
otters no certainties and little guidance. A scrutiny 
of the limits of reason makes necessary a leap into 
the ultimate problems of philosophy. 
one specific negative conclusion is worthy of 
notice. "Being may no longer be accounted tor through 
some entity."3 This statement is a denial of the doc-
trine of creation, as commonly understood. Christian 
1. SG, 27. 
2. SG, 84. 
3. Dies sagt: Sein nicht mehr durch etwas Seiendes 
erkl!!ren. sGF,..;;.;rl:;rl'l'lsF-;;:1"~1'iigr-" •....;;;;~!i:ta~17i~c'=s'""'ii'=n-=-;:t,ch.::e~o"=r~i-=g'ii"=na:.::.;:l.=.. 
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faith and much philosophy have thought of reality as a 
product of divine will. In Heidegger•s terminology, 
this means to explain being (Sein} by reference to an 
entity (Seiendes), God, in this case. 
A most illustrative part of the book is Heidegger•s 
treatment of Leibn:ttzts principle of sufficient reason 
in relation to the doctrine of creation. Likewise il-
lustrative is the interpretation of Kant's critical 
philosophy as an attempt to discover and make explicit 
the a priori conditions of possibility of nature and 
1 freedom. Heidegger is thoroughly consistent in his 
refusal to make any leap into faith in God as a basic 
assumption for philosophizing. This means that God 
might possibly be a concept to which philosophy arrives, 
but may not be used in any way as a principle of ex-
planation without becoming an obvious case of circular 
reasoning. 
17. "Der Satz der Identit~t." 
"The Principle of Identity" is a lecture given 
by Heidegger on Faculty Day, June 27, 1957, during the 
Fifth Centennial celebration of the University of F.rei-
burg. It is included in the small volume, Identity and 
1. SG, 126. 
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Difference, 1 und nrovides the contrdst, in the title, 
to the longer ci.nd rnore L·r:.port.:..nt p:::l.rt of the book, 1.-.Thich 
deals v.rith t:1e "ontologicEJ.l differerce" between being 
and entities. The nrinciple of identity has been tra-
ditionally considered the bccsic ryrinciple of logic, U"C·on 
'hich in soae YJu.y depend the princi,Jlcs of (non) contrc1-
diction ,<ncl excluded ;;:ciddle. Heidegr:er cxaEines t'1.e 
principle of identity fror::. various -ooink of view, sone 
of which seem to ha.ve no connection 'iiith logic. 
18. "Die onto-theo-lcgische Verfassung der :;etu•Jhysik." 2 
In the acadenic yeo.r, 1956-1957, Heidegr:er g.:..ve .J. 
se·•LHJ.r course on ;{egel's "Science of Logic." The lee-
ture on "'rhe Onto-Theo-Logical Conce•Jtion of i.etu:Jhysics" 
coLles from the content of that course. The pur:oose of 
tne course was to ee1ter into a dialogue •;rith ':ecel. So:t;le 
of the pri;;ci!ld.l questions for discussion nere t:w sub-
j e ct ;cutter of thought, t:1e criterion or s tandcJ.rd (Lussr;c1.be) 
for a dialogue Yli th the history of tlc.ow;h t, ccnd the nature 
of dialogue. Heidegr-er' s "ontoloc;icc;.l c1if:"erence" bet•Jeen 
1. Identit:lt urd Differenz, zvreite, unverl!nderte ·"uLcctge 
(Pfullingen: GUnther l'~es'm, 1957). .Sorevh:ted, ID. 
2. ID, 35-71. 
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being (Sein) and entities (Seiendes) is the key to the 
differences between his own views and those of Hegel 
on the questions mentioned. The subject matter of 
thought, for Hegel, is thought itself, as the absolute 
concept or idea (Begriff); for Heidegger, the subject 
matter of thought is being, as the difference between 
being and entities. 
The criterion or standard for the dialogue with 
the history of philosophy is, for Hegel, the ability 
to enter into the thoughts of earlier thinkers, within 
their proper context. For Heidegger, the standard is 
the ability to enter into what was not thought out 
clearly by earlier thinkers, i.e., their implicit as-
sumptions. The nature of the dialogue is, for Hegel, 
a dialectical movement to a higher synthesis in the 
Absolute. For Heidegger, the dialogue is a step back 
(der Schritt zurUck) into the vague depths from which 
the essence of truth first arose. 1 
There are references to Heidegger's famous lecture 
on, "What Is Metaphysics?" (1929), which raised the 
question of the nature of entities as such and as a 
whole. Traditional metaphysics deals with entities. 
The ontological difference requires an overcoming, a 
surpassing of the traditional concept of metaphysics, 
which, because of its exclusive concern with entities, 
with the concept of God as First Gause, and with 
1. ID, 43-47. 
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logic as the criterion of thought about entities, may 
more properly be spoken of as onto-thee-logic. 1 
Heidegger pleads for a delivery (Austrag), or carrying 
out, a going beyond and away from such a traditional 
way of thinking, especially with regard to the concept 
of God. In philosophy, God is neither to be worshiped 
nor addressed in prayer. God, for philosophy, is Self-
Cause, First Cause, a principle of explanation, which 
must be abandoned, according to Heidegger. As a result 
of God-less philosophizing (Heidegger•s), philosophy 
may approach the divine God. 2 
B. Works on Aesthetics and Poetry. 
h. "Heimkunrt/ An die Verwandten. " 3 
The first of four essays in the second, enlarged 
edition (1951) of ErlMuterungen zu Hnlderlins Dichtung 
is the commentary on "Homecoming, to Kindred Ones." 
Heidegger gave the address on the centenary of the death 
of ~lderlin, June 6,1943. The speech was first pub-
lished in 1944. English translations of the poem and of 
1. ID, 51. 
2. ID, 70-71. 
3. ErlMuterun~en zu ~lderlins Dichtung, zweite, 
!indarte Au lage (Frankturt am Maiil: Vittorio 
mann, 1951), 9-30. abbreviated, EHD. 
unver-
Kloster-
Heideg;;:er•s speech, cis well as an i:r.troductory essay by 
':Ierner Brock, mciy be found in ExisteHce dnd iloing. 
The poem is an elegy on "homecomi;,g," dnd rotay be 
interpreted as a :oortrdyal of the poet's thoughts u Jon 
returning to his childhood home. Heidegrzer interprets 
t!l.e poet's thoughts in a different, ;;,ore philosouhical 
sense. "Homecomillg is the return to the nearness to the 
1 
origin." 'l'he whole concept of origin (Ursprung) is 
bdsic for r:eidegger•s thought. This origin is a mystery, 
c~.nd the poet's tusk is to care for--to 1vatch over, cuc~.rd, 
dnd pr8serve--tho mystery ciS mystery. The mystery ~ust 
be 'mmm in order to be revealed, but it is not ::novm by 
a.nalysis. It is knovm in joy a.nd revealed in Cdre. The 
joy of the poet is the ca.re of the singer. 
The poet's difficulty is the la cJc of "holy nCJ.I:,es." 
This lack is caused by the "lack" (Fehl} of God, b the 
sense of his non-appeardnce. Heidegger comments on 
"the holy" and "the highest," which cere the sune til ire; 
for the poet, thut is, brightness (die Heitere). The 
Ge:rrian term, in ordi:1ary usar~e, r;;e~ns bri,'htnes~, seren-
ity, calmness, glctdness, or cheerfulness. I-Ieidegger 
refers to its Ii;ed.lling in Old Gernan, ';J;ich combines 
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three ideas: brightness as clarifying light; ;;;ajesty 
as strength, elevation, and serenity; ~nd joy or glad-
1 
ness. 
Ee idegr;er' s purpose, in the co:mr1entary, is "to 
Leake itself superfluous" and "to disappeetr," that is, 
to let the s ignificccnce of the poem i tsolf be corr:e ;·cani-
fest when read again. 2 
2. ·~IHderlin und das Wt;sen der Dichtung. " 3 
The speech entitled, "Eillderlin cJ.n5 the :i£ssence of 
Poetry," Vias ,c;i ven by He idegger in Ro;,e on .cCJril 2, 1 S36, 
and dedicated to -:;he ne:nory of Harbert von }~ellin.c;::-J.th, 
who collected etnd published Irelderlin•s vwrks. "l'he speech 
''•>cts published in 1937, cJ.nd agJ.in in 1944 in the first edi-
tion of Erlauterungen zu HlHderl ins Di chtung. In the 
second, enlarged edition (1951), it is the shortest of 
the four essays in the volw:le, but by far th8 , 'ost im-
l. EP.D, 18. 
2. EliD, 8. 
3. Eiill' 31-45. 
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portant of the four in presenting Heidegger's thought 
on the nature of poetry and art. The form of the pre-
sentation is a commentary of five clue sayings which 
Heidegger selects from H6lderlin's works. Douglas Scott's 
translation of the five pointers is as follows: 
1. Writing poetry: "That most innocent of all 
occupations." (III, 377,) 
2. "Therefore has language, most dangerous of pos-
sessions, been given to man ••• so that he may 
affirm what he is •••• " ( IV, 246 • ) 
3. "Much has man learnt. 
Many of the heavenly ones has he named. 
Since we have been a conversation 
And have been able to hear from one another." 
(IV, 343.) 
4. "But that which remains, is established by the 
poets." (IV, 63.) 
5. "Full of merit, and yet poetically, dwells 
Man on this earth." (VI, 25.)1 
Heidegger selects H6lderlin, a relatively little-
knovm poet, for a discussion of the essence of poetry 
because he considers H6lderlin to be a poet's poet, i.e., 
he writes poetry about being a poet and thus about the 
essence of poetry. The essence of poetry may not be 
found, according to .l:ieidegger, in a generalized or uni-
versal concept of what is common to all poetry. Instead, 
the "essence" of poetry is a different kind of essence. 
The essence which Heidegger seeks is what will bring us 
to the decision to take poetry seriously, to come under 
1. EAB, 293; EHD, 31. The references in parentheses are 
to the Hellingrath edition of H6lderlin 1 s works (1923). 
its influence. The aim of the essay is the "essential" 
definition of poetry. 
The first clue presents the raw material of poetry 
and its superficial characterization. Poetry is "the 
most innocent of occupations;" it is harmless, dream-
like playing with words and expression. The poet cre-
ates his work out of the material of language. The in-
nocent, dream-like appearance of poetry is the poet's 
social protection from the inherent dangers of being a 
poet. The superficial appearance of innocence is as 
necessary to the real danger of writing poetry as the 
valley is necessary to the mountain peak. 
The second pointer is discussed with emphasis upon 
language as the "most dangerous good" of man. Language 
as a good (possession, value, property) is not, for Hei-
degger, merely an instrument. Language is the event that 
makes available, that disposes, the highest possibility 
of being man. In contrast to man as a rational animal, 
man is, for Heidegger, a speaking entity, whose speaking 
of being is his highest possibility. Language guarantees 
that man can be historical. Man's historicity involves 
his freedom of decision, his creation of a world, his 
testimony that he belongs to the world, and his under-
standing of being. In language man testifies as to what 
he is. The danger involved in this good called language 
is "the threatening of being through entities."1 This 
1. EHD, 34. 
2::~2 
is the danger of too much light, which makes us blind. 
The fact that H6lderlin went insane is a testimony of 
the danger involved in writing poetry. 
Heidegger discusses the third pointer with regard 
to language as a dialogue or conversation (ein Gespr§ch). 
"The being of man is grounded in language; but the latter 
only happens properly in the dialogue."1 To be able to 
speak and to be able to hear are equally original, and 
belong together. "We are .Qlli!. dialogue."2 The unity of 
dialogue and the historicity of man are also equally 
original, belong together, and are the same thing. 
The fourth pointer, together with the phrase from 
the third that attributes the naming of the heavenly to 
poets, is discussed in relation to Heidegger•s thought 
on ground (cause and reason). Poets name the gods and 
all things. Poets establish what abides (remains), in 
the sense that poets establish being in words, and then 
gods and things are known as entities. Establishing 
(Stiftung) is a free gift, in the sense that poetry 
creates, fixes, and bestows the being and essence of 
things out of freedom, not out of things present (Vor-
handen). 
Being is never an entity. But because being and 
essence of things can never be found by calculating 
nor derived from what is present, they must be freely 
created, set up, and bestowed. Such free bestowal 
is establishing.3 
1. EHD, 36. Dialogue, as presented here, roughly cor-
responds to speech (~) in Sein und Zeit. 
2. EHD, 36. 
3. EHD, 38. 
In the same historical happening in which the gods are 
named and the essence of things comes to expression as 
a free gift, the Dasein of man is established in its 
ground. The saying of the poet also brings man into 
a firm relation to his ground. 
The fifth pointer is interpreted by Heidegger as 
the clue to the essence of man, the essence of language, 
and the essence of poetry. Man dwells poetically upon 
the earth, in the sense that poetry, in addition to 
naming the gods and the essence of things, is the gift 
which supports man's essence as a historical entity. 
Poetry is the supporting ground of history. Our human, 
historical dwelling upon the earth is basically poetic. 
Poetry "first makes language possible. Poetry is the 
original language of a historical people. Therefore, ••• 
the essence of language must be understood out of the 
essence of poetry."1 
The poet's free establishing of being in words is 
not arbitrary wishing or creative fancy. Instead, the 
poet is bound by a double necessity. The poet must pay 
attention to the hints (Winke--winks, signs, beckonings) 
of the gods, and he must interpret the voice of the peo-
ple. The voice of the people is the poet's inherent be-
longing to a historical people, and thus to "entities in 
2 the whole." The poet stands between gods and men, pro-
1. EHD, 40. 
2. EHD, 43. 
jected out into the "between," "where it is decided who 
man is and where his Dasein settles.nl The historical 
time of HBlderlin's poetry is also a factor which Hei-
degger emphasizes. It is a needy time, "the no more of 
the gods who have flown away and the not yet of the god 
to come."2 HBlderlin establishes the essence of poetry, 
according to Heidegger, and thus determines a new time, 
i • e • , a new age • 
· 3:. "Wie wenn am Feiertage ••• n3 
Heidegger's address on HBlderlin's poem which begins, 
"When on a festive day ••• ," was given several times in 
1939 and 1940. It was first published in 1941, and forms 
part of the second, enlarged edition of Heidegger's work 
on HBlderlin's poetry. The poem in question was written 
in 1800, and was first published in Hellingrath's edition 
of HBlderlin's works in 1910. The poem is unfinished and 
has no title. Heidegger's address is devoted chiefly to 
a discussion of "the holy" (das Heilige) and its relations 
to nature, divinity, spirit, chaos, love, God and men, and 
the present age • 
The theme of the poem is nature as ubiquitous, all-
creating power, and the ways in which nature educates the 
1. EHD, 43. 
2. EHD, 44. L6with, in Heidegger, Denker in dUrftiger Zeit, 
uses this idea of a "needy time," not only in the title 
of the book, but also to expound and criticize Heidegger•s 
thought. 
3. EHD, 47-74. 
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poets, f-tscinates dnd enre1.ptures them vrith her bec:.uty. 
The uoem also uses such terms as "divinely bedutiful 
ndture," "the holy, 11 "holy chaos," "fire in the souls of 
the uoets 11 "the sons of earth " and "God." Heidef:ger 
., ' ' ---' 
interprets the poem in tne light of his own concepts. 
)llc;.ture is DOwerful because it is divinely bedutiful. 
nature fa.s cinates dnd enraptures, bec8.use beJ.uth, vrhose 
essence is fdscindtion dnd rapture, is present in nuture. 
Ndture is divine bec8.use a god or goddess is preser:.t. :•ia-
ture is all-gloviing, all-credting, J.nd dll-livir:.g. Fdture 
is "the holy." Hature is older thdn times, but not older 
them time. Nature is the oldest tir:e, but not supertempo-
rdl or eternal. The holy is the essence of nature. 
"The holy is not holy because it is godly, but the 
godly is godly because in its WdY it is holy; for in this 
stanza fWlderlin dlso calls 'chaos' 'holy.' ,.l lJdture ,c;i ves 
inspiration (Begeisterung) because ntJ.tur-e is spirit (Geist). 
Spirit unifies the real. Fature as lav1 is \'ihut nediates 
the essence of all things, und all thircgs, even God und 
r1en dnd all tcnovlled~~e, are r:Je did te . Only "the open" is 
ir:r::1ediate. The open is what is opened in lcivr .. iithout law 
it is chaos. Chaos itself is holy. "Chaos is the holy it-
self." There is love betv;een God and men; gods ~ .. ust be gods 
und ;:en sust be wen, but neither Ccin be '.vithout the other. ~-s 
l. E~::D, 58. 
2. EED, 61. 
3. EED, 67. 
The holy is given to the sons of earth in the gift 
of a word, a song, and thus without danger. The holy is 
the inwardness (Innigkeit) of "the eternal heart." The 
holy is named, and is older than "times," yet the present 
age is the age in which the holy is to come. The naming 
of the holy in words (poetry) is the "now" in which the 
holy is to be called forth. 
4 • "Andenken • ,.l 
Heidegger's essay entitled, "Remembrance," was first 
published in 1943 as a contribution to a memorial volume 
to H~lderlin on the one hundredth anniversary of his death. 
It is included, as the final chapter, in the second edition 
of the volume by Heidegger on H~lderlin's poetry. The es-
say is an extended commentary on H~lderlin's poem of the 
same title. One interpretation of the poem, which Heideg-
ger suggests as an obvious one, is a presentation by the 
poet of his remembrance of earlier experiences and his 
thoughts on calling to mind his former residence in south-
ern Germany. But Heidegger sees much more in the poem 
than descriptive reminiscences. Much of the material in 
the essay is a repetition, in a varied form of expression, 
of concepts Heidegger presents more systematically in other 
writings. The holy, the essence of dwelling, spirit, his-
tory, and dialogue are examples of such concepts used in 
1. EHD, 75-143. 
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the present essay. There are, however, several concepts 
which are ·centr~l to the essay and which merit more than 
a mere reference. The meaning of remembrance, the nature 
of awe (Scheue), and further characterizations of the es-
sence of poetry are significant. 
Remembrance (Andenken) is not merely remembering 
or recalling what is past. Remembrance is as much con-
cerned with the present and the future as with the "been" 
(Gewesen); it is not a matter of things past (Vergangene). 
The essence of remembrance is to be able to hold something 
firmly in its proper essenoe.l Remembrance is a return 
or homecoming of thought back into origin, into a near-
ness to the source. The ab:ld 1ng which is established by 
the poets is going to the origin. The poet's greeting 
(das GrUssen) is a kind of being afar off. Remembrance 
is a poetic mode of dwelling near the source. 
The concept of awe (Scheue) is apparently similar 
in poetry to dread (Angst) in Heidegger•s existential 
analysis in Sein und Zeit. Awe is not mere shyness or 
timidity. It is a hesitation before the awe-producing, 
which restrains and attracts at the same time. "This 
essential awe is the mood of the remembrance which has 
come home to the origin. Awe is the knowledge that the 
origin may not be directly experienced."2 Awe is the 
1. EHD, 135. 
2. EHD, 124. 
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weight of heaviness in the heart of the poet. It sets 
the mood for poetry. 
The essence of poetry is not an expression of the 
poet's experiences. Instead, poetry is a historical 
event in which the poet is taken into a newly opened 
realm of his essence. Writing poetry is going into 
the nearness of the origin, into the presence of the 
wonderful, the holy. 
Writing poetry is remembrance. Remembrance is 
establishing. The establishing dwelling of the 
poet shows and consecrates the ground to the poetic 
dwelling of the sons of earth.l 
5 • "Der Ursprung des Kunstwerkes. n2 
The essay on, "The origin of the work of art," 
which is included in the volume entitled, Holzwege 
(1950), was first presented as lectures in 1935 and 
1936. The postscript was added later. The essay is only 
indirectly concerned with origin in the sense of produc-
tion or the stimulation of artistic activity. Origin, 
as used in the title, has to do with the nature or es-
sence of art, art being the determining factor in the 
work of art (Kunstwerk). "The origin of something is 
the arising of its essence."3 The three sections of the 
essay, supposedly corresponding to three lectures as re-
vised and presented in Hl36, are entitled, "The thing and 
1. EBD, 143. 
2. HOL, ?-68. 
3. HOL, ? • 
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the work," "The work and truth," and "Truth and art." 
The brief postscript relates the conclusions of the es-
say to experience (Erlebnis) and beauty ( Schl3nhe it), 
which are barely mentioned in the essay proper. 
The first section is an attempt to find a concept 
of thing which could be satisfactory for the thing-ness 
of the work of art. Heidegger examines and rejects 
three concepts of things: substance with attributes, 
a bundle of percept ions, and formed matter. Then he 
presents his own theory of thing as the utility of an 
instrument within a framework of references. The dis-
cussion leads to the interpretation of entities in the 
whole and their relation to the question of being. The 
work of art opens or reveals the truth of the thing as 
instrument. Heidegger's example is Van Gogh's painting 
of a pair of shoes. The painting reveals what the shoes 
are, i.e., instruments in the life of a farm woman. The 
work of art presents truth as unconcealedness of entities. 
The essence of art is to set into the work the truth of 
entities. The conclusion of the first section is that 
the attempt to find the essence of art or of the work of 
art in the thing-ness of the work is doomed to failure. 
Things do not make works of art. Art makes works of art. 
The second section begins with the distinction be-
tween the art-work and the art-object. The art-object 
is a matter of business, such as buying and selling, or 
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distribution. To treo.t ci v10rk of w.rt ciS J.n art-object 
is the unconceuli.ng of the truth of entities. .crt is u 
happening i.ri. history. 'l'ruth clcippens in art, us -.Jell dB 
in thinking, for ex~~le. The esseJlce of urt is described 
as the brin~ing together of three pri•cinul ~snects in 
the •:JOrk of art: the est-Lblishment of ci 'rorld ( -!l.lfste:•_::_-
ung einer iielt), the restoration of the earth (Herstel:.ung 
der l!:rde), ctnd the strife (Streit) between ·.wrld ctnd eccrth. 
The setting-up or estct·c:lislling of ci vwrld is a pu.rt of the 
vrork of art iE the sense tr·_ctt v:orld is the csnte;'t of the 
revelc!tion of the truth of entities. The restor-Ltion c.f 
the e-Lrth is a.ppareEtly ths use of r.sr nuteriw.ls, r:!Lo.t is 
given to work wi-ch. The eY.<h,'Jles Lc:eidegger r;ives -Lre stone, 
netals, colors, sounds, J.nd words. -~1 thePe are used in 
-.-.•arks of urt, but they are in "'nd of theuselves incor1spic-
uous, instrunent--<1 iY:gredients in the v:or k. 'J.'hc .. ore suit-
J.ble the 1::ateriul, the uore it becoEes incor.snicuous -Lnd 
disup::-;ec:.rs in the ·.mrk of urt. "The rec:toring of t:1s e"'rth 
r:-ledns to brinr~ it i:~to the open 2i.s th~ t ~:.'hich locl:s itself 
1 
up." The eurth concectls itself in the •;,·ork of c:.rt. 
The third eler.ent of the vro:ck of '-'rt is the strife 
bet•:•e8n the ·;;orld -ind the e"'rth. Tlle coricb"-tting of this 
stTife is ,,::;.C<.t gives unity to the ~ ... rork of' art. 'l11e b'-'-sic 
1. IWL, 36. 
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or original strife (Urstreit) is the struggle between 
lighting and concealing in truth. In this struggle 
truth happens as the work of art. Entities are brought 
into unconcealedness (truth) and held there. The work 
of art is one of several essential ways in which truth 
happens. "Beauty is a way in which truth essences. ,l 
The essence of art is to set truth into the work (Ins-
werksetzen). 
The third section of the essay deals with truth and 
art. The reality of the work of art is the happening or 
occurrence of truth in it. Technique is not a matter of 
creative activity in the sense of handwork, but is basic-
ally a mode of knowing which takes place in the artist. 
This knovling is not scientific, because science is not 
an original happening of truth. The creative aspect of 
the work of art is the establishing or setting-fast of 
truth in fo~ (Festgestelltsein der Wahrheit in die Ge-
stalt).2 The preservation of the work or art is "letting 
the work be a work."3 This preservation has to do with the 
creativity of the work, not the work as an object. The 
discussion or creativity leads to the conclusion that the 
work of art is created out of nothing, insofar as art and 
truth are concerned. Nothing is the not of entities, and 
refers to Heidegger's interpretation of being. Writing 
1. HOL, 44. 
2. HOL, 52. 
3. HOL, 54. 
poetry is considered the basic or most original, as well 
as the most comprehensive, form of art. "The essence of 
1 
art is writing poetry." But this writing poetry (Dicht-
~ includes much more than poetry in the ordinary sense 
of the term. It is the founding (Stiftung) of truth, in 
the triple sense of bestowing (Schenken), grounding 
(Grttnden), and beginning (Anfansen). Writing poetry, 
in the wider sense, is speaking of the unconcealedness 
of entities. Art is the origin of the work of art; art 
lets truth arise and come forth. In this sense, the es-
sence of art is an origin, out of which truth historically 
arises. 
In the postscript Heidegger criticizes aesthetics 
because it takes the work of art as an object, usually as 
an object of sensory perception. This leads to the con-
clusion that art is an experience, not only in the appre-
ciation of the object, but even in its creation. Experi-
ence, for Heidegger, is the last stage of the forgetting 
of being in the history of western thought. Being becomes 
Idea. Energy, as the whole of for.m and matter, becomes 
actuality. Actuality becomes reality. Reality becomes 
objectivity. Objectivity becomes experience. Art as ex-
perience is, for Heidegger, about as far removed as pos-
sible from art as the revelation of truth. 
1. HOL, 62. 
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6 • "Wozu Dichter?"1 
The lecture entitled, "VIhy poet?" was given by Hei-
degger before a small group on December 29, 1946, which 
was the twentieth anniversary of the death of the German 
poet, R. M. Rilke. The title is an excerpt from Hlllder-
lin's poem, "Bread and Wine." In its complete form the 
question is, "VIhy poet in a needy time?" The needy time 
is interpreted by Heidegger as the age to which we belong, 
in which God and the divine are absent. The time has be-
come so needy that the lack of God is not noticed as a 
lack. Although Heidegger speaks of evening and world-
night, he maintains that the discussion is not concerned 
with optimism and pessimism. "To be a poet in a needy 
time is to pay attention, singing, to the trace of the 
gods that have flown away."2 
After an introduction based upon the excerpt from 
H6lderlin, Heidegger cites and then discusses in detail 
a brief poem by Rilke. The poem has no title. Rilke 
referred to it in a letter to his wife as "improvised 
verses." The apparent theme of the poem, as understood 
by the writer of this dissertation, is the venture or 
risk involved in life. We venture more than plants and 
animals; we are without protection or refuge. Defense-
less, turned into the open, after seeing its threat, we 
are affirmative in our attitudes. Heidegger's interpreta-
1. HOL, 248-295. 
2. HOL, 251. 
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tion of the poem is strictly metaphysical. The venture 
of the poem has to do with being, in the traditional, 
metaphysical meaning of that term. Being is venture, 
and it ventures us, men. Nature, life, middle, relation, 
and gravity are synonymous terms, according to Heidegger•s 
interpretation of the poem, and refer to "entities as such 
1 in the whole," or to being as understood in traditional 
metaphysics. The lecture contains references to other 
poems and letters by Hilke, in an effort to get at the 
meanings of terms. A strong overtone of the whole dis-
cussion is that the venture involved is the insecurity 
and lack of "success" of the poet (or thinker) in the 
modern world of technology, organization, success, and 
security. One conclusion reached in the lecture is that 
the poet is a prophetic voice, because he makes question-
worthy the essence or function of poetry. Hilke's "angel" 
is, for Heidegger, the same as Nietzsche's "Zarathustra," 
Both are prophetic voices that point to a higher order of 
reality, yet to be attained, 
· 7 • "Dichter is ch wohnet der Mensch. n2 
The lecture entitled, ·~an dwells poetically," was 
delivered on October 6, 1951, and first published in 1954 
in Akzente, a periodical on poetry. The title is a quota-
1. HOL, 261. 
2. VA, 187-204. 
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tion from a poem by H6lderlin, and in the course of the 
lecture Heidegger makes numerous references to the con-
text of the quotation. The thought pattern of the lec-
ture is similar to that of "Building dwelling thinking," 
and, in this regard, the subject matter of the lecture 
could be stated as "Building dwelling writing poetry" 
(Bauen Wohnen Dichten). The basic concept is composing 
or writing poetry (Dichten), which is fundamental to 
dwelling and to building. "Writing poetry is the proper 
letting dwell. nl 
Writing poetry is characterized by Heidegger as di-
mension, as measuring (meter), as taking a measure or 
criterion. Man lives or dwells on earth by taking a 
measure, by measuring himself with heaven or with divin-
ity. Poetry is the original or basic form of measuring. 
Man can be unpoetical only in the same sense in which he 
can become blind, i.e., because he was made to see, and 
to be poetical. Things and animals are neither unpoetical 
nor blind. "Writing poetry is the basic capacity of human 
dwelling."2 Man's nature is to be poetic. 
c. Works on the history of philosophy, 
1. Die Lehre vom Urteil im Psychologismus. 
Heidegger's dissertation on "The theory of judgment 
in psychologism" (University of Freiburg, 1914) is a 
1. VA, 189. 
2. VA, 203. 
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critical study in logic, based on an investigation of the 
essence of judgment in four examples of logical theory, 
as represented by w. Vrundt, H. Maier, F. Brentano and A. 
Marty, and T. Lipps. The psychic origin of judgment in 
apperception is the main point in the discussion of 
Wundt's theory. Maier's theory of judgment is discussed 
with regard to its normative character, and thus its rela-
tion to psychic activity in thinking. Brentano•s theory 
of judgment as one of three basic kinds of psychic phenom-
ena places his theory also within the realm of psychologism. 
For Lipps the essence of logical judgment is found in the 
act of recognizing a necessity or compulsion required by 
the object. Heidegger characterizes as unsuccessful Lipps's 
attempt to overcome psychologism in his theory of judgment. 
The positive contribution of Heidegger•s dissertation 
is the limitation of the problem of the nature of judgment 
to the realm of pure logic, i.e., validity and meaning, 
rather than anything like psychic activity, phenomenon, or 
attitude. Heidegger's point of view in the dissertation 
represents the influence of Rickert, to whom Heidegger ex-
presses appreciatio~ in the preface, for his understanding 
of the problems of modern logic. 
2. Die Kategorien- und Bedeutungslehre des Duns Scotus. 
Heidegger's book on "Duns Scotus•s doctrine of cate-
gories and significance" was first presented in 1915, 
23? 
without the brief concluding chapter, as the research 
which qualified him for admission to the faculty (Habili-
tationsschrift) of the University of Freiburg. •iith the 
addition of the concluding chapter and minor changes in 
the text the work was published in 1916. The book is 
dedicated to H. Rickert. In the prefatory note Heidegger 
also mentions Professors Husserl and Finke, as well as 
Emil Lask, whose contributions to philosophy were pre-
maturely ended by the First World War. There are quite 
a number of references throughout the book to works by 
these thinkers. 
For a study of the roots and development of Heidegger's 
thought, this book is of great importance. It shows some 
influences of Duns Scotus, Rickert, Lask, and Husserl, as 
well as early stages of Heidegger's thought on such prob-
lems as categorial structure, subject-object relation, 
meaning in logic as related to the psychology of thinking, 
being and entities, individuality, the analysis of language, 
the functions of terms, and the nature of transcendence. 
Since the aim of this dissertation is the influence of Rei-
dagger, rather than an investigation of the sources of his 
thought, the latter problem will not be discussed in detail. 
The most significant result of Heidegger's study of 
Duns Scotus, in the opinion of the writer, is a positive 
evaluation of the detailed, critical, analytic thought of 
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the medievctl Philosophers, v:11ich hcts sometL:es been 
ch8.racterized <iS er:1pty logic-chopping. ConterJpord.ry 
Gerr,Lm philosoDhy, especially in the phenor.lenolocicctl 
,-,·ove:rrent, llds tended to revive intersst in the problem 
of essences, ide"'l objects, cLnd the reeilm of validity, 
all of which dre cor,cerned •,'lith the proble:·1 of the nuture 
of universals. Heideg•·er joins vdth r:rany other contem-
·oor .. uy thinkers in a nevr a.pprecidtiorl of medieval sub-
tleties, of which Duns 3cotus was d ;:uster. 
3. l"leitons Lehre von c1er :1a.hrheit. 
'l'he t·::o-hour public lecture entitled, "Plato•s 
Theory of Truth," v:a.s first given in the acader,:ic :re"-r, 
1930-1931. It c:as first :oublished in 1942, in JcLhrbuch 
f'llr fseistige Ueb:Jrlieferung, -cind U1YOeured us a separate 
volune, along •;ith the letter "On Hummism," ir, 1947. 
'fhe DUrDose of the lecture is to shm; •l. ohunce • .. itl,in 
Pluto 1 s thin.king, as illustrctted by t;:o cillegor:r of the 
Cd.Ve, r•ith regard to the esse:J.ce of truth. The ·orcbler:, 
of the lecture ;•licht be st-J.ted as Pluto• s devel_o,~::rcnt of 
ctn Idea of truth. 
Tile lecture begins •,lith a translcttion of oche Lyth, 
v:i th u number of brief, clarifyi··g com en ts c;dded by 
B.eidegr,er. Tb.ese con'i.:.Tients are little ~Jore thd.n the ddd:L-
tion of phrases 2-nd the clarh"ication of "JronoL:inctl ref-
erc!l.ces, in order- to :Jrovide a. free rctther ti:tcL.'1 d literal 
) 
translation. 
Heidegger begins his interpretation with the ideal 
of formation (education, -trrf.l~f./11., Bildung) as a transition 
(Uebergang) from the shadows of the cave to the light of 
the sun (ldea of the Good) and back again. But there is 
also, according to Heidegger, a deeper, more basic meaning 
of formation (iT~t£€1111., Bildung), in contrast to formless-
• c ~ 
ness (o<.mx.toE VO'"t~ Bildungslosigke it). The contrast is 
between what is formed (made into Ideas) and what is un-
formed (not made into Ideas). Formation itself is essen-
tially related to the essence of truth as relation. Truth 
as relation is the truth of what is formed. Heidegger's 
aim is to show the priority of truth as unconcealedness 
(Unverborgenheit), which is his interpretation of ~~{eEt~, 
over truth as relation or correspondence between thought 
and thing. 
The transition involved in the myth of the cave in-
cludes four stages. The first is the stage in which men 
live in chains within the cave, in which only the shadows 
are unconcealed. The second stage is more unconcealed, 
in the sense that men, although still imprisoned within 
the cave, are free within the cave to look at the fire. 
But the light of the fire blinds their eyes, which are 
unaccustomed to anything but shadows, so that they are 
confused, and think that only the shadows offer them 
genuine truth. The third stage is freedam outside the 
cave, to see the still more unconcealed, even the super-
lative, the most unconcealed (Unverborgenste). Heidegger 
here admits that the teDn is not Plato's, but asserts 
that it fits with Plato's meaning of the truest, i.e., 
complete or proper truth. Each of these three successive 
stages of formation is an overcoming of formlessness. But 
the myth does not end with the arrival at the highest stage 
of formation. Instead, the informed man (note the double 
meaning) becomes the emancipator of those who live in the 
lower stages. This fourth stage results in a struggle 
between the emancipator and the imprisoned, since the lat-
ter prefer to remain imprisoned and chained to the shadows, 
rather than to be free. The possibility of the destiny of 
Socrates always threatens the emancipator. 
Heidegger emphasizes the aspect of struggle involved 
in unconcealing what was formerly concealed. Truth is a 
tearing away (Entreissen); it is robbing (Rauben); it is 
wresting from (Abringen). Therefore, truth was originally 
characterized by the privative prefix "a," Jc..-A{~&III:.. 
"Truth signifies at first what is wrested from concealed-
ness,"1 
The whole myth, however, may also be considered from 
the point of view of the system of Ideas. In this sense, 
the myth is a representation, or, rather, a set of repre-
sentations, including the fire, the fire light, the shadows, 
1. PLW, 32. 
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the light of day, the light of the sun, and the sun it-
self. The Ideas themselves show themselves; they ap-
pear; they become visible. Appearance, seeing, and vis-
ibility are terms which suggest a relation between seeing 
and the seen. The question arises: what connects seeing 
and the seen? The answer is the Idea of the Good, which 
makes things visible. The Good is the Idea of Ideas. 
Truth itself comes under the yoke of Ideas, and becomes 
a correct relation. The Idea of the Good is what makes 
possible the visibility of all entities. The possibility 
of all other Ideas, insofar as they belong to a teleo-
logical whole, arises out of the Idea of the Good. 
The change in the nature of truth from unconcealed-
ness to correct relation is accompanied by a change in the 
location of truth. Truth as unconcealedness belongs to 
entities; truth as relation belongs to "seeing" or the 
human relation to entities. In the myth of the cave, 
according to Heidegger, there is an ambiguity with regard 
to the essence of truth. This ambiguity extends all the 
way to the Idea of the Good, which not only makes possible 
correct relations, but also is the source of beauty and 
truth (as unconcealedness). In either case, however, 
truth is under the yoke of Idea, i.e., Plato holds that 
there is an Idea of truth. 
Heidegger traces briefly the concept of the essence 
of truth as a correct relation through Aristotle, St. 
Thomas, Descartes, and Nietzsche. His conclusion is that 
all of western thought has regarded truth as the correct-
ness of knowledge of entities, not as an unconcealing of 
being. In regard to truth as correctness, metaphysics 
has been theological. God as the most complete and most 
real entity is considered the cause of all other entities. 
Likewise, humanism has its origin in Plato's metaphysical 
thought. Humanism is defined in the broadest possible 
sense, including the beginning, development, and end of 
metaphysics and every respect in which man moves in the 
midst of entities.1 The change in the essence of truth 
effected by Plato is still present, according to Heidegger, 
and dominates all ideas of the real and of values. Hei-
degger opposes the essence of truth as relation, and favors 
the concept of truth as unconcealedness. In his essay, Vom 
Wesen der W§hrheit, Heidegger deals with the problems of 
the essence of truth and the truth of essence. The lecture 
on Plato is a historical consideration of the same problem. 
4. "Die Zeit des Weltbildes."2 
The lecture on "The Time of the \;orld-image" was first 
presented on June 9, 1938, and was published in Holzwege 
(1950). The lecture deals with modern philosophy as the 
basis of modern culture and civilization. The modern age, 
1. PLW, 49. This is the reference to humanism which oc-
casioned the exchange of letters between J. Beaufret 
and Heidegger. Cf. above, p. 170. 
2. HOL, 69-104. 
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according to Heidegger, is characterized by five prin-
cipal features: science, machine technology, art as an 
object of experience; culture as human activity and man-
agement; and un-deification (Entg~tterung), which is de-
fined as "the condition of the lack of decision with re-
gard to God and the gods."l The lecture is limited 
specifically to a consideration of science as the first 
of the five characteristics of the modern age. 
The essence of science is investigation. Scientific 
investigation is directed toward a realm of entities. 
As methodology, investigation depends upon an openness 
of entities which is prior to method as such. Investiga-
tion is a project. Scientific investigation is mathe-
matical; it is exact. Investigation is strict. In the 
natural sciences this strictness is mathematical. In 
historical science, strictness is of a different kind, 
but no less strict simply because it is not mathematical. 
Scientific investigation is a matter of management (~­
trieb), in the direction and control of methods and pro-
cedures. In all these characteristics, modern science 
depends upon the idea of the world as an image, a repre-
sentation. The subject-object relation is fundamental. 
In general, for Heidegger, modern science and its pre-
suppositions in modern philosophy are founded upon the 
world-image, i.e., the world as a representation (Vor-
1. HOL, 70. 
stellung). The fact that the world beco!,os a representa-
tion or :J.n inu.?;e (~) is, for Heideg~:er, tiw esso:1co of 
tho _-,odarn age. In contrast, for tile mediev'"l period, the 
<;;o:rld wcts un order of divine crecttion,, r-.ither t)an repre-
sentcJ.tion. For the Greoks, the ·world could not becor:1e an 
irW.{"'e, beccJ.use man '.vas thoue;ht of as a -oerce i ver of enc~ities •1 
The ;wrld as idea or representation is the essence of 
r,:odern thov.sht, dccording to Heidegc-er. The f"-ct thdt the 
v10rld becones an in;age is the other side of the reduction 
of Lln to the status of subject. 1'hus, the vmrld-Lut:;c 
:1e.ms rHn as subject "-lid man's world-view ( ·,/eltcJ.nschauung). 
"The basic proceedi:1g in modern tine is the conquest of the 
2 vmrl.d as im-3.t;e." Eoidogger 1 s lecture on "The tirc.s of the 
':rorld-:D"n.c.n:e" is a criticism of the subjectivity of c·:odern 
,, 
thcuc;ht. ·- In the extended footnotes to the lecture, Ee ideg-
rer refers to K.J.nt, Eecel, Fichte, 3che ~.J. iw;;, ::1e dievJ.l .Jhi-
J.osouhy, -~nd Greek views. -·ill i:1tere st inrc ':l.ut of thco notes 
is the deni.J.l of su.bje ctivism in Prot:.J.cor0..s ctncL tl-.!.o S01)hists. 
5. "Eegels Begriff der Erfahrung. 114 
The essay on "Hec;el' s Concept of :Experi~·,ncen ':.Jds 
:Jrese:'"l_tcd b~.~ ~~~eidegper in 104:2 e1.nd 19~3 c.::.s -:J..lrt of d 
1. T.IOL, 83-84. 
2. :UOL, 27. 
3. Cf. '.Jilii~.: B.J.rrett, ",/h.J.t Is Exi:ts11tialistl? (:-s'.t :rorlc: 
Partisan Hevievi Series, 1947), for u.!l ir:-:_ ...... ci11eC ,:~_--.loe;ue 
betv,;een E::.:idegc;er :J..l!d ·;,'flitehs ..... d, ~:.,t:_o · .ot to cJ!lSU.::_G.:LJ.te 
tbe clecJ.t:O of Desco.rtes. 
4. EGL, 105-J.£2. 
seminar on Hegel, and as two lectures before a small 
group. It is included in the collection of lectures 
and essays entitled, Forest Paths (Holzwege). The 
essay first presents an excerpt of sixteen paragraphs 
from Hegel's Phanomenologie des Geistes. The excerpt 
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is the part immediately following the preface in the 
first edition, and is the introduction in later editions, 
The argument of Heidegger•s essay rests upon a number of 
factors, such as: Hegel's addition of the title, "Intro-
duction," to this section; the change of the title for 
the entire work from, "Science of the experience of con-
sciousness," to "Science of the phenomenology of spirit;" 
the problem of the possibility of relations for the Ab-
solute; and the interpretation of all these problems in 
the light of Heidegger's own views on ontology. The es-
say follows the form of a commentary, in the sense that 
successive sections refer to successive paragraphs of 
the printed excerpt from Hegel, with some generalized 
conclusions at the close. 
The first problem presented is that of the possi-
bility of relations for the Absolute. Knowledge is spoken 
of by Hegel as either an instrument (Werkzeug) or a means 
(Mittel). The relation is between the Absolute and us, 
as knowers, as natural consciousness (natUrliche Bewusst-
sein). Knowledge is presented as a subject-object rela-
tion. Heidegger's complaint is that if the Absolute is 
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on one side of any relation, it is not absolute, but 
relative. 1 The Absolute has no need for means or in-
struments. Natural consciousness, which means all in 
consciousness that is particularly mine, and not merely 
what is sensory, is not real knowledge. This means, 
according to Heidegger, that nature (the natural) is not 
real, that the individual consciousness is not real. As 
natural consciousness it can never become real, for the 
real is the Absolute and the Absolute does rtot become, 
Absolute knowledge must begin in absoluteness. In short, 
Heidegger interprets "absolute" so strictly that all rela-
tion, all growth, all development, all movement is logic-
ally excluded. 
The addition of the title, "Introduction," to the 
section in question is, for Heidegger, a logical mistake. 
Phenomenology has to do with the being present (Parusie) 
of the Absolute. The Absolute is already present in us 
in the form of natural consciousness. An introduction 
to this being-present is, for Heidegger, an impossibility 
and a perversion of the nature or essence of man. 2 
The original title of the work was "Science of the 
experience of consciousness." Heidegger interprets the 
genitive, "of consciousness," as a genitive of subject, 
rather than of object, i.e., consciousness has its ex-
perience. Furthermore, experience has its science. The 
1. HOL, l23. 
2. HOL, 189. 
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change of title to "Science of the phenomenology of 
spirit" is interpreted by Heidegger to mean the equiva-
lence of spirit with consciousness and phenomenology with 
experience. Consequently, spirit has its phenomenology,, 
or consciousness has its experience. Phenomenology, or 
experience, has its science. In short, Heidegger reverses 
the accustomed direction of thought in interpreting the 
title of the Phenomenology of Mind. Heidegger also in-
verts the accustomed order in interpreting Hegel's thought. 
Instead of a movement from thought to being, from the par-
ticular to the Absolute, Heidegger makes Hegel's philosophy 
a movement from being to thoup)lt, from the Absolute to its 
being present in us. 
The apparent aim of the essay is not so much an in-
terpretation or even a criticism of Hegel, as an attempt 
to interpret Hegel in the light of Heidegger's own thought. 
Hegel's experience is made to correspond to Heidegger•s 
being. The experience of consciousness is Heidegger's 
being of entities. Heidegger's concepts of phenomenon 
and phenomenology, in relation to ontology, are applied 
to Hegel, and the Phenomenology of Mind,is the same as 
Heidegger's ontology. Spirit's being present with us is 
Heidegger's Dasein. The "with us" (bei uns) is the nec-
essary connection of being and Dasein, and means "not 
without us." Thus, the Absolute necessarily aDpears in 
natural consciousness, or, in Heidegger's terms, being is 
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unveiled in Dctsein. 
God 
other referG~ce is to I!cccl 's Logic .J..S a nt::eolo[:;~.r OJ~ t~1e 
·0 
OJ.bsolutensss of ths .. .~.bsolute bcfol"'e t>e c:re: . Ltio~l. n'~' Tt.e 
Lor?ic is sue:::. a. theolocy, not becJuse it :i.s Ci1::cj_ctiJ.n, but 
bec~use it is ontology, in Eeides::·er's sc~se. a:r·isti_n 
::ct~)hysics. T~ese ~lJ.usio~s, ~s ~ell ~s t~:J c~ti:rc c~s~y, 
i~te~~retutj_on of ~esel. 
6. ":?ietzsches c;·:ort 'Gott ist tot. 1 n 3 
T~:e es:::~~J.Y on ''l~ietzsche' s 3J.yj_ne:, 'God is de..1d, '" is 
d 1:1roduct of ::---cidegger' s thilli:i~E of J..:ietzsche' s pl:j 2.os-
o:r:>hY c_s tile J.."i:rctl sta.;e in '.1ester!l w.et-.i})hysics. J-Ieideg-
e;er' s lectures on :·:_:ietzs che vrere presGnted i~ the Uni ver-
sit.! of l!"'reiburc frou 1936 to 1940. The :·: .• jor pc.Tt of 
l .. ~OL, 186. 
2.. :oL, lG6. 
3. :cL, 1?3-247. 
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this essay was presented as a lecture before a small group 
in 1943. The essay is part of the collection entitled, 
Holzwege (1950). The essay contains specific comments 
on the saying, "God is dead," and its context in the speech 
by the mad man in Nietzsche's "Joyful Science." But the 
specific comments are overshadowed by Heidegger's inter-
pretation, not merely of Nietzsche's thought, but also of 
Nietzsche's significance as representing the final stage 
in the history of metaphysics. 
Heidegger recognizes that Nietzsche's saying refers 
to the Christian God, but the figure of the murdered God 
also refers, according to Heidegger, to the whole apparatus 
of ideas, ideals, culture, and practices that accompany 
the Christian God. The supersensory world, with its con-
trol over the actual world, is the object of Nietzsche's 
revolt. The socio-political control of culture and civ-
ilization by the organized Christian Church is also an 
object of Nietzsche's criticism. The death of God sig-
nifies the absence of the controlling power of the super-
sensory world, the absence of domination by ideas and 
ideals, by Platonism as a metaphysical system. The death 
of God means nihilism. 
The basic content of the essay on Nietzsche is a 
discussion of nihilism. Heidegger's thesis is that Niet-
zsche experienced nihilism as the substitution of entities 
and values for being, in modern metaphysics, against which 
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Nietzsche revolted and which he sought to overcome in 
the "superman," but that Nietzsche was mt able to think 
the essence of nihilism. Thus, for Heidegger, Nietzsche 
represents the completion of the trend in metaphysics to 
forget being, to substitute the truth of entities for the 
truth of being, and, most of all, to kill being (God) by 
substituting value for it. God is murdered by thinking 
of him as the highest value rather than the most real en-
tity. The whole trend of modern metaphysics, from the 
subjectivism of Descartes to the value-position of Niet-
zsche, is away from being. Being sinks down to a value, 
and then becomes nothing. The history of modern meta-
physics is the movement toward nihilism. Nietzsche rep-
resents the final stage. He experienced nihilism, but 
could not think the problem through, because he stayed 
within the whole value framework. 
The details of the argument in this essay are rela-
tively unimportant. The important conclusion, although 
it is not explicitly stated, but only implied in such a 
way that no reader could avoid it, is that the essence of 
nihilism is a metaphysical theory of values. The substi-
tution of values for being and the emphasis upon God as 
the highest value rather than the most real entity are the 
main features of nihilism, according to Heidegger. The 
interpretation of Nietzsche's thought as metaphysical 
rather than ethical or psychological is a necessary part 
of Heidegger's interpretation of Nietzsche as the 
representative of the final stage in the movement of 
metaphysics to nihilism. The essay might also be in-
terpreted as Heidegger's attempt to defend himself 
against the charge of nihilism by turning it upon his 
accusers. 
1 7. "Der Spruch des Anaximander." 
The essay on "The Saying of Anaximander" was written 
in 1946 and is included in the collection entitled, Holz-
wege {1950), It is an attempt to give new meaning, in 
the light of Heidegger's theory that the history of being 
is the history of the forgetting of being, to the saying 
of Anaximander, supposedly the oldest fragment of Greek 
philosophy. Heidegger maintains that previous translations 
and interpretations of early Greek thought depend too much 
upon modern, medieval, Roman, and late Greek translations 
and interpretations. Heidegger suggests, for example, 
that the early Greeks are, for Hegel, pre-Aristotelian 
thinkers, because Hegel interprets them through Aristotle. 
Likewise, for Nietzsche they are pre~Platonists, and for 
Diels they are pre-Socratics. Heidegger refuses to be 
guided in his interpretation of Anaximander by references 
and translations in Aristotle and Theophrastus, because 
their doctrines of ;J~IS, especially as distinguished in 
1. HOL, 296-343. 
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later Greek thought from Alytnand ~ea~, are necessary 
parts of their interpretations. viithout help from later 
thinkers, and with no other statements from Anaximander, 
Heidegger goes back to Homer's Iliad for the meanings of 
some terms, not only because of their usual meanings, but 
also because of the intimate relation between thought and 
poetry in the beginning of Greek culture. 
There are, in the opinion of the writer, two prin-
cipal results of Heidegger•s essay on Anaximander's enig-
matic saying. The first is a translation which fits into 
Heidegger's theory of being as being-present. The saying 
has to do with being, and expresses the manner in which 
being is present. This is the relation of being and 
thinking, and involves the theory of truth as unconceal-
edness. The second result is Heidegger•s affirmation 
that Anaximander is speaking of what, for him, is the 
basic feature of being-present. Anaximander speaks of 
Xf6tfJ.,, Parmenides of ftOlfrl..o Heraclitus of tl o y~s, Plato 
. ) , 
of I~l«o and Aristotle of ~VtSfYE«· According to Heideg-
ger, each speaks of the same thing, being, and thinks 
with his own term the basic feature of being. Heidegger's 
theory is that what was being for all the Greek thinkers 
has been progressively forgotten. The basic steps in the 
process of forgettin~ are the changes from being to actu-
ality, actuality to reality, and reality to objectivity 
252i 
as objective representation. In the opinion of the 
writer, the essay is extremely suggestive and creative, 
but does little to clarify the enigmatic statement by 
Anaximander. 
8. "Wer ist Nietzsches Zarathustra?"1 
The lecture entitled, "Who Is Nietzsche's Zara-
thustra?" was delivered on May 8, 1953. The problem, 
as stated in the title, is discussed in part on its own 
merits, i.e., as a genuine problem within the framework 
of Nietzsche's thought. Near the end of the lecture, 
however, the point of view definitely changes (or the 
underlying aim simply becomes apparent then), and Niet-
zsche's (Zarathustra•s) main doctrines are interpreted 
in the framework of Heidegger•s ideas. 
Nietzsche's Zarathustra is the teacher of two doc-
trines: the eternal recurrence of the same, and the 
superman. Zarathustra does not thus identify himself; 
instead, his animals tell him who he is. The animals 
are the eagle, representing pride (Stolz), and the ser-
pent, representing prudence or cleverness (Klugheit). 
Zarathustra sees the eagle flying, with the serpent 
coiled around the eagle's neck. The eagle and the ser-
pent (pride and cleverness) belong together. 
1. VA, 101-126. 
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The doctrine of the superman is interpreted as a 
sort of preparation, by questioning man's status and 
abilities, for man's domination over the earth. Hei-
degger rejects the common interpretation of the super-
man as Nietzsche's moral revolt against traditional 
standards. The doctrine of eternal recurrence is no mere 
restatement of the cyclical theory of history; instead, 
it is relevant to hope, to redemption from vengeance, 
and to being (in Heidegger•s usage). For Nietzsche, 
according to Heidegger, vengeance is antipathy to time 
and the "passing" ( Vergehen) of all things. Nietzsche 
is opposed to the non-temporal ideal, which reduces all 
that is temporal to secondary, subordinate status. Re-
demption from vengeance or freedom from vengeance is 
Nietzsche's way of opposing the domination of a non-tem-
poral ideal, which dominates the temporal by degrading 
it to a status of non-entity (Nicht-Seienden). Redemp-
tion from vengeance is to be affirmative in relation to 
time. Nietzsche's hope is for a time that will come and 
remain, thus bringing freedom from the time that comes 
only to pass away. 
Heidegger maintains that Nietzsche was unable to 
solve the problems involved in his doctrines of vengeance, 
hope, redemption, eternal recurrence, and the superman. 
But Nietzsche did see the problems and made them question-
worthy. The ability to see a problem, to view its enigmas, 
25.) 
even though they are not solved, is the ability to think. 
According to Heidegger, and in relation to his own ideas, 
the doctrine of eternal recurrence is Nietzsche's name 
for the being of entities (Sein des Seienden). The super-
man is the essence of man (Menschenwesen), which corres-
ponds to being. Zarathustra is the connection between 
the two doctrines. Zarathustra is the advocate (lnr-
sprecher), the teacher of both doctrines. They belong 
together; he holds them together. 
9. "Logos (Heraklit, Fragment 50). 111 
The essay on "Logos" was published in 1951 as a 
contribution to a volume of essays in honor of Hans 
Jantzen. The essay was read as a lecture in Bremen on 
May 4, 1951, and was discussed in detail by Heidegger 
in an unpublished lecture in 1954. The theme of the 
essay is the meaning of the word, "logos," for Heracli-
tus and for the Greeks in general. The traditional in-
terpretations, such as reason, word, world-law, the log-
ical, and meaning, are rejected at the outset. Heidegger 
finds the meaning of logos in the German word, Legen, to 
lay. The etymological allusions are numerous and extended 
in the essay. The conclusions which Heidegger reaches are 
that logos "is the name for the being of entities."2 Logos 
is a matter of speech, but not in the accepted form of mere 
1. VA, 20?-229. 
2. VA, 228. 
256 
expression. The Greeks dwelt in the essence of logos as 
speech, but did not so think logos explicitly. Heraclitus 
gave only a hint as to the real meaning of logos, the 
being of entities, in contrast to the traditional con-
cept of speech as phonetic expression. Furthermore, 
Heracl!l.tus gave a hint, in the enigmatic saying that 
one is' or one unites all (''Ev rr.:. v TJ'-)' of the divinity 
of God. 
10. "Moira (Parmenides VIII, 34-41) ."1 
The essay entitled, "Moira," was prepared as part of 
the lecture series (1951-1952), Was heisst Denken?2 It 
was not included in the lectures or the printed text of 
that volume, but in the collection entitled, Vortr§ge 
und Aufs§tze. The problem of the essay is the relation 
of thinking and being, arising out of the statement by 
Parmenides that they are the same. Their sameness is 
obviously not mere identity, but a kind of duality (two-
ness, Zwiefalt). Heidegger rejects the theories of 
Berkeley (esse is percipi) and Hegel (being is objective 
self-representation of thought) on the relation between 
thinking and being. He also rejects the identification 
of being with entities in the whole (Seiendes 1m Ganzen), 
maintaining the distinction between being and entities. 
1. VA, 231-256. 
2. cr. above, p. 190. 
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Consequently, the sameness of being and thinking, as 
stated by Parmenides, is interpreted in the light of 
Heidegger's use of those terms. The discussion reaches 
no specific conclusion, but does suggest the boundless 
possibilities of such discussion. 
11. "Aletheia (Heraklit, Fragment 16). ,.l 
The essay on "Aletheia" was Heidegger•s contribu-
tion to a collection of essays on the three hundred fif-
tieth anniversary of the Humanistic Gymnasium in Con-
stance. It was given as a lecture on Heraclitus in 1943, 
and contains references to various other fragments, in 
addition to number 16, which Heidegger considers of pri-
mary importance. Fragne nt 16 is a question, which may 
be translated as follows: "How can one conceal himself 
before that which never perishes?"2 The "never-perishing" 
may be interpreted as a light which enlightens man. Ac-
cordingly, the Church Fathers, Clement of Alexandria in 
particular, used the fragment in support of Christian 
teaching. Heidegger interprets the fragment from the 
standpoint of his own ideas of truth as unconcealing 
(Entbergung) or un-forgetting (~-A,'fl. Heidegger in-
terprets the Greek word, A>)~,, as forgetting (Vera:essen-
heit), through etymological references to Homer's Odyssey. 
Lighting (LichtuDg) is the principal concept of the essay, 
1. VA, 257-282. 
2. VA, 259. 
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.-;.nd it :is ur-esented in_ rel,;.tion to c;ods ,_i:-lc. ~--:.on. Gods 
1 
it2 esse!:.ce" (-ins Volle seines u'ese~:.s -::J::cj_·:;.r'cn) .- ~r--ej_dcg-
co~cludes the css~y ~;ith d st~te 
tion the interpretatj_on 
the ::e~ninr of the frag ent cdn be inte~preted tti~de~ond-
9 
cr..tly of~:erctcJitus's field of re·;JT8[~e:~Jc .. -i.tio:_-l ,_it th-At ti:·:~e."'"'"' 
D. Liscellcineous ~:,,ur}:.:s 
1 .. "Der Zeitbegriff in dcr Geschichts•.:;iss(-Jllf::Cl:_~tft.n 3 
~'eider,csr• s lecture on "The Concc9t o·~' 'I'irD ~n the 
Scie:-:cce of ~~is tory" r;,\lS t;iven on Ju:O_J 27, 1015, :~~ :::: .... ul-
l. VA, 27t3. 
2. v.~, 279. 
3. Zeitschri ft fUr Philcso0hic und ;pJ~j_lo:::o:J':.iscllo =-~:riti_;~, 
161(1916), 17~-iss. · 
filr,12nt of d re:1uirer.1cnt (Probevor lcsunc;) for ..:...d2_-:_is ~~ iol-1 
tc tl12 fJ.culty cf "'~tc t'-~_iversi t~l of ~'rc~_burg. It ~.-.-J.s 
the r.<..tturo --~net function of t~~e conce;;t o::':' t5~:~e j~-~ h:_stor-
ic~l science v1itl1 tho concept o~ t1_~_,e in physic~l science. 
In )hysiciil scie::1ce the structure d.:ncl_ fu:r:~ctj_o:n. of t:L,::e are 
f.J..ctor, :.~otion is to be measured. 
for f-:_1 :_inc bodies, is ~rJU1'8ly r-lUiJ.nt:i.tG.tive. r_L'j_:-le ·aecor.:.es 
u succession of honoseneous ~ooints, :re~rese:l!ted 0::.1 -.i sc:lle. 
T- .... ..L. • "' t . . ; . t . , . .::e zur~cvlo:ns or li';_e ln nls orlC.:;.__t_ 3Clsnce, -.-.'>_:i_ch 
h.J.s to 6o T: .. ith t:1.2 objectificc.tions of S)i.C'it in cuJ.tUJ:'e, 
eve:r-'-~cs, c..ro illustruted b:·.' :~~eidegccr, ":Jut :·~ot e:xh·._.usted, 
ir.. t~J.e testing ~.-nc1 vc:cific:..;,_tion of sources --nci. i:rJ. tl:c es-
t;J.bl i.s!J..:·:_sn t of cor:.ne ctions betY<'een cven.ts. T~:~c c~c:i.t icu1 
eva.J_u..;.tion of source T:l:.:..teri.J.ls i:'1cludss rei'erences to 
ot'.1er events of the tiEe (]eriod) under consiC:eLct'_on. 
~Ieidegger uses ~s un exa;.·:_~_)le the J:)apu.l Dec:--ces ~ttributc;d 
csr:tUTy). T~e docm.~nts pr~sup)ose c~:-
later thdn the first century; t::ey nust be ...:.djud,sed spur-
ious. Eeideg~er's choice of dll exa1.ple illustr~tes u 
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criticill attitude to~:ro..rrl ecclcsi..:.!.sticc.l tr-~dition. ·:<is 
t,.tblishing ccnnections d.Long events j_s tte ~.-.~ol~~-: en'"' 
Troeltsch o~-: St ... ugustine, ir VI~-:icll ·::croeltsch setf1 
__ ugustine dt the close of ths 11eriod of dYlti-fv.ity .. 
I~eidee;r;er' s col-:.clus j.on is th...;.t the :Cu.~-lctio:ns of ti-'1e 
lD historic0.l science h...1.ve to do ,_..;ith the co:.'1CC)t 
J..s qualitdtive. Even the use of ntU!lbers is not 20 •:::uch 
to :~e..csu:c:e tine ctf: to refer to specific events. :Tor e:x-
nccrt ::;erely d :c1a.tter of convenience, is based upon dn event 
~"':ith peculi ... Lr :J_u ...... lit;.itive significcl.nce, sucl:cta.s the four:.ding 
of the RoLko.n State, the birth of Ci1rist, :.Jr 
.. ·.ccording to Eeideu::er, the coJCcent of tj;:e in historiccll 
scier~ce :,:ust be J. IJ.cttter, not of the '.}Udnt:ltu.tive .ce'---'-surlnG 
of h{_;~--~ogoneous, abstract points, but of -~fu-.::.J_i t<-.1 ti ve ( vulue-
relc1tec, spiritually significd'CJ.t) events. '1':1e cor:cce nt of 
t:Lr~e used in physico.l science is not ,;u_j_ted for <.c.:ce in 
l!istorical science. 
2. Die Selbstbeha.u:otu I" der deuts cher• 1Tni vers it:J.t. 
Eeidegger' s speech entitled, "The .::ielf-_,sseT·tion of' 
the Gerr::.a . .n U:1.iversi ty," vr_.s given on l<dy 27, 1933, irl con-
nection ~rlth l1is acceptance of the position of Bector of 
l. Ibid., 128. 
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the university of ~'l'reiburg, under tne ~'-ltional Socic,2·:.0 ~ 
:,_--ee:irn.e. Ee resigned eurly in 1934. 1 1.11:8 extent of ::.is 
co-oper,J.tion V;'ith the Hazi l-.1overnent o.J.nd tl1c ,.--~otivcs for 
l:is 'Jarticipation are debatc:cble points. :~.is :Dhilosopnical 
e:~:oha::is uuon freedo:: -1nd individuality is obviously not 
in accord v1i th the racial and nationalistic fom:d"'tions 
(Blut llild Boden) of Eational Socialism. 
such as the return to the origins of Grer'l: philoso;)l:Jy, 
the inadequu.cy of science eomd scientific :,Jethod for 
:ohilosophy, ~nd the conceuts of history and destiny 
are found in the spes ch. The essence of the GerLJ.n 
University, vrhich is the b..isis for self-dss~~rtion, is 
:ore sen ted as d lmoYiine service ( Wissensdienst) to the 
historical, S)Jiritual destiny of the Genicll1 IJBO))le. 
T'1is ·:nov;ing service is eq_ually origincil (f;leichur-
sor'l1nrlich) viith labor service (ccrbeitsdienst) and. :•ili-
tcJ.ry service ( "lehrdienst). Knoviing is not :orimJ.rily to 
serve the professions {Berufe, vocc::.tions), but tr.e ·oro-
fessions, aJ.ong ·;:ith the education required for then, 
are res:1ons·j __ blc to the l-:noYring service to the peo)le . 2 
1. Of. Karl Ballmer, -"ber Herr Heide~mer~ (!3asel: liudolf 
Geering, 1933), for u severe crit1cis:c, of Eeidegc·er•s 
co-opera.tion v;ith Eationul Socialism. 
2. su, 16-17. 
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The concept of struggle (Kampf) is emphasized in relation 
to the questioning inherent in the search for knowledge. 
The concept of "academic freedom" is rejected as inade-
quate, because of its impure, nef,ative character. In 
its place Heidegger defines the highest freedom as giving 
to itself the law of its own essence.1 The phrase, "Blut 
und Boden," does not occur in the speech, but "erd- und 
bluthaften Kr~fte" are used in the definition of the 
spiritual world of a people. 2 The spiritual task of the 
university is to preserve the racial heritage of a people, 
rather than to construct a superstructure of culture and 
values which have no basic connection with the greatness 
of a people. 
In brief, as this writer understands the situation, 
the whole speech stresses the idea of social responsibility 
for those who make up a university. In an atmosphere of 
"academic freedom," semi-autonomous departments, and wide-
ly divergent aims and viewpoints in many contemporary in-
stitutions, Heidegger's emphasis upon responsibility to 
the larger social unit would be needed and welcome. But 
in the atmosphere of National Socialism, with its clear-
cut, unashamed doctrines of nationalism, racism, struggle, 
and the destiny of the German people, the speech reminds 
the writer of Heidegger's own account of the fall into the 
one-among-many (Verfallen in das Man). 
1. su' 15. 
2. su, 13. 
263 
3, Der Feldweg, 
"The field path" is the title of a brief ( 7 pages) 
essay by Heidegger, published in 1953. The essay is a 
kind of allegory on the way of the thinker, presented 
in an extended figure of speech called the way (or path) 
of the field. The field path collects and bears the being 
of all who pass upon it, each with his own purpose. It 
is the way of the simple, which appears uniform, monot-
onous, and boring to the distracted and the vexatious. 
The gentle power of the field path can outlast the gi-
gantic powers of atomic energy. The danger to men is 
that they hardly hear the admonition of the field path. 
The admonition awakens a sense of freedom and brightness, 
a cheerful serenity (Heiterkeit), and brings all into 
harmony. "Knowing cheerfulness is a door to eternity." 1 
The field path is the way of the simple. It is renuncia-
tion, which gives the inexhaustible power of the simple. 
4. Aus der Erfahrung des Denkens. 
The little book entitled, "Out of the experience of 
thinking," contains about fifteen sparsely-printed pages 
of poems and pithy sayings, each page being introduced 
with a succinct description of a rural scene, supposedly 
where Heidegger lives in Todtnauberg. The book is not an 
autobiography, but the sayings are certainly autobiograph-
ical. A typical page, one of the most interesting to the 
1. DF, 6, 
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~p~~o .~:ood . .:.nc: therefore ~;,rholesone d-:..r.Per is the 
neirhborhood of the singing noet. ~ 
'11he bctd dnd there:.fore sh<..irpest d--.ncer is thir;J:ing 
itself. It ;;ust think agctinst itself--so:.:ethi"1g 
which it is only seldom ctble to do. 
The simple and therefore confused dctnger is 
pi'lilosonhizing ,1 
Two ::1ore excerpts • .. hich could stir:mla.te c.:uch discussion 
a.bout pi1ilosonhy cmd about ~!eidegc·er's career cJ.re the 
follovring: 
'de "'.o.y dure to tccke the step out of :}hilosonhy 
back into thin:dng u.s soon as V.'B h.J.ve beco::1e at 
home in the origin of thinldng. 
l-Ie v.rho thinks 2 e;reutl:r must greatly err. 
These sa,yings rctise the questio21, for t~ne ~1ri ter, 
dbout the degroe in 1:hicl1 phi' oso:oniccil tf:i'1kinE;, in 
. d tl . t . . l • l 3 
'·Teldc:,c:r er 0.!1 o .1ers, 1s au oologrctpJllCd • 
l. :.ED, 15. 
2 • .:.ED , 19 , l 7 • 
3. In l9e7, Eeidegger published a s:·,"ll book entitled, 
Hebel--Der Hausfreund (Pfullingen: GUnther I'esJ.;:e, 
1957). 1111~.e v.Titer VIZ...S unable to cet this book u11til 
t~1e :presc:r.t study ·~·ias prcicticJ..l~,-Y co:.r~J' eted. ~L 1 l'lc book 
is Feide::_:ger's co,.Tlsnti.lry on selected tte~·:£:s fror:~ the 
poc~s of Johdnn Peter Rebel. 
CHAPTER IV 
THE MOST SIGNIFICANT FEATURES OF HEIDEGGER'S PHILOSOPHY 
The two previous chapters of this dissertation have 
been an attempt to present an exposition of Heidegger's 
philosophy. The exposition has followed, for the most 
part, Heidegger•s own order in each published work. The 
writer has attempted to avoid critical evaluation, al-
though some evaluation is inherent in the selection of 
important ideas and in making summaries, like book re-
views, of whole volumes and courses of lectures in a 
few pages. 
The present chapter is an attempt to interpret, 
largely from the selections and summaries already pre-
sented, some basic ideas which recur throughout Heideg-
ger•s works, in order to use these ideas as a guide to 
the study of his influence in Latin-american philosophy. 
There will be a greater measure of criticism anl. evalua-
tion than in the preceding chapters, although the prin-
cipal aim of the criticism is not to take a stand against 
Heidegger•s views, but to present a more systematic ex-
position of some of the problems. 
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A. Unfinished business. 
One of the most significant features of Heidegger•s 
philosophy is the fact that his main work, upon which 
both his other works and his influence are largely de-
pendent, is incomplete. The two introductory chapters 
of Sein und Zeit are almost as audacious in the scope 
of what is attempted as the first two chapters of Gen-
esis. In fact, there is a sense in which Heidegger 
attempted to define the nature of the creative process, 
that is, what does it mean for anything to be. Although 
the subject matter is similar to the creation stories in 
Genesis, the method is radically different. Genesis 
simply presents great affirmations, to be accepted in 
religious faith. Heidegger seeks to comprehend and to 
interpret, using phenomenological analysis of what it 
means for a given entity to be. Genesis is myth; Sein 
und Zeit is philosophy. In Genesis, the story of creation 
is told, and the remainder of the Bible proceeds to lesser 
themes, in greater detail. Heidegger•s work has been far 
more modest in its results. 
The easiest interpretation of the fact that Sein 
und Zeit has not been completed would be simply to say 
that Heidegger did not take the trouble to investigate 
closely the far end of a dead-end street. There has 
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been, however, no confession of failure nor any retrac-
tation of the point of view of Sein und Zeit by the only 
person who could give the final word. No such final 
word has been given. This open-end philosophy, this 
unfinished business of a most audacious philosophical 
attempt makes Heidegger an enigma to which only he, at 
his own pleasure, could give the solution. 
There is, however, another possible interpretation 
of the incompleteness of Heidegger•s main work, along 
symbolic lines. Philosophy is, in its nature, unfinished 
business. The history of philosophy might be interpreted 
as a succession of philosophical systems, each of which 
attempted to end the succession of systems. Heidegger•s 
incomplete work is a symbol with double significance. It 
refers to his ovm position, that it is the major task of 
philosophy to ask questions rather than to find answers. 
Heidegger has no system. Everything is at loose ends. 
And the incompleteness also refers to the nature of phi-
losophy. Philosophy itself is unfinished business. 
If viewed from the negative side, this conclusion 
is skepticism, or at least relativism •. From the positive 
side, it means heuristic agnosticism, for there can be no 
future to a philosophy that already has all the answers. 
If philosophy is conceived as a pendulum between radical 
questions and systematic answers, as in the movement from 
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the Sophists and Socrates to Plato and Aristotle, from 
Hume to Kant and Hegel, so Heidegger may be the left 
extreme (negative, radical ~uestioning), after which 
will follow some fUture system of answers. Heidegger 
is symbolic of the radical doubts and shifting relativities 
of contemporary thought. It is in this sense that Heideg-
may be spoken of as the most authentic voice of the con-
temporary world. 
A similar movement may be seen in the natural sci-
ences. Certainty has given way to probability, in the 
form of statistical averages; axioms have given way to 
postulates. Process and fUnction are more fruitful con-
cepts than matter and substance; in fact, substance itself 
may be conceived in terms of energy and process. Contem-
porary philosophy shows a similar preference for dynamic 
concepts. Process is more significant than substance; 
probability and evidence are substituted for demonstra-
tion. Heidegger•s philosophy might be interpreted as 
the frustration of a grandiose attempt to demonstrate the 
meaning of being, or, in negative terms, a concrete illus-
tration that demonstration is impossible in dealing with 
the major problems of philosophy. 
Unfinished business or an open-end inquiry is sym-
bolic of the whole contemporary trend in philosophy. 
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Heidegger has done in the twentieth eentury what Hume 
did in the eighteenth: called into QUestion all com-
monly accepted postulates. It is to be hoped that 
some great dogmatic slumberer will be awakened, in 
order that the pendulum may start back toward system, 
toward answers rather than ultimate questioning. 
B· Ontology, the question of being. 
The question of the meaning of being is the central 
problem in all of Heidegger•s philosophy, and the main 
problem involved is the possibility of a concrete defini-
tion. Definition is possible only by means of universals; 
the logic of classification, if carried to its ultimate 
limit, arrives at a universal, but empty, concept of being. 
In the logic of classification being may not be defined. 
Heidegger is not content to accept without question the fact 
that anything "is." He insists upon defining the undefinable. 
He attempts to use universals to define what is, by defini-
tion, beyond universals. Being is separated from entities. 
Entities, both human and non-human, exist in the traditional 
sense of space-time objectivity (existentia, Heidegger•s 
Vorhandensein). But the problem of being goes beyond the 
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debate over the relations between essentia and existentia, 
in which essence (the universal) is prior to existence in 
most philosophy and existence is prior to essence in ex-
istentialism (and nominalism). For Heidegger, the problem 
of being transcends the problems of the nature of essence 
and the nature of existence, because both essence and ex-
istence "are" in some sense. Being is absolute trans-
cendence. Being is beyond all distinctions and relations 
among entities, beyond all logic, beyond all definitions 
of things, beyond essence, beyond existence, beyond cause, 
beyond reason, beyond ground. It is the same as nothing, 
if nothing is defined strictly as no-thing, for being is 
never an entity. Neither is being the totality of enti-
ties, or, in traditional ter.ms, the world, reality, or God 
and the created world. Being is qualitatively different 
from every definable entity. The aim of Heidegger's philos-
ophy is to reveal the meaning of being. 
In the light of Heidegger's aim and his definition 
of being as absolute transcendence, he is correct, in the 
opinion of the writer, in stating that his philosophy is 
not existentialism. It is not on the same plane as Kier-
kegaard's revolt against Hegel, not equivalent to Jaspers, 
Sartre, or Marcel. To classify Heidegger as the most sys-
tematic of the existentialists is to deny the validity of 
his aim and to regard all his efforts as misdirected. 
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So considered, Heidegger's philosophy is subjective, 
tmmanent {this-worldly), nominalistic, and temporalistic. 
Classified as existentialism, separated from his central 
aim, and considered from the point of view of actual ac-
complishment, Heidegger's thought is philosophical anthro-
pology, a descriptive account of the nature of human exist-
ence that ends in a relativistic philosophy of finitude. 
Heidegger interprets the whole history of philosophy, 
from Plato to the present, as a forgetting of the problem 
of being, as the domination of thought by logic and by 
the idea of time as an infinite succession of "nows." 
Truth degenerates from a revelation of being to correct 
propositions about entities. His interpretations are, in 
the opinion of the writer, consistent with his own onto-
logical purpose. But it must not be forgotten that Hei-
degger's is not a traditional ontology. The latter seeks 
an ultimate reality (in theistic terms, the Supreme Being) 
upon which all other realities {or created beings) depend. 
The most difficult problem in the evaluation of 
Heidegger's philosophy is the validity of his aim. If 
his purpose is valid, then his philosophy is unique, and 
his objections to all criticisms and classifications of 
his thought are sound. If being transcends all entities 
and the totality of entities, that is, if being is quali-
tatively different from entities, then Heidegger's phe-
nomenological ontology is really a new concept of philos-
ophy. It requires a new language, which Heidegger has 
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practically created, for language as we know it is talk 
about things (entities), not a dialogue with being (or 
nothing), Logic, too, must be transcended, because logic 
deals with entities, with their relations, classes, causes, 
and effects. The traditional problems of epistemology 
(subject-object relation) and of universals (essentia and 
existential are inadequate to think this absolute tran-
wcendence, for these problems deal with entities. The 
controversial issues with respect to Heidegger's thought 
fall into a distinct and consistent pattern, in the light 
of his central aim and his definition of being as absolute 
transcendence. 
The basic issue, then, seems to be whether Heidegger' s 
aim is valid. Must philosophy deal with entities alone? 
Is there being that is not the being of something? Is 
it possible to deal with being as absolute transcendence? 
As no-thing? If being is a non-entity, then it must also 
be non-sense, non-existent, and non-essential (non-essence). 
If entities are finite by definition, then being must be 
the in-finite, the universal negative, the nothing. Free-
dom (transcendence) is the cause of cause, the basis of all 
necessity. From the standpoint of cmwaon sense, these 
thoughts are simply absurd. How absurd can philosophy get? 
And, once again, there is an irony in Heidegger, for he 
recognizes the logical validity of these criticisms from 
the standpoint of common sense, science, or a traditional 
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metaphysical position, but goes ahead on his way to the 
abyss. (Abgrund, lack of ground, lack of cause, lack of 
reason), and complains that "philosophers" do not con-
sider the real problems.1 If Heidegger•s concept of the 
aim and nature of philosophy is accepted, then certain 
results must be granted. Ontology as such would not be 
a theory of reality; an ontology that transcends all 
entities would contain no doctrines of God, man, nature, 
universals, or values; it would not be physics, logic, 
or ethics; it would be nothing. Heidegger admits the 
sterility (no results) of essential thinking. 2 In the 
opinion of the writer, if ontology is to have content, 
it must deal with entities, because the nature of thinking 
is to think something, because the nature of conscious-
ness is to be conscious of something, because, in fine, 
the nature of being is that something "is." 
The fact that the all-important third main section 
of Part I of Sein und Zeit has not been published is an 
argument ad hominem against the possibility of finishing 
the work as a systematic'whole. The fact that the work 
remains incomplete does not entail the necessity of its 
incomplete status; but it does suggest that perhaps the 
plan contains inherent internal difficulties. Heidegger's 
philosophical ability and audacity are outstanding. He is 
aware of the problems involved, and he persists in his 
1. WG, 5. Preface to the third edition. 
2. WHD, 161. 
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point of view. If Heidegger can not finish his own system, 
what mortal can? Certainly not we who remain content to 
busy ourselves with philosophy. 
c. Fundamental ontology. 
The fact is that Heidegger's philosophy has its 
greatest influence, and most significance, when it is 
no longer understood strictly as ontology. As his phi-
losophy slips away from the avowed purpose and as it is 
misunderstood, it becomes more meaningful and influential. 
Heidegger's fundamental ontology has real content. In 
traditional terms it is personalism, in the sense that 
personality is the entity that provides access to basic 
metaphysical problems. Dasein and Existenz are strictly 
personal terms. The~ of Dasein refers to the openness 
of being to personal existence, to the lighting (Lichtung) 
of being, to an understanding of being and a concern for 
being that are peculiar to persons. Existentials and ex-
istentiality are characteristics of personal existence, 
as distinct from the existentia (Vorhandensein), and cate-
gories of non-human entities. The being of hon-human 
entities must be understood through Dasein, through the 
human, the personal. Original time or temporality is 
strictly personal, and all other concepts of time are de-
rivative and secondary. Existential analysis is the basis 
for ontology. Strictly speaking, it must be recognized 
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that Hcidee~er's existential dnalysis or ful·d~:~c~~tdl 
ontolocy ( s~:l1lOD~Ti~'2.ous teras) is the })rere·-J..uisite fou:·1du.-
tj_or.. for ontology in his sense. Lmt the fuct is thd t his 
fu:"ld-:L':e:1tcJ.l ontoloe;y can be, dnd is, 1 interpreted cts the 
focmd.J.tion for ontology (netd~llysics) in the tru.c1itional 
sense. If so interpreted, 'Ieidegr·er' s f'Unct.L'enteil ontology 
is uersonalism; it is a tyye of exis :enticclisn; -lnd it is 
u':lj_l_oso•)hicill anthrouDlogy. Even if it be cr..c!l.ted to Eei-
de.:;ger th.J.t these cla.ssifj_cations ;_lre . ~is~-~."Lte:c~ore·~_,_tio~:.s 
of !lis philosophy, it l:'Ust be cHlNitted thcct in tl'e lic;ht 
of such :.1is interpretdt ions, his philosophy beco~·~es mean-
ingful, crecctive, ccnil_ fruitful. 
'-Ieidegger•s collection of evide·,:ce 0-nd his argume!Jts 
for the finitude of hu":an existence c1re d contribution to 
philosoCJhy •::ith resuect to the ncctUl'G of nan. 1'-'is c'escri:;J-
tions of the pheno•:,ena of dreccd, care, "'nd the ilclc;roDer 
;:odes of hu. :an e:d ste!!ce show ins i J:.t i:'lto the n0. ture of 
nan, especicJ.lly of modern :::an in a technolon·iccel G·J:_-:_;:·re. 
'::eideg'er' s interDretcctions of the r"all c1nd of debt ( cuil t) 
dre not theol8sical, in tl1e fr<£:leY'/ork of Lis systc:11, bl).t 
2 ful for theology.~ Both Protest . .mt -il''1c. R::cctn Cdtl!olic 
theolosians ll<iVe shoi.'·Tn r .. uch interest ir. ~:::eidog;::_:er' s ~~Jhi-
Joso:0hy. Strictly ir.te::prcted, ~Ieic-;_o[-:r;cr's e:::istenti~l 
l. Cf. I.=~. Bochens_\,:i, Europi!!ische Philoso~""~(.:_ie dor Gcccn-
"'-',;drt {3ern: .. 1.. l1'r0.:1Cke Verla.s, 194?), ls:B-201. 
2. 2u--o1<Jh :r3u}_tna:r:.n, i'cr e:;,:a_ -~~le, h<J.s :_\~J.clc considerable use 
of =~eide{~ger' s -ol"lil·:Jso 'Jhy in the fj_~Jld of t!~~sc:)l·:_··~~;:r. 
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analysis is the foundation for his ontology; it is funda-
mental ontology. It is on a different plane from per-
sonalism, existentialism, a theology without God, and 
philosophical anthropology. But if Heidegger's principal 
aim is rejected as invalid and if his existential analysis 
is re-aligned to fit into a traditional ontology, theology, 
or philosophical anthropology, then his fundamental ontology 
becomes a creative, significant contribution to personalism 
and, with a little more elasticity in the interpretation, 
a fine theoretical formulation of existentialism. 
D. The nature of man. 
Heidegger rejects traditional definitions of the 
nature of man, such as the "rational animal" and the 
"image of God." The attempt to define the nature of man 
without using man's relation to anything outside himself, 
such as God, nature, society, or the state, makes the task 
of definition a matter of synonyms and tautologies. For 
Heidegger, man (Dasein) is first of all an ontological 
entity. Man is the entity (the being) whose being lies 
in being concerned with being. If seen from the vantage 
point of being, rather than man, then man is the light:lng 
of being, the entity that reveals being, that watches over, 
cares for, and guards being. Man is a speaking entity who 
speaks of being. Man is a feeling entity whose ever-present 
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moods and changes of disposition reveal his being. Man 
understands being in a pre-ontological sense, but this 
understanding is not primarily intellectual or rational. 
The fact that man is concerned with his being means the.t 
his being is that concern. He cares about being and his 
being is care. His essence and existence can not be sepa-
rated, because his essence (definition) is to be concerned 
with his existence and his existence is dominated by con-
cern for his essence. l\Ian's being is at stake in being. 
To be unconcerned is to lose the essence of existence. 
Total indifference is non-human. 
The being of man is found in care (Sorge). The most 
common forms of care, for Heidegger, are the use or man-
agement of things (Besorgen) and caring for persons (FUr-
serge). Both are derivatives of care, which is concern 
with or care for one's own self (Selbstsorge)--a tautology, 
for He idegger. The definition of care (Sorge) is, "~­
yorweg-schon-sein-in-(der-Welt-)als Sein-bei (innerweltlich 
begegnendem Seiendenl."1 Although basically a unitary phe-
nomenon, care may be analyzed into such structures as proj-
ect and possibility, thrownness and factUality, caring, and 
the fall. The unitary phenomenon also involves temporal 
ecstasies of future, been, and present. Care dominates 
man's temporal passage through the world. lllan is care, in 
the sense that death alone puts an end to care and concern. 
So long as man is, he cares. Man's being is to be concerned 
with being. 
1. suz, l92. 
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To be concerned with being is to care about and to 
become one's possibilities. :r.:an is the possibilities 
which he cares about and which he becomes. To live is 
to become one's possibilities, to run forward into them. 
Life is a continuous project, the realization of possi-
bilities. When possibilities and projects (becoming or 
process, in traditional terms) are brought to an end, 
life itself is a whole that is past. The being of man is 
to be incomplete, to be in the process of becoming one's 
own possibilities, even unto the one insurmountable, ir-
referable possibility (a certainty) of having no more 
possibilities, at least in the world. 1 Man's being is to 
run forward into death, his ovm possibl~ impossibility, 
Ean's being becomes a whole when it comes to its end. 
Man's being is to be finite. To be finite is to run 
forward into de-finite-ness, to be definite, to be de-
finable as a fixed essence, no longer existing as an 
entity in the process of becoming its possibilities. The 
fact that man is never a static entity, never a fixed es-
sence (until he no longer is), means that man's essence 
lies in his existence as a transcending entity. lvlan tran-
scends himself both temporally and spatially. !>;an's being 
1. Although Heidegger rejects the criticism that his theory 
is a denial of immortality, it seems beyond doubt that 
his doctrine denies the possibility of reincarnation in 
this world. In the opinion of the writer, Heidegger's 
doctrine of death as the possibility of one's own im::>os-
sibility is not a strict argument against immortality, 
but its overtones are entirely negative. 
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is his tr~~scendence. 'rhis tr___._nscsnc1cnce Js ,_:-.J.v.' s fJ.."'eedon, 
to ti' .. :...nsce:-20. hi:·:self :i.rcto Y.'hu.t ~e cG.n bo __,_nd ~.-:ill be. 
~ -~:..:1 is t~_e o::1tclo,:;icv..l entity •.-:hose be inc :~~: to Oe co::.ccrncd 
x~a., 
J.l, t::c~:_ ~-'c ido::-::~~~cr' S ')D.r ~)OS 8 is ur ..l!.C CC-:J S .S.:1.l":·.r a 
is by its n~ture (by definition) 
.. ~rsi'b:.lis::..l. Cf. !-~'.lins f.:=:;_..,~ft, Vo': ··,:s::~;;-'.·} ::.:~,u __ ·:.~l:=..er:···er 
( Tc.~-.-l""l·'":"· -,-_q-;<:' u-,q'~n Vorl--·:· lor.':'.:) ~-r·~l ffr;l:~e p~,-~,Or;.,)...,hv _.:_• ~-:-.....: .. • _ _,_ ...... _~..;..; .UU'-'-~'-' '-""' -'-'--:;) ..,._,,_, ) '-"'··--'-- J."_;,_ .l ..... • __ .l ';J 1-'~-'-,J 
0:~ Exi2tcnce, Its St:c·u.ctu:re c.nd Sic~~ if'ic,.LlCe," ir: Fl1i-
J.cso~·hy "'nj Phe:·o:·Gr:oJ.ogicccl Reseirch, 1( l94C-104l),3~39-
358. .. 
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A serious implication involved in Heidegger's attempt 
to define man by reference only to himself, to being, and 
to nothing, is the tendency toward making man an absolute. 
God, as the great "I Jun,"1 is worthy of awe and reverence; 
the "I yam what I yam" of Popeye2 is ludicrous. A religion 
of humanism, in the opinion of the writer, is blasphemy 
and a contradiction of terms. There is a tendency in Hei-
degger to make man into an absolute, into the entity upon 
which all other entities depend for their truth, their 
meaning, and even their being. 3 The incomplete nature of 
Heidegger's main work, the lack of precision in his figur-
ative language (for example, man is the shepherd of being), 
and the writer's inability to grasp the implications of 
Heidegger's statements make it impossible to deal more 
critically with the problem in this dissertation. 
Another serious problem in Heidegger's doctrine of 
man is the ambiguity of the term Dasein, whether it is 
strictly applicable only to the individual (Jemeinigkeit), 
or if it is a universal (Dasein als solches) which refers 
to the essence of all individuals. The problem of universals 
becomes acute when any particular entity is taken as exem-
plary for a class, especially if the essence of the exam-
plary entity is its particular, individual existence. Can 
1. Exodus, 3: 14. 
2. One-eyed, ruffian sailor, a comic-strip character. 
3. De Waelhens interprets Heidegger as affirming a brute 
existence (Seiendes) without meaning, and thus a degree 
of realism that eliminates the possibility of man's 
becoming the creator of other entities (solipsism). 
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tion t~_ldt :i_Jl. the JrobleJa of univers~1ls 
is ~ u~5_versul iEdiviductlity. 
l. SuZ, 1:::2. 
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~:sit -.JJ s 3~Jicgel C.er GereEr.',r_l.rt (1.-els::::..hs:u,: .__;__-·.: --'-',_ . .:,.n: 
·c.~t'...,,l-~\l•·""'rorl.'r::- ,r,~--on T_""-.:.l'n JO"l} l.c_<;"' l'::-;-~r.: -?or-:' 
',/-._.,___ -<..t~I.J -.. •. ';'--' -~--'-t:, -'-J'.U £,._......_ , _.__,._, ' --'- .._,,__,, ~-- '-•·'"__./' _ <..,(. 
-: j_,::~ cu~:' ~=: :i C:D of ncol~._t:r~~dictio::ls" -:1.:1d n .s -~·J.c..::-i:.--,_: tl'.c ci::::'cle." 
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focus in personal existence, whereas in the realms of 
physical things and purely formal structures (logic and 
mathematics) one side or the other of the problem is 
simply given precedence and the other side is re-intro-
duced later, often surreptitiously, in order to complete 
the system. One difficulty with a personalistic solution 
(including Heidegger in this classification) is that are-
location of the problem is in itself no solution. Another 
difficulty is the tendency toward nominalistic subjectivism 
in any personalism, and especially in a type (Heidegger) 
which stresses individuality. There are contradictory 
tendencies in Heidegger. 
For the writer, the nominalistic 
dagger's starting point and his basic 
tendency is Hei-
1 position. Freedom, 
which means individuality, is the basis for essence (cause, 
reason, ground, necessity, truth). Original truth is reve-
lation, discovery, unveiling; propositional truth (essences, 
universals) is a secondary, derived truth. Original time 
is finite and qualitative; an abstract series of "news" is 
a secondary concept. Heidegger's concept of historicity 
emphasizes the unique (Einmalig) in what happens. With a 
nominalistic starting point, how does Heidegger arrive at 
a theory of man, and, still more difficult, a theory of 
being? The answers are, that he does not arrive at a theory 
of being, and that he arrives at a theory of man, if it may 
1. suz, 41-42. 
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be so named, by re-introducing essentialist tendencies in 
the form of existentials, which are merely another name 
for a flexible system of categories of personal existence, 
Heidegger's existentials function as essences, as universals. 
In part they are generalizations from his personal experi-
ence, in part observations of others, in part hypotheses 
taken from other thinkers, and in part, perhaps, mere as-
sumptions which precede "phenomenological" discovery. 
Heidegger is unequivecal on one point: his opposition to 
the "eternal verities," to a realism of universals prior 
to things (ante res), He has not presented a precise, 
clear solution to the problem of universals. 
E. Phenomenological method. 
Heidegger nominally belongs to the phenomenological 
movement. He has been a student, a colleague, and the suc-
cessor of Husserl. Heidegger calls his own method phenom-
enological. In order to distinguish his method from the 
later, idealistic phase of Husserl's philosophy, Heidegger 
strictly limits phenomenology to method, whereas ontology 
is the content of philosophy. Philosophy, for Heidegger, 
is ontology in content and phenomenology in method. The 
slogan, "To the things (facts) themselves," is accepted. 
But Heidegger's interpretation of the method is definitely 
not what Husserl means by phenomenology. Phenomenon is, 
for Heidegger, the appearance of what shows itself. Phe-
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nomenology necessarily involves presupposition. The 
basic meaning of' logos is speech and "letting see" 
rather than the "logic," "science," or "theory" of' some-
thing, as in theology, biology, and sociology. Phenom-
enology is "that which shows itself, as it shows itself' 
forth from itself', by letting itself' be seen." 1 Hei-
degger emphasizes the "how" of phenomenology rather than 
the "what" (essence, intellectual content). 
In contrast to Husserl's intellectualism and emphasis 
upon essence, Heidegger stresses in methodology the mode 
or manner in which an entity reveals its truth. In con-
trast to Husserl's aim of' avoiding presuppositions in 
method, Heidegger affirms the necessity of presupposing 
a pre-ontological understanding of being in Dasein, in 
order to interpret, in progressively larger circles, the 
meaning of being. 2 This is Heidegger's hermeneutics or 
interpretive method. Heidegger accepts the idea of "cir-
cular reasoning" and claims that "formal objections" such 
as the charge of circular proof can not stand in the way 
of actual inquiry. 3 In contrast to Husserl's fundamental 
principle of' intentionality, Heidegger emphasizes the 
"equal originality" (Gleichursprtl.nglichkeit) of co-ordinate, 
mutually involved principles. Heidegger uses the terms 
erschliessen and Erschlossenheit only with regard to the 
openness of' Dasein to its world, but never in the sense of' 
1. suz, 34. 
2. suz, 31, 37. 
3. suz, 7, 148-153. 
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a conclusion in syllogistic inference. In fact, Rei-
dagger's method is not logical in the sense of classi-
fication or of strict inference. For example, there is 
no "proof" of the external world; the scandal of philos-
ophy is the perseverance of the attempt. But Heidegger 
does refer to wholes of significance, utility, and con-
formity in which Dasein manages things at hand. To grasp 
a hammer and use it for the llllinediate task is, for Hei-
degger, more convincing than a theoretical argument, be-
cause the latter presupposes a subject separated from the 
world and then without any bridge to close the gap. 
Heidegger's emphasis upon the "how" rather than the 
"what" in method, upon the interpretation of pre-ontolog-
ical presuppositions rather than the construction of a 
logical system, and upon the equal originality of co-
ordinate principles rather than logical inference means 
that his philosophy can not be a system in the strict 
meaning of the term. If his philosophy is a system, it 
must be a flexible, moving, developing system, and not a 
traditional ontology with a tendency toward eternal, un-
changing essences. Nevertheless, the avowed purpose of 
the method is to elaborate the meaning of being, or, in 
common understanding, to construct an ontology, to give 
an account that may be understood, to present the truth 
about being, The rationalistic implications of such a 
purpose are hardly consistent with the secondary status 
Heidegger attributes to propositional truth. Logic, 
~86 
t~e hiS?l ~e3ree of r~tion~lity in clbstr~tct, tlleorstic~l foTI1U-
loss of ori::~_n...-tlity dnd concreteness. Discovery is :':orE: 
ori~;iYI-ll tho:.:--!. an "objective" t:1eory. 'i'lle Ul'-'lei]_i~,~ of Loads 
is :··.:ore ori.'"'':l_nG-1 th2-~:. ]sycholo[:;ic...:..l ·C,I:eory. Loc;:Lc2.l defini-
tions ~n~ tltoories are secondary, derived trut~s. 
1 is nnt ''esse~tti~l t:1inkj~s.'' 
,:icience 
rut~::_cr th~ln ir.r:?~--ic.J.tion, ii1 tvro ser.ses. In 0..ll :;_ue ·tions 
Subjective ·io~;ti::!.Y :2_s ,:..,t stuke, .J.s ~.;ell :....s ob:_iecti.ve truth. 
In rel i:-:.:iou2 ter.:.~s, this in vel vel.-"1_ent ~!18-:i.ES _,_,_' .,__ Li_[ __ ,::.>,. u 
1. For 0. coT~yJrison of ::~e idec;cer s..nd ::hit~;Lc ..... d c·n co;-,_c:-ccte-
ness, cf. ~,~'illidL B--.:.r·('ett, ",·n.'ldt Is E~~l st~;:1ti..:,li;;;~_:? 
(:"ev·,' "'_rorl<::: ?c-trtis ... ::-n Hcvie•:r Series, 1~::47). 
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T~1_e esscr:ce of !'lclD's b:=::i;:1s is to Oc conc::rn:'_:;d .J.bo:rt his 
being. Scic;r:.ce is not essential th5_~1~Ci:;J.f-3 bec;J..use it is 
unccnc,~-;rned .;jj;out ulti.r:l.dte !;le-~:linc -.;..nQ destiny. ~")cic:'.l.ce, 
oth(:;r sense, as ·v-~·elJ. It is not strictly "~:-'.-3..Jytic. Des-pite 
his use of the term, e::istential ctn~lysis, so:~ of l1is anal-
ysis of ~.1d.L' s existence is a matter of J.f:ir.:-.~i:r;.c holist.ic 
ct- t rnc ~-~~~r t~-~n ~~fl"·n"tl"on 1·-~~·~·c:,~· ~ f·-
'-' J.UC u ._;,..-;, ...LV..l.Jj_J_,__;; l..J.U. v.C .Ll .L' C ..... u..;::;,~~l..Ll C-<,ulon, ..Lll E,J..-
ence, ~nd strict system. Ris chara.cteriz~tion of te·rno-
ra.lity ( origin..tl tin.e) ~s a ur:.ita.ry 'Jhe:coc.:enon of ecst.,•.tic 
te:··_--::·oriz:Itions illustrutes the holi,(~tic rc1t:~sr tJ1,;.n a.ni..~lytic 
tcnc'ency of his thought. The pri;,ci•Jle of e0_ua.J. oric;i!ulity 
::e..cns a _l:ind of plurulisrcl of first yn:i~.ci•Jles, •:;;1ici: in 
~o.;.'e •:;uy involve each other but vrhich do not :L"':')ly BelCh 
other. ~~eid.eceer's thour::ht is opyocad to a lo~?ic of in-
~Jlicw..tion; it co~'!.tuins no strict il~fereEce. I::eidor!."·er is 
_ore i~terested in conviction than in nroof. oricinal 
truth is discovery, unveiling, rcvelutio~; it is beyond 
the li~-~ts of der~~stration. 
sition to r~:ttion~ll :.J.ethodS in philosophy. :!:n the ~-rrit13r's 
oy:~:lio::-1, chaos is never "holy." It is a ch:.i.l1cn,~e to be 
net. The t~ck of philosophy is to overco~~ chaos and 
confusion, not r::erely to o.ffir'~' their "orie; i:c.uli t:r." 
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S~'he Y.Jri ter :J..grees Vli th l~~eide[;t::;er, ho•:;ever, th.J.t loE;iC 
:::.lone, in science or Lt )hilosophy, r:ives an inc1dequc.te 
01icture of nc1n ~nd his \Wrld. PhilosophiccLl net;1od ~'Ust 
be stretched to ::~it the evidence, -:.<.red the evide:1ce includes 
the non.-ration:.:Ll uspects of e:;~perier..ce o.s Yiell a.s rationdl 
?~eidegser :oes too fu.r, for the '.lri ter, be C·..i.Use he 
te':lss tc: .;__,:ce a virtue of confusion, contrJ.dictions, ctnd 
obscurit:r, ·~md bcccu.use :c.e fc1ils to reco~;o::ize th,~t ro.tional 
tlwucht can 'lrogressively invade the co'•fines oi' tl'e ir-
l'cl t ionul in c.::m a.nd his 'JOrld. Ee :i.d egc~ elo :"ec;r'-'.des cldri ty 
of thou~ht cilld exprescion, in a locic~l systen, such d~i 
disin.torested scio"tific theory, to c1 second,"ry stcJ.tu.s of 
derived, uncsser2.tiul t!'uth. Th8 1-\rriter <J.c;rees ·.·; ith J_-~e :t-
de~'7C'8I' th<J.t scientific truth is in-J.d8l.EJ..te to solve; the 
1JJ_ti2~-~.:..:.te p:coblel.:s of hu::ldll destiny. rrhere is d .J . ...-..nger in 
scientific idol~try, c..nd in em idol,"try of rcJ.tio':cJ.listic 
phiJ.cso"hy. But there is ulso a th:ce-t of idoLttry in 
"Loly chaos," in an uttitude that ridicules scic:ce e-nd 
tr-ditional, rutionalistic :-~etanhysics. lleideg:::er cure-
fully avoiC:s the for1::er danger. 
~eide~~or is also correct, in t~e oninion of the 
Y-,Ti ter, in his 5urlgr::..ent that un i:ltte,-,Jpt to .;.}_\:e 3)flilos-
opl::.y confor·u to scientific .::letiods -1n6. stu.nd<..l..rds i.s to 
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finds its success i:r. co"--~fining its ·field o~c"' i~:..-{uiry to 
a snccifj_c reu.lm, ;;,rithin tl1e lir.-1its of el~~iricul, ::_Jru.g-
lld tic verificcJ. tion, uhe reas -philosophy is cone rn.ed 1:,'1 th 
truth. rrhe \'.1riter ·:.rould SUE;f,est, d.S d crj_ticis:.;l Of ~~ei-
degror, thu.t scientific objectivity u.nd r"-tiona.l inference 
(o. loc:ic of systera w.nd irn.plicw.tion) c.tre, in relw.tion to 
subjective cor12dtnent c:.nd spoculc.tive inv:.•lver1ont, oguw.l'y 
ori~i~:al u..ncl equally ir.:Jortunt. For t~e ·,·,Titer, life is 
.. - ·'·h -~ 1· . 
.. ore c .. '-'-' ogle, .:end fw.ith is nore th"'n rec.son; but life 
'.-d thout logic is chaos cmc self-destruction, c.nd L<i t:C. 
1:ithsut reason is :cJB.gic tJ.nd superstition. 
F. Ee idegger 1 s lunf;mr e . 
The difficulty in re~ding Eeidegcer is notorious. 
Fe analyzes soL-e ·,·._~ords into various T~e0.::1ing~:, for e~:w·.~~;le, 
v10rld und history, c.Lnd then uses quotw.tion · ,,r!\:S ("',felt" 
and 'delt) or different roots (Geschichte 2-nd Eictor'e) 
or VtJ.ried e'1c1ings (Jelt <-"nd :teltlicb.!:cit) to re:Cer to 
the several r.1eanings. Such distir:.ctions in.vol ve a ~·.1igh 
~egree of c0nce~tual abstr~ction. ~he te~dsrtcy, on the 
part of the re~der, is to forget the tech~icul definition 
t~e "hovr" I'd.thc;r th..::tn t.~e "vrh-...... t" ~nd th:,; ::_-:.odes of exis-..ience 
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rather than essence and substance, he nevertheless trans-
forms whole hyphenated phrases and all parts of speech 
into substantives. His definition of care is either 
masterly creative or ludicrous, depending upon the point 
of view of the critic. Meaning is a "whereupon." At-
tempts at translation, at least those by the writer, in-
evitably contain numerous repetitions of "that which," 
in order to preserve the substantive character of Rei-
dagger's formulations. The German language is partic-
ularly adapted to conceptual formulations. The use of 
capitals for nouns and words used as nouns makes it pos-
sible to recognize a substantive word or phrase without 
difficulty. In fact, it is easy to capitalize a verb, 
adverb, preposition, or the initial word of a hyphenated 
phrase. It is not so easy to conceptualize "whereupon-
ness," throvmness, or the ontological definition of care. 
Heidegger uses words with well-established meanings in 
novel ways, sometimes even in contradiction to the usual 
definitions. "Letting-be" means to enter into relation 
with, to participate in. The "destruction of the history 
of ontology" has a positive aim. Conscience is a meta-
physical, or, more precisely, an ontological term, without 
religious or ethical significance. Debt (guilt} refers to 
the temporal, ontological finitude of man, and has nothing 
to do with moral fault or religious sin. The fall has 
2Sl 
nothing to do with original sin and supposedly LQplies 
no moral distinctions. Proper and improper are to be 
understood only literally, that is, mine and not-mine. 
The ontological concept of death (Sterben) is not con-
cerned with biological death (Verenden). 
In the examples given, a term used by Heideg~er is 
given a precise definition; it then becomes a technical 
term. But the precise definition is rndically different, 
sometimes even contradictory, if carefully compared to 
the ordinary meaning of the word. All of the overtones 
and implicit connotations of a term must be radically 
expunged from the precise meaning if Heidegger's thought 
is to be understood in its (supposed) purity. No reader, 
in the opinion of the writer, does so understand Hei-
degger. For the writer, the chief problem is whether 
Heidegger himself so understands his terms. Or, to 
sharpen the problem, can they be so understood? ilhat is 
destruction, if not negative? vlhat is conscience, if 
stripped of all moral significance? ·;lnat is death, if 
it does not at least include the cessation of biological 
function? Being-in-the-"world," rather than being-in-
the-world, is the major concern of nan's being, because 
"world," not world, is what we ordinarily mean by that 
term. Heidegger's use of quotation marks for a term in 
its ordinary usage is misleading. l1iuch of the difficulty 
in understanding Heidegger is the result of his pretended 
precis ion in the use of terms. The pretense involved :i.s 
that the term is precisely defined, but is practically 
unintelligible within the frame of reference of the def-
inition. Care, conscience, debt (guilt), and propriety 
are terms that may be defined in such frames of reference 
as psychology, ethics, and religion. Their definition in 
physics would involve some relations of the physicist to 
his investigations, and would be a matter of the iinplicit 
relations of psychology, ethics, and religion to the realm 
of physical science. The ontological definitions of these 
terms would, analogously, involve the relations of psychol-
ogy, ethics, and religion to ontological problems, in which 
case the quest ion of being would be come concrete throurth 
the care, conscience, debt (guilt), and propriety of the 
questioner, whose being is involved in his questioning. 
But this procedure is to define the terms in their own 
frame of reference and to carry the whole frame into the 
inclusive realm of metaphysics. Strictly speaking, Hei-
degger does not follow such a procedure. Instead, he :re-
pudiates the definition within its ovm frame of refere~>ce 
and attempts to substitute a purely ontological meaning. 
As a result, in the strictly ontological sense, Heidegger's 
terms are precise but unintelligible. The terms have mean-
ing when they are misunderstood. 'rhe variety of interpreta-
tions and criticisms of Heidegger's philosophy is the log-
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ical result of divergent te;1dencies in :lis use of ter::lE. 
en -C._,he one h~nd, he strecsss :~".odes r_J.thcr t:1ctn esser.:.ce::: 
.J..lld. .subst<J.nce; on tl:c ot!.1er hu.nd, :1e r.~ulti)lies sub-
i:--:itions; but the terms slip ba.ck i~1to tl1eir ~ccusto .. ·,od 
usJge, uncl thus beco:;:e c..r:1oiguous. .lithout this ar:bigu:Lty, 
:~eideg:-'.er's terEs l:::se tb.eir concrete significcince, ;.l!id 
~illother serio:·s difficulty in Yeidegper's lan~uage 
is his use of noun-verb cognates. ',Iorld vmrlds. Tine 
te:·clporizes. 'l''1e thing things. Essences es<Oence. c:>'uc:~ 
::odes of e:·pre s s i.on, although not clec:tr ~nd :'rs c ise in 
their objective significance, do su::g2 st tvm ir:.:oort,mt 
a.spec-ts of Eeidec;:··er's thouGht. The negative 0.~_:-Ject is 
HeifJegr:er's :J.ttei:.pt to avoid the a.f:fir1~1J.tion of substv.nce 
or a re'-llisn of universals. Ee sees tllC dc:.nc;sr, to his 
uoint of view, in uffiVLing, even b;,; L:,lication, thiit 
there is a y,rorld, tirn.e, tD.ings, or essences. =~is use 
of cognates is an cttteEpt to escc1pe the C'Ubstance-
essence innlications of the cor:u·~on use of' l0.ncuu;;e. 11he 
positive d~·Ject of such nodes of e:x::nession is ~'eidegc;er•s 
enphas is upon :;Jro cess, be cor::ing, trd·wcen ~.en ce, '"nd free-
do1-:1. Tlw -,,Titer would '-iuestion t e possibilit:r of ..tf-
fir:.r~_ing 2YJ.re process, ··.l'lithout J.ny fixc~d c::sence or sub-
Btdnce. There is lit-;;18 ::jUestion, however, tiJ.ctt ·2:Ldec;ger 
1. Cf. above, p. 279, for references to the ch-1rgc of 
verbc1l is12.. 
moves toward that possibility. 
If being is distinct from all entities and the 
totality of entities, then ontology must have a new 
language, because language as man uses it is speech 
2\i4 
about entities. Heidegger' s language will conti.nue to 
be misunderstood until his readers enter into a dialogue 
with being and nothing. Most philosophers prefer to 
"talk sense," by which they mean to deal with the rela-
tions of entities within the whole of entities (reality 
or being in the traditional sense). If Heidegger's terms 
are interpreted as the introduction of moral, religious, 
and psychological concerns into the realm of ontology, 
then his philosophy becomes a systematic exposition of 
existentialism. 
G. Art as revelation of truth. 
Heidegger's works on poetry and art may not be con-
sidered as aesthetics, if the latter be defined as an 
axiological discipline that has to do with beauty. Art 
is primarily neither a value nor an experience, for Hei-
degger. Art, of which the most original and most crea-
tive form is poetry, is a revelation of truth. -~t 
creates a revelation. Thinking and writing poetry 
(Denken and Dichten) are closely related, but not iden-
tical. Thinking, for Heidegger, has to do with being 
and with nothing, the veil of being. iiriting poetry has 
to do with the revelation of the truth of entities. In 
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brief, poetry can not substitute for thinking (philosophy, 
in Heidegger's sense), but it can reveal the type of truth 
that is usually thought of as the province of science, 
religion, and traditional philosophy. The essence of art 
is not merely its function in revealing truth, but also 
the involvement in such truth, so that art will be taken 
seriously. In the opinion of the writer, this is Hei-
degger's way of affirming the superiority of subjective, 
emotionally involved knowledge over scientifically objec-
tive knowledge. A picture or a poem reveals truth; a 
scientific theory is, at best, technically correct. The 
superiority of art is the concreteness of its revelation. 
The artist is involved in his work, and the "essence" of 
art is that it be taken seriously. In other words, art 
involves commitment and emotional response. Truth,.even 
in the realm of entities, is more than abstract theory. 
The writer agrees with Heidegger that art may be a 
concrete revelation of truth, and that as such it is 
closely related to thinking. But the writer disagrees 
with Heidegger on two points, with regard to art as a 
revelation of truth. In the first place, art is one 
revelation among many. Science, also, reveals truth. 
Their revelations differ in kind, and both are necessary. 
Religion also reveals truth, and of the same kind that 
Heidegger refers to in his discussions of art, that is, 
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the kind of truth in which commitment or subjective in-
volvement is of primary importance. In brief, the writer 
suspects that Heidegger's art, including poetry, is a 
substitute for religion. This hypothesis is beyond the 
limits of strict verification. Nevertheless, Heidegger's 
essays on art and poetry contain numerous references to 
such religious concepts as God, gods, the holy, and awe. 
The ;vriter's second disagreement with Heidegger is the 
way in which he selects and interprets his examples. 
The selections are arbitrary and the interpretations are 
dubious. In fact, the interpretations, in the opinion 
of the writer, have only scant intrinsic value or validity. 
Their value and validity are practically exhausted in their 
relations to Heidegger's own system of thought. 
H. Interpretations of other philosophers. 
Heidegger's interpretations of other philosonhers 
are penetrating and creative. His hypotheses represent 
an intellectual grasp of the whole significance of a 
philosophical theory or movement in the history of thought. 
The interpretations of Duns Scotus, Kant, Plato, and the 
early Greeks demonstrate that Heidegger has a comprehensive 
knowledge of the history of philosophy, which is exceeded 
only by his creativity and audacity. The interpretations 
are creative because they set a theory or movement into a 
whole new perspective. The result is a novel possibility 
29'7 
of interpretation, for example, of Kant's Critique of 
Pure Reason as fundamental ontology, or of Hegel's Phe-
nomenology of Mind as subjectivism rather than objectiv-
ism, because the genitive of subject replaces the genitive 
of object. 
Precisely because of this creativity, and not on 
account of the intriguing audacity of novel interpreta-
tions which are largely opposed to traditional or "stand-
ard" explanations, Heidegger's views on other philosophers 
are, in the opinion of the writer, dominated by his own 
purpose and ideas. The book on Duns Scotus and his dis-
sertation on various logicians are the most objective of 
his works on other thinkers. Heidegger is also "at hone" 
in Nietzsche, although there are dubious points in the 
details of his interpretation.1 The "violence" of his 
interpretation of Kant is admitted. For the writer, his 
works on Hegel, Plato's myth of the cave, and the pre-
Socratics are equally dominated by a purpose and system 
which are foreign to the thinkers under consideration. 
At best, the interpretations are highly dubious. Objec-
tive exposition gives way to subjective aim. 
The writer recognizes many limitations in this chap-
ter and in the whole expesition of HeidegP,er's philosophy. 
Serious problems have been mentioned, but by no means solved 
or even sufficiently clarified. Many detailed problems 
have not even been mentioned. Other aspects of Heidegger's 
1. Cf. Lllwith, Heiqegger, Denker in d\J.rftigcr Zeit, ?2;-109. 
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thought could be selected for critical discussion, even 
from the writer's own summarized exposition in the first 
two chapters. The critical evaluation in this chapter 
is neither complete nor thorough in its details. Never-
theless, the writer believes that the exposition and dis-
cussion of a few central features do provide sufficient 
understanding of Heidegger's philosophy to serve as a 
basis for investigating his influence on other thinkers. 
At least, the writer's understanding of Heidegger's 
philosophy has been made explicit. 
CHAPTER V 
THE INTRODUCTION OF HEIDEGGER 
TO LATIN-AMERICAN PHILOSOPHY 
A· The importance of German philosophy in contemporary 
Latin-American thought 
In a review of Francisco Romero's Filosof1a con-
tempor~nea, the late Dr. Edgar s. Brightman criticized 
Romero for the too-inclusive title. 
The title of the book is, however, somewhat mis-
leadillg. From it one would expect either a'survey 
of Latin-American philosophy or else a picture of 
world-wide philosophical tendencies. In fact, we 
find neither. What we have, apart from references 
to the classics of the past, is limited almost en-
tirely to recent pre-Nazi German philosophy, with 
an occasional mention of Bergson. Romero's chief 
"heroes"--Husserl, Hartmann, Heidegger, Dilthey, 
and Scheler--are indeed important thinkers; but 
they hirdly merit the rubric "Contemporary Philos-
ophy." 
Such. a criticism, despite its validity, probably never 
occurred to most of Romero's Latin-American readers. 
For them, the main problems of contemporary philosophy 
center around the themes found in the thinkers mentioned. 
An interesting discussion at the First Inter-Amer-
ican Congress of Philosophy, held at Yale University in 
1943, followed the presentation of a paper by Riaieri 
Frondizi, of Argentina. 
1. Review of Romero, Filosof1a contemporanea, in Phil-
osophy and Phanomenoioslca! Research, 3(1942-1943), 
lib. 
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He [Frondizi) replied that three courses were 
given usually in the history of philosophy, the 
first extending from earliest times to the medi-
eval period, the second from Bacon to Kant, and 
the third from Kant to the contemporary philos-
ophy. He added laughingly that "contemporary 
philosophy meant, in general, German philosophy." 
This stress on German philosophy, he said, had as 
its principal cause the influence of Ortega y 
Gasset who not only in his Revista de Occidente 
frequently discussed contemporary German philos-
ophy, bui also translated many German books into 
Spanish. 
In the history of Latin-American philosophy, 
Scholasticism was the dominant philosophy until the 
latter part of the nineteenth century, when Comtean 
Positivism assumed the position of leadership in some 
areas, especially in Mexico, Cuba, Brazil, and Argen-
tina. Scholasticism continued as a major current of 
philosophy, despite the ascendance of Positivism, and 
is stronger at present than the positivistic movement 
which threatened to supplant it. Nevertheless, Scho-
lasticism, even though it is a strong contemporary 
force, is more often thought of as a return to the old, 
perennial philosophy than as a contemporary movement. 
Positivism, too, is now looked upon as a philosophy of 
the nineteenth century, not suitable to the contemporary 
world. Bergson was probably the thinker of greatest in-
fluence in the Latin-American revolt against the arbi-
1. Cornelius Krus~, "Notes by the Secretary on the First 
Inter-American Congress of Philosophy." Philosoph~ 
and Phenomenological Research, 4(1943-1944), 193-1 4. 
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trary anti-metaphysical limitations of Positivism. 
Antonio Caso and Jos~ Vasconcelos are leading Mexican 
representatives of the Bergsonian influence, in the 
sense that they used ideas from Bergson, as well as 
Boutroux and James, among others, to overcome the anti-
metaphysical bias of Positivism. Neither Caso nor Vas-
concelos is a mere follower of Bergson, however, and 
both of them developed personal theories ot metaphysics. 
Alejandro Korn, ot Argentina, speaks of the influence of 
Bergson as follows: 
[BergsonJ has relieved us of the oppression of 
mechanistic theories. He has recovered the con-
cept of liberty. The vital impetus is not im-
prisoned by the net of Hegelian ~ophistry nor 
by the barrier of Spencer's law. 
Bergson's influence is still felt, not only in 
Mexico and Argentina, but also in all of Latin America. 
His influence has been especially valuable in promoting 
a climate of philosophical autonomy in Latin America. 
The inspiration for the future of Latin-American philos-
ophy, however, no longer comes from Bergson. The "newer 
generation" of thinkers has found its main themes in con-
temporary German philosophy. 
In fact, we may distinguish broadly between the 
"new generation" of 1910 and the "newer genera-
tion" of 1930 by stating that the first has been 
1. Alejandro Korn, Obras, tres tomos (La Plata: Uni-
versidad Nacionai de la Plata, 1938, 1939, 1940), 
II, 136. 
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influenced primarily by contemporary French ideas 
and the second, by contemporary German ones. Such 
shift in intellectual geography is reflected in the 
greater interest of the "newer generation" in the 
problems of axiology and the applications of phe-
nomenology to determinate regions of inquiry,l 
These conclusions on philosophical influences in 
Mexican thought, by Patrick Romanell, are applicable, 
in varying degrees, to the other Latin-American countries, 
The precise dates would vary in other countries, as would 
the relative strength of different movements, but the 
pattern of the succession of philosophical currents is 
general. The phenomenological movement, with its various 
trends represented by Husserl, Scheler, Hartmann, and 
Heidegger, is probably the most influential "school," 
although differences within the label are very great. 
Dilthey1 s historicism is a strong trend. It is less 
widespread than the whole phenomenological movement, 
although perhaps stronger than the influence of any one 
thinker among the four already mentioned. Juan David 
Garcia Bacca, in the preface to his book on Nine Great 
Contemporary Philosophers and Their Themes, explains 
his selection of nine--not "the nine"--and the omission 
of others, especially Dilthey, by saying that Dilthey•s 
influence Ea1 be seen in the treatment of all those who 
1. Patrick Romanell, "The Background of Contemporary 
Mexican Thought." PhilosoShy and Phenomenological 
Research, 8(1947-1948), 26 • 
were included. For each thinker there is a chapter; 
the whole is the influence of Dilthey. 1 
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Anibal S~nchez Reulet has succinctly expressed the 
importance of German philosophy in Latin America. 
It is not strange, then, that the most influential 
European authors since 1930 have been Dilthey, 
Husserl, Scheler, Hartmann, and Heidegger. They 
have determined, for the most part, the philosoph-
ical problematic and terminolog! customary today 
in the area of Spanish culture. 
S~nchez Reulet mentions as two important causes of the 
turn toward German thinkers, the work of Ortega y Gasset 
in translating and publishing German philosophical works, 
and a rising interest among the younger generation of 
Latin Americans in German authors. AS early as 1918 
ortega visited Argentina. In 1922 he founded the Revilta 
de Occidente, by means of which his own ideas became 
widely known in Latin America. The influence of Ortega 
through the Revista may have directed the interest of 
some of the younger students to German philosophers. 
Many of these younger thinkers began to read philosophical 
works in the German originals, and some went to Germany 
for study in the universities. 3 S~nchez Reulet warns, 
1. Juan David Garcia Bacca, Nueve grandes fil6sofos 
contemaor~neos ~sus temas, 2 vola. (caracas: Minis-
terio e Educac On Nacional de Venezuela, 1947). 
2. Anibal Sanchez Reulet, La filosofia latinoamericana 
contempor~nea (Washington, D.C.: Uni6n Panamericana, 
1949), 15. 
3. Ibid., 14. 
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however, against thinking of Latin-.tmerican philosophy 
as just a matter of influences, with the shift in recent 
decades from France (and Italy, according to S~nchez 
Reulet) to Germany as the focal center. Instead of 
influence, it would be more precise to speak of selec-
tive preferences on the part of Latin-4merican thinkers 
themselves. The sustained strength of older positions, 
especially Thomism and, to a lesser extent, Positivism, 
principally in Brazil, has meant a growing climate of 
discussion, with several strong movements taking part. 
Mexican Neo-Kantians are a good example of a philosoph-
ical trend that must make its place against the old, 
perennial Scholastic philosophy as well as· against new, 
contemporary movements. The relative strength of these 
various philosophical currents varies from place to 
place, even within a given country, for example, in 
Brazil. l>lany factors, some of which are not strictly 
philosophical, must be taken into account in any attempt 
to understand a particular situation. Patrick Romanell 
has presented a good general description of the situation 
in Mexico, in the final chapter of his book, The Making 
of the Mexican 1;;ind. 1 Heidegger•s affiliation with the 
phenomenological movement and the relation of his thought 
1. Patrick Romanell, The Making of the Mexican !/lind 
(Lincoln, Nebraska: University of Nebraska Press, 
1952). 
305 
to Dilthey•s historicism are important factors in his 
introduction to Latin Americans. 
In an exhaustive study of the relations between 
German philosophy and Spanish and Latin-.~erican thought, 
other factors which would have to be investigated are 
the introduction of the philosophy of Krause to Spain 
in the nineteenth century by Julian Sanz del R1o, the 
political and social liberalism identified in Spain with 
Krause's philosophy and exemplified in Francisco Giner 
de los R1os and the Free Institution of Education, 1 
Unamuno•s relation to Kierkegaard and other thinkers 
influenced by Kierkegaard, the similarities in the ideas 
ot Ortega y Gasset and the thought of Dilthey, the at-
tempt by the Republican government of Spain to keep pace 
with foreign cultures by providing scholarship aid tor 
students to study in other European countries, 2 Alejandro 
Korn•s influence on students and colleagues in the Kantian 
Society in Buenos Aires, and the Latin-American apprecia-
tion of German thought because of the high quality of 
Germany's scientific, cultural, and material products. 
1. Ct. articles on ~ause," "Krausismo," "Giner de los 
R1os," and "Sanz del Rio" in Diccionario de Filoso1'1a, 
by Jos~ Ferrater Mora (Segunda edici6n, M~xico: Edi-
torial Atlanta, 1944) (Tercera y cuarta edicionesl 
Buenos Aires: Editorial Sudamericana, 1951, 1958 • 
2. Ct. Jos~ Gaos, Confesiones protesionales (M~xico: 
Fondo de Cultura Econ6mica, 1958), 31-32. 
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The detailed investigation or these interrelated factors 
is beyond the scope or the present study, but the Tdriety 
of factors is mentioned, in order to avoid the superficial 
conclusion that German influence in Latin-.~erican phil-
osophy is nothing more than the lengthened shadow of 
Ortega y Gas set. 
B. The influence of Spanish philosophers in Latin America 
The military victory of Generalissimo Franco and 
the Phalange movement in the Spanish Civil V~r forced 
many liberal and republican elements to seek refuge in 
other countries. Some of the good which that ill wind 
blew to Latin America was the transplanting of much of 
the best ( la ~) of Spanish culture to the New Horld. 
The political retugees included a group of philosophers 
who have greatly enriched the culture of the Americas. 
Probably the best-known among them was Jos~ ortega y 
Gasset. He remained an exile until he finally returned 
to Spain not long before his death in 1955. The other 
philosophers of note among the political refugees may 
no longer be spoken or as exiles, because they have 
round their places and made themselves "at home" in their 
new environment. They are so deeply rooted in the New 
World that they are now "transpatriates, not expatriates. 111 
1. "Transterrados", que no "desterrados 11 • Jos~ Gaos, 
Pensamiento de lengua espanola (M~xico: Editorial 
styio, 1945), 7. 
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Jos~ Ferrater Mora, Jos~ Ge.os, Juan David Garcia Bacca, 
1~nuel Garcia Morante, Luis Recas~ns Siches, Eduardo 
Nicol, Joaquin Xirau, Maria Zambrano, and :xi:l.vier Zubiri, 
among others, have made significant contributions to 
philosophy and to Latin-American culture. 
Jos~ Ferrater Mora, who is now Professor of Phil-
osophy at Bryn Mawr College, is known best for his Dic-
cionario de filosoria, which has now had four editions. 
Each edition has included new articles and new material 
within the articles printed in former editions. Ferra-
ter•s dictionary articles on contemporary German phil-
osophers and on phenomenological, axiological, and exis-
tentialist themes are outstanding. His work in the Die-
cionario reflects a thorough knowledge or contemporary 
movements and their importance in Latin Ainerica. This 
dictionary, which is really a one-volume encyclopedia, 
serves as a written illustration of the oral work done 
in classrooms and lecture halls by the entire group or 
Spanish philosophers in Latin America. 
Manuel Garcia Morante's Preliminary Lessons in 
Philosophy1 was originally a series of lectures at the 
National University of Tuc~n, in argentina. The manu-
script was prepared from shorthand notes of the lectures. 
1. Manuel Garcia Morante, Lecciones preliminares de file-
sofia ( Tucuman: Universidad Nacionai de TUcUl'!Uin, Im-
prenta Miguel Violette, 1938). 
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The book has been exceptionally popular as an intro-
ductory text and reference work in philosophy, Garcia 
Morante refers often to ideas and te~s found in con-
temporary German philosophy. The closing chapters re-
flect the influence of Heidegger, to whom Garcia gives 
credit for being "the greatest philosopher which Ger-
many has today" (1938). 1 
The importance of Spanish refugees in bringing to 
light in Latin America some of the newer currents of 
European philosophy is presented by Jos~ Gaos in an 
article, "Spanish •Transpatriates• of Philosophy in 
Mexico, 112 The article is a summary of what the refu-
gees have done in Mexico, in the field of philosophy, 
up to that date (1949). In particular, it is inter-
esting to note what Gaos did with regard to Heidegger. 
While still in Spain, when Xavier Zubiri returned trom 
studying with Heidegger in Freiburg, Gaos spent one year 
studying Sein und Zeit, in constant consultation with 
ZUbiri, making detailed notes, in preparation for a 
translation. Later, in Mexico, Gaos spent four and 
one-half years in class work, with students, studying 
Sein und Zeit a sentence at a time, also with a view 
1. Ibid., 392. 
2. ·~os •transterrados• Espanoles de la filosof1a en 
Mexico," first published in Filosofia y letras, 18 
(JUlio-die., 1949), and re-issued as one chapter in 
Filosofia mexicana de nuestros dias (M~xioo: Im-
prenta Universitaria, l954), 
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to the publication of a translation. Gaos•s translation 
was published in 1951, and along with it an introduction 
to the work.l Included in the translation is an index 
of translations, which constitutes a glossary of German 
terms, as used by Heidegger, and brief justifications, 
where considered necessary, for the Spanish terms or 
phrases used in the translation. 
In this same article on the work of the refugees, 
Gaos feels the need to answer charges of historicism, 
existentialism, atheism, and skepticism, with particular 
reference to his position on existentialism. His answer 
is a reference to his article, "Existentialism andEs-
sentialism," published in Luminar in the special number 
dedicated to existentialism. 2 Gaos reaffirms his earlier 
position. Basically, his view is that existentialism is 
one philosophical extreme, just as essentialism (Platonic 
realism) is the other. aristotle's conceut of the golden 
mean teaches that the mean is not a static position be-
tween the extremes, but a kind of oscillation between 
them. Gaos proceeds to lament the fact that many, even 
supposedly intelligent, persons falsely assume that the 
teacher of a doctrine shares the point of view taught.3 
1. The translation and introduction will be considered 
in the final section of this chapter. 
2. Jos~ Gaos, "Existencialismo y esencialismo." Luminar, 6 
(1943), 161-181. 
3. Filosof1a mexicana de nuestros d1as, 305. 
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The selection of Heidegger•s main work for ad-
vanced, detailed study by his students illustrates 
Gaos 1 s estimate of the importance of Heidegger's phil-
osophy. Gaos has not, however, limited his work as 
translator, teacher, or thesis consultant to Heidegger, 
or even to contemporary German philosophers. He could 
hardly be considered a "follower" of Husserl, Hartmann, 
or Heidegger, even though he has translated works by 
all three German thinkers. He also translated John 
Dewey's Experience and Nature and several other works, 
representing varied points of view. Gaos has repeatedly 
pointed out difficulties and limitations in Heidegger•s 
thought. He helped to direct a student•s work, in Mexico 
City College, on personalism in Bowne, Brightman, Caso, 
and Romero. According to his own statement, Gaos•s main 
contribution to philosophy in Mexico has been in turning 
the attention of students to the values in their own 
tradition. Leopolda Zea's theses on Mexican Positivism 
are the prime example. Gaos also called attention to 
the value of Mexican philosophical tradition by a new, 
high appraisal of the work of Samuel Ramos. 1 
For the purposes of this dissertation, then, it is 
fair to say only that Gaos has been instrumental in 
making Heidegger known to an entire generation of Mexi-
can thinkers. AS a teacher and consultant on thesis-
1. Jos~ Gaos, En torno a la filosof1a mexicana. Segunda 
parte: la filosof1a del Mexicano (M~xico: Porrda y 
Obreg6n, 1953), 63n. 
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writing, Gaos refrains from imposing his own point of 
view on his students. He points out errors of inter-
pretation and gives suggestions, but leaves critical 
evaluation and the formation of a point of view to the 
initiative of the student. It must be recognized, of 
course, that such a teaching method, in its results, 
may be far more effective in communicating a point of 
view than the method of imposition. 1 
Juan David Garcia Bacca also came to Mexico as a 
political retugee, and taught in the Department of Phil-
osophy and Letters in the National University. In 1946 
he moved to Caracas, Venezuela, where he has played an 
increasingly important role in the development of phil-
osophy in the Central National University. Mayz Valle-
nilla's work on Husserl is an excellent illustration of 
the nature and quality of work that Garcia Bacca is en-
couraging in that country. In addition to numerous 
articles and books, Garcia Bacca has published two im-
portant books which include substantial chapters on 
Heidegger. Nine Great Contemporary Philosophers and 
Their Themes, which has been mentioned with reference 
to German philosophy, includes a discussion of "Heideg-
ger and the Meaning of Being." Seven Models of Phil-
1. As mentioned in the introduction of this disserta-
tion, the writer worked part-time for two years, 
particularly on the exposition of Sein und Zeit, 
in consultation with Professor Gaos. 
osophizins1 concludes with a chapter on "Heidegger, 
Model of the Existential Method of Philosophizing," 
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in which the author admirably combines philosophical 
acumen with literary ability in popularizing Heideg-
ger's thought. The book is significant, too, in that 
it is the published version of seven lectures given by 
Garcia Bacca in 1946, on the occasion of the founding of 
the Department of Philosophy in the Central National 
University in Caracas. 
Eduardo Nicol, like other Spanish refugees, has 
continued his philosophical vocation in Mexico. also, 
he, like Gaos and Garo1a Bacoa, has taken an interest 
in Heidegger as representative of the new current of 
existentialist philosophy. Nicol's Historicism and 
Existentialism contains much historical exposition of 
the two related philosophies, but his main purpose in 
the work stands out as critica~. The popular appeal 
of these philosophies is found in their statement of 
problems, problems which, Nicol thinks, historicism 
and existentialism can not answer. 2 The danger in 
their popularity, for Nicol, is that the diagnosis 
may be accepted as complete in itself, without any 
remedy.3 
1. Siete modelos de filosofar (Caracas: Universidad 
Central, Facultad de Filosof1a y Letras, 1950). 
2. Eduardo Nicol, Historicismo y existencialismo. La 
temporalidad del ser y la rai6n (M6xico: El Colegio 
de M~xioo, 1950), 8, 339. 
3. Ibid., 9. 
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Nicol criticizes Heidegger•s existential analysis 
of Dasein for the emphasis upon negative, limited data. 
Faith and hope must be taken into account, as well as 
anxiety. In fact, faith and hope are sentiments which 
expand and enrich life, whereas anxiety and an undue 
attention upon self reduce life to a mintmum.1 Heideg-
ger•s philosophy of disillusionment, in facing death, 
for example, has its value. But disenchantment is only 
a halt-truth. Illusions, dreams, and hopes are also es-
sential to the nature of man. Wisdom must not be iden-
tified with desperation. 2 In brief, Nicol criticizes 
Heidegger for a biased and narrow selection of data in 
the existential analysis. 
The difference between Gaos and Nicol on Heidegger 
is perhaps not so great as would appear at first sight. 
In fact, both agree that Heidegger•s philosophy has its 
limitations, its bias toward negative sentiments and 
toward the irrational. But there is also a difference 
of emphasis in the two men, who are colleagues in the 
Department of Philosophy in the National University of 
Mexico. Both criticize existentialism, including Heideg-
ger, in strong terms, but Gaos tends to put his criticism 
1. Ibid., 365, 369. 
2. Ibid., 365. 
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in second place, and to emphasize the teaching fUnction. 
Nicol is more aggressive in presenting his own position. 
He is less a teacher and more a representative of a given 
point of view. 
Xavier Zubiri, a Roman Catholic Priest, studied 
with Heidegger in Germany, and was influential in di-
recting other Spanish thinkers, especially Gaos, toward 
Heidegger. Zubiri also represents Heidegger•s stimulating 
influence on his students. ZUbiri may be compared with 
Rudolph Bultmann and Karl L~with, who represent Heidegger•s 
influence on Protestant theology. Zubiri represents the 
influence of Heidegger's thought upon Roman Catholic 
philosophy and theology. Bultmann has used Heidegger's 
concepts for an analysis and interpretation of New Testa-
ment Theology. 1 Zubiri has also used Heidegger's ideas, 
but has added another main concept to Heidegger•s exis-
tential analysis, that of "religation," by which Zubiri 
means to show that religious dependence of some sort is 
a fundamental characteristic of the nature of man. Man 
is not merely "thrown" or "adrift" in his existence; he 
is bound to something beyond himselt. 2 In going beyond 
Heidegger•s imman•ntism (pure this-worldliness) to tran-
1. Ct. John Macquarrie, An Existentialist Theology. A 
Comparison of Heidegger and Bultmann (New York: The 
Macmillan Company, 1955), 
2. Xavier Zubiri, Naturaleza, historia, Dies, edici6n 
hispano-americana (BUenos Aires: Editorial Poblet, 
1948), 373-3?4. 
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scendence (dependence upon a power outside this world), 
Zubiri has manifested both his dependence upon Heidegger, 
as a point of departure, and his independence from being 
dominated by his teacher. If any attempt to assimilate 
Heidegger•s existential analysis into Scholasticism is 
to be successful, the work of Zubiri will undoubtedly 
be of considerable importance in that regard. 
The Spanish refugees who have made their philosoph-
ical homes in the New World do not constitute a unified 
school of thought, at least in philosophy. To be sure, 
all show the marks of political liberalism, in varying 
degrees, because opposition to Franco was the common 
cause of their emigration from Spain. They also share 
certain dominant traits in Spanish character, such as 
marked individualism and the capacity for intense feeling 
and vivid expression of it. No single pattern explains 
their reaction to Heidegger•s philosophy, but all have 
had something to contribute in making Heidegger•s ideas 
known in Latin America. 
c. The influence of Heidegger and the influence of Sartre 
In the letter "On Humanism" Heidegger clearly denied 
any responsibility for Sartre•s philosophy and any vital 
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connection </.'ith existentialism, at leu.st ·,;i"th ::Jartrc •s 
vo.riety. Eever"theless, Sa.rtre •s use of ,'ieidec"·er' s con-
cents is an undenio.ble fact, which est~blishes at le~st 
a nininu.r.J. of connection betv1eon the tvm ti1inkers. >lso, 
both are clussified u.s existen"tLtlists. 'l"J.1e logicc.l ( ccn-
ceotual} and psych:)l_ogicctl reasons for relating or sepurat-
ing the tvm Hen u.nd their pf'ilosop:C•ies is be_;'o:r.d the scope 
of this dissertcc tion; but the fuct th~ t tho :r ~rc cls.es if'ied 
together in Lutin d:1oric:1 us le,,ding Gerr~un '"nd i<rench ren-
resent"'tives of existentidlism ;cmst be noted .J.nd ev.J.luated. 
Usudlly EeideGger -.:.nc1 Sw.rt.re a..re cl:.1ssified toc;ethe:r 
cts the c.ttheist:i.c exis1;ent:i.alists, in co:1t~cc..st to tLc theistic 
views of ICierl:eg3.ard dlld Larcel, und, ::!ossibly, J..;.s~;ers. 
Of the tYJo atheistic ronresent--ttives, Feiclec;cer p:covideE• 
the b.J.sic intellectual structure; durtre pooularizes the 
doctrine in his literary productions :J.nd ;Jr..cctices it in 
J!rench Cdfe s and i:1 i1is revel t against tr--tdi t:i.onctl so ciccl 
custons. Tll is is the nonular opinion. It docs not con-
sider Setrtre as a genuine, original nhilosonher, but as 
a t,tlented rr•nec:ade Vlllo ponularizes r~or-tl dece:er:.ercicy. 
~~ehe resu~t is tDu.t existentii.:.l..lisri: hcts a bad re}1Ut~tj_on 
in a I,loral dnd socidl sense, as well ces stTonc; intelle c-
tual onuosition. Its devotees are aiso chaructel'ized by 
t:::e eGot ior:.al qu:>l it ie s of their aaherence to the uhilo-
sophical position. 
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'I'he euotiona.l qudlity of o:oposition cend cJ.dC:lore:rcce 
sue;:=ests tno tnings. First, e:xistentiulist phi1osophy 
r:ldY hci ve touched some vi ta.l is sues, for '.;here there is 
intense feeling, soEJething is psychica.lly reu.l--ulthough 
not re cesscJ.rily true or fcJ.lse, good. or bad. Se cored, ex is-
tentiu.list philosoDhy may be populur because o.nd in so far 
as it is enotionally chare;ed but conce:otu.:tlly vae;ue. The 
source of the eEJotion ma.y or na.y not be philosophica.l. 
In the opinion of the writer, ;Lrtre 1 s philcso·Jhica.l 
cmd liter .:try vrorks a.re popula.r for a va.riety of re.,son:3. 
Icis artistic clbiJ.ity as a r<ovelist a.nd n1.1lY';;right ·_uy not 
be guins0.id. ·illY philosophy CcJ.n benefit fron liter.;ry 
ability; Plato is the prime exu.:c:ple. .:iirtre• s "Gher:es 
and illustrutions reve,,l a da.ring snirit. :c:e is unlii:e 
the CJoliticia.n who 11 Jllays it sa.fe" by e:xtollinc: ;~0.trio·~ism, 
::otherhood, .md God. Sc:.rtre is sufficiently iconocl<~stic 
to corn.'cJ.nd attontion.l His use of scxuul :c.nd. a.bnor..:'"'-1 nsy-
chic :phenor.tenu as illustrations cm::8lete8 the ;:JictD.ro, Yrith 
regard to po_;)Uldr u.ppe0.l. Business lec.l.ders, r.ri thcut uny 
speciLcl trc.inL:g in philosophy, hcJ.ve leu.~.·ned tlut Dictures 
of shapely, scantily-clad young women :·.1ay be used to sell 
anything from cigarettes and soft drinks to diesel loco-
motives and earth-:n.overs. Philosophy beco::~es fur more 
1. Cf. Bertrand Russell, whose atheism is probu.bly better 
knovm than his contributions to nather1o.tics. 
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popular when it includes a good measure of sex appeal. 
All this digression is not meant to say that Sctrtre 
is no philosopher--far from it. But there are non-phil-
osophical motives for reading Sartre and for talking 
about Sartre•s philosophy. Much of the popular reaction 
to his philosophy, both favorable and unfavorable, is 
on non-philosophical grounds. The writer believes that 
this popular reaction has had a negative influence upon 
the understanding and appreciation of Sctrtre as a thinker, 
in France, in the United States, and in Latin "unerica. 
The popular reaction to Sartre is responsible, at least 
in part, for the bad name that existentialism has ac-
QUired as a literary and social movement. 
In Mexico, several young thinkers have attempted 
to rescue Sartre•s contribution to philosophy from the 
amalgam of philosophical, literary, iconoclast literature 
that comes from his pen, and to isolate that contribution 
from the contused popular reaction. This may be con-
sidered a secondary purpose of the Hyperion Philosophical 
Group. A series of public lectures on "French Existen-
tialism" was the first public presentation of the Group, 
in 1948.1 The main purpose of the Hyperion Group is to 
develop philosophical autonomy, or to overcome the in-
1. Several of the lectures were published in Filosof1a 
y letras, 15(enero-junio, 1948). 
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feriority complex inherent in copying imported ideas. 1 
In relation to European philosophy, the Hyperion Group 
wants to develop an American philosophy; but autonomy 
is also desired in relation to anglo-.unerican philosophy, 
and even to other Latin-American and Spanish-American 
philosophies, until the ideal becomes an autonomous 
Mexican philosophy. In the Hyperion Group, Emilio 
Uranga, Ricardo Guerra, and Joaquin Macgr~gor represent 
the influence of Sartre•s existentialism, whereas Jorge 
Portilla and Luis Villoro represent French existentialism 
in its theistic, Christian tendency. 2 Sartre•s use of 
Heidegger•s ideas is recognized by all, but Sartre is 
no mere follower or popularizer of Heidegger. Uranga, 
for example, shows his preference for Sartre in the 
article, "Two Theories of Death: Sartre and Heidegger. ,.3 
AS an existentialist, Sartre is probably more widely 
known in Latin America, outside philosophical circles, 
than Heidegger. Sartre•s philosophy is perhaps more 
controversial than Heidegger•s, in stirring up strong 
opposition and strong support, although less contro-
versial in the sense of its true import and meaning. 
1. Luis Villoro, "~nesis y proyecto del existencialismo 
en M~xico." Filosof1a y letras, 18(julio-dic., 1949) 1 233-244. cr. especially p. 241. 
2. Ibid., 241. 
3. Emilio Uranga, "Dos teor1as de la muerte: Sartre y 
Heidegger." Filosof1a y letras, l?(enero-junio, 1949), 
55-?1. 
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That is, Sartre is less ambiguous than Heidegger, and 
his clear, forceful presentation facilitates the decision 
of acceptance or rejection of his ideas. The ~uestion of 
atheism is illustrative. Heidegger•s position is a sub-
ject of divergent interpretations; Sartre•s point of 
view is explicit, and thus the target for much popular 
opposition, as well as ardent support from a smaller 
group. In developing the theme of responsibility for 
accepting and changing their own circumstances, the Hy-
perion Group sees in Sartre•s open defiance of cultural 
traditions a more mature responsibility than may be found 
in Heidegger•s enigmatic, indecisive formulations. 
In conclusion, Sartre's philosophy has been in-
strumental in popularizing existentialism, in arousing 
public opinion to its values and dangers, and in clari-
fying issues. Since Heidegger is almost invariably in-
cluded among the existentialists, Sartre•s philosophy 
has helped to popularize Heidegger, to arouse public 
opinion about him, and, in some cases, to clarify issues 
of interpretation. 
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D. Translations and expositions of Heidegger 
The translation of philosophical works to Spanish 
can hardly be accounted for by economic motives. In 
English, the possibility of reaching a numerous group 
of readers may sometimes be a serious motive for the 
work of translators and publishers. The market for 
technical philosophical works in Spanish limits editions 
to two or three thousand copies, with, of course, some 
exceptions. 
The non-economic motives are significant for the 
present study. The desire to make a work known to a 
wider public or even to one's own students is a kind 
of loydlty to a respected thinker and an example of 
magnanimity to students and the one-language scholarly 
public. Translators are frequently former students who 
pay intellectual homage to their teachers by translating 
works to their native or acquired tongue. Xavier Zubiri 
and Alberto Wagner de Reyna studied with Heidegger. Gaos 
and ~rc1a Bacca think of Heidegger as an important rep-
resentative of the most radical contemporary trend in 
philosophy, Carlos Astrada and Humberto Pifiera Llera 
have been strongly influenced by Heidegger. Raimundo 
Lida, Francisco Soler Grimma, and Samuel Ramos found 
Heidegger interesting and important, and translated some 
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of his works. These names make up a good part of the 
list of Heidegger's translators to Spanish. 
One other motive may be mentioned: the subjective 
drive in some philosophers to attempt the impossible. 
Gaos calls this drive an obstinate urge to go ahead in 
philosophy, even after having been disillusioned about 
the outcome. He also speaks of his own predilection 
for scientific, technical, and semantic philosophies. 1 
Sein und Zeit was the objective answer to Gaos•s sub-
jective need, to his inner urge to translate the most 
difficult book he could find. The translation is just 
as difficult as the original, both in content and in 
the form of expression. The contrast between Gaos•s 
technical terminology and the fluency so common to 
Spanish literary works makes El ser y el tiempo truly 
formidable. In a review of the translation, Juan Adolfo 
V~zquez complains that Gaos has made the work unneces-
sarily difficult.2 The writer suggests that Gaos•s 
subjective motives in translating and teaching philos-
1. Jos~ Gaos, Confesiones rofesionales (M~xico: Fondo 
de Cultura Econ mica, 1958 , 131-133. 
2. Juan Adolfo VJzquez, "El lenguaje de la metaf1sica y 
la traducci6n espanola de Elser y el tiempo," (Buenos 
Aires: La Naci6n, 30 de septiembre de 1951). 
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ophy have played an important part in his preference 
for Heidegger. It may be that the complex, intricate, 
and involved structure of Heidegger•s thought and lan-
guage is partially responsible for the popularity of 
his philosophy--a sort of super-sophisticated philo-
sophical crossword puzzle. 
In addition to the motives for translations, the 
objective facts in the form of results must be con-
sidered. The first work to be translated to Spanish 
was Was ist Metaphysik? Raimundo Lida's version was 
published in Buenos Aires in 1932, 1 and Xavier Zubiri•s 
translation appeared in Madrid in 1933. 2 In 1940 the 
translation of Vom Wesen des Grundes by augusta Goller 
de Walther appeared in Tucuman, Argentina, in Sustancia. 3 
In 1941 ZUbiri•s translation of the essay on metaphysics 
was re-published in Mexioo. 4 The introductory section 
of Sein und Zeit, translated by Gaos, was published in 
1942 in the organ of the Department of Philosophy and 
Letters of the National University of Mexico, 5 
1, "&~u~ es metaf1sica?" ~. 2(1932), No.5, 128-150, 
2. "&'~Ue es metaf1sica?" Cruz y raya, (1933), No. 6 (15 
de septiembre), 83-115. 
3. "De la esencia del fundamento (o de la raz6n)" (tr. 
Auguste Goller de walther), Sustancia, 1(1939-1940), 
4??-517. 
4. "&,;~u~ es metaf1sica?" (tr. Xavier ZUbiri) (M~xico: 
Editorial S~neca, 1941). 
5. "El ser ~ el tiempo por Martin Heidegger" (tr. Jos~ 
Gaos), Filosor14~y letras, 4(julio-dic., 1942),169-197; 
5(enero-junio, 1943), 3-29, 
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In 1944 Juctn David Garcia Bctcca tr"-nsLtted t·<"lo 
of Eeideg£~er 1 s essuys, on "H~lderlin _end tie Es,;er;ce 
of Poetry,n J.nd "On the Essence of Ground,u wi1ich r-rere 
published in i ,e:xico' Ylhere Garcia BJ.cca ·;us te_cclli,-.G u:G 
' th_ct tir:!B. "- The letter "On Eunanism" Wc;.S trc.nsllted b:r 
.clb8rto 'ifdgner de Reyna, d:ld appe.;_red in He~lidcld in 
1948. 2 There also dppeared in 1948, in Bue:1os Qres, 
a tr-<nsLttion by Carlos .ilitrada of the essay, "On the 
Essence of 'I'ruth. n 3 
The transldtion of ~Ie idegger 1 s rui!l vror~:, by Gaos, 
·.'Jas published in 1251.4 ccn index of tr~nslations _end c. 
prologue were included ·::i t:':l the text, ..J.nd an Introduction, 
by the translator, v;as published dS a sr.;all COl'lpdnion 
volune. 5 The Spdnish editio'!1 of Eeidege;ei" s !Eain ViOrli: 
WdS of four thousu.nd couies, of nhich eight llundre'l v1ere 
sent to ~gent ina und VIere sold in four Lronths. ·l'he beak 
was out of l)rint within one yeC<r. .>.notller edition, with 
so!•'.e revisions, will be published in 1960. 6 
1. HlllderLn la esencia de la oes1a. De la ese:c.cia 
del fundar.:.en o tr. Juan Dav1d arc1a Bctcca) (u!ixico: 
Editorial Si§neca, 1944). 
2. "Carta sabre el humanisno" {tr •. •lberto ·,'iugner de Rey-
na), Realidad, 3{en~ro-junio, 1948), 1-25, 343-367. 
3. "De Ja esencia de la verdud 11 ( tr. Carlos ".strctda) , 
Cuadernos de filosof1a, 1{1948), prin:er f"'sc1culo. 
4. El ser y el tlei;lpo ( tr. Jos~ Gaos) {;:e;fico: Fc!ldo de 
Cultura,con6rdca, 1951). 
5. Jose Gtios 1 Introduce i6n a 11El ser y el t ier.;;oo 11 de Lartin He ldegFer (L~x1co: Jlondo de CUitura Ecofi5,dca, 
(1951). 
6. These data were provided to the v!I'iter through the 
ki:J.dr.ess of l:iss Elsa Cecilia Frost, in representa-
tion of the publishers. 
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The staff of Notas y estudios de filosof1a trans-
lated and published in their periodical Heidegger•s 
1 brief literary essay, "The Field Path." In 1952 the 
r~dio lecture, "What Does !t Mean to Think?" was trans-
lated by Herru1n Zucchi and published in Buenos Aires." 2 
During the same year Humberto Pifiera Llera•s translation 
of the essay "On the Essence of Truth" was published in 
3 Cuba. Plato•s Theory of Truth was translated by Nor-
barto V. Silvetti and published in Buenos Aires in a eom-
bined number of Cuadernos de Filosof1a, for 1952-1953.4 
"Comments on Imlderlin• s Poetry" was translated by Ra-
fael Guti,rrez Girardot and published in Bogot&, Colom-
bia in 1953. 5 "The Origin of the Work of-Art" was 
translated by Francisco Soler Grimma, and appeared in 
~ook form in 1953, with an introduction by the trans-
lator.6 
1. "La vozc;del camino," Notas y estudios de filosof1a, 
2(1951), 1-4. 
2. 11 l,Q,U~ si1:mifica pensar?" (tr. Herruin Zucchi), Sur, 
(1952), No. 215-216 (sept.-oct.), 1-12. ---
3. "De la esenoia de la verdad" (tr. Humberto Piffera 
Llera), Revista Uubana de filosof1a, 2(1952), No. 10 
(enero-junio), 5-26. 
4. "La doctrina de Plat6n acer4a de la verdad" (tr. Nor-
barto V. Silvetti), Cuadernos de filosof1a, 5-6(1952-
1953), Fasc1culo 7, Nos. 16-12. 
5. "Comentarios a la poes1a de Imlderlin" (tr. Rafael 
Gutierrez Girardot), Bolivar,. (1953), No. 18(abril), 
577-595. 
6. Francisco Soler Grimma, El origen de la obra de arte 
y 1a verdad en Heidegger. Beguido de 1a traducci6n 
del ensayo de Heidegger1 "El origen de la obra de arte" y del vocabulario filosofico de Heideg~er (Bogot!: 
Universidad Nacional de Colombia, 1953). 
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In 1954 t•:•o signific,mt tr-"nsl~tions appeared.. 
The bo .. -· k on Kant ~.-:us tr:...trJs 1:--;.ted by Greb Is cher .r\oth 
and publis'led in ;.,e:dco . 1 The book on ?lato, 'irith 
the letter "On Huranism," was published in Sc:,_nti-"r~O, 
Chile. 2 The Introduction to ;.;et'-lphysics v1as published 
in !Juenos ,dres in 1\?56, transL:.ted by i£Lilio i:stiu. 3 
1'he book, What Does It ;;e:_,_n To 'E'li!G:? (not the radio 
lecture by the same title), was trcJ.nsli.i"Ged b:r Ldr~.lc1o 
lCa.hner:cJ.nn and :QUblished in Buenos .dres in 1958. 
Sur,mel Ranos 1 s translation of two of ~:e ideg~:er• s essctys 
on aesthetics ap:Qeared in l.exico in 1958. 5 
This chronologicctl sur:Jmary of tr"'m3lcttions of 
:Eeidee;ger•s ·dorks indicates sor~ethi·.g of the Vctriety 
of nlaces, circll-'.!Stances, a.nc; forms of uubliciltion 
in 'dhich Eej_decf:'er's "~:'·.~arks ho.ve bee~1 r::a..de lmo"l.-'ill to 
Latin _;:neric.,ns. T'ost of the more i:~1Jort~nt ·:1or!:s 
ctre novr avai l_able in Suanish. The style •. nd '"u"'J.ity 
1. Kant y el problema de la meto.fisica (tr. Greb Iscl:!er 
Roth)(i3\xico: Fondo de CUltura J:!:cor;6mica, 195?). 
2. Doctrina de la verdad se cUrl Plat6n y C0.rtd sobre el 
hu-JaJ1lerco tr. ? ant1ago: Ins· 1 u-oo e IllvescJ:Guciones 
Eistorico-Culturdles, 1954). 
3. Introducci6n a ld r.retafisicet (tr. s•iJ.io Estiu) {3uec~OS 
,dres: ~ditorial l'!ova.;. l956). 
4. <, -~ue s irnffi ca :oensar? ( tr. Haraldo ::C•.ihrenw.nn) {Buenos 
-.ires: Editorial i'·ovu, 1958). 
5. -~te y noesia {traducci6n y pr6loe;o de ::>unucl Ra1:os). 
So tratct de "El origcn de la obrd de d.rte" y "Hilldo:clin 
y la esencia de la ryoesia," reunidos con el ·t;itulo ilbre-
viado de .Arte y -poesia {;:~xico: Fondo do Cultura l!:·~o­
n6nica, 1958). 
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of the translations are widely divergent, as are the 
points of view of the translators. The economic situa-
tion prevalent in most Latin-American countries has its 
effects upon the publishing business. Large editions of 
philosophical works are seldom ventured, because of the 
problem of costs in long-term financing. Conse~uently, 
most of the translati.oJiS mentioned in this summary are 
now out of print, and available only in libraries, if 
at all. 
Secondary sources on Heidegger began to appear in 
Spanish in the early 1930's. Georges Gurvitch•s book 
on Present-Day Tendencies in German Philosophy was pub-
lished in French in 1930, and in a Spanish translation 
1 by F. Almela y Vives in 1931. The book is a summary 
of courses given by the author in the Sorbonne. Leonor 
Garcia, in a review, complained that the translation 
was published hurriedly and carelessly, with numerous, 
2 
serious errors. In the same number of Verbum in which 
the review appeared, there were two other items on Hei-
degger. Raimundo Lida presented a summary of Franz 
Muth•s doctoral dissertation (Munich, 1931), in which 
Husserl and Heidegger are compared. 3 angel Vassallo 
1. Georges Gurvitch, Las tendencias actuales de la file-
sofia alemana (tr. F. Aimeia y Vlves)(Madrld: M. 
Aguilar, 1931). · 
2. Cf. Verbum, Buenos Aires, 26(1933), 105-107. 
3. Raimurido Lida, "Husserl y Heidegger," Verbum, Buenos 
Aires, 26(1933), 110-121. 
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reviewed Heidegger•s essay, What Is Metaphysics?! 
Gilbert Ryle's review of Sein und Zeit, which was 
published in Mind in 1929, was presented in a trans-
lation by Bnrique Mallea. 2 also in 1933, Carlos astrada 
published his book on Existential Dynamic. 3 Astrada•s 
book on Husserl and Heidegger, entitled, Phenomenolog-
ical Idealism and Existential Metaphysics, 4 appeared 
in 1936. It is an exposition of the philosophical 
views of the two men, with the apparent purpose of 
showing Heidegger•s superiority. Astrada's preference 
for Heidegger is expressed very clearly in the concluding 
chapter. Also in 1936, Astrada presented an article enO 
titled, "From Kierkegaard to Heidegger."5 
1. Verbum, Buenos Aires, 26(1933), 27-31. 
2. Gilbert Ryle, "Resefia bibliografica de Sein und 
Zeit de Martin Heidegger" (tr. Enrique Mallea), 
verbum, Buenos aires, 26 (1933), 79-96. Cf. Mind, 
New Series, 38(1929), 355-370. 
3. Carlos Astrada, El jue~o existencial (Buenos Aires: 
:sabel, 1933). '11he wor , "Juego" frequently means 
"play" in English. It also means game, gambling, 
movement, mechanism, set, suite, and clearance. 
astrada's idea is a combination of play, gamble, 
and movement • 
4. Carlos Astrada, Idealismo fenomenol6 ico 
f!sica existencia uenos A res: Impren a 
Universidad, 1936). 
5. SUr, 6(1936), No. 25 (oct.), 50-59. 
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In 1937 Carlos Alberto Erro published his Existen-
tial Dialogue, 1 dedicated to Unamuno as a precursor of 
existentialism, and in which Erro reports on a visit 
with Heidegger in the summer of 1936. Erro was cordially 
received by Heidegger, who had just returned from some 
work on the mountain side. Erro was impressed by Hei-
degger•s physical vigor and activity. They discussed 
several philosophical questions, such as Heidegger's 
relation to Kierkegaard and other philosophers, what 
title would best fit Heidegger•s philosophy, and the 
moral significance of the distinction between proper 
and improper modes of being. In the light of the na-
ture of the discussion, Heidegger suggested that he pro-
vide Erro answers in writing. Consequently, Erro for-
mulated a series of eight questions, and Heidegger pro-
vided the answers. The book is Erro•s report of the 
visit and his summary translations of Heidegger•s an-
swers. One chapter is an imaginary dialogue with Kier-
kegaard, in which excerpts from Kierkegaard's writings 
are set in answer to Erro•s questions. The little book 
is written in excellent style, and the argument moves 
rapidly. In itself it is a concise introduction to 
Heidegger•s thought. 
1. Carlos Alberto Erro, Di~logo existencial (Buenos 
Aires: Editorial Sur, 1937). 
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Manuel Garcia r.•iorente' s lectures at Tucurru1n were 
published in 1938 under the title, Preliminary Lessons 
in Philosophy, to which reference has already been made 
in connection with Spanish thinkers in Latin America. 
In 1939 alberto Wagner de Reyna published his in-
troductory work, Heidegqer•s Fundamental Ontology, 1 with 
a foreword by Francisco Romero. In the same year, Gur-
vitch 1 s work was re-published by Editorial Losada in 
Buenos Aires. Also in 1939, Adolfo l1ien~ndez Samara pub-
lished an article on HeidegF-er in Letras de 11;~xico. 2 
Since 1940, the literature on Heidegc·er in Latin 
America has become profuse. It is neither fe~sible nor 
necessary to give a detailed account of the bibliography. 
A few later works may be mentioned because of their sig-
nificance. Romero, Caso, and Vasconcelos treat Heidegger•s 
philosophy briefly, but in no uncertain terms. "iluhonse de 
Waelhens vrrote his dissertation at Louvain on Heidegger, 
and the original, in French, v~s published in 1942. The 
Spanish translation, by Ram6n Cenal, appeared in 1945, and 
in a second edition in 1952. 3 The book by De Waelhens 
1. Alberto Wagner de Reyna, La ontolo~1a fundamentdl de 
Heidegger, su motive y significaci n, con nota preli-
minar por Francisco Romero, segunda edici6n (Buenos 
Aires: Editorial Losada, 1939, 1945). 
2. Cf. Luis Villoro, "cMnesis y proyecto del existencialismo 
en M~xico," Filosof1a y letras, lB(julio-dic., 1949),233-244. 
3. AlPhonse de Waelhens, La filosof1a de Jviartin Heideyger ( tr. 
Ram6n Celal), segunda edic16n, con nueva nota Prel minar, 
sobre "Los dltimos escritos de Heidegger," por el traduc-
tor (Madrid: Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Cien-
t1ficas, Institute "Luis Vives" de Filosof1a, 1952). 
is one of the best secondary sources on Heidegger, 
and has had much influence in Latin .~erica. 
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Works by Gaos and Garcia Bacca have already been 
mentioned, in connection with the importance of Spanish 
philosophers in Latin America. Both men are highly 
respected in their interpretations of Heidegger. 
Another book may be mentioned to illustrate a 
further step in making Heidegger•s philosophy known 
in Latin America. Juan Ram6n Sepich published in 1954 
a book of 527 pages on Heidegger•s existential analysis, 
which is the first half of the published portion of 
Sein und Zeit. Sepich's work is an extended paraphrase 
and commentary on one aspect of Heidegger•s thought. It 
illustrates a new phase in the development of Heidegger•s 
1 importance for Latin-American philosophy. 
To the publication of translations, expositions, 
and critical analyses of Heidegger•s works may be added 
the work done in classes and seminars in many depart-
menta of philosophy in Latin-American universities. An 
early instance of this work in Mexico is the reference 
to Heidegger by Adalberto Garcia de l!Uendoza, from 1933 
2 
to 1936. Gaos and Garcia Bacca are outstanding examples, 
1. Juan Ram6n Sepich, La filosof1a de Ser y tiempo de 
M. Heideseer {Buenos Aires: Editorial Nuestro Tiempo, 
1954). 
2. Cf. Luis Villoro, "~nesis y proyecto del existencialismo 
en E~xico." 
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but examples only, of a wides;pread practice. 
In .April of 1949, the First National Congress of 
Philosophy was held at the National University of Cuyo 
in Mendoza, ~;.rgentina. Many philosophers from Europe 
and other American countries were present or sent papers. 
There was one plenary session on existentialism, with 
five papers presented. In the discussion group on the 
philosophy of existence, twenty papers were presented in 
two days of sessions. The three large volumes of Actasl 
were published in 1950, and include not only all of the 
papers presented, with translations to Spanish of German 
and English originals, but also the minutiae of official 
welcome speeches and a note from Heidegger expressing 
his regrets for being unable to attend or to send any 
paper. The absence of such important names as Frondizi, 
~nche z Reulet, and Romero, from within the ~'-rgent in ian 
philosophical family, undoubtedly stems from political 
tensions of that time rather than from any particular 
differences of philosophical doctrine. 
The Third Inter-american Congress of Philosophy 
met in !liexico City in January of 1950. One of the main 
themes was "The Importance of Existentialism," upon which 
participants were invited to send papers. Twenty-two 
1. Aetas del Primer congreso nacional de filosof1a, 3 
tomes. Publicaci6n al cuidado de Luis Juan Guerrero, 
Secretario de aetas del congreso, 30 marzo - 9 abril 
de 1949 (Mendoza: Universidad Nacional de Cuyo, 1950). 
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1Japers were received on this thene. "iS could be expected, 
the quality of papers v,nied greutly. 'l'lle papers v;ere 
presented to delegates in ldJaeograph co:lies' cii1d there 
vterc t;;;o dJ.ys of norning J.lld i.lfternoon sessions of corn-
nent a.nd discussion. !:a.ny of the point': of e.iscU~Jsi.cn 
are not rslevant to the purDoses of this O.issertc;tion, 
but a. few points of e;en,:;ral agre•coment are of i!·,terest. 
In the first ])lace, d1Jparentl:r •,:ithout exce:Jtion 
Eeideg(;'er is classified v;ith the existenticl.lists. Sccond, 
F~eides-~er and other existentia.lists a.re better 'cnm·m 
and :':.ore apureciated in Lutin--if.!.ericu.n colj_1ltrics thc.n 
in the ·unit·3d States. Third, Latin _...t.':lericans, 1,·v'·hether 
they accept or reject existenti~liso, think of it us d 
philosoo:>hica.l I;l.OVec:or.t of primary inporta.nce, ·;:he reus 
sone ~·Jhi.loso:Jhers in the United States Dci)T little at-
tention to the 2-.;_ove:-.lsnt. The situat:i.on ir. both _.,;:-:.e:ric-J.s 
}).us cfl.dne;ed some;· .. ~hett in a decade. Ir. Lutin .l2::leJ.:~ic'-l the 
uccept<.ince of e:~istent ic.ilisn us a "f.J.d" has v.ran('_~d, 0.nd 
o. ;:·ore critical a.ttitude has develoeed, not 02~ly £cons 
philosoPhers, but also in tho sener.J.l Cc'lture. In tb.e 
United Stutes, on the oth:cr hc..nd, e~dEtontL.li.sn is be-
conins :~uch better kno~:,~n, ctnd occo.sio~.!.ully d:9preci0.ted. 
In the foul"'th Dl<J.ce, the r:ki.jority of yu}Jers fror;: LJ.tin 
.. J.nerica.ns vrcre o.pprociative in tone, des·~~ite criticisr:1s. 
334 
A few papers were exceptions to this generalization. 
Papers received from the United States were more tech-
nical and more critical, pointing out the limitations 
and inconsistencies in existentialism. 
Further evidence for the hypothesis of Heidegger•s 
recognition by Latin ~ericans and his influence in 
Latin•American philosophy may be found in the section 
on "Philosophy" in the Handbook of~ Latin-.werican .':>'tudies. 
Risieri Frondizi began the section for volume 5, in 1939. 
In that first year, Frondizi wrote: "At present the exis-
tentialism of Heidegger seems to be the philosophical tena-
ency which is spreading with greatest rapidity and in-
tensity."l Frondizi•s additional comments, however, re-
veal his doubts about the philosophical significance of 
juvenile, ephemeral enthusiasm. Nevertheless, in later 
accounts in the Handbook, Frondizi mentions the continuing 
importance of existentialism.2 He regrets the polemical 
nature of most discussions of existentialism. 
an1bal ~nchez Reulet took over the section from 
Frondizi in 1950. In the edition for 1952, ~nchez 
Reulet wrote: "It is easy to notice that existentialism 
is still the tendency that is most studied."3 
1. Handbook of Latin American Studies, 5(1939), 419. 
2. Ibid., 15(1949), 249. 
3. Ibid., 18(1952), 243. 
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The present chc1pte1' has been c1 sketch of the intro-
duction of Ee idegcer to Lati.n-American n~lilos ophy. ;, a::1y 
persons and ..:1ge:::-Lcies have br~en uentioned. I.~ti:'1--',_;_·:1erican 
interest in Gerrnv.n 'Jhenomenolo~:;y included interest ::.n 
~·{eid.ec·~·er as a. nem.ber of tha.t r~ove;:ent. Orteca y G.J.sset 
he l:led to cuke Gerr.w.n Dhilosoc)hers li:noYill tl:roue;h his 
,ievista de Occidente and the publicJ.tion of tr,msl.,'cions. 
The Spun ish phj.losc phers v1ho c..::.me to Lut in --~~1erica.. u.s :c)o-
litical refugees aft(,r the Spanish Civil ,/a.r broup;l1t .O:uro-
pean philoso:c1hy into loccel situc:.tion.s, es;:Jeciv.lly i1: :.:exico 
e.nd ~Jgentinci, but also in other countries. Carlos >Strada 
cend cUberto ,idi?;ncr de Re:/na studied -;,·ith 'C:eider;ger j_n G-er-
:!:~1Cl.ny, J.nd brcu0ht his philoso9hy ba.ck to their no. ti ve 
countries. Sc..i.rtre's philosophic~l -..;.nd literar~r '.·.ror~:s hc.:J.ve 
cc1lled 1JOpular atte:o,tion to ~;eidegcer. 
Eeideg··er' s principal v1orl:s are cJ.VcdL.ble in S·:Ja.nish 
tr~nslutions. Ex~ository articles ~nd books on 3eidec~er 
becan to a.ppea.r about 1932, and h'-'-Ve incre."sed bot:1 in 
nw··ber a.nd in size U;J to the present. This chc~.Dter h'-'.s 
s~1o•,·.,rn so2"'":.ethi~g Of the r~1echanics of :JJ.al:inc 7Ieidegc:;er's 
Dhil_oso·oroy avcJ.ilable to Latin -'meric'-<ns. 'l'heir re_._ctio::ls 
to :'eidege;er will be nresented in succeedincs chapters. 
CHAPTER VI 
OPPOSITION AND CRITICISM 
During the first two decades of this century, 
philosophy in Latin America had a new birth, partie-
ularly in Mexico and Argentina. Since colonial times 
philosophy in the Scholastic tradition has been taught, 
without interruption, in Roman Catholic schools and 
seminaries. Eclecticism or modernism made something 
of an entrance into what appeared to be an impermeable 
1 
system, but without greatly disturbing the dominance 
of tradition. 
In the latter part of the nineteenth century, 
positivism, following Comte most of all but also Mill 
and Spencer to lesser degrees, made a tremendous impact 
upon Latin-American philosophy and the general culture. 
The economic need to exploit natural resources was a 
part of the movement, and the utility of science in 
education and industry gave a naturalistic turn to 
1. Cf. Bernab~ Navarro, La introducci6n de la filosofia 
moderna en lii~xico (M~xico: El Colegio de l.i~xico, 
l948). 
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thought, in opposition to authoritarian, conservative 
tradition. Frondizi states clearly the contribution of 
positivistic theories in philosophy. 
Positivistic theories arose as a protest against 
Scholasticism; their job was to free philosophical 
issues from the monopoly of the Catholic church. 
And they did it very well. Since positivism, a 
free examination of any philosophical question is 
possible in Latin America, and even those who later 
on repudiated positivism took advantage of this 
definite1and fundamental contribution of the posi-tivists. 
The revolt against the narrow limitations of posi-
tivism was an attempt to overcome its anti-metaphysical 
bias and its exclusive use of scientific theories of 
knowledge in regard to social, humanistic, and spiritual 
problems. Positivism might be thought of as successful 
in its negative results, as a revolt against authority, 
but very limited in its attempt to provide a philosophical 
foundation for a whole culture. It was necessary, in the 
interests of a wider freedom, to go beyond positivistic 
freedom from authority. 
Many thinkers have taken part in the rebirth of 
philosophy after positivistic domination, but four names 
that must stand out in any summary of the new Latin-
American philosophical autonomy of the twentieth cen-
l. Risieri Frondizi, "Contemporary .• rgentine Philosophy," 
Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 4(1943-1944), 
181. 
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tury are "·~lejc<ndro Korn, Jose Vasconcelos, ",ntonio Caso, 
c.nd Fr~ncisco Romero. These men are the intellectual 
heroes of the "new genercJ.tion," who broke '.·:ith :oositiv-
istic scientism in the I'irst two decctdes of this ce::1tury, 
.me. have been the most i:1flue:ctial tlcinkers in the firct 
half of the century. The reaction of these four thinkErs 
to IC:e idegr:er is the onening section of t'ds cll'"nter on 
"Opnosition :J.nd Criticism." 
~. T.1e Older Generation of Philosonhers 
1. _clejandro Korn . 
.. ;.lejandro Korn can hcn'dly be cc.lled a fw::ous phi-
loeonher on account of a nhilosonhical syeten. Insteac., 
he was a gre.~t teacher of nhiloeophy and an ins·:Jirdtior_ 
for hie etudente. z:orn VldS the r:'oving s0iri t of the 
Kanticm Society of ~uenos "dres, founded in 1929. o:-:e 
vJas also one of the found"rs of tlB 1"ree School of :-:igher 
Studies (Colegio Libre de Estudios Superiores) in Buenos 
"dres in 1930. 1 The Kantian Society y;as the l.leans by 
~:."hich students cm:e i~-:to conta.ct \vith so:r:~e of the nev,lest 
Euronean r:coVeEents in nh ilosophy. 
1. Frctr,cisco Romero, Sobre la fi 1 osof1a en .. ,;cericu. 
(Buenos .cires: Editorial Rcdgal, 1952) , !J4. 
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The Kantian Society of Buenos dires held private 
meetings and public sessions; but in addition to 
these regular functions, it was a meeting place 
for friends, in a group around Alejandro Korn, 
who assiduously went there for the exchange of 
ideas •••• The most recent German philosophy vras 
expounded and commented upon in the Eantian Soci-
ety, along with other expressions of the newest 
thought. To cite only one case, Dilthey•s ideas, 
which much later have rightly stimulated so much 
attention, were examined in the first year of the 
Society's existence, as well as, in the first year 
or soon after, the ideas of Husserl, Heidegger, 
Hartmann, and th~ most noteworthy contemporary 
French thinkers. 
The name of the Kantian Society illustrates a 
central feature of Korn 1 s philosophy. Kant and Neo-
Kantianism are very great influences in Korn. But 
perhaps Bergson is even more influential in Korn and 
his students. Korn gives credit to Bergson for liber-
ating philosophy from mechanistic theories. 2 
Korn•s reaction to Heidegger was unfavorable. In 
"An Argentine Position," written after Heidegger fell 
into line with Hitler's Nazism by accepting the Reo-
torship of the University of Freiburg, Korn spoke as 
follows: 
Another great representative of German philosophy, 
who also has his admirers, is He idegger, who simply 
revives the visions of the mystics who matched 
being and nothing and who, in brief, insinuate to 
us that the absolute metaphysical principle is 
time. Very well: this eternal time is a little 
difficult to grasp, and l>ir. Heidegger has recently 
1. Ibid., 53. 
2. Korn, Obras, II, 136, Cf. above, Chapter V. 
decided to be content with the present time that 
he is living and he has become a part of the regime 
in power in Germany. and if that is the result of 
this metaphysical effort, we may declare that it i~ 
indeed barren [bien pobre: very poor, destitute]. 
Korn•s argument ad hominem can hardly be considered 
relevant to Heidegger•s finitism, temporalism, or onto-
logical questioning. It might be considered relevant 
to the ethical implications of the choice between proper 
(eigentlich) and improper (uneigentlich) modes of being 
oneself. But there is also a sense in which a man's 
life and practical decisions may be used as a criticism 
of his philosophy. It may be said that the author of 
a philosophy does not himself believe it to be objec-
tively true; and the problem of the objective validity 
or correctness of an idea raises perplexing questions 
for the attempt to reduce truth to a subjective judg-
ment or decision. Or it may be said that the nature 
of a man's philosophy can only become transparently 
clear in its concrete results. 2 In the latter case, 
the non-moral nature of Heidegger•s existential anal-
ysis, following his ovm guidance in understanding his 
theory, leads to the necessity of making decisions, 
which are moral in their consequences if not so clearly 
moral in their roots, without guideposts of any kind. 
1. Korn, Obras, II, 254-255. 
2. Cf. the rise of pragmatism in the United States. 
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On such an interpretation, Heidegger•s philosophy is 
indeed barren, in Korn•s words, because it offers no 
guidance in practical matters. Korn•s argument ad 
hominem illustrates clearly Latin-American interest 
in the moral, social, and political consequences of 
philosophical theories. 
Korn•s suggestion that Heidegger fits best with 
the mystics who match being and nothing and who in-
sinuate that time is the basic principle is an early, 
keen, and, to all appearances, a fully autonomous 
judgment on Heidegger. This suggestion illustrates 
possible motives for Heidegger•s popularity among 
Latin Americans, in the mystical and religious over-
tones of his philosophy. 
2. Jos~ Vasconcelos. 
Jos~ Vasconcelos was a leading Mexican thinker 
from early in the century until his death in 1959. 
His career as social reformer, politician, and educator 
adds much of interest and color to a study of his per-
sonality and influence. His voluminous works cover many 
subjects. He was not less a philosopher for being in-
terested and active in other pursuits. 
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Like Alejandro Korn, Vasconcelos had a high opinion 
of Bergson. Unlike Korn, he had little respect for some 
other currents of contemporary philosophy. In his book 
on Aesthetics, he has a brief tirade against liberalism 
in Spain, Protestantism, and humanism. 
French positivism and North-American pragmatism 
freed us from the kind of philosophical Protestantism 
which Krausism became in Spain--a mediocre humanistic 
sect whose political failure in the first cabinets 
of the present Spanish Republic made manifest the 
sectarian tendencies, the short view, and the inept-
ness of its creed.l 
Vasconcelos was particularly hard on phenomenology, 
and wasted no words in giving his adverse opinions on 
the attention paid to the whole movement. 
There is no danger that phenomenist philosophy--
abstruse, poorly-written, subdivided into niches, 
ingenious, and false--may become popular. But it 
is now time that the little groups of youth who 
rack their brains in deciphering unimportant enig-
mas, look for a less sterile occupation.2 
In a review of several books by Vasconcelos, 
Professor Brightman rightly saw this antagonistic spirit 
as directed more to the Mexican than to the German situa-
tion. Brightman thought that Vasconcelos's remarks on 
Hegelianism and phenomenology were unwise, but perhaps 
understandable and justifiable in the light of the situ-
ation in which many younger thinkers were a mere "echo 
1. Jose Vasconcelos, Estetica, tercera edici6n (Mexico: 
Editorial Botas, 1945), 11. 
2. Ibid., 26. 
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of soc:e European voice. 11 
In fa.ct, his criticisrr1s of =.:::us.serl -:tnd Hef;el :_lc..y 
be viewed in this context. He is pro bctbly not so 
r:uch concerned to Cit tack e i the:::- :r;usserl or ,-'e iuegger 
or Fe gel thetcsel ves as to de1Jlore tho ir unfortuna·':;e 
influence on LcJ.tin--cr~erican thought, which hds of·~en 
been an imitc.tive fu.d rather thc.n u source of crea-
tive intuitions c:.nd ne'ii insights. If t)lis be true, 
even his exctgger;J.tions have u v~nolesone intent und 
exert d much-needed influence.-
For the Ld tin _lJnericans, philosophy is neve:c 'cJure 
t!:eory. Vasconcelos ·::c:s objecting to -Glo_e use being 
nade of phenonenologic~l theories ciS nuch ciS to the 
ideas as such. Likewise, Vasconcelos's OTnosition to 
-;Jhenonenolor;y urose frorJ a conservative point of viei'J 
in social theory, politics, md rel5.gion, c.s co:.1p0.red 
to the "nev.~er" dDd r:J.ore rt..~.dica.l younger generation. 
V0.s concelos ld.nen ts the iY>fluence of .Tose Ortega. 
y GcJ.sset '-'lld his Llevista de Occicl.onte on Latin .z.lorica. 
Fevertheless, this [contagious de caderwe] is \!hat 
has been happening in the Hhole intolle ctual ]Jrov-
ince of Snanish .,me rica, fro'·: : .. ezico City to Buenos 
.• ires. _, return to Ladrid. But to tho ; :o.cl.rio. of 
the Revis ta of Fe gel and pheno".lenology, thCJ.t is, <;, 
:,adrld trans let ted from German, the : .. adrid of IIusserl' s 
phenomenology, Scheler• s ethics of rese!ltr:o;:;t, the 
nyst icism of ~nxiet;}r, const.ipu ted Eys ticisl:.!. of Kier-
kec<u.rd and ::eideg~er, co·cc~lented on by Uncc.·uno, v:no 
lived a life intoxicated with nothinc but y·,'Ords. 2 
1. Edg0..r S. Brie;ht:;:.a.n, "Don Jose Vasconcelos," Pbilos-
ophy and Phenomenoloc;icCJ.l Research, 7(1946-1947), 
459-460. 
2. Jose Vasconcelos, Locica org6.nica (iexico: Ec.ici.on 
del Colegio !Tacior.cal, 1945), p. xxii. 
Vasconcelos pays negative tribute to the influence 
of the "phenomenological plague" by saying that it domi-
nates in all of Latin America except Brazil. He complains 
of the futile efforts of professors to explain Husserl, 
who "could not explain himself," and to translate Heideg-
ger, who "suffers innate difficulties in expressing him-
1 
self in his own language." Vasconcelos sees in modern 
German :philosophical influences, especially the :phenomeno-
logical movement, another attempt at a Protestant Reforma-
tion, a threat to Roman Catholic tradition. The back-
wardness of Spain and Spanish culture is not to be over-
come by liberal, reformist tendencies in :philosophy and 
religion, but by a return to the genuine Spanish, Roman 
Catholic traditions. 2 
Of the various representatives of the :phenomenological 
movement, Heidegger is singled out for attack in Vascon-
celos's Organic Logic, with the devastating heading, 
3 
"Heidegger, or the Tangle." The object of Vasconcelos's 
criticism is Heidegger' s essay on "What Is Metaphysics?" 
and, more :precisely, the question, "Why are there entities 
rather than nothing?" Vasconcelos calls it a tangled, 
silly question, because the answer is :previously given 
1. Ibid., :p. xxii. 
2. Ibid., :p:p. xxii-xxv. 
3. ''Heidegger o el enredo," Ibid., p. xxv. 
in the definition of terms. Entity is what 
nothing is what does not exist. ~ow could 
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exists; 
1 it exist?" 
Vasconcelos calls this a silly question, of the kind 
children ask. 
Vasconcelos is in favor of "existential philosophy," 
if what is meant is the concrete nature of the whole 
person as the starting point of philosophy, reversing 
in actual process the Cartesian principle. 
My being is not derived from my thought, but just 
the contrary, I think because I exist; and every-
thing that occurs in my consciousness depends, in 
the first place, upon my existence. These obvious 
affirmations, contained in my Metaphysics, and pub-
lished in 1929, are similar to those that circulate 
today under the name of existential philosophy; 
but the name seems to me neither precise nor useful.2 
Vasconcelos objects to Heidegger's doctrine of the 
nature of personality. He thinks that Heidegger denies, 
in anxiety (Angst, dread) the very nature of personality 
as an organic unity, constituted by meaning, activity, 
and a divine spark. 
In the person multiplicity is unified and acquires 
meaning. and, far from losing itself in things, 
the soul, integrated in itself, may traverse the 
whole universe, without separating itself from 
itself, without losing its uniqueness. [It is] an 
organic uniqueness of living person, not a unity 
of abstract numbers. This copy of the angel, this 
being with a destiny, this spark of God himself, 
---------·-
1. Ibid., p. xxxiv. 
2. Ibid., p. 27. 
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is since then [publication of my book on metaphysic~ 
the axis of all [my] thinking, of all [my] feeling, 
without any need for "existentialism." He idegger, 
with his abstract existentialism, is really the one 
who denies personility; in anxiety he denies the 
self as existing. 
Vasconcelos has indulged in some name-calling, and 
there are moot issues on the possible values and dis-
values of liberalism in religion and politics, as well 
as in philosophy. His calling Heidegger•s ~uestion about 
entities and nothing a silly ~uestion, of the kind that 
children ask, is a specific illustration of Heidegger•s 
argument that the problem of being has been forgotten, 
ruled out of metaphysics, and even made trivial. Vas-
concelos's argument against Heidegger by an appeal to 
the logic of the definition of terms may be compared to 
Dr. ~ohnson•s attempt to refute Berkeley by kicking a 
stone. The validity of the logic of definition to think 
the problem of being, rather than to define one entity 
in terms of a system of entities, is precisely what 
Heidegger ~uestions. For Heidegger, Vasconcelos's argu-
ment is an illustration of the inability of traditional 
philosophy to answer the profound, ultimate ~uestions 
that children have not yet learned not to ask. 
Despite some name-calling and ~uestion-begging, 
Vasconcelos surely has two points of solid criticism of 
1. Ibid., 28. 
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Heidegger•s views: abstraction and negative content, 
in his view of the nature of man. Vasconcelos is op-
posed to logic-chopping. The whole uhenomenological 
movement is prone to make distinctions ad infinitum and 
ad absurdum. Heidegger is perhaps the worst offender 
of the school. In the prolixity of verbal distinctions, 
his leadership is unchallenged. Vasconcelos sees such 
verbal and existential analyses as an inadequate method 
to grasp the nature of personality. Personality is a 
unique whole. No phenomenological analysis, as pure 
analysis, is able to discover its real nature. 
In addition, like Nicol and many others, Vasconcelos 
calls attention to the negative bias involved in Heideg-
ger•s analysis and interpretation of the nature of man. 
Anxiety is the negating aspect of experience. Vasconce-
los defines man in terms of positive purpose and destiny. 
3. Antonio Caso. 
Antonio Caso and Jos~ Vasconcelos were contemporaries, 
and shared many points of view. Both opposed the narrow 
limitations of positivism and scientism. Like others of 
their generation, both found inspiration in Bergson for 
going beyond positivism. Both were interested in fields 
outside technical philosophy, especially in social and 
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educational reform and in the political progress of 
Mexico. But whereas Vasconcelos actively campaigned 
for political office, and became somewhat disillusioned 
and negative in his sentiments toward democratic process 
when he was defeated, Case always remained a teacher. 
His vocation was genuinely educational more than polem-
ical, and all his works, even those on controversial 
issues, are deeply rooted in the purpose and atmosphere 
of the classroom. Many schools in Mexico are dedicated 
to Caso, and he is still sometimes referred to as "the 
teacher" (el maestro). 
Caso•s essay on Heidegger is published as a small 
subdivision of a chapter on war in The Human Person and 
the Totalitarian State. 1 The book was published in the 
early stages of World war II. The title of the section 
on Heidegger is an obsolescent Spanish word for laziness 
or weakness (acidia), which might be translated idiomat-
ically as "the let-down." Caso defines the term, using 
a literary reference, by a combination of laziness, 
2 boredom, and sorrow. Pride, wrath, and envy in ndtional 
life have tremendous consequences for war. Then comes 
the catastrophe, and afterward the let-down, with its 
pessimism, deception, disenchantment, misery, and suf-
fering.3 
1. Antonio Caso, La persona humana y el estado totalitario 
(Mexico: Ediciones de Ia Universidad Nacional AUtl5noma, 
1941). 
2. Ibid., 265. 
3. Ibid., 262-263. 
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The let-down is the gathering together of all the 
negative emotional symptoms of defeat. Caso likens our 
own time to the nightmare of the medieval period, with 
the difference that more people are living now, and the 
post-war let-down, he predicted, will be more intense 
and tragic than medieval timew. 1 
After having related the causes of war and charac-
terized the aftermath, Caso then refers to Heidegger. 
But, why meditate for ourselves on the attributes 
of the post-war let-down, if Martin Heidegger, 
perhaps the most distinguished philosopher of 
contemporary Germany, has formulated a curious 
and profound "existential philosophy" founded upon 
the court of negative sentiments which distinguish 
the let-down? ••• Philosophy, since it is always 
the work of a personal consciousness, always re-
flects the historical moment to which it refers. 2 
Caso proceeds to elaborate his conviction that Heideg-
ger•s philosophy is ready-made for a tragic situation. 
Negative sentiments find their rigfitful place in a 
philosophy of tragedy, of the let-down. 
Only a few lustrums have passed since the last 
catastrophe ended, and already there are new, 
terrible struggles, in which we live and partici-
pate •••• \fuen all this sea of wars and catastrophes 
is past, Heidegger's thought, in accordance with 
disaster, will continue to be the philosophy of the 
let-down, the terrigle philosophy of death, of 
"being-unto-death." 
1. Ibid., 263-264. 
2. Ibid., 266. 
3 • Ibid • , 2 68. 
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In Man's Danger, published in 1942, Caso refers to 
Heidegger in comparison with Kierkegaard. Caso prefers 
a Christian cure to anxiety, as found in Kierkegaard, to 
an anxiety without any remedy, as in Heidegger. Faith 
is the only remedy for desperation. 1 
Caso•s arguments against Heidegger's philosophy are 
set in the context, not strictly of metaphysics or the 
ontology of man, but rather in philosophical psychology 
and social philosophy. Caso criticizes Heidegger•s doc-
trine of man as negative in quality and inadequate for 
the development of personality. He criticizes the social 
aspects of Heidegger 1 s philosophy for the same negative 
bias, that is, for the lack of any positive purpose which 
could give meaning to life. 
Patrick Romanell has characterized existentialism 
as the "philosophy of failure."2 Romanell's phrase may 
be used as a good, concise summary of Caso on Heidegger. 
Romanell thinks that the tragic sense of life in Spanish 
culture is the key to the popularity of the philosophy 
of failure in Latin .unerica. 
1. .Antonio Caso, El peligro del hombre (Mexico: Editorial 
Stylo, 1942), 158-160. 
2. Patrick Romanell, "A Vision of the Two Americas," a 
paper sent to the Third Inter-american Congress of 
Philosophy in Mexico City, in 1950. Published in a 
Spanish translation in Filosof1a y letras, 19(enero-
junio, 1950), 385-392. 
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4. Francisco Romero. 
Francisco Romero wrote in 1939, in a preliminary 
note to Alberto Wagner de Reyna's The Fundamental on-
1 tology of Heidegger, that Heidegger•s voice, since 
1927, has been recognized as "one of the most profound 
d i i f time' " 2 th gh ft an genu ne vo ces o our even ou o en not 
clearly understood. Romero suggests that the difficulties 
in understanding Heidegger have added to the marked curi-
osity about his thought. ASide from linguistic difficul-
ties which Romero attributes in part to the German lan-
guage and in part to Heidegger•s unique use of it, the 
most moving part of Heidegger•s philosophy, for Romero, 
is its temporalism. 
In an article entitled, "Temporalism,"3 Romero 
elaborates the nature of the concept of time and its 
place in modern and contemporary philosophy, with special 
reference to Nietzsche, Hegel, Schelling, Dilthey, Spengler, 
Husserl, Bergson, Simmel, and Heidegger. Heidegger rep-
resents both 
the most recent and the most resonant temporalism. 
The struggle between essences and existents (exis-
tencias) reaches its maximum intensity in him, even 
though a sole, privileged existent assumes the 
1. Alberto Wagner de Reyna, La ontolog1a. fundamental de 
Heidegger (Buenos Aires: Editorial Losada, 1939), 9. 
2. Ibid., 7. 
3. First published in Nosotros, mayo-junio de 1940, and 
later as Chapter II of Filosof1a contem~oranea. Estu-
dios y notas, primera serie. Segunda e icion (Buenos 
Aires: Editorial Losada, 1944), 27-55. 
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principal role. In a complete recovery of the 
existential, he emphasizes that condition of exist-
ence which formerly contributed most to its devalu-
ation, temporality not as mere temporality--which 
on the long view may be eternity--but as temporal 
precariousness. Existence is not only something 
in time; it is progression toward final and inev-
itable annihilation,l 
Finitude as such becomes the key to being. Romero 
notes, however, that transcendence is also a part of 
Heidegger• s philosophy. :Man transcends to his world. 
The present transcends to the future. Man as existent 
transcends to being and the meaning of being. Romero 
sees finitude and transcendence as conflicting tenden-
cies in Heidegger. 
A violent antagonism is manifest between these 
two intuitions, finitude and transcendence, which 
are so powerful and weighty in his systematization. 
Finitude defines a closed region, an immanence; 
transcendence affirms the infinite will of evasion 
proper to man. Finitude receives its warranty from 
the fact of death, but transcendenc2 is recognized 
as an essential constituent of man. 
Romero is not satisfied to conclude the struggle 
with a final victory for finitude. 
Heidegger's thesis that the memento mori is eluded 
by anonymous, improper existence, that proper ex-
istence, in an attitude of supreme veracity lives 
facing finitude and realizes its existence as being 
unto death, ~s without doubt a truth--but not the 
whole truth. 
1. Ibid., 48, 
2. Ibid., 49-50. 
3. Ibid., 50. 
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1'i3.n is not merely for the tomb, becccuse his will to 
transcend is the proper, constitutive char::tcteristic 
of his human nature. "In the last and definitive for-
mula, man is not a being unto death, as Heidegger thinks, 
1 but a being for value." 
Romero goes on to criticize extreme temporalism, 
as in Heidegger, with the argument that temporalists 
pay a "secret and involuntary tribute to the rational-
istic demand for homogeneity and unification, by set-
ting up a new monism, the monism of existence. " 2 Romero 
believes that time has a rightful place in philosophy. 
No rationalistic eternalism may rule out the facts as 
unreal. But time does not have exclusive rights in 
philosophy. Romero stresses particularly the rights 
of transcendence and of values. 
R t Th fMa 3. omero s eory o 'n 1s a systematic presenta-
tion of his thought, not only on man as such, but also 
on man in relation to nature, to society, to culture and 
history, and to the spiritual world of meaning and value. 
In f.1ct, the book might be called an a tterapt to de fine 
man in relation to all these systems. The intentional 
consciousness, of which the dominant feature is the 
1. Ibid., 50. 
2. Ibid. , 55. 
3. Francisco Romero, Teor1a del hombre (Buenos .dres: 
Editorial Losada, 1952). 
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capacity to form subject-object relations, is the key 
concept in the minimum definition of man. The inten-
tional consciousness is sufficient, for Romero, to 
define the nature of man. Spirit, which is intentional 
consciousness in transcendence to complete, disinterested 
objectivity, is a later and higher development, as is, 
also, reflexive self-consciousness. l•"'m must be in-
tentional, that is, must develop into a self or subject 
with an objective world, in order to be man, as distinct 
from the "states" found in subhuman and pre-conscious 
existence. 
This book is one of the great works in contemporary 
philosophy, dSide from its place in Latin-.-;.merican nhi-
losophy. It is not within the scope of this disserta-
tion to examine the whole work; neither is it within the 
temnoral and other limits of the present task for the 
writer to compare Romero's ideas with Heidegger•s. That 
would be another dissertation in itself, on a most in-
teresting and important theme. Nevertheless, a few gen-
er:J.l impressions, tentatively presented, are in order. 
Romero does not mention Heideg~:er in this book. 
Seldom, if at all, does he use the term, existentialism. 
But there are obvious references to existentL.,.lism, and 
to Heideg~er. Romero seeks, first of all, to present 
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his own theory, rather than to comment o~or to refute, 
other points of view. He seeks to avoid polemic and 
name-calling. He prefers to deal critically with idecJ.s 
rcJ.ther than with names. 
In an extended review of the work, Quos argues that 
Romero, in addition to avoiding the mention of HeidegGer, 
has failed to deal adEjquately with Heidegger's "previous" 
criticisms of Romero's position. 1 apart from the possible 
validity of Guos•s argument, other factors might be con-
sidered. Precise definition or a clear presentation of 
some theories is difficult, especially if the theories 
contain internal tensions. There is the problem of being 
able to present some views in terms acceptable to the 
authors of those views, even though the consensus of 
opinion might be in agreement with the terms used. 
Sartre•s attempt to state Heidegger•s position is an 
excellent example of the problem. The universal tend-
ency to take sides on names rather than on issues is 
not entirely lacking among Latin-american philosophers. 
The association of names with social and political issues 
has added much to the heat of the polemic over existen-
tialism. The consideration of ideas rather than names 
permits the authors and proponents of those ideas to 
make their own alignments, if and when they so choose. 
1. Jos~ Quos, "Comentario sobre La teor1a del hombre 
de Frano:t.aco Romero," DMnoia, 2(1956), 32?-344. 
Cf. especially pages 340-342. 
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In a situation that was far from conducive to impcJ.rtial 
philosophical speculation, Romero wrote a major work 
that is remarkably free from references to his own con-
dition and to the circumstances of his country. 
In the presentation of his own theory, Romero seeks 
to clarify his own position in reference to other points 
of view. Some of the "other interpretations" can easily 
be recognized as existentialist. 
Of them, we shall refer to the view which sees in 
spirit the unique and the distinguishing feature 
in man; to the view which holds that man has no 
fixed nature, but makes his nature in his happening 
(su acontecer), in his history; to the view which 
adduces that the practiCal or manual relations with 
things is primary (lo originario) and the principal 
condition for the appea~nce of an objective world; 
to the thesis on the priority of the emotional and 
volitional over the intellectual; and to the views 
which concede the predominant role to certain or-
ganic and impulsive tendencies, such as sexuality 
and the instinct of domination.l 
Romero admits that these views are of importance, and 
must contain some truth, because they have their ad-
herents, 
but we declare them insufficient to give account 
of what is essential to man. In our considerations 
we shall not deal with formulations by individual 
authors, but rather give attention to the general 
meaning of these opinions and to the general outline 
in which they have been passing into common under-
standing.2 
It is not possible for the writer to deal adequately 
with the problems raised in Romero's objections to ideas 
1. Romero, Teoria del hombre, 23. 
2. Ibid. , 23. 
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found in Heidegger. A brief statement must suffice, 
on three selected problems: Does man have a fixed 
nature or essence? Is practice prior to thought in 
man's relation to things? Is it possible to think of 
man as tempo~al process without reference to universals? 
On the question of man's nature, Romero does not 
try to present a Platonic Idea of the soul, but to find 
in man's intentionality th.e basic structure of his being. 
Man is, primarily, an intentional consciousness; 
without that, man is not. The nature (lo protio) 
of the intentional consciousness is to consis in 
a bundle (un haz) of intentions or acts projected 
toward objects, in such functions as cognitive ap-
prehension, emotion, and will. The psychic facts 
or "states" without intentional character, that is, 
without objective direction, occur in man as in 
animals; but it is man•s prerogative that many of 
his states lose their condition as states when they 
are converted into the material of intentional acts. 
Of these acts, the cognitive ones enjoy an indubit-
able priority and preeminence in the configuration 
characteristic of man, because they form the basis 
for the intentional consciousness.l 
The intentional consciousness provides the minimum 
requirements for being human. Spiritual objectivity, in 
disinterested, complete transcendence, is the vocation of 
man, his ideal maximum. Too much humanity is left out 
if man is defined as spirit or pure transcendence. The 
minimum needed to differentiate man from the world of 
things, animals, and even his own psychic states as 
1. Ibid., 15. 
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states, is intentional consciousness. Such is man's 
nature or essence. 
On the question of the primary or secondary nature 
of the cognitive function in man, ~o~ero presents clearly 
his view of the primacy of the cognitive function, in the 
subject-object relation. He opposes making objectification 
secondary to a practical, manual acquaintance with things. 
The reference to Heidegger•s Zuhandenheit and Vorhanden-
heit is unmistakable. Romero's chief argument is a com-
parison between the human and the animal reaction, use, 
and management of things. Man•s reaction is intentional, 
intelligent (although not always rationally intelligent), 
and objective; the animal reaction to things reveals a 
different nature in the managing entity. 
In the origin of what is human, others attribute 
an exceptional role to the effective treatment of 
reality, the practical management of it, which 
would give the opportunity for the revelation of 
the consistency or mode of being of things. But 
the entity vmich is capable of taking advantage of 
this type of experience may not be imagined except 
as a subject, and the subject is not conceivable, 
in turn, without its correlation to the perceived 
object. Furthermore, there would need to be a justification of why the animal, who has before 
him the same things as man, does not succeed in 
executing with things the same practical commerce 
as man does •••• The whole zooloeical scale gives 
evidence that mere manipulation of things does not 
generate humanity •••• The lucid management of things 
presupposes the capacity of objectification.l 
1. Ibid., 26, 27. 
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Romero recognizes the place of practical, handling 
contact with things in the experience of cognition, 
tor example, in objective methods and instruments in 
science, but he affirms the priority of the mind, 
based upon the subject-object relation, in knowing. 
on the problem of "pure process," Romero affirms 
the need for universals in some minimum sense. 
If man were pure becoming, that becoming would 
recognize certain norms and patterns or would 
lack them; if it has norms and patterns, these 
would be, although merely orientations of a dy-
namic process, the essence of man; and, on the 
contrary assumption, becoming itself would be 
unthinkable on account of its confusion and arbi-
trary nature. For our part, we maintain the his-
toricity of man, but subject to the norms and pat-
terns which are prescribed for man by the specific 
human structure (contextura), that is the inten-
tional structure (estructura intencional). Thus, 
historicity is not something indefinable, without 
law or essence, but the historicity of a subject 
whose environment appears to him as a reality of 
objectifications, a subject who takes account of 
himself and of his environment in different ways, 
who objectifies space and time and assumes before 
them the few £ositions which are possible in this 
respect, etc. 
Romero is a temporalist in his theory of man. But in 
temporal process there must be some constant or recur-
rent patterns, some fixed points of reference, some 
order or cosmos; if not, then the only essence left 
would be chaos itself. 
1. Ibid., 25-26. 
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Romero recognizes the present and future importance 
of philosophies of pure process. 
With regard to the metaphysical basis of reality, 
it has already been indicated that in certain phi-
losophies an inspiration that might be called Herac-
litan is becoming dominant, and, it should be added, 
these philosophies seem to be those ~f a most secure 
future (las de ~s seguro porvenir). 
The importance of process is illustrated, for Romero, in 
Hegel, Bergson, and modern physics. Romero makes no 
specific reference to Whitehead in this connection. 
But, for Romero, essences are still possible, and neces-
sary, in process, on all levels, even if only as points 
of reference which have no reality in themselves. 
To admit essences does not go beyond recognizing 
that reality shows nodes of being, that it is an 
order, a cosmos; this is equivalent to affirming 
that there is reality in the commonly accepted 
sense. Only if there were no reality, if the mul-
tiple and prodigious procession of entities, with 
their generic cha~acteristics and individual attri-
butes, with their regular sequences and concatena-
tions did not exist, but instead a confused chaos, 
there would be no essences, in the plural; but 
there would be, vlith all, a singular essence, the 
chaotic essence. The passionate frie~ds of chaos 
ought at least to admit this essence. 
Romero has thought through many of the details, as 
well as some centr~l features and problems, of Heidegger•s 
philosophy. He has rejected Heidegger, as compared to his 
own system, although he seems to admit the growing im-
portance of Heidegger and existentialism in the fUture. 
1. Ibid., 75-76. 
2. Ibid., 76. 
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In summary, it might be said that Romero accepts 
Heidegger's philosophy in two ways. Heidegger is one of 
the best representatives of the contemporary trend toward 
pure temporalism, which will probably continue into the 
future as a strong movement. ~lso, time, whether or not 
it is considered as irrational and chaotic, is a fact, 
and must be accepted as a fact, especially in regard to 
persons. 
But Romero opposes Heidegger 1 s negative bias, his 
tendency to belittle intellectual cognition, his denial 
of any fixed nature or essence in man, and his philos-
ophy of pure process without structure or even fixed 
points of reference. 
Of the four men mentioned in this section, Romero 
alone still lives. He is almost universally respected 
as the greatest living Latin-.~rican philosopher. His 
Theory of Man could be interpreted as a Herculean effort 
to turn the tide of existentialist irrationalism. ~1-
though Romero is in Pdrtial agreement with Eeidegger, 
there is little influence of Heidegger in his thought, 
except as a challenge to his own view. 
This same evaluation of Romero's views on Heideg-
ger could be applied, a fortiori, to Korn, Vasconcelos, 
and Caso. These men formulated their own points of 
view prior to the advent of Heidegger. .cs compared to 
the nineteenth century, these four were great pioneer 
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thinkers, genuine philosophers in a culture wher3 the 
philosophical vocation was largely limited to a mastery 
of a previous system of thought. 'f.hese men were revolu-
tionary in the second, third, and fourth decades of this 
century. For their own time they were the "new" genera-
tion. But to the "newer" generation of the last two 
decades, these men are the "older" generation of philos-
ophers, whose "newness" fades into established positions 
with the arrival of still more radical forms of philo-
sophical inquiry. 
B. Opposition from established positions 
1. Francisco Larroyo. 
Francisco Larroyo is a leading representative of 
Neo-Kantian philosophy in Mexico. He.· is a prolific 
writer, and many of his works are polemical in tone. 
Four chapters in his book on Existentialism1 are of 
interest for the purposes of this dissertation. The 
book is in a popular style, for it was first published 
as a series of newspaper articles. 'I'he book is a con-
crete illustration of opposition to Heidegger, along 
with other existentialists, from a given point of view 
in philosophy. 
1. Francisco Larroyo, El existencialismo, sus f'Uentes 
y direcciones (Mexico: Editorial Stylo, 1951). 
The general characterization of existentialism by 
Larroyo includes both references to Heidegger and a num-
ber of ideas found in Heidegger, such as anxiety, nothing, 
being-in-the-world, death, and finitude. One chapter is 
devoted to the exposition of Heidegger's thought, in a 
popular style. Then, of most interest for the present 
study, the two final chapters deal with existentialism 
in Mexico and a critical estimate of existentialism as 
a philosophy. 
Larroyo mentions four circumstances, which could 
also be interpreted as causal factors, for the rise and 
development of existentialist philosophy in Mexico. The 
time of crisis in which the world is now living is a 
universal factor, not peculiar to I,iexico. A second cir-
cumstance is the revolt against positivism in Le:xico. 
A third is the philosophical awareness of the originality 
of Mexican culture. The fourth circumstance, or factor, 
is the influence of "transpatriated" Spanish refugees, 
who were "the forceps which brought forth the cred. ture, 
1 
already formed." 
In the final, critical chapter of his work, Larroyo 
opposes existentialism for its inability to solve the 
problem of universals. Universal concepts, or essences, 
l. Ibid., 206. 
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are necessary to any philosophy. "In and through es-
sences things are what they are."1 The individual may 
not be known except by means of essences. Larroyo ar-
gues for a synthetic view of essence and existence. 
Neither can be absolutely prior to the other. They are 
the two correlative terms of the philosophical problem. 
Theoretically, Larroyo's position appears to be 
about the same as Gaos's, that is, that both universals 
and particulars, or essences and existents, in their 
terminology, are necessary in philosophy. But whereas 
Gaos holds that the .>.ristotelian mean between extremes 
is a process of oscillation, Larroyo would seek to find 
a more stable, Neo-Kantian middle ground. 'l'he overtones 
of Larroyo's criticism are negative, while Gaos has an 
attitude of appreciation even for the radical, extreme 
anti-essentialism found in Heidegger. For Larroyo, ex-
istentialism is an extremist position, which simply must 
be rejected as inadequate. 
2. Andr~s Aveline • 
.andr~s .. >.velino Garcia Solano is professor of phi-
losophy in the University of dante Domingo. Since 1920 
l. Ibid., 224. 
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he has published articles and books with the shorter, 
literary name of .'l.ndres .\. velino. He has develo:r;Jed a 
very !Jersonal metaphysical system, which he calls Cate-
gorial Metaphysics •1 Other L3. tin-.americcm nhilosophers 
have paid little attention to his works, perhaps because 
the system is not too clearly defined. 
From his own, very personal position, Aveline 
strongly opposes Heidegger•s existentialism, with special 
reference to the nominalistic and temporalistic extremes 
in Heidegger•s thought. "Being, for existentialism, is 
being thought as mere existence; being is thought as a 
simple 'being-there• in naked, brutal presence."2 
In a paper presented at the First National Congress 
of Philosophy in ~rgentina, in 1949, ~velino criticizes 
Heidegger•s concept of being-in-the-world for its imman-
entism. Being as such may not be found through an anal-
ysis of being-in-the-world. Being may be found, A.velirco 
thinks, in religious revelation. 3 He also sent a paper 
for the Third Inter-.american Congress of Philosophy in 
Mexico City in 1950. In this paper he criticizes Heidegger 
1. Andres n.velino, Metaf1sica categorial (Cd. Trujillo, 
R.D.: Editora Montalvo, 1940). 
2. Andres Aveline, Esencia existencia del ser y de la 
nada, metaf1sica de la nada Cd. · uj llo, R.D.: ~di­
tora Montalvo, 1942), 55-56. 
3. _-\.ndres Aveline, "El problema antin6mico fundamental de 
la metaf1sica," Aetas del Primer Congreso Nctcional de 
Filosof1a, II, 666-674. 
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severely for his anti-religious, anti-spiritual, and 
even anti-moral tendencies. 1 
Although Aveline does not belong to any philosophical 
school, such as Thomism, Personalism, or Neo•Kantianism, 
his attitudes toward Heidegger may be considered as 
coming from an established,position, that is, from 
RVelino•s own doctrine of categorial metaphysics. 
3. antonio G6mez Robledo. 
antonio G6mez Robledo is a young Mexican philoso-
pher-diplomat who, like Guillermo ]~ancovich from Boli-
via, combines professional diplomacy with a philosophical 
vocation. G6mez Robledo spent a term of service in Brazil, 
and his book on Philosophy in Brazil is the product of 
his investigations carried on there. 2 
although the theme of this book is not directly re-
lated to the present discussion, G6mez Robledo includes 
some very revealing statements about his own position in 
philosophy and in philosophy of education, in i'.iexico as 
well as in Brazil. He finds that Brazil has escaped the 
1. Andr~s Aveline, "El problema antin6mico de la arreli-
giosidad del existencialismo," a paper sent to the 
Third Inter-American Congress of Philosophy, and re-
produced by mimeograph for delegates. 
2. Antonio G6mez Robledo, La filosofia en el Brasil 
(Mexico: Imprenta Universitaria, 1946). 
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invasion of existentialism, and is firmly rooted in 
Scholastic philosophy, despite the past threat of posi-
tivism and the Brazilian Positivist Church and the 
present threat of Marxism in Joao Cruz Costa. At 
least it is possible to study philosophy in Brazil 
without being subjected to existentialism. 
G6mez Robledo may have overlooked some existen-
tialist ferment in Brazil, because of the fact that 
the official departments of philosophy were dominated 
either by li:.trxist or Scholastic tendencies. Only a 
few years later, in 1949, Luis ~~shington, from Sao 
Paolo, complained that existentialists were unable to 
break into the philosophical circles, and had to meet 
privately. 1 
Gomez Robledo was highly pleased to find Scholastic 
philosophy still strong in Brazil. Aside from the pos-
sibility that his own strongly-held position in favor 
of perennial philosophy may have been a factor in his 
overlooking a rising ferment of existentialism, GOmez 
Robledo's book, which is excellent on its main theme, 
suggests a strong, negative reaction to having been sub-
jected to Heidegger while he was studying, with Gaos, in 
the National University in Mexico. 
1. Luis Washington, "La filosof1a actual en el Brasil," 
Netas y estudios de filosof1a, 1(1949-1950), 143-147. 
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One of the problems of the book is the reconcilia-
tion of the dominating position of Scholasticism in Brazil, 
which G6mez Robledo approves, and the lack of genuine 
origirulity in Brazilian thinkers, which he deplores. 
From a less conservative point of view, the answer would 
easily be found: the lack of stimulation by conflicting, 
forward-looking tendencies. But G6mez Robledo also op-
poses modernism, positivism, and N~rxism. His explana-
tion of the lack of originality in Brazilian thought is 
a combination of the negative, limiting influence of the 
tendencies just mentioned, and an inadequate philosophy 
of education. 
In presenting his own philosophy of education, 
G6mez Robledo defends "perennial philosophy" against 
the subjectivism ani immsnentism of modern trends, es-
pecially the historicism of Dilthey and Ortega and the 
immanentism of Heidegger. He sees the necessity of a 
struggle between Scholasticism and the new currents in 
vogue in Mexico (Gaos and others in the National Univer-
sity). 
We are not so ingeni~us as to think that by these 
and other arguments or descriptions real agreement 
may be established. To tell the truth, what in-
terests us most is struggle, but a struggle in 
which we, along with the others, may have our place 
in the sun. Let the student have an opportunity to 
breathe some air other than the artificial paradises 
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of modern philosophy, something different from 
the solitary into!ication of the modifications 
of consciousness. 
The manner in which G6mez Robledo contrasts the 
guiding truths of Thomism to the "shipwreck" philosophy 
of Heidegger may be seen in the following quotation. 
We postulate a pedagogical structure, not a 
teaching monopoly, much less a monopoly of human 
truth. The well-known saying that every system 
contains some truth is also found in st. Thomas • 
• • • lviore than once attention has been Ci:l.lled to 
the profound and both implicit and explicit knowl-
edge of ~ristotle in the work of Heidegger. But 
to throw oneself into the sea of anxiety without 
a previous, complete knowledge of the constella-
tions which, apart from our wills, preside over 
every philosophical vo~ge, can lead only to the 
most certain shipwreck. 
G6mez Robledo is apparently in revolt against 
having been subjected to too much Heidegger and not 
enough St. Thomas • 
A later book, in a series devoted to the History 
of Ideas in .~erica, shows a change of attitude toward 
his own experience as a student. G6mez Robledo uresents 
a philosophy of Pan-Americanism in his Idea and Experience 
of America. 3 Although still a believer in "perennial 
philosophy" and still no adherent of historicism or ex-
istentialism, he pays high tribute to Gaos's influence 
1. Ibid. , 198. 
2. Ibid., 192. 
3. Antonio G6mez Robledo, Idea v experiencia de Am~rica 
(M~xico y Buenos Aires: Ji'on(\o de Oultura Econ6mica, 
1958). 
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on a group of young Mexicans. 
Long past are the days in which our beloved teacher 
Gaos proposed to us this grandiose theme in those 
wonderful evenings at Mascarenas [former location of 
the Department of Philosophy], when, like another 
Prosperus, he used to gather round him his favorite 
group, to share with us his deepest experiences and 
what, in his mind, should be given preference by 
American philosophers. Those of us who were part 
of that unforgettable group now are dispersed, sepa-
rated by distances that are practically insurmount-
able--spatial distance is perchance the least--but 
in all of us he raised the hope, already brilliantly 
fulfilled by some, of dedicating at least part of 
our work to the exploration of the Idea of America, 
either as such, or its immeasurable incarnation, or 
at least some part of it.l 
Roman Catholic Scholasticism is still the dominant 
philosophical tendency in Latin America, in the number 
of adherents, if the whole field of Roman Catholic insti-
tutions is included in the consideration. In the official 
departments of philosophy, Scholasticism is dominant in 
many universities, but only a contender for supremacy in 
others. G6mez Robledo's initial negative reaction to 
Heidegger is an excellent illustration of the Roman 
Catholic position, both in regard to Heidegger and in 
the teaching of philosophy. Perennial philosophy should 
be the central, dominant position, from which other points 
of view are studied and evaluated. 
1. Ibid., 9. 
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The situation in the National University of 
Mexico seems to be a three-way struggle among Neo-
Thomists, Neo-Kantians, and liberals of various shades. 
The liberals are in the majority, if they stay together, 
which they have managed to do, at least in preventing 
the dominance of either of the other groups. But within 
the liberal group there are divergences of philosophical 
opinion and sentiment, from Nicol to Gaos, among the 
Spanish refugees, and from Jos~ Romano Munoz and Eduardo 
Garcia M!ynez to Leopolda Zea and Emilio Uranga, among 
the native Mexicans. 
In relation to this dissertation, G6mez Robledo 
represents, especially in his book on Brazilian philos-
ophy, a conservative tendency within Scholasticism. To 
the outside, superficial observer, Scholastic philosophy 
may seem to be a monolithic position, especially if the 
dogmatic principle of faith is emphasized. A closer 
examination, however, reveals differences of schools and 
individual preferences within Scholasticism, and even 
within Neo-Thomism. G6mez Robledo is probably less open 
to Heidegger•s influence, for example, than is the leading 
Mexican Neo-Thomist, Oswaldo Robles. Nevertheless, some 
references favorable to Heidegger may be found in G6mez 
Robledo's later work.l 
1. Cf. Idea y experiencia de ~rica, 10, 12. 
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It seems that no Scholastic philosopher completely 
accepts Heidegger, but some or the Scholastics genuinely, 
whole-heartedly accept some aspects of Heidegger•s 
thought. Some or them, on the contrary, are openly 
polemical in their opposition to Heidegger and to all 
existentialists. G6mez Robledo, especially in his work 
on philosophy in Brazil, serves as an example or the 
more polemical reaction, not only against Heidegger, 
but also against the inrluence or his philosophy. 1 
Other names which could be mentioned, as repre-
senting the Roman Catholic point of view, and varying 
from almost pure rejection of Heidegger to a partial 
acceptance of his views, are Juan Ram6n Sepich, Octavio 
Derisi, Nimio de Anqu1n, Luis Pareyson, Miguel llllgel 
Virasoro, Rafael Virasoro, and Vicente Fatone, among 
many others • 
As another example, mention may be made of Vicente 
Fatone's article, ~eidegger and the Myth of Hyginius," 2 
in which Fatone points out that Heidegger has dealt with 
all the characters or the myth save Jupiter. Care is 
1. A good description of the situation in Mexico, and 
probably as impartial as is possible in such circum-
stances, is given by Juan Hern~ndez Luna in an article, 
"La rilosor1a contemporanea en Ivl~xico," Filosof1a y 
letras, 14(julio-dic., 1947}, 89-113. ~tter another 
decade, the situation continues in unstable equilibrium. 
2. Vicente Fatone, "Heidegger y la fabula de Higinio," 
Sur, (1952}, No. 207-208 (enero-feb.}, 1-23. 
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the beinfo of wan. Time (Suturn) is the judge. E"-rth 
gives rr:an his nar(le c.nd receives his body ut decJ.th. 
Sein und Zeit is Heidegger's consider"'tion of r:an us 
care "-Ed a.s finite ter;porctlity. fut what dboc:t Juc0iter? 
The absence of a doctrine of God, of trcJ.nsceEdeEce, of 
eternity, of hUL:an destiny beyond de~th, is the grectt 
defect, the unforgivdble onission in Heidege;er•s phi-
losoohy. 
C. The Nee-Scholastic mixture of rejection und acceptunce 
l. _,lberto ;iagner de Reyna. 
"'lberto iiagner de Reyna is a Peruvian who studied 
in Germany, vrith Hartmann in Berlin dnd with Eeider:-er 
in Freiburg. His book on He idegger• s Fundar::entul ontology 
has already been mentioned in this dissertation. 
In this book, .iagner de Reyna hcis two aims: to 
show thcit Eeidegper•s philosoohy is an attenpt to solve 
the problen of being, for v1hich e:dstenti<.J.l analysis is 
a means, and to show that in Eeideg"er te:::porality is ·che 
ontological condition (conditioner) of hu;,;an existence. 
Three rel21ted aims are explicitly excluded: the book 
is not an exposition of all of HeicJ.egger's ohilosophy; 
related philosoDhies are not taken into dccount; there 
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is no attenpt at critical evaluation. In 120 pages 
Wagner de Reyna presents a summary exposition, in a 
clear, straightforward style, of Heidegger•s existential 
analysis as the foundation for ontology. ASide from a 
minimum of criticism inherent in the selection and ex-
position of topics, the author is faithful to his ideal 
of impartial, non-critical exposition. 
Six years after the publication of this book, in 
1945, the same year that the second edition appeared, 
the magazine Verbum of Rio de ~aneiro published an ar-
ticle by Wagner de Reyna on "Two Problems in the Phi-
losophy of Heidegger."1 The first problem discussed is 
the problem of God. Wagner de Reyna draws heavily upon 
the work of Zubiri and the latter's concept of man•s 
"religation." Wagner de Reyna speaks of the need for 
"religation" as a vertical dimension, a being-unto-God, 
as well as the horizontal dimension of being-in-the-
world. 
The second problem is in a similar vein, that of 
life after death. Heidegger•s being-unto-death as 
reaching totality acquires meaning in relation to a 
doctrine of judgment, but judgment itself, to have 
2 
meaning, presupposes a future life. 
1. Alberto Wagner de Reyna, Do is problemas na filosofla 
de Heidegger (Rio de ~aneiro: Imprensa Nacional, l945}. 
Separata de la Revista Verbum, 2(1945}, fasc. 1 (maryo} 
2. Ibid., 9-11 
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Wagner de Reyna argues that Heidegger•s philosophy 
is not completed, and that it could either be inter-
preted so as implicitly to include the concepts of God 
and a future life, or could, without contradiction, be 
extended and further developed to include them. wagner 
de Reyna seeks to save Heidegger from the criticism that 
atheism and man•s ultimate finitude are necessary or 
essential to his philosophy. 
In November, 1946, W1gner de Reyna read a paper at 
the International Congress of Philosophy in Rome. The 
paper was read in French, but the author published a 
Spanish version of it in Mercurio ;peruano in 1947. The 
title of the article is "Existentialism and Christian 
Religion."1 
The external relation between existentialism and 
Christian faith is that both deal with the same problems 
and use similar concepts. It might be argued, ;'iagner de 
Reyna admits, that they arrive at different, even opposing 
conclusions, so that existentialism gives a non-religious 
or irreligious answer to religious questions. So it may 
seem, the author argues, but such a conclusion implies 
a definition of existentialism that is foreign to the 
nhilosophy of Heidegger. Heidegger•s point of view 
1. Alberto Wagner de Reyna,flExistencialismo y religi6n 
cristiana," Mercurio peruano, 22(1947), No. 241, 183-188. 
'-
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consists of an ontological, phenomenological descrip-
tion of the nature of man. The problem of God is not 
a part of Heidegger•s philosophy. If the problem of 
the divine existence is included, then the limits of 
1 
existential philosophy have already been passed. 
\Jagner de Reyna then goes on to suggest that a 
consideration of the hum~n attribute of being-unto-
God, which could rightly fall within the limits of 
existential analysis, does not solve the question of 
the divine existence. 
Existentialism can only describe being-unto-God--
which is an ontological component of existence as 
being-in-the-world--and fulfilling this responsi-
bility, it is not theistic in2the sense of af-firming the existence of God. 
Existentialism, and in this term Wagner de Reyna in-
cludes Heidegger•s philosophy, is neither theistic nor 
atheistic; it is neutral in religious matters; it may 
lead to a general philosophy of theism or atheism, but 
not necessarily to either, as is shown by the various 
representatives of existentialism; it is possible that 
future developments of existential philosophy may pro-
vide a structural basis for Christian theology.3 
In a paper on "Death: Life's ~eciding and Decisive 
Possibility, 114 at the Congress of Philosophy at Mendoza, 
1. Ibid., 183-186. 
2 • Ibid. , 187. 
3. Ibid., 188. 
4. Alberto W<J.gner de Reyna, ''La muerte: posibilidad de-
cisiva y decisoria de la vida," Aetas del Primer Oon-
greso Nacional de Filosof1a, II, IIQ6-IIIO. 
3?? 
Argentina, in 1949, Wagner de Reyna shows the religious 
significance of death as final and as a choice. The ac-
ceptance of death as the acceptance of finitude and con-
tingence is an essential part of religious conversion.1 
But death is not a final negation. In death, life finds 
its completion or fulfillment. 2 
In an article published in 1959, entitled, "Without 
and Within in Philosophizing,"3 Wagner de Reyna interprets 
Heidegger•s recent publications as an attempt to find a 
point of intersection between the "without" and "within" 
points of view in philosophy, or, in customary terminology, 
between the objective method of positing some external 
reality, such as matter, and the internal method, which 
leads to subjectivism. The point at which the two dimen-
sions cross is being. The problem is to reach being and 
not to alter it in the process, to avoid letting the con-
ceptual apparatus used to reach being determine the lldture 
of what is reached. Vlagner de Reyna gives this 3.s the 
reason Heidegger has gone back to the Pre-Socratics, when 
"without" and "within" were not so differentiated as to 
constitute dimensions. 
1. Ibid., 1109. 
2. Ibid. , 1110. 
3. Alberto Wagner de Reyna, "Fuera y dentro en el filo-
sofar," Cultura universitaria, Caracas, (1959), No. 
66-6? (enero-junio), 47-54. 
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Wagner de Reyna's loyalty to his former teacher 
appears to be just as firm as his religious faith. 
There is undoubtedly a certain tension between the two 
objects of his loyalty, but he apparently manages to 
keep an inner peace by co-existence. His criticism of 
Heidegger is that the religious nature of man should be 
included in existential analysis, und that there has been 
no completion or fulfillment of Heidegger•s philosophy in 
a general philosophy, which would include a doctrine of 
God and the future life as two essential features of a 
Christian world view. 
Wagner de Reyna's acceptance of Heideg~er is seen 
in his continued belief in the incomplete, unfinished 
stage of Heidegger•s philosophy. Or, in evangelistic 
terminology, he is still praying for Heidegger•s con-
version to a point of view wholly consistent with Chris-
tian theology. So far, Heidegger has not openly avowed 
atheism, although his "God-less thinking" in the lecture 
1 
on Hegel and his refusal to accept any entity as the 
ground for being2 surely constitute a denial of the 
traditional Scholastic concept of God. Wagner de Reyna 
is able to remain loyal to Heidegger•s philosophy only 
by understanding it in a purely ontological sense, not 
1. Cf. Heidegger, Identit~t und Differenz, ?0-?1. 
2. Cf. Heidegger, Der Satz vom Grund, 118-119. 
........ · 
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ontically religious, and by limiting it precisely to 
the definite conclusions reached by Heidegger himself. 
Two fUrther comments may be made upon the mixture 
of rejection and acceptance of Heidegger by i'iagner de 
Reyna. His position illustrates the fact of varied 
reactions to/Heidegr:er within the Scholastic tradition. 
Scholasticism does not present a solid front; there is 
room for widely divergent attitudes toward Heidegger. 
In the second place, Wagner de Reyna illustrates the 
profound and lasting influence Heidegrer has had upon 
his students. Zubiri, Lewith, and Bultmann are other 
illustrations, in the field of religious thought. 
Wagner de Reyna does not think of Heidegger as non-
religious or anti-religious. The anti-religious inter-
pretation comes principally from critics who do not know 
Heidegger personally. Heidegger•s influence upon his 
students may be seen in their tendencies toward a new 
statement of the problems of religious thought, but not 
in tendencies that could be called anti-religious. The 
teacher-pupil relation is probably far more effective in 
communicating religious attitudes than is the author-
reader relation. From the point of view of religious 
faith, it is more dangerous for a student to study with 
an atheist than to read his book. Wagner de Reyna is 
living testimony against an anti-religious attitude in 
his teacher. 
.• 
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2. Os>oraldo Robles. 
oswaldo Robles is the recognized leader of the 
Neo-Thomist group in the National University of Mexico. 
He is not happy with the Neo-Thomist name, and prefers 
to use "New Thomism" (Tomismo NUevo), in an attempt to 
avoid the negative evaluation of Tomism as merely a 
system already completed and simply passed from genera-
tion to generation. Thomism needs to be kept alive as 
inquiry, rather than as a completed system of thought. 
Robles wrote a small volume entitled, Essay on an 
Augustinian-Thomist Existential Metaphysics, 1 which the 
writer has been unable to secure. The title indicates 
a triple purpose in that work: an examination of exis-
tential themes in existentialism dnd in Scholasticism; 
a substitution of Augustinian restlessness, find.lly re-
solved in God, for existentialist anxiety and abdndon-
ment; and the need for objective Thomist argument as well 
as _.,_ugustinian sentiment in the se:arch for truth. 'I'hese 
themes are found in his later work, in summury form. 
Robles has an introductory textbook for beginning 
students in philosophy, entitled, The Jdain Problems of 
Philosophy, in the English translation by Kurt F. Rein-
hart, or Philosophical Propaedeutic2 in the original. 
1. Ensafo de una metaf1sica existencial augustino-tomista. 
2. Oswa do Robles, Proped~utica filos6fica, curso de intro-
ducci6n general a la filosof!a, cuarta edici6n aumentada 
(Mexico: Editorial Porrua, 1958). The English edition 
is published by the Bruce Publishing Company, J,:ilwa ukee • 
r 
... I " II 
-.I : 
I I 
... ~ 
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In the prologue to the second edition {194?), the author 
emphasizes that philosophy is, for him, first a problem 
and then answers, but not first of all a system simply 
to be passed from teacher to student. 
In the first place, we must affirm that, for us, 
philosophy is a problem before it is system: to 
ask questions in order to reply, to inquire in 
order to affirm, to investigate in order to take 
a stand. I~ this we firmly hold to the spirit of 
St. Thomas. 
The spirit of St. Thomas is the spirit of inquiry, which 
Robles praises even in Kant, who "in his century shook 
off the dogmatic vice and, in his own way, followed the 
same Thomistic ideal." 2 
Although Robles would sympathize with Heidegger•s 
suirit of investigation, he has little sympathy vrith the 
results reached by Heidegger. 
To the fundamental question, "What is being?" 
the German thinker gives an incomplete and, in 
addition, a nihilist answer. He limits his ex-
planation to the being of man; but he does not 
say even a word about what being is in itself. 
Furthermore, he continues to say that the being 
of man, the being of human existence, is a going 
away from itself, a being-unto-death, a temporality, 
a historicity •••• We face a nihilism which takes 
anxiety a~ its method and nothing as something 
positive. 
Robles examines the view that in the letter "On 
Humanism" Heidegger expressed a change tow..trd a posi-
tive doctrine of being. Robles finds no change. 
1. Robles, Proped~utica filos6fica, 13. 
2. Ibid., 16. 
3. Ibid., 1?3. 
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The search for some ontological foundation beyond exis-
tentialism, as in Zubiri, for example, may be a legiti-
mate search, but it is not Heidegger, who, for Robles, 
"continues to hold to his original position."1 
Despite his rejection of Heidegger•s conclusions, 
Robles recognizes the values of the phenomenological 
description of finite, fallen man in this world. 
But let it be clearly understood that in charac-
terizing Heidegger•s philosophy, in its present 
state, as a metaphysics of nihilism, we do not 
wish to affirm that transcendence to an absolute 
foundation is not at all possible, although with 
changes in his statement of the problem, and taking 
advantage of the undeniable wealth of his phenom-
enological description of the human existent.2 
In the formation of his own doctrine of man, Robles 
uses Augustine rather than Heidegger. Man's "ontological 
restlessness" is a longing to overcome finitude, at the 
same time that it emphasizes finitude. 
Heidegger nissed the way: his existential analysis 
ends in nothing; it is affirmed in negation. Aug-
ustine, on the contrary, ends in be~ng and finds 
rest in the boundless heart of God. 
AUgustinian "restlessness is the reflexive consciousness 
that the contingent being has of his own contingency."4 
1. 
2. 
3. 
4. 
This restlessness, for Robles, hc<B two directions. 
Ibid., 
Ibid., 
Ibid., 
Ibid., 
175. 
176. 
268. 
272. 
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It dScvnds, on the one lUnd , toward the Supreme Baing; 
it also descend~ to death, to its existential emptying. 
Both .L\lP'UStine nd Heidegger describe the descent; there 
is no ascent .,1n Hei egp,. r • 
In •ddition to the description of man •s finitude, 
the logical recognition of finitude requires a fUrther 
step . The key argument , for Robles, is the need for 
something necess~ry in order to ~ffirm the contingent . 
There is no doubt that exiBtent~al restlessness , 
to ~ve the anxious experience ot my limitation, 
is a Point of de~rture from which the intellect 
muy discover the contingence of my exi~tence; but 
this discovery could not be nude if the intellect 
had not first found itself in possession of jntel-
ligible being , of existential judgment and of the 
first principles of being: possibility and actu-
ality. To feel limitation ie not to know it as 
limitc1tion; to live restlessness1is not to explain the meaning of restlessness ." 
Robles also utilizes Zubiri ' s doctrine of "reli-
gation, " and goes on to c1ffirm the desire for a "dis-
cursive demonstrc1tion of the existence of God ." 
In summary, Robles finds in Heidegger a sPirit of 
inquiry into the great problems of Philosophy und a good 
description of man ' s finitude . Like other Schol~stics , 
Robles regards He1deggor1 s Philosophy as incomplete and 
negative. There is still hone for him, ho~~ver, in con-
r<ist to Sd.rtre . "Slrtre •s work , we sincerely believe , 
should not be read by philosophers , but by psyohiatrists ."2 
1 . Ibid. 272- 273 . 
2 . Ibid ., 187 
' 
• j 
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3. riiiJidel ~uiles. 
; 
Is~el ~uiles, of the ~esuit Order, is general 
editor r;,! a series of small volumes on "The Philosophy 
of our Time; Men and Ideas," published by Espasa-Calpe 
in Buenos ..;.ires and Mexico City. His own book on Hei-
1 degger; the,Existentialism of Anxiety is the third of 
the series. It carries an Imprimatur from the episcopal 
-....____office of Bue•lOS Aires. The book is small (108 pp.), 
but ver:y r.:learly written and forthright in its exposi-
tion and critical evaluation of Heidegger. 
The book consists of three parts and a conclusion. 
The three parts are entitled: "Exposition of Heidegger•s 
Existentialism," "Critical Observations," and "Beyond 
Existentialism. n 2 The first part, which is almost en-
tirely limited to exposition but which contains a few 
points of sharp criticism, constitutes almost half the 
volume. One brief paragraph of critical remarks, within 
the exposition, reads as follows: 
We shall not follow Heidegger in his analysis of 
temporality--profuse analyses which certainly con-
stitute the weakest, most confused, and least ac-
ceptable part of his whole work, in spite of its 
being the culminating point. We believe that here 
more frequently than anywhere else the experience 
of the original situation is forced, in o3der to 
accommodate it to a pre-conceived thesis. 
1. Ismael ~uiles, Heidegger; el existencialismo de la 
an~ustia (M~xico: Espasa-caipe Mexicana, 1948). 
2. Ib d., 15. 
3. Ibid., 45. 
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In the second part of the book, ~uiles accepts 
three positive values in Heidegger•s existential anal-
ysis: an initial spirit of realism in attacking the 
ontological problem, the value of the individual, and 
1 
the essential finitude of man. 'dith regard to the 
first point, ~uiles lauds Heidegger•s phenomenological 
description "without presuppositions" in theory; 
but in practice it is difficult to do away with 
presuppositions, and some critics observe that 
Heidegger•s investigation is made, at leas~ in 
part, from a pre-determined point of view. 
The second point of acceptance also has its limi-
tations. Heidegger follows Kierkegaard in an accent 
upon the individual. This emphasis is in agreement 
with Christian philosophy, for 'tUiles, if what is meant 
is the autonomy of man, despite his dependence upon 
absolute being (God). 3 
The third point also has its limitations. I~n 
is finite, but ••• the incomplete analysis needs to 
be faithfully completed. 4 
~uiles presents his negative (1) evaluation of 
Heidegger under the heading, "Forgotten Values." There 
are four elements omitted from Heidegger•s analysis: 
the joy of life, the aspiration for eternity, a profound 
1. Ibid., 53-55. 3. Ibid., 54. 
2. Ibid., 54. 4. Ibid. , 55. 
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impulse toward complete satisfaction in "something 
absolute," and Zubiri•s "religation." 1 
The writer understands these four omissions as, 
in reality, two: positive sentiments and religious 
dependence. ~uiles criticizes Heidegger for the as-
sumption that the negative sentiment of anxiety is 
more adequate to reveal the nature of existence than 
is the positive sentiment of a happy life. The issue 
is debatable. ·~Uiles also criticizes Heidegger for not 
finding religion in his analysis of man. 
In this little book by ~uiles, the ecclesiastical 
position on Heideg?'er seems to be quite clearly and 
carefully defined. Heidegger is not officially denounced 
as atheistic. There is still hope for him, in contrast 
to Sartre. But Heidegger's position is far from com-
plete, and far from satisfactory if accepted as complete. 
The third section of the "warning to the faithful," 
as it might be called, is an attempt to go beyond exis-
tentialism. In this section ~uiles examines Heideg17.er• s 
letter "On Humanism," and the doctrine of ex-sistence, 
in contrast to other doctrines of the nature of man. 
~uiles prefers in-sistence, by which he means that man 
L "f&id., 57-74. 
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finds the reality of his own being in something deeper 
within himself, rather than outside himself. 
We are in agreement with Heidegger that the true 
ex-sistenoe is beyond essence and exis.tenoe and 
"rational animal," and tliat it·is the u!hmate 
ground of his essence and his e~istenoe, of his 
rationality and his animality, 6f his "humanitT' 
and of what is most intimate in his being. But 
this ground is not found in "going out" (eo-stasis 
toward nothing, toward the external), but "entering" 
into himself (eo-stasis toward the internal), in 
order to arrive at what is more I than I myself. 
To be in him, in-sistence, is the truth of man, 
the truth, in its way, of every contingent being.1 
~uiles goes on to mention, specifically, the ~ugustinian 
doctrine of man's "restlessness" and its solution in 
God, and Zubiri's doctrine of "religation." These are 
the two leading ideas to be used in going beyond exis-
tentialism. 
Finally, in a concluding chapter, ~uiles suggests 
that Augustinian sentiment toward God must be objectively 
complemented by Thomistic arguments. In effect, this 
is another oritioism of Heidegger's sentimentalism and 
nominalism, from the point of view of "perennial" phi-
2 losophy. 
The major question involved in the exposition and 
oritioism of Heidegger by ~uiles is the adequacy of a 
perennial philosophy of entities (God and his creation) 
1. Ibid., 83-84. "Being," in this quotation is equivalent 
to entity in other parts of this dissertation. 
2. Ibid., 104-105. 
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as a point of view from which to judge a philosophy of 
the meaning of being. The two are in different realms 
of discourse, unless it be affirmed that Heidegger•s 
"ontological difference" is pure nonsense, and that 
all philosophy is necessarily a philosophy of "some-
thing," hence subject to commonly accepted criteria. 
Heidegger•s later works may be understood as a strong 
reaction against the traditional point of view. <~,uiles 
and Heidegger are on the same road, but are not going 
in the same direction. The partial acceptance of 
Heidegger by <~,uiles is little more than a point of 
departure for the refutation of his philosophy. 
The attempt to absorb Heidegger into Roman Catho-
lic Scholasticism takes the "sting" out of his philos-
ophy, by reducing it to a somewhat-incomplete, some-
what-misguided philosophy of human finitude. Heidegger 
serves as a challenge to the "true view," but beyond 
that his philosophy has little usefulness and very 
little truth. 
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D. Other mixtures of rejection and acceptance 
1. Samuel Ramos. 
Samuel Ramos is known throughout Latin America 
for his philosophical best-seller, The Profile of ~hn 
and Culture in Mexico, 1 first published in 1934. In 
this book Ramos utilizes the results of Adler's psychol-
ogy in an analysis of Mexican personality and culture. 
The imitation of Europe and the feeling of inferiority 
are developed in an attempt to provide for Mexicans a 
deeper understanding of themselves, in order to over-
come their limitations. Self-acceptance is a step 
toward self-improvement. 
The value of Ramos's work for philosophy was rec-
ognized slowly, but in recent years his contributions 
have been greatly appreciated, at least in Mexico. Much 
of the contemporary movement in the history of ideas, both 
in Mexico and in Latin America as a whole, can be traced 
to the influence of Ramos on his students at the National 
University of Mexico. Ramos is also known for his in-
formative History of Philosophy in l\iexico. 2 
1. Samuel Ramos, El erfil del hombre y la cultura en 
Mexico (Buenos A res: spasa- a pe, 195 • Cont1ene 
un pr6logo a la tercera edici6n, pp. 9-lSJ 
2. Samuel Ramos, Historia de la filosof1a en Mexico 
(Mexico: Imprenta Universitaria, 1943). 
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The influence of Heidegger in Ramos's thought is 
succinctly stated by the latter as a starting .. point for 
his philosophical anthropology, of which a sketch is 
given in his book, Toward a New Humanism. 1 The point 
of departure is a set of axioms of human ontology. 
These axioms appear obvious or commonplace, but are 
not for that reason without philosophical importance. 
Precisely on account of their axiomatic character, 
some of these ideas may be considered obvious or 
commonplace, like truths that everyone already 
knows; and the question may be raised why a phi-
losopher should do so much work to find what has 
already been discovered. This happens with some 
of the most characteristic ideas in Heidegger, 
which, when stripped of their philosophical ter-
minology and expressed in co~on language, seem 
to lose their novel prestige. 
Despite this sharp criticism of Heidegger•s ex-
pression of commonplace truths in novel terminology, 
Ramos justifies the philosophical clarification of ideas 
that are basic but only vaguely recognized and accepted. 
Ramos proceeds to make use of several of the concepts 
presented by Heidegger. Human existence is not objec-
tive, like the existence of things, but is always round 
as being-in-the-world. Human existence is temporal, 
1. samuel Ramos, Hacia un nuevo humanismo, programa de 
una antropolog1a rilos6fica (Mihico: La G:isa de 
Espana en Mexico, 1940). 
2. Ibid. , 60. 
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never fixed or static. Objective time is the river bed 
over which things flow; for human existence, time is the 
river itself, an integral part of human nu ture •1 Anxiety 
is axiomatic of human existence because death is always 
a possibility. The uncertainty and the multiple pos-
sibilities of human existence make of it a teleological 
project. Man is free to make of himself something more 
than what he is • 
Ramos uses Heidegger•s "phenomenology of human 
existence," like an a priori essence of man, as the 
foundation for the concrete science of philosophical 
anthropology. For the development of his theory, Ramos 
makes frequent use of other modern philosophers, especi-
ally Bergson, Ortega y Gasset, Scheler, and N. Hartmann. 
Ideas from Heidegger are really only a point of departure, 
an axiomatic foundation, almost purely formal in its lack 
of specific content. 
Thus, Heidegger's existential analysis, which is 
fundamental ontology, or, in common language, the founda-
tion for ontology, is the foundation for philosophical 
anthropology in Ramos. Ramos insists upon an empirical, 
scientific method to gain concrete data for his theory 
of man. To know what man is, man must be empirically 
1. Ibid., 62. Ramos makes no reference to dames's "stream 
of consciousness." 
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observed, not merely analyzed in relation to his peculiar 
mode of being. Despite this difference in methodology, 
Ramos's use of Heidegger•s existential analysis is quite 
in accord with Heidegger•s idea that the concrete sciences 
of man, such as sociology and anthropology, are on a 
different level of investigation from fUndamental ontology.1 
A major problem, which Ramos saw more clearly than 
many other critics of Heidegger, is the matter of method 
in a theory of man. Heidegger•s method is existential 
analysis, the phenomenological attempt to approach the 
essence, core, central feature, or un-presupposed nature 
of human existence, apart from its content. Heidegger 
does not speak of bracketing, as Husserl did, but there 
is a sense in which he does bracket all of the concrete 
facts of human existence in his analysis of it. To see 
this method in Heidegger, every term must be stripped of 
its concrete meanings, and must be thought in a purely 
ontological sense (if such is possible). By so doing, 
Heidegger may be seen as a genuine follower of Husserl, 
having applied Husserl 1 s method to the most radical 
philosophical problems of what it means to exist as a 
person and to be, in general. The latter problem is 
1. Of. Heidegger, Sein und Zeit, 45-50. 
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mentioned and introduced in the published portion of 
Sein und Zeit, but not discussed. It is the central 
unsolved problem of Heidegger's thought. 
The \vriter sees in Ramos's criticism a rejection 
of Heidegger's methodology. Ramos insists upon concrete 
data in tbe elaboration of a theory of man. Heidegger 
seeks to arrive by analysis to the core of man•s being. 
Ramos's use of Heidegger•s ideas as an axiomatic base 
for empirical investigation changes the nature of those 
ideas. The problem raised in regard to the interpretation 
of Heidegger is equally difficult. Is Heidegger himself, 
or anyone else, capable of thinking phenomenologically 
about the essence of human existence? Or, in regard to 
the problem of language, is it possible to think terms 
in a purely ontological sense, without any concrete, 
ontical significance? Aside from these deeper problems, 
Ramos thinks that Heidegger•s method is unsatisfactory. 
In its place, Ramos uses an empirical, scientific method 
in the elaboration of his humanism. 
Ramos understands Heidegger sufficiently to appreci-
ate his thought, although he does not fully agree with 
Heidegger. Heidegger's philosophy is not pedantry, nor 
a futile attempt to think the impossible. It is an at-
tempt to justify philosophically the simple, basic truths 
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of existence which are usually taken for granted. 
The phenomenology of human existence may not be, 
in itself, the whole of philosophical anthropology. 
Once having defined the a priori essence of man, 
it is then necessary to begin the construction of 
the science as such, and confront the empirical 
reality of man and t~e theories which have been 
expressed about man. 
For the writer, Samuel Ramos illustrates a healthy-
minded utilization of imported ideas. He is no follower, 
imitator, or defender of Heidegger; neither does he op-
pose Heidegger from a previously-established philosoPhical 
fortress. He appreciates Heidegger as a thinker, criti-
cizes some of his procedures and conclusions, and uti-
lizes some of Heidegger•s ideas for his own purpose. 
Ramos is an example of mature, critical appropriation 
in philosophy. 
2. Jos~ Romano Munoz. 
Jos~ Romano l\i!ufioz, professor of ethics in the 
National University of Mexico, has little sympathy with 
the conclusions of existentialist philosophy in Heidegger 
and Sartre. His book, Towards an Existential Philosophy, 2 
is sharply critical in its opposition to negative conclu-
sions which are intellectually "pernicious" and morally 
1. Ramos, Hacia un nuevo humanismo, 61. 
2. Jos~ Romano Munoz, Hacia una filosofia existencial, 
al margen de la nada, de la muerte y de la nausea 
metafisica (Mexico: Imprenta Universitaria, 1953). 
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"deplorable."1 The particular objects of his criticism 
are Heidegger•s "nothing" and Sartre•s "nausea." Both 
thinkers, according to Romano Munoz, reach nihilist 
conclusions 
In his opposition to the two basic ideas mentioned, 
Romano Munoz presents three main arguments. First, 
negative presuppositions are the foundations of phi-
losophy for Heidegger and Sartre. a philosophy without 
any presuppositions is impossible. Negative prejudices, 
as found 
positive 
in Heidegger and Sartre, are even worse than 
2 
ones. In the second place, both Heidegger and 
Sartre make an arbitrary selection of data for their 
philosonhies of man. They do not take into account 
the whole of human experience. Some data, especially 
the positive aspects of moral and religious experience, 
are ignored. 3 
The third argument which Romano Munoz brings against 
the nihilist conclusions of Heidegger and Sartre is a 
reference to the circumstances of Europe which accom-
pany the two philosophies in question: disillusionment, 
skepticism, oYn.icism, and the destruction of moral and 
religious standards. The tragic situation, it is in-
sinuated, augments the production and the reception of 
1. Ibid., 31. 
2. Ibid., 13, 91, 101. 
3. Ibid., 81-91. 
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tragic philosophies. In this argument, Romano Munoz 
is in full agree.tnent with Norberta Bobbie, who charac-
terizes existentialiSJn as a philosophy of decadence, 
a philosophical rationalization of decadent culture. 1 
Romano Munoz mentions one detail of life in post-war 
Germany. When Sein und Zeit was translated to Spanish, 
Heidegger asked that the few dollars due him for trans-
lation rights be sent in food. 2 
Despite his sharp criticiSJn and general rejection 
of Heidegger•s philosophy, along with Sartre•s, Romano 
Mu.i'ioz accepts and uses some of He idegger• s ideJ.s. He 
considers himself, in a specific sense, an existential 
philosopher. The specific sense is the consideration 
of the existence of the human individual as the point 
of departure for philosophy. J"ust as the psychology 
of the subconscious is greatly indebted to the pioneer 
in that field, Freud, but is not limited to Freud's 
reduction of everything to sex, so existentialism owes 
much to Heidegf:er and Sartre, but needs to go beyond 
their nihilist con elusions. 3 In this point of view, 
Romano Munoz agrees with the idea of Bri~htman, as 
found in a paper sent by the latter to the Third Inter-
American Congress of Philosophy. 4 
1. Norberta Bobbio, El existencialismo (tr. Lore Terra-
cini) (M~xico: li'ondo de Cultura Econ6mica, 1951). 
2. Romano Munoz, Hacia una filosof1a existencial, 145. 
3. Ibid., 33. 
4. Edgar S. Brightman, "The Shining Present." 
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Romano Munoz also uses Heidegger•s distinction 
between authentic and inauthentic selfhood as an argu-
ment against Sartre•s definition of freedom. For Romano 
Munoz, Sartre's freedom is meaningless because it is 
simply freedom to be free, without content of any kind. 
In Heidegger, even though the content is not adequately 
defined in terms of specific values, freedom is at least 
freedom "for something," to be one's own self. In pre-
senting this argument, Romano Munoz goes ahead to his 
own doctrine of moral philosophy, in which freedom is 
always freedom for something--for meaning and value--
without which it would have little or no significance. 1 
Romano Munoz makes use of Heidegf':er•s personalistic 
tendencies and the title of "existential philosophy." 
Heidegger•s ideas, however, find little resonance in 
the basic thought patterns of Romano Munoz. 'lhe latter 
is far more responsive to the philosophers of value, to 
Scheler and Hartmann, rather than to Heidegger, in the 
development of his philosophy. 
1. Romano Munoz, Hacia una filosof1a exi_stencial, 77, 80. 
In this cha.ytcr, the negative c:.nd nixed re.~ctions 
na.Lss of the c0.rl:r :x.:1.rt of the centrtry, :corn, V0.sconcelos, 
and C:1so, ;:;.re ur:_u.n:ll:tous in their re ~i e ct ion of tl:e ~1ev.r 
phj_losoyhy of neccl.ti ve, no1 J.n.::.::..~istic te.·_-_l---:JOr...:J.lisn. :~orn 
objects tc Eeideg-~er's c~pitul~tion to ~7~zisn, on t~e 
1_>:round that his ''h:_losophy LUSt be coctitute to -,;er,;:it 
such a t}o-i_1J.g. Vctseoncelos c::;.lls 2-:Teide~::-:er' s yhono:·-~eno-
l rlr-i c.--'1 anal~'"Ql·s a "t <"'(''r-le " ctnr1 u;:·.- -'- - ,!'-' ~ ..... c, ' ~ the :J_uestion -~bout vlhy 
entities ruther thQn nothing a sil~y, illopical question. 
Ca.so objects to Eeidegc;er's full arru;r of ~er;;,;,tive sen.ti-
2~:ents, a "let-dovvn''! ~~hiiosophy, sui t~J..:-_.le for t~c; '-.:.ft2r-
r::a th of ·:·Iar • 
F:r:_..;,ncisco Ro~,1ero is not e!ltire:!_:r ner:~.:.tiv·e ir:. ~1.is 
recJ.ction to Eeidell;ver, althouc;h he renl'escnts ~o rs-J.l 
iEfluefl.ce of Ye idefp;er exce~t as a ch8.llcnc:e to lis ovm 
vie1.-r..r. Ho~_:;_ero J.cce:;:t2 ti·:-:;r~por8.lism, Out :·_Jot a. tc::~ :-or~lism 
'idthout ,my st·:'ucture. "'e opoor;es Lcide~;:-er' s scbordina-
tion of reason (the int,~~=1t:i_o:nt!l consciousness :r:. ~he sub-
ject-object rel'-ltion) to a "hc;.rdlins" conure'ce;1sion of 
utensils. Ro~ero also ilsists upon the ~eed for fixed 
Doints of reference, such o..s vc..lues, leGt the \)~flilcsophy 
of nure ~n'ocess becor,:e an uffirmution of ch,ws. 
Of the othsr established points of view in conten-
porary Ll.l t in-_:...:::e:ri can ~J}:ilos ophy, tie =-::eo-J..::..:L:nt i-:J.!lS, the 
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phj_losophcrs of value, und the Hona.n C0.t:nol ic r::·eo-Jcho-
lastics have eithCJr rejCJcted c'eideg~er e'.",tireJ~:r or uc-
ce)ted Lis tdes.s in u lini ted v;:.;.y, usuo.lly us a. cJ:.d~_J..snge 
to the "true viev~'. '" 
de Reyna utto:~mts to ha.rnonize Heidegr.;er• s furcdu::cer:tul 
onto loe:y '.:i th tru.d it ional vie'::s , re cog:1 i zing, ctl ons ·:,~i th 
Zubiri, t:t;_at reidecrer's o.nci.lysis of hu:JLa.n e:·:i.ste!1Ce is 
inco!'lnlete. Relit;ious dependence is a. necessar:r cJart of 
r.:a.n's nature. os~/ialdo Robles 8X:l:;~inos Eeidetji''Gr's ~~)11i­
lcsophy 'Hith Cclre, but has no synrpdthy Vlith Iceidee;,c;er' s 
conclusions. Isuael ,uiles illustrates the conservdtive, 
authori~uridn tendency ~ithin Scholastic thought in his 
criticism of ?eidegrer. 
Samuel Rar:os finds in Heidegger soc:;e com.:'on:Jluce 
truths in novel ter'''inology; he uses these truths as an 
axiomatic foundation for his philosochicJ.l dnthro~Jology 
or neYT hu..rnanisu. R.u.::os op-ooses the idea. that :'un can be 
knovm by 'Jhenomenoloq:iccJ.l anJ.lysis alone; scientific and 
enpirical methods must also be used to define the full 
nc1ture of nan. 
CHAPTER VII 
HEIDEGGER' S EXISTEHTIALIS!1: IN Loi.TIN ilJilERICA 
The title of the present chapter includes Heideg-
ger within the classification of existentialism in 
Latin 1lillerica, despite Heidegger• s rejection of the term 
in its application to his philosophy. The point is wor-
thy of brief consideration, especially in the light of 
the two preceding ehapters, on the introduction of Hei-
degger to Latin .limerica and the widespread negative reac-
tions to his philosophy. Heidegger•s opponents and crit-
ics, with the possible except ions of J"os~ Gaos, .Juan 
David Garcia Bacca, and samuel Ramos, have classified 
Heidegger with Kierkegaard, .Jaspers, Sartre, Earcel, and 
a few other lesser figures. 
The major attempt to avoid this clctssification has 
been the work of J"os~ Gaos, in his translation of Rei-
dagger's main work, in the Introduction to that >rork, 
and in other articles and books. Gaos's translation 
follows Heidegcer•s avowed purpose, and presents his 
terminology as a new language, that is, new in the mean-
ing of terms. Sein und Zeit has not yet been translated 
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:!J:rto Sp9.nish, if Spanish means the language of ordinary 
life and literature. Gaos chose the literal method of 
translation, because, for him, any other method would 
have been a falsification of Heidegger•s purpose. Such 
literalism was not happily received. l,Iany readers of 
Spanish expected Heidegger to become clear and under-
standable to accustomed thought patterns, if only the 
language barrier could be traversed. Gaos attempted to 
make Heidegger just as difficult to grasp in Spanish as 
in German, but also just as faithfully presented in the 
translation, insofar as possible. He w·as eminently suc-
cessful, at least with regard to the difficulty. His 
Introduction uses the same technicalities, and is alnost 
as formidable as the translation itself. 
Gaos sought to save Heidegger from the existentialist 
label, insofar as the literal translation of terminology 
could do so. The Lla,jor questions asked by a reader of 
Heidegger 's Dhilosouhy are like the following: What does 
it all mean? How cloes it "add up?" Where is he going? 
Gaos chose to translate Heidegger, and not to answer the 
questions a reader might have about the content. ~uberto 
Wagner de Reyna chose to answer major questions, within 
certain limits, with the reply that Heidegger is a "funda-
mental ontologist," or an existentialist, if existential 
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PhilosoPhy is defined as a foundation for ontology. 
J,:ost Latin _,mericans have classified Heideg['er v,cith 
other existentialj:sts. This classification is the key 
to understanding many of the negative reactions to his 
PhilosoPhy. It is also the key to understanding some, 
althoug~ not all, of the positive acceptance of his 
philosouhy by Latin cllllericans. If to call He idegger 
an existentialist is to misunderstand his Philosophy, 
then his influence in Latin .'l!llerica is larr;ely a result 
of such misunderstanding. 
It will be the purpose of this chapter to present 
positive reactions to Heidegger among the Latin •llllericans. 
'rhe initial desire of the writer to survey the -hole 
field of Latin-.illlerican philosophy in this regard has 
met with repeated :railure and frust:·atior:. _,_ll_ '~!,at 
can be done is to give a sample of positive reactio~s, 
particularly in ".rgentina, Cuba, and };iexico. 
"03 
A, • .J.rgentina 
1. Carlos astrada. 
Carlos "\.Strada studied with Heidegger in Freibure;, 
and found in his teacher an insniration for a personal, 
existential type of philosoDhical thinking. The intro-
duction to his book, Existential Dynamic, contains a 
statement of gratitude and admiration for his teacher, 
along v1ith a discussion of tre impossibility of a strict 
teacher-pupil relation in philosophy. Philoso:ohy is 
strictly personal, in contrast to scientific thought, 
where there is a possibility of one person's substituting 
for another. In philosophy, according to ,cstrada, each 
punil must be his ovm teacher, must make his ovm lessons . 1 
. .J.Strada calls Heidegger the most imnortant Western 
nhilosonher of the present [1933]. Heidegger did not 
offer a new system to his students; neither did he tectch 
and comment upon famous systems of the uast. Instead, 
he inspired vital urgency in the concrete activity of 
h 'l h' . 2 p 1. oson 1.z1.ng. "'-strada presents his "ovm" views, fol-
lowing Eeideg;cer for the most part (sic), on the nature 
of existence, of philosophy, and of science. ~'he key 
term is "juego," ir. its varied, yet somev1hat related 
meanings, 
1. Astrada, El juego existencial, 9. 
2. Ibid., 9. 
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c..strada presents his o'V'm analysis of a child's 
ulay (juego) as an activity that is free and autonomous. 
In this analysis, the author takes only a suFgestion 
from Heidegger, and is not presenting Heidegr,er's views 
on the subject. 
The attitude of complete freedom is a characteristic 
of a child's play. Play is a mood or attitude, nore than 
any specific type of activity. Rules, things, and pro-
cedures are all subject to utilization and modification 
in the course of ulay. Play is a free happening (libre 
acontecer). The living process is original and autono-
mous; all 
titude of 
other asnects are subject to the child's at-
1 play. ..utonomy and phantasy are emphasized. 
A peculiar characteristic of a child's ulay is that 
the child dominates, like a sovereign, the things 
with which he ulays, in his imagination--for exaBple, 
when an upset chair becomes a car--vlithout letting 
these objects impose upon him as reality in any 
moment. For the child there is no difference between 
play and reali_ty. The fundamental characteristigs of 
the child's world are the same as those of nlay. 
From the object lesson of a child at play, ".strada 
proceeds to the fundamental metaphysical uroblem of 
transcendence • 
J!'rom the child's ulay, in that it is a nrocess which 
transcends everything in which it is exercised, there 
bec;ins the anxiety which shakes existence and pro-
jects it toward be~ng, that is, toward the under-
standing of being. 
1. Ibid., 20-21. 
2. Ibid., 21. 
3. Ibid., }3. 
The transition fron the chi !.d at play to the metar)hysical 
problem is the change from ".tuel"o" as play to "juego" as 
risk or gamble, as a game in vrhich the existence of the 
player is at stake. "Hu..llB.n existence is ulaced in the 
game of the underst<mding of being. ,l This understanding 
of being is the pre-ontological understanding found in 
human existence. ~'he task of philosophy is to na.ke ex-
plicit this pre-ontological understanding of being • 
• \.strada concludes the chapter from which the title of 
the book is taken, as follows: 
The understanding of being is a thread of light, 
tense over nothing. It is a thread which goes 
toward being because it comes out of nothing and 
passes through the nest finite of the finite--
ezistence. On this thread man maintains his equi-
librium--a risk which he runs only once--the e-
quilibrium of his existence, H~man existence is 
the acrobat who risks his being ( juega el ser) on 
the loos~ rope of transcendence, and can gain only 
nothing. 
The nature of philosophy, from the existential 
point of view, is the subject matter of the second 
chapter. 1wo characteristics seem to stand out in 
existential philosophizing, for ,iStrada. The first is 
its conplete transc·9ndence of scientific ob je ctivi ty. 
The lilnit of soience is transcendence, or the 
understanding of being •.•• The understanding of 
being is possible only in the transcending of 
existence. Th:is transcending, which makes sci-
ence possible, is the very essence of philosophy. 
Here lies the difference between philosophy and. 
science. To transcend is to philosophize, that 
1. Ibid., 25. 
2. Ibid., 26. 
is, to understand being. 
sense, is thl liberation 
its essence. 
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Philosophy, in this 
of hunan existence in 
The second characteristic of existential philoso-
uhizing is its finitude, not in conclusions but in its 
beginnings. 
Philosophy is a free possibility of man, and, as 
such, finite. But finitude does not mean not to 
be able to arrive at the end. Finitude is not at 
the end, but at the beginning of philosophy, and 
thus ought to be included in the idea of philosophy. 
In contrast to science, philosophy gives no indica-
tion about the object, but about the conviction and 
the manner of bei~ of the philosopher, of the man 
who uhilosophizes. 
In the third chapter, "c.Strada presents the ex is-
tential concept of science. The subject-object relation 
is the principal target of his criticism. "Pre-scientific 
existence provides the foundation for scientific existence."3 
This means that exi.stential truth is, for c>Strada, deeper 
than sc::.entific truth, that the understanding of being 
is prior to objectivity. 
In a chapter on religious existentialists, .cstrada 
uresents the views of Kierkegaard, Unamuno, and Marcel. 
He presents no criticisms of these philosophies. In 
later chapters, the views of Husserl, Cassirer, D1lthey, 
Scheler, Ortega, and Hans Freyer are uresented in com-
parison with Heidegger's ideas, as AStrada sees them. 
1. Ibid., 29. 
2. Ibid., 32. 
3. Ibid., 38. 
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An interesting chapter is entitled, "Suicide and 
the Existential Task." Man's task is to be, in some 
form or other. The chief characteristic of man's being 
is abandonment. Suicide is an extreme form of the 
task. 1 The author laments the too-idealistic suicides 
which were frequent in Europe at the time. ioung people 
were conmdtt:ing suicide over trivial matters, such as 
being unable to succeed in school, or emotional rifts 
with parents. !,:any suicides have been "disinterested," 
according to .iStrada, by which is meant a high sensitivity 
to ideal values. Some would counsel greater loyalty to 
ideal values; .-..strada counsels a new orientation in exis-
tential aims. Young neople are too much denendent upon 
what is outside themselves, such as things, theories, 
values, and ideals. 2 A greater acceptance of existential 
finitude, it is insinuated, would be the key to mental 
health. 
In 1936, Astrada published a book comparing Husserl 
and Heidegger, entitled, Phenomenological Idealism and 
Existential Metaphysics. 3 The purpose in this work is 
to show, after comparing the vievm of the two thinkers, 
that Heidegger is not simply a student of Husserl who 
1. Ibid. , 109. 
2 • Ibid • , 114. 
3. Carlos .<J.strada, Idealismo fenomenol6gico y metafisica 
existencial ( Bue'nos .aires: Imprenta de la Universidad, 
1936). 
developed further the views of his teacher, but an 
original thinker wto arrives at a position not only 
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at variance with Husserl 1 s, but basically in opposition 
1 
to Husserl's. For .AStrada, Husserl's "universal phe-
nomenological idealism," although not a continuation 
of historical forms of idealism, is really "only a 
making explicit of self as the subject of possible 
1 d .,2 know e ge. .'~.Strada holds that Hus serl' s views, on 
account of inherent limitations, can not be developed 
into a metaphysics of essences. If phenomenology is 
switched from essence to existence, "\strada thinks, 
the limitations may be surmounted. 3 
AS the first part of the book is an exposition 
and criticism of Husserl, so the second part is an 
exposition and defense of Heidegger. Eusserl's truth 
is, according to AStrada, a derived, secondary truth, 
whereas Heidegger's truth is more original, more basic, 
urior to propositional truth. 4 
In a brief chapter of critical conclusions, ",strada 
presents a series of alternatives, or comparisons, of 
Husserl and Heidegger. Consciousness and existentiality, 
1. Ibid., 6. 
2. Ibid., 43. 
3. Ibid., 48. 
4. Ibid., 111. 
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intuition of essences and existential understanding, 
intentionality and transcendence, or Husserl and Hei-
degger, respectively, are the is sues to be decided. 
Astrada prefers Heidegger in each instance. 
Two more problems in Heidegger are discussed by 
_'l.strada. The firs1; is the question of why there is so 
much misunderstanding and misdirected criticism of 
Heidegger•s views. Astrada attacks the criticisms 
of I:eidegger presented by Maximilian Beck, Paul Hof-
mann, Fritz Heinemann, and dUlius Kraft, and evaluates 
these criticisms as a failure to understand Heidegger. 1 
·~~uch has been written about Heidegger, and almost all 
has been erroneous in its interpretation."2 Heidegger 
can not be fitted into traditional molds; the attempt 
to classify his philosophy in the old patterns is re-
sponsible for misinterpretations. 
1mother problem is the difficulty in understanding 
Heidegger. -1Btrada recognizes the difficulty. ·~ei-
degger is a difficult philosopher, but not obscure. 
Heidegger is certainly not within the reach of the 
curious majority. 113 .d.strada believes that Heidegger 
is the philosopher of the contemporary epoch, and that 
some day he will no longer seem difficult, especially 
1. Ibid., 115-120. 
2. Ibid . , ll8. 
3. Ibid. , 122. 
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after his philosophy is accepted as representative of 
the time and is assimilated and used as a speculative 
1 
orientation. Kant and Hegel were also difficult in 
their times. 
In a brief appendix to the work, • ..strada compares 
Heidegger and Dilthey, and emphasizes the difference 
between Dil they• s psychological approach and He idegger' s 
existential analysis. 
The argument of the entire book might be summarized 
by calling it Astrada' s defense of Heidegger against the 
charge of subjectiYism. The problem is not faced squarely. 
Instead, "-l.Strada a'~tributes the "subjectivistic" criticisms 
to misunderstanding, which, in turn, results from the 
attempt to fit Heidegger into traditional patterns. 
In 1942, .~strada published Metaphysical Dynarnic. 2 
Several of the chapters were written during the 1930's, 
although only a few were published when written. The 
book contains material on Jaspers, Scheler, and Kierke-
gaard, but the point of view from which these thinkers 
are considered is dominated by Heide(Sger, as .c~Strada 
understands him. 1be basic theme of the book may be 
found in the subtitle, "For a Philosophy of Finitude." 
Finitude is the starting point of philosophy and the 
1. Ibid., 122. 
2. Carlos ";.strada, El ,juego metaf1sico, para una file-
sofia de la finitud (Buenos .ures: Librer1a ElAte-
nee, Editorial, 1942). 
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key to the nature of man as philosopher. 
Philosophy is not the "dead language" of pawt 
systems, but the living activity of philosophizing 
from the concrete, existential situation. 'f.he search 
for being becomes a drama in which man's being is at 
stake and in which man's being is revealed to him as 
"essentially precarious, finite, as pure nothing. ,l 
The dynamic (juego) of metaphysics is an activity, a 
game ( ,juego), a risk ( ,juego). 
Metaphysics is the existential dynamic of thought 
(the metaphysical game), playing for and around 
being, the active understanding of which condenses 
the drama of our own being, of our irrevocable 
nothing.2 
Four chapters in the first part of the book con-
tain various aspects of •!.Strada' s thought. "The !Vleta-
physical Vigil" is an attempt to say that all men are 
asleep, until they awake, and stay awake, to the meta-
physical game, in which all is at stake. 3 In "'I'he 
End of Philosophy," the author affirms that philosophy 
has no end (aim, telos) other than itself, to transcend 
all things, to exist in the understanding of being. 
The only end of philosophy is to philosophize. 
To be faithful to this end is to be faithful to 
ourselves, to maintain ourselves in the midst of 
existence, immersed in its radical historicity.4 
1. Ibid., 9. 
2. Ibid., 10. La motafisica es la dinAmica existencial 
delppensamiento (el juego metafisico), jugAndose por y 
en torno al ser, cuya comprensi6n activa compendia el 
drama de nuestro propio ser, de nuestra irrevocable 
nihilidad. 
3. Ibid., 15-17. 
4. Ibid., 21. 
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In "The Game of Philosophy," .~strada combines the 
ideas of playing a game and complete involvement in the 
game. If the writer understands .->.strada correctly, the 
idea is that of a nlayer who gives himself wholly and 
completely in the playing of the game, so that his ·whole 
being is involved. He "risks all." Such is philoso-
phizing. Man's being is involved in it. The game is 
tragic, because of the risk. The risk gives rise to 
emotional overtones. Consequently, if there is no 
emotion in philosophy, it is not philosophizing, be-
cause nothing is risked. 1 The finitude of the nlayer-
philosopher is the element that gives the only possible 
solution or end to the game. Mystical religion, for 
Astrada, is a violation of fair play in the game, be-
cause the game is prematurely ended. 
Only the metaphysician practices existential fair 
play. He knows that he can exist only when in each 
stake he pllays the totality of his being, without 
anything beyond the g~ itself. This is the finite 
game of a fin:i.te being. 
When all is at stake, there is anxiety, because of 
the nature of the game. There is no philosophy of e;ame, 
in the sense of another point of view from which to see 
the game, but nhilosophy itself is the tragic game. 
"There is no philosophy of game, but a tragic game of 
3 philosophy." 
1. Ibid., 30. 
2 • Ibid • , 33 • 
3. Ibid., 33-34. 
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The question of rules for the garne is briefly 
mentioned. For .d.strada, there must be no rules exter-
nally imposed upon the game. The process itself of 
playing makes its ovm rules as it goes. To exist as 
man is to philosophize. ''We exist only in the dramatic 
adventure of philosophizing. rr1 
another interesting chapter in the book is the 
comparison of Kierkegaard and Heidegger. Kierkegaard 
is a religious mystic, who finds respite from the great 
dramatic adventure in a 
more venturesome in the 
desperate faith. 
2 
risky garne. 
Heidegger is 
In relation to existentialist themes, "'strada' s 
critical remarks on Scheler are of interest. 
The great merit of Scheler is to have shovm the 
inconsistency of this teleological view, vmich, 
from its clase.ical origins until the present, has 
been the pillow of laziness of Western philosophy. 3 
The problem of philosophy, for .d.strada, is not to find 
a presupposed meaning or purpose in existence, but to 
elaborate the nature of the problem. He contrasts the 
attitudes of Hegel and Heidegger on the legitimacy of 
philosonhical nroblems. For Hegel, "only problems which 
are susceptible to some solution should be posed."4 For 
Heidegger, and Astrada, possible solutions must not be 
allowed to limit the nature of the problems. 
1. Ibid., 34. 3. Ibid., 158. 
2. Ibid., 102. 4. Ibid • , 158. 
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In 1943, .,strada nublished a collection of essays, 
with the title, Temporality. 1 The essays were '.'.·ritten 
over a period of a-oproximately two decades. They deal 
with a variety of theraes. 
The title, Temnorality, in suite of the variety 
of themes--better sa1d, aspects of a single prob-
lem--abstracts the spiritual unity, the speculative 
style of this collection of essays. From the first 
to the last, the same theme pulsates on different 
levels and with various m~tivations, always under 
the sign of Tempus Fugit • 
• 1.strada 1 s main thesis, it seems, is that time, as 
finitude, is the end of everything. Life is to be lived 
in the assurance that death is final, that all man's 
attempts to attain anything of permanence are doomed to 
failure. The asnirations of the moral life, the ideal 
of beauty, the impulse to find permanence in thoueht, 
in art, in mystical experience--all come to nothing. 
'l'hus there arises the antinomy, which is transformed 
into an agonizing struggle in the intimacy of the 
spirit, which in spite of its longing for permanence 
does not attain transcendence of the moving, transi-
tory structure in which it is involved. This is its 
fate insofar as it is human spir~t, insofar as it 
is joined to the destiny of man. 
The probl~l of man is that his ideal asuirations 
for truth, beauty, and goodness, even beyond death, are 
not nossible of attainment. 
1. Carlos .~trada, Temporalidad (Buenos ~ires: Ediciones 
Cultura Viva, 1943). 
2. Ibid., 7. 
3. Ibid., 9. 
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In idea, man goes beyond his end, and projects 
himself into the most remote future, u.nd, even 
beyond time, into eternity; but this does not 
mean that he can really transcend his existenttal 
structure as a completed totality of duration. 
The book conta.ins fifteen chapters, or essays, 
in four groups. Two chapters in the section entitled, 
"From Life to Existence," are of interest. The transition 
is from the Philosophy of life to existentialism. In 
the chapter on "Rupture with Platonism," -"i.Struda argues 
for cleaning out all remnants of Platonic and religious 
postulates in philosophy. 
Nietzsche's philosophy of life signifies the ad-
vent of a revolutionary philosophy, which today 
is concentruted in existentialism, u position 
which affirms the immanent structures of human 
existence and its concrete unfolding in historicity. 
In summary, tl:.e present pas it ion proposes to bring 
out the factual situation of hunan existence, 
stripped of every transcendental illusion, of 
every alienat~on and exile in seductive objec-
tive spheres. 
Astrada gives Heidegger credit for making a complete 
break with Platonism, and with all religious postulates 
of a transcendent world. 
Existential philosophy starts from the bare fac-
tuality of human existence in this world. It 
wishes to establish neatly the human situation, 
just as it presents itself on this side of every 
religious or transcendental hypothesis, evalua-
tion, or conception. In this regard it is neces-
sary to note that this is not a matter of an 
1. Ibid., 9. 
2. Ibid., 114. 
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anti-religious attitude, nor a hostile attitude 
toward the peculiar task of a dogmatic or a 
speculative theology, since it explicitly recog-
nizes the rights of a metaphysics, based upon 
reason or mystical experience, as a doctrine of 
belief' •1 
.-..strada proceeds to def'end a view of man limited 
strictly to this world. Ref'erences to another world 
or to a divine providence have no place in the descrip-
tion of man in this world. "Human existence is limited 
to itself and has its end in itself; it rests in its 
own precarious reality." 2 
In a chapter on "The Existential Genesis of Values," 
.~trada attacks the attempt to subject man to any kind 
of objective structure. The philosophy of values is a 
magnificent intellectual structure, with a magic curtain 
of fixed stars, but it tumbles and falls before the real 
drama of anxious, f'inite man, who will not subject him-
self to being an engineer who manages theatrical tricks. 3 
The remedy, f'or .-1Strada, is to recognize the existential 
origin of values, by which he apparently means their 
comulete subjectivity. 4 
In the final chapter of' the book, on ''J,Iysticism and 
the Existential Climate," .~trada presents a study of 
Kierkegaard and Unamuno as precursors of Heidegger•s 
1. Ibid., 115. 
2. Ibid • , 116 • 
3. Ibid., 128-129. parauhrase. 
4. Ibid., 130-131. 
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existentialism. Only through desperation are they 
able to attain religious faith. Their mysticism is 
transcendental, and takes them out of this world. It 
is a paradoxical mixture of finitude and infinity. 
Heidegger•s philosophy is more in accord with Rilke•s 
mysticism within this world. "What Heidegger calls 
'the end,' being unto death, then, is nothing but 
Rilke's poetic·postulate of his •own death.•"1 The 
discussion is not carried to its logical conclusion, 
but 4strada's insinuation is that man must learn to 
be religious entirely within the limits of finitude. 
In 1949, .1.Strada published a book entitled, Being, 
Humanism, "Existentialism."2 The writer has been unable 
to secure this book. 
Other publications of the same period are .1.Strada's 
papers at the First National Congress of Philosophy, 
held at the National University of Cuyo, in },;endoza, 
"~gentina, in 1949. His philosophy of finitude is 
presented in a clear contrast to philosophies of the 
infinite or the absolute, of which Hegel's "'bsolute is 
the outstanding example. The title of AStrada•s paper 
indicates the basic content of his argument: "The Meta-
physics of Infinity as a Result of the "Transcendental 
1. Ibid., 202. 
2. Carlos AStrada, 
(Buenos 4ires: 
Ser, humanismo, "existencialismo" 
Kairos, 1949). 
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Illusion. ,.l The metaphysics of infinity is, for .>Strada, 
a product of an illusion of transcendent (other-worldly) 
reality. 
In another paper at the same Congress, .J.Strada in-
terprets existentialism as a philosophy of the present 
2 
age. Existentialism is often thought of as a ":ohilos-
ophy of the crisis" of our time. This characterization 
means that the present critical times have produced a 
philosophy in accord with the times. For ."-Strada, exis-
tentialism means a crisis for philosophy. Traditional 
positions are striving to accommodate the new philo-
sophical problems into old formulations. The striving 
is in vain, for the new problems will not fit into the 
old systems. 3 
The contrast between existentialism and traditional 
religious views is succinctly stated. 
One of the most far-reaching consequences of the 
phenomenological analysis of human existence 
(Dasein) is that it brings out the situation of 
human existence, as it presents itself in this 
1. Carlos -~trada, "La metaf1sica de la infinitud como 
resultado de la 'ilusi6n trascendental, '" .~etas del 
Primer Congreso Nacional de Filosof1a, II, 660-665. 
2. Carlos ">.strada, "El existencialismo, filosof1a de 
nuestro tiempo," Ibid., I, 349-358. 
3. Ibid., I, 355. 
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world, in its bare factuality, as a temporal 
process, conclusive in itself. Therefore, it is 
no longer conceived as a mere transition, in re-
lation to another world of blessedness, to which 
it could be destined. Thus there arises the af-
firmation of concrete existence, with its social, 
historical environment and with the destiny of 
man as a worldly being; for man the way is open 
which is to lead him to his full humanity, without 
transcendental interference nor calls from beyond. 1 
The disillusioned acceptance of finitude is man's ·way 
to be free in the creation of himself and his destiny. 
Man creates himself in his own historical process, 
through a succession of contingencies, necessities, 
and changes. 2 
In 1952, ~trada published a book entitled, The 
Existential Revolution, with a clarifying subtitle, 
"Toward a Humanism of Liberty. "3 The book contains 
some of the ideas and formulations of earlier works, 
especially the author's papers at the Congress of 
Philosophy in 1949. Some of the later developments 
of his thought may be found in this book, as well. 
One of the problems is the question of "existen-
tialism," that is, whether or not Heidegger is an exis-
tentialist, and in what sense. •iStrada believes that 
Heidegger is existentialist in his point of departure, 
but not similar to other existentialists in his conclusions.4 
1. Ibid., I, 358. 
2. Ibid., I, 358. 
3. Carlos .iStrada, La revoluci6n existencialista, hacia 
un humanismo de la libertad (Buenos Aires: Ediciones 
J\Tuevo Destino, 1952). 
4. Ibid., 36-37. 
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d8trada wishes, most of all, to avoid confusing Hei-
degger•s views with the Christian existentialism of 
Marcel and various attempts to reconcile Heidegger to 
"perennial philosophy."1 
"mother question which AStrada discusses is the 
problem of nihilism. .'2trada believes that a comnlete 
renunciation of the conservative, "eternal" values and 
truths of Christianity and Plato's transcendent world 
is a necessary stage in the achievement of humanistic 
liberty. Nihilism "should be not only negation, but 
also affirmation, redemption, and liberation."2 Nihilism 
is a necessary stage in the transition from man•s aliena-
tion from himself in traditional values and concepts to 
a new, vital, existential affirmation. 3 
On the question about the nature or essence of man, 
.dStrada classifies Heidegger•s views with other theories 
which make of man a task or project rather than the 
realization of an essence. 
The pragmatist postulate coincides with this 
fundamental idea jn Marx [that the tusk of phi-
losophy is to change the world, not to interpret 
it], and with the meaning which traxis assumes in 
Heidegger's initial position. I may be said that 
Marx's homo oeconomicus coincides with pragmatism's 
homo faber and, in part, with the homo curans (the 
man of care4 in Heidegger•s existential-ontological 
concention. 
1. Ibid., 37. 3. Ibid., ll. 
2. Ibid., 9. 4. Ibid., 54-55. 
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Astrada finds a change in Heidegger's position, 
between Sein und Zeit and later works, esnecially the 
letter "On Humanism." Whereas in the major work Rei-
degger consistently interprets being (~) from the 
point of view of Dasein, in the later works there are 
indications of a "turn" in the movement, so that being 
is used to interpret Dasein. 
This ambiguity in Heidegger•s thought, the oscil-
lation between the two directions, makes a place 
for an ambivalent idea of bein~, as well as of 
the historical essence of mE\n. 
Astrada sees the change in Heidegger as a turn toward 
mythology. The chapter is entitled, "Heidegger, li!ythol-
ogist of Being." 
The fact that "'"strada takes a position which he 
thinks Heidegger once held and later abandoned, is 
most interesting. For nstrada, Heidegger is not quite 
radical enough in his denial of any essence in man. 
Sartre and Heidegger, the latter without doubt 
in lesser degree than the former, do not recog-
nize the real dimension of the Problem of liberty, 
by not elucidating it from a point of view strictly 
consistent with an exhaustive position that is both 
existent and existential •••• To affirm that the 
"essence" of Dasein is its existence means that 
Dasein has no essence, in the traditional philo-
sophical sense of th~s word, because for an entity 
to have an essence presupposes that the entity 
maintains a unitary and constant relation with its 
being. But this is not the case of Dasein, which 
may abdicate its being by alienation (Hegel, Marx), 
1. Ibid. , 66. 
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permitting itself to be absorbed in Confessions, 
in the State, in the manifestations of ritual, of 
cult, or in objective structures in general; or 
it may appropriate its being in authentic or un-
authentic modes (Heidegger); or it may dilute its 
being, hypostatically, in an absolute entity, God 
(the mystics). It may be said that Dasein, in 
synthesis, may affirm itself in the selfness (%psei-
dad) of its being or may lose that selfness, a -
dicating its liberty and condemning itself to 
carry on an un-home-like existence, which is the 
ulti~te consequence of the various modes of aliena-
tion. 
leian is to be redeemed from the loss of uure selfness 
jn anything outside himself. Heidegger's later works 
indicate, for .~trada, a departure from his earlier 
nosition. The mythologizing of being becomes, in •• strada's 
view, a poor substitute (Ersatz) for the Sunreme Being 
of religion. 2 
.~trada also opnoses Heidegger• s romantic nep:ation 
of technology. There is no redemption from technology 
in an ascetic retreat into simplicity, into a type of 
life which belongs to ages now long past. 0uch an es-
cape is possible for the individual, but is only a 
brief parenthesis in the technological age. 3 
.~trada anpears to be such a strong advocate of 
absolute freedom for man to be himself that he rejects 
any kind of limitations that might be imposed upon man • 
• ul things, all ideals, all truth, and all values are 
1. Ibid., 10~-104. 
2. Ibid., 125. 
3. Ibid., 152. 
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entirely subject to man. He does not discuss in this 
bock the problem of freedom among individuals, that is, 
the question of the individual and society. 
Of all the Latin "unericans, .">Strada is easily the 
closest follower of Heidegger, especially of the earlier 
Heidegger, as Astrada understood him. 'I'here is consider-
able confusion in some of AStrada's views, and an ap-
parent inability to see the arguments for opposing 
positions. The question might be raised whether or not 
the imitation of Heidegger and the literal following of 
his position, as understood by a student, is genuine 
philosophical influence. A minimum of independence is 
necessary, in order to be able to speak of influence; 
otherwise there is only imitative repetition. Neverthe-
less, c~trada does reach a degree of indenendence in 
rejecting supposed changes in Heidegger•s point of view. 
An interesting consideration is the variation 
between the ways in vvhich .rt.Strada and dagner de Reyna 
understand the views of their teacher. " .. strada is ap-
narently in onposition to any religious view of life 
as an alienation of man's freedom; Wagner de Reyna 
accommodates Heidegger, with certain limitations, to 
a religious point of view. 
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2. Carlos ,iJ.berto Erro. 
Carlos .uberto Erro is an . .;.rgentinian author and 
essayist who has shown much interest in philosophical 
themes. His book, Lacerated Time, 1 published in 1936, 
is a study of the neriod after the First .iorld 'dar. 
This period is presented as a lacerated, decadent time, 
in need of great new currents of thought. The period 
of decadence in Roman society is presented in compari-
son to modern times. Christian thought, esDecially in 
"'ugustine, Provided the necessary renewal in the time 
of Roman decadence. 
The nature of the renewing influence was a kind of 
thought which, by its anxious, sentimental nature, stirred 
up a new dramatic conception in thought. ""nxious, deeply 
felt thinking was the renewing factor, in contr~st to 
nlay thinking, the sporting attitude of later Roman 
Stoicism and Epicureanism. 
Erro characterizes modern liberalism as a decadent 
philosophy, no longer sufficiently anxious or felt deeply 
enough'to renew the spirit of the times. Kierkegaard, 
Unamuno, and Peguy are three prophets who speak for re-
1. Carlos Alberto Erro, TiemDo lacerado (Buenos .e.ires: 
Ediciones Sur, 1936). 
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newal, for a new, deeper vi,sor in "the profound voice 
of metaphysical torture." 
Bergson, Max Scheler, and Heidegger express this 
voice from varied posit ions. Heidegger is the 
youngest, the most recent; his theories are the 
latest Philosophical novelty of importance, the 
latest which have stirred up a movement of uni-
versal curiosity, and which take as their point 
of departure, like an axis or foundation of their 
ideal architecture, the concept of anxiety.l 
Althou~p Erro does not use the phrase, his ideas 
are in accord with the adverse judgment on liberalism 
as a "too-easy optimism." For Erro, humanity has become 
intoxicated with ideuls .2 The anxious thinking of con-
temporary existentialism is largely a recognition of 
Kierkegaard and a revival of the philosophical impor-
tance of desperate anxiety. Erro sees Heidegf:er cts a 
philosopher who raises the mood of anxiety to the 
heights of supreme importance in philosophy. Philosophy 
is renewed by becoming passionately dramatic. 3 
In the summer of 1936, Erro visited Heidegger in 
Freiburg. The report of his visit is another small 
volume, Existential Dialogue, to wrci ch reference v1as 
made in Chapter V of this dissertcttion. Erro sought 
in Heidegger the systematic, philosophical formulation 
of the anxious mood of the times and of Kierkegaard•s 
1. Ibid., 79. 
2. Ibid., 130. 
3. Ibid., 181-182. 
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prophetic, deswrate, existential thought. For Erro, 
Heidegger' s main work is the first "strictly philosoPh-
ical formulution of existential thought." In Heidegger, 
this existential thour:ht "passes fron the plane of lit-
erature and essays to a philosophy developed according 
to classic norms."1 Erro was pleased to find thut 
existential thinking had, "at last, attained the authen-
2 
tic category of Philosophy." 
The dialogue between Erro and HeidegGer illustrates 
tlE varied purnoses of the two men and their atterant to 
arrive at an understanding. Erro sought to link Heideg-
ger to Kierkee-:aard. Heidegger attempted to convince 
Erro that the relation between his ovm philosonhy and 
Kierkegaard's thought was largely accidental, limited 
to the use of a few terms and concents, in Particular, 
anxiety. ~t the end of the conversation, Heidegger sug-
gested that he would be hapny to Provide w:ritten ctnswers 
to s orne of the quest ions they ha.d dis cussed. 
For the writer, this dialogue takes on cons ide ra b le 
significance when seen as Heidegger' s atternpt to show 
the dif:':'erence between his ovm philosophy and the thought 
of Kierkegaard. l!'or the Da.nish prophet, anxiety is an 
atter~pt to show the deeper significance of feeling in 
l. Erro, DialOfO existencial, 23. 
2. Ibid., 23-24. 
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the religious life, as conpared to thought, '-'nd the need 
of man, as an individual, to cast himself wholly upon 
the Lord in irrational, trusting fuith. J:<"or Heidegger, 
anxiety reveals the non-substantive nature of man . 
. illxiety is one among several data, such as conscience, 
debt, and resolve, which must not be understood in their 
ordinary ethical meanings. For Beideg{'er, these data 
J.re ontological revelations of the view that terrmorality 
is the horizon from which the being of man nay be com-
prehended.1 
In summary, Heidegger tries to clarify briefly that 
the meuning of terms in Sein und Zeit is strictly related 
to the stated purpose of that work. He also gives Erro 
an answer to the question about his relation to r:ierke-
gaard. 
In fact, much has been said of the influence of 
Kierkegaard on my works. Hegel, Kant, Leibniz, 
.I.I'istotle, and Heraclitus have been just us great 
in their influence on me. Everyone ·sho professes 
uhilosouhy should seek the influence of the great 
thinkers •••• Referring to the influence of Kierke-
gaard, in particular, I must tell you that the 
Danish author is as far from the question discussed 
i'1 Sein und Zeit as any author could be. In aeta-
physics, Kierkegaard is so dominated by Hegel that 
for his thought, from the point of view of Dhilo-
sophical metaphysics, Hegel's logic is no problem. 
But for w~, for examDle, Hegel's logic is the most 
extreme contrast ano 2the most profound problem in 
'de stern metauhysics. 
1. Ibid., 121-123. 
2. Ibid., 132, 133. 
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The dialogue illustrates Heidegger•s desire to 
avoid the confusion of his fundarnentJ.l ontology with 
KierkeBaard 1 s urouhetic individualism in religion. 
This confusion auuarently dominated Erro's uuruose in 
seeking a visit Vlith Heidegtzer. The generosity of the 
philosopher in providing written answers to questions 
was apparently an attemPt to clarify what has become 
one of the most confusing problems in the interPreta-
tion of Heidegger 1 s philosoPhy. 
If Heidegger•s philosophy is seen as a sequel to 
Kierkegaard, then Heidegger 1 s contribution to philos-
oPhy is twofold: he systematized the individualistic 
revolt against system, ~nd turned into atheism the 
prophetic call to a desPerate, passionate, irrational 
theism. 
For the writer, Erro•s Existential Dialogue helps 
slightly to clarify Heidegger's position and to illus-
trate the extensive popular confusion of cross currents 
in the "existentialist school." Heidegger's Philosophy 
becomes a masterpiece of self-deception on this theory, 
desuite the following considerations. Both KierkefSaard 
and Heidegger oppose Hegel, although for different reasons. 
Both use many of the same terms, or more Precisely, the 
same vrords, but in different contexts. It could be said 
that they sneak the same sounds in different languages. 
<l29 
Both are subjectivistic and individualistic, but, again, 
in different aims and contexts. Both have irrationalist 
tendencies, although Kierkegaard is a passionate pronhet 
who nuts his desperate trust in God, while He idep;ger is 
a disillusioned nominalist who trusts nothing in any 
ultimate sense. 1 
Erro' s co:ooluding comments on his visit l'iith Rei-
dogger indicate a new perspective on the relution between 
Heidegp;er and Kierkegaard. 
'rhe influer.ce of Kierkegaard on Heidepe:er, w:Cich 
tl:e latter recognizes, "s we have just seen, ctnd 
which, without doubt, is very imnortant, is not, 
however, so gredt as has generully been thought, 
nor is it of the nature generally thought. 'lbe 
majority of conLtentators have been imnressed with 
the reanpearance of Kierkegaard' s the:-aes--anxiety, 
debt, nothing--in Heidegger•s work, J.nd on this 
basis have affirmed categorically that in this 
latter work a large part of the funish author• s 
thouvht is faithfully reflected, vcithout consid-
ering the different meiilling which those therLss 
have in Heidegger•s terminology and in the dif-
ferences between the two edifices one and tpe other 
have made from a common point of departure.~ 
To illustrate the differences, Erro explains the 
con cent of nothing as used by the tvm r:~.en. 
It is another nothing, soi!l.ething distinct, which 
both authors designate with the same vmrd. Behind 
the use of words in common there has been an at-
tempt to find, at bottom, an ~dentity or real simi-
larity, wnich docs nc>t exist. 
1. To substitute "some" for "any" in this sentence is to 
illustrate both Heidegger•s thought natterns "'nd another 
internretation of his philosophy. 
2. Ibid., 135. The "com.rrwn point of departure" is dubious. 
3. Ibid., 136. 
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Erro attributes Part of the confusion in the 
interpretation of Heidegger•s philosophy to sor.w sec-
ondo.ry sources, especially Vlorks b7 Gurvitch und Chestov, 
which have added-to popular confusion bec'"use of the in-
adequate understanding of Heidegger. 
Erro found in Heidegr;er a new lib0ration. 1 The 
writer believes that Erro•s liberation v,ao; in uccord ·-'ith 
".is m·:n previous concept of Heidep:t:e:t as a systematizer 
of Kierkegaard's existential thought, ra.ther than in con-
sonance with Heidegger•s ideas as found in the written 
report. This "erroneou-s" influence, '-'S it rdr:;ht be 
called, is a sir;nificant factor in Latin "~aerica. Rei-
degger is acclaimed by some as the Gost syster,cl.tic voice 
w"long the irrationalist prophets who revolt agttinst what 
is called the abstract, superficial, Proud oPtimisr!l of 
rettson. If so interpreted, Heidegger is a philosoPher 
who revolts ae;ainst philosophy as syster•l"-tic doctrine, 
anr3 thus illustr:ottes the bankruptcy of Phi los oohy itself, 
of man's attempt to fathom the divine mysteries. Erro•s 
rePort is, in itself, a concrete examole of Heidegr·or' s 
influence in this sense. For Erro, a great value in 
Heidegger is to have called attention to Kierkegaard. 2 
1. Ibid., 21. 
2. Ibid., 136-140. 
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Influence thus becomes a two-way street, and Heidegc:er 
is just as important for carrying sip:nificance back to 
Kierkegaard as Kierkegaard is important for Lis influence 
on Heidegf:er. 
In Latin .ooerica, Erro has little significance as 
a philosopher. His report on the visit v1ith Eeidegr,er 
is on the level of a writer or colu..'11!1ist. I1Teverthelese, 
his report illustrates the extent ~nd the n~ture of the 
confusion about Heidegf:er in Latin ."l!aerica. The fact 
that his reuort is not clear on some of the deeper nrob-
lems involved, such as a "Common point of dep~rture" in 
Kierkegaard and Heidegger, has limited the Philosophical 
importance of Erro 's work. 
3. ~. Salas Subirat. 
iill Open Letter on Existentialism, by~. Salae Subi-
rat,1 is a popular exposition of several currents of 
existentialist philosophy, including Heidesr:er, and an 
illustration of the manner in which existentialist ideas 
may be used to foster autonomy in the fields of norals 
and uublic on inion. The author seems particularly con-
cerned about the need for liberation of thought ~nd moral 
choice from theological control. He affirms that a 
1. ~. Salas Subirat, Carta abierta sobre el existencialismo 
(Buenos cdres: Santiago Rueda, Editor, 1954). 
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Christian ~xistentialism is really a contradiction in 
terms. Existentialism means choice; the Christian has 
already chosen. 1 
Salas Subirat counsels self-realization, here and 
now, without fUrther ado. 2 Disillusionment and the 
acceptance of finitude, VIith all its limitations, are 
included in his "moderation," a sort of equilibrium 
between extremes. The book has many literary allusions, 
a.nd is very interesting, almost entertaining, vii th the 
accompanying limitations of no footnotes for the many 
quotations, and unsystematic presentation. 'Ihe book 
has little significance for philosophy, except on a 
very superficial, popular level. 
In relation to the theme of this dissertation, 
the book by Salas Subirat illustrates the popula.rity 
of existentialist philosophy as literary subject matter. 
For the author, existentialism is sw1ply an instrument 
to be used in the struggle for freedom of thought and 
moral choice on a popular level. 
1. Ibid., 182. 
2. Ibid., 18?. 
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4. Lorenzo Carnelli. 
In Tliae and Right, 1 Lorenzo Carnelli applies Hei-
degger1s ideas to the philosophy of Right. The explana-
tion of the title is as follows: 
.>.lthough Heidegger reserved for the second purt of 
his work the relations which lead to being in general, 
what he has produced, in terms of his ontology as 
compared to regional ontologies, o.dequately shows us 
man as a singular, concrete existence in time. -"nd 
if, in reducing time to a co-essential mode of being 
human, he chooses the title, Sein und Zeit, we, who 
use his analysis and apply it to the basic structure 
of' the juridical object, believe that the title, Time 
and Right, is scttisf~ctory, in accord Yii th this p-;::r::--
tlcular application. 
The book consists of three Jl.klin parts, of which the 
first tvm are the author's exposition of existence and 
temporality, follml'ing Heidegger. l'he third part is the 
application of Heidegser 1s ideas to the philosophy of 
Right. 
The basic tension in the work is between ilight as 
creative, responsible judgnent ctnd Right as fixed in 
forms and precedents. Carnelli argues for freedor:l from 
fixed putterns, e~.nd especially from patterns imposed by 
any external authority, such as religion or philosophy. 
l. Lorenzo Carnell, l·iempo y derecho (Euenos ".ires: 
Librer1a dur1dica, 1952). 
2. Ibid., 9-10. 
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On any hypothesis, Right, now exorcized fron the 
religious spirit which formerly subjected and per-
verted it, will hardly fall again under ti:ld t dom-
ination, and even less, we hope, bl the indirect 
way of a philosophical estimation. 
The creativity of Right is found in the judge, and 
in Right itself. 
Philosophy does not nake Right. .0art fron the 
positive character that nornatively depends upon 
the judge, Right .wakes. itself, as nan makes him-
self, in response to his existent~al ought-to-be, 
from his antic-ontological depth. 
The problem of judgnent is crucial. The judge must 
juda:e the facts of the case, in the sense of lmo'lfledge. 
The judge must also judge in the sense of sanction. 
Both are volitional acts of the judge, who constitutes 
"' himself as judge in the act of judging.u Nevertheless, 
the judf,e must not interpose his own noral criterion 
in his judgment. Neither history nor precedent is 
adeQuate basis for jud&ment. 
Carnelli recognizes that time, although it is 
basic to the problem of Right, gives no reul ansv.rer 
to the judge's probler.; in judging. ''Ultima. tely, then, 
we have an unsolved problem."4 Carnelli's conclusion, 
for whut it is worth, is as follows: "Let Hight be 
vrhat it is."5 The relation of Right to ldw, dnd the 
nature and validity of law are not discussed. 
1. Ibid., 87. 4. Ibid., 198. 
2. Ibid., 88. 5. Ibid., 203. 
3. Ibid., 179. 
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B. Cuba. Humberto Pinera Llera. 
Humberto Pinera Llera is a leader in the younger 
generation of Cuban thinkers. In a brief survey of 
philosophy in Cuba, Waldo Ross, from Chile, charac-
terizes this generation as eclectic. 1 Pinera Llera, as 
president of the Cuban Philosophical Society, partici-
pated in the Unesco investigations on the teaching of 
philosonhy. He wrote the report on "The Teaching of 
Philosophy in Cuba," in which he confirms the dominant 
position of eclecticism in the two official universities.2 
Pinera Llera attributes the recent renewal of phi-
losophy in CUba to three principal causes: an increasing 
maturity in abstrctct thought, the critical world situa-
tion, and the influence of European thought, especially 
from France and Germany.3 
The possibility of new solutions to the epistemo-
logical problem has been of particular interest to 
Pinera Llera. In 194?, at the Second Inter-American 
1. Waldo Ross, Cr1tica de la filosof1a cubana de hoy 
(La Habana: Comisi6n Nacional Cubana de la Unesco, 
1954), 15. 
2. Humberto Pinera Llera, La ensenanza de la filosof1a 
en Cuba, una encuesta internacional organizada por 
la Unesco (La Habana: Comisi6n Nacional Cubana de la 
Unesco, 1954), 35-36. 
3. Ibid., 25. 
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Congress of Philosophy, in New York City, he presented 
a paper on "Epistemological Possibilities of Existential 
Philosophy."! Traditional epistemology has focused its 
interest on the subject-object relation and the doctrine 
of categories. Pifiera Llera follows Heidegger in rejecting 
the subject-object relation as basic to the epistemological 
problem, in an attempt to avoid the impasse between ide-
alism and realism. 
A second epistemological problem is the nature of 
categories. For Pifiera Llera, Heidegger•s existentials 
may be thought of as categories of human existence. They 
are interpretative in nature, whereas traditional cate-
gories are entitative in nature, and Kant's categories 
are constitutive. 2 This new type of categories opens 
up new possibilities for epistemology. 'I'he new pos-
sibilities are not worked out. 
In another paper, sent to the Third Inter-1l.Illerican 
Congress of Philosophy in liiexico City, in 1950, Pin era 
Llera continues with the theme of a new existentialist 
epistemology. The instrumental nature of objects is 
the basis for a new approach to epistemology. 
It is the pragmatic character of Heidegger•s exis-
tentialism which opens a new and very serious breach 
in traditional epistemology; his notion of the in-
strument as a point of departure for a theory of 
objects, besides being novel, presages a possibility 
of overcoming the impasse, due to inherent contra-
dictions, in which, up to now, the two fundamental 
1. Humberto Pifiera Llera, "Posibilidades epistemol6gicas 
de la filosofia existencial," Philosophy 'nd Phenom-
enological Research, 9(1948-1949), 400-415. 
2. Ibid • , 413. 
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attitude]., realism and idec1lism, h:ciVe solved the 
problem. 
The precise manner in ·which this nev1 epistemology 
is to be worked out is not presented. 
Pinera Llera has published a collection of essays 
under the title, Philosophy of Life c1nd Existential Phi-
2 losophy. The v~riter has been unable to secure this book. 
"• seco~·dary source on Latin-.n.lllerican philosoDhy, by Vic-
toria de Caturla Bru, of Cuba, includes the following 
informative passage. 
ili th regard to ontology, Pii'iera ledves Heidec;~'or 
and approaches, instead, tow·ard Sartre' s pragraatic 
rddicalism, condensed in the dctivist pri_ncip~e 
that man has to be doing, lest he stop being. 
Caturla Bru also indicates thdt Pii'iera Llera favors a 
philosoDhy of life over a philosophy of death. Lan is 
"not a 'being unto dea.th,' but a being for life."4 
Co.turla Bru•s introductory work on Latin-".rnerican phi-
losophy was published in 1959, and without doubt repre-
sents more advanced stages in the thought of Pinera 
Llera than the urticles vrhich the v~riter of this dis-
sertation has examined. 
1. Eumberto Pii'iera Llera, "La importanciu del ezisten-
cialismo," a paper sent to -che Third Inter-->merican 
Congress of Philosophy, 1950. 
2. Humberto Pii'iera Llera, l!'ilosof1a de la vida y filosof1a 
existencialj ensayos (Habana: Sociedad CUbana de ii1o-
sof1a, 1952 • 
3. Victoria de Caturla Br(t, .:,CU<iles son los grandes temas 
de la filosof1a latinoamericana? (U~xico: Editorial Yo-
varo, 1959J, 75. 
4. Ibid., 76. 
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C. Mexico 
1. Leopolda Zea and the Hyperion Group. 
LeoPolda zea is a young Mexican philoso:nher whose 
books on Mexican Positivism were the fruits of his ad-
vanced studies in philoso:nhy under the direction of Jose 
Gaos. One of Gaos•s principal ideas in directing stud-
ents• investigations for theses has been the philosophical 
value of Eexican thought. Gaos thinks of Zea•s work on 
Iciexican Positivism as one of the most successful and most 
important examples of the value of this approach. 
Zea•s main interests in philosonhy, durin~ the past 
fifteen yectrs, have been the history of idects in .lmeri ca 
and the developnent of an "AII1erican" philosonhy, which 
could take its Place along with Geroan, French, British, 
and other traditions. In a still more particular aim, 
Zea wishes to develoP a !;;ex ican philosophy. 
His work on the history of ideas in ;.:exico is found 
in numerous articles for magazines, newspapers, c.1nd 
scholi.irly journals. In 1955, he Published two snall 
volumes on Philosophy in J..iexico,l which contained a weries 
of articles first Published in ney,·spaPers in 1947, plus 
other essays on the same theme. 
1. Leopolda Zea, La filosof1a en i·_exico, 2 tomes, con 
paginaci6n co.,secutiva (l;~xico: Libro-,."ex • .c.ditores, 
1955). 
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One of the articles, v1hich is a chapter in the 
published volumes, deals with existentialism in :.,ex ico. 
Zea' s presentation of Heidegger as a contrast to ~·:usserl 
is interesting • 
.6. final effort to save the VjQrld of essences has 
b,,en the i"//rk of Husserl, '.vith his nhenomenology. 
Scheler and Hartmann have attemnted, in vain, to 
reestablish an ideal ·,•;orld of vc;.lue s, similar to 
the Plo.tonic world; but this world turns out to be 
impotent without the assistdnce of the nowers of 
the world of imnanence .. ~lso, the irtlLanentist 
counterpart soon arises, in the existentidlist 
philoso:ohy of ;,;art in Heidegger; thus :oheno:rcenology 
is no longer a solution, but is converted into a 
method in the servic~ of the imma.nentisi< v:hich it 
attem:oted to combat. 
In the same article, written in 1947, Lea sta.tes 
tho.t the existentialist fad had penetrated in only tV!o 
countries in Lo.tin .{Oerica: .~gentina and Brazil. Zea 
attributes the • .rgentine existentialist fa.d to the Euro-
pean orientation of the culture of t':!u.t country. Fe 
also nentions that some existentialist nrofessors were 
sympathetic to totalitarian doctrines in politics. 2 In 
Brazil, the close relation of .drazilian to .trench culture 
is given as the principal factor in the existentb.list 
fad in that country. 
In Eexico, Zea attributes the interest in ex is ten-
tialisr~ to the hur~anism of !.;exican culture "nd the in-
terest in anthro:oology. 
1. Ibid., 138-139. 
2. Ibid., 154-155. 
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In regard to Eexico, the positive uart of exis-
tentialisn, which has interested c:Jhilosonhical 
scholars, has been its anthronology. Phenorlen-
ology, that is, the description of human life, 
of the hu."lan, constitutes the .nost brilliaiJt 
pages of Heidegger•s fanous work •..• on the other 
hand, the nessinistic consequeljlces of existential 
philosophy have been rejected.-
Zea refers to the work of Gaos i:-1 translatin.g a.nd 
studying Sein und Zeit with students in his clusses. 
Jose Gaos has nade a broad critique of the negative 
part of existentialism in the five and a half years 
during VThich he has been e:xnlair~ing this Philosophy. 
_;,. sUTll'lary of his main critici~ms r::ay be found in the 
article PUblished in Luninar. 
Zea also refers to Juan David Garcia Bdcca, who at that 
time vras teaching in Lexica, and to other critics of 
existentialism. 
Zea' s work on the history of ideJ.s in Lexica includes 
other traditions, vrhich are not within the scone of this 
dissertation, except in regard to the question of the 
degree of Heide::c,o:er' s influence unon Zeu, ccs co:rrmaren to 
other influences. Zea's predecessor in the study of the 
history of 1\iexican Philosophy was 8anuel Ramos. .,lso, 
Rar:os vms a r:reat student of locexican culture, in the form 
of humanistic anthroPology and psychology. For namos, the 
i\iexican needs first to understand hin;self, then accept him-
self, in order, later, to achieve an affirmative reulization 
of himself. The accePtance of limitations .md an insight 
l. Ibid., 155. 
2. Ibid. , 156. 
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into J:,,exican feelings of inferiority are necessary steps 
in the realization of effective possibilities, ruther 
t an ir: the unreal world of :ohantasy. rianos•s work on 
r.texictm psychology and culture is siP"nifi.cant in L.ea' s 
thought. tho con cent of a new huruanisc;l is Cl.lso ir1uortant. 
'.!'he Hyperion Philosophical Grouu was founded in 
;_exico City by some students in philosonhy. The founding 
members were Ricardo Guerra, .Joaquin i.acgr~gor, .Jorge 
Portilla, Salvador Reyes Nev:1rez, Emilio Uranga, .B'austo 
Vega, and Luis Villoro. Zea is recognized us the le--tder 
or sponsor of the groun. They began their activities in 
the study of French existentialism. 'l'heir first nublic 
appearance, in 1948, vias in a series of nublic lectures 
on the same theme. Later in that year they presented a 
series of oublic lectures on "Problems of Contennorury 
philosophy." 1 
The major project of the nyperion Group h~s been 
the nublication of a seri'"s of studies on Lexica und the 
Lezicci.n. . . s sponsor for the movement, Zea became general 
editor of the series of small volurnes. The entire col-
lection of studies may be thought of as an extension of 
the work of Samuel Ramos in The Profile of :,an and Culture 
0 • 0 2 
ln l-.eXlCO. 
1. Luis Villoro, "Mnesis y proyecto del existencialismo 
en L.~xico," Filosofia y letras, 16( julio-die., 1949), 
241. 
2. Cf. above, Chapter VI. 
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The series on lilexico and the 1,,exican contains 
twenty-five volumes, by a wide variety of authors. 
The first volume is a collection of essays by "Qfonso 
Reyes, outstanding contemporary j,;exican vrriter. In 
the second volume, Zea presents not only his ovm con-
tribution to the series, but also a comprehensive justi-
fication for the entire project. The aim is an exulicit 
understanding of r.:exican culture, in order first to ac-
cept the situation realistically, c.nd then to chanpe it 
and to develop what is authentically Lexican. 
Zea uresents in this book, entitled, Consciousness 
and Possibility of the Mexican, 1 a summary of some of 
the characteristics of Mexican culture. These charac-
teristics include a defensive nationalism, an inferiority 
comulex or feeling of insufficiency in relation to Europe 
and a colossal northern neivhbor, inherent conflicts and 
insecurities, opportunism and demap;oguery in politics, 
fatalism, a humtJ.nistic reaction ago.inst mechanization, 
o.nd a constant longing for equal stccnd ing v:i th other 
no.tions. These themes are the subject matter of the 
whole series of studies. 2 
l. Leouoldo Zea, Conoiencia y posibilidad del lv1exicano 
(l!i~xico: Porr'Cia y -Obreg6n, 1952). 
2. Cf. Jos~ Gaos, En torno a la filosofia mexicana, se-
gunda parte: la filosofia del Mexicano (b4xico: 
Porr~a-y Obreg6n, 1953), for a critical distinction 
between the nationalistic and the philosophical aims 
of the Hyperion Group in this project. 
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Heidegger•s philosouhy comes into this extremely 
comulex picture as an instrunent, t!long '"'·ith historicism 
and existentialism in general, by which lvlexican culture 
can find itself und ret~lize its authentic uossibilities. 
There is no fixed, abstract essence of the Lexican; the 
true l•:exican is in the making. 
,-,an, in contrt~st to what traditional phi.losouhy has 
been maintaining, has no determined nature or es-
sence. His nature, it is said, is urecisely not to 
have any nature in the traditional sense; his essence 
lacks essence. i,!an is not1 something made, but some-thing which is being made. 
The aim of Zea Is philosophy of the i;Iexican is to 
develo~, to make explicit the concrete universal of the 
Mexican. '11hat is concrete, present, actual comes first; 
universality is an extension of authentic concreteness. 
Zea 1 s chief concern is that the philosouhy of the r,;exican 
be authentically J,iexican, not simply imitation of some 
other culture or philosophy. 
Ylhat is important and decisive is thut this work 
be done Vlith full authenticity :.md not simply for 
an L~itative eagerness or futile preswnption.2 
"uthough Zea recognizes the importance of ~uropean 
existentialism in the formation of the Hyperion Group and 
in its projected ideal, he rejects the possible interpre-
tation that the Group has explicitly adopted existentialism 
as its philosophical creed. Instead, existentialism, in 
l. Ibid • , 19. 
2. Ibid., 23. 
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its varied forns, along with historicism (chiefly Dil-
they and Ortega, via Gaos), is a set of instruments to 
be adanted and used in the program of the Hynerion Group, 
not a fixed standard by which Eexican reality is to be 
evaluated. 
In this Group existentialism is only a set of in-
struments for captivating the reality of the 
1\,:exican man, but not a doctrine to which is con-
ceded a determinate faith. It is a set of instru-
ments, among others taken from modern and contem-
porary European philosophy. It is a set of in-
struments which in no sense carries wilh it any 
definitive evaluations on our reality. 
In a book entitled, Philosophy as Obligation, 2 Zea 
~ives other indications of the place of existentialism 
" -
in his own thought. The book is dedicated to the members 
of the Hyper ion Group. Some members of the GrouP follow 
Sartre in his statement of existentialist problems. Zea 
calls attention to the differences between Sartre•s situ-
ation, which is hopeless, hemmed-in, and doomed to failure, 
and situation in J,iexico. The Mexican situation is not 
doomed to failure. li:exican responsibility must be posi-
tive in its aims. 3 Zea rejects the attitude of ues-imism 
in the use of existentialist ideas. ~he European brand 
of existentialism is pessimistic because of the situation 
out of which it arose. Mexican existentialism accepts 
responsibility for the formation of a better future. 
1. Ibid., 83. 
2. Leopolda Zea, La 
ensayos p,;6xico: 
1952). 
3. Ibid., 34. 
filosofia como comnromiso, y otros 
Tezontle, Fonda de Cultura Econ6mica, 
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The value of existentialism may be found, according 
to Zea, in its formulation of problems, but not in its 
solutions. 
Existentialism solves no problems; the solution 
corresponds to the Mexican in the concrete. Exis-
tentialism, instead of providing solutions, only 
poses problems •••• This is the meaning which exis-
tentialism has for those who have adopted it, not 
as a system which solves all the problems, but as 
an attitude with 'Which to face problems .1 
The use of existentialist ideas by the Hyperion 
Group in their study of Mexican culture can be seen in 
their stateuent of the problem and in the methods chosen 
to deal with the problem. For exanmle, Emilio Uranga 
sees the problem as the ";nalysis of the Being of the 
] .. . 2 v1eXlCan. This title of Uranga's contribution to the 
collection of volumes appears to be the same as Heideg-
ger•s problem and method. In fact, it is neither. The 
being of the l"exican turns out to be the 1oiexicun in his 
concrete situution, in a set of circ~ustances, in a con-
text of cultural, social, economic, and political rela-
tions. The method appears to be analysis, perhaus phe-
nomenological; but in fact it is descriptive and empiri-
cal. 
l. Ibid., 169-170. 
2. Emilio Uranga, "m<1lisis del ser del I.,exicano (i·l~xico: 
Porr~a y Obreg6n, l952). 
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The key to the solution of these two problems is 
not a matter of tension between the preferences of Zea 
and Uranga for Ramos and Sartre, respectively. The 
question had to be decided whether or not to include in 
the collection of volumes on Mexico and the ;,;exican the 
works of scholars in other disciplines outside the tech-
nical field of philosouhy. In introductory remarks for 
a series of lectures sponsored by the Hyperion Grouu, 
Zea spoke as follows: 
The Group which sponsors these lectures and all that 
the lectures may provoke, is called the Eyperion 
Philosophical Group, a symbolic name, in which Hy-
perion represents the union of heaven and earth, the 
universal with the concrete, culture in a universal 
sense with kexico in a concrete sense ••.• The ure-
occupation which unites the members causes them to 
present their problems to scholars of other fields 
outside Philosophy; in lectures, round-table discus-
sions, and polemics, historians, sociologists, authors, 
economists, scientists, psychologists, etc., are in-
vited to uarticipate. The results of the whole move-
ment will be 1published in the Collection, Lexica and the li.lexican. 
This quotation is indicative of the orientation of 
the Hyperion Group with regard to Heidegger. Heidegger 
may have some good ideas, but they will be accepted only 
insofar as they are useful in the development of a program 
that the Hyperion Group sets for itself. 
In summary, it may be said that Zea and the Hyperion 
Group accept the existentialist doctrine that man has no 
l. Zea, La filosofia en ,,,~xico, 249-250. 
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fixed essence, but is a project, an essence in the making. 
'rhey also accept, probably as much from Ramos as from 
Heidegger, the idea of authentic acceptance und realiza-
tion of inherent possibilities, rather than inauthentic 
imitation. Heidegger•s philosophy, along with other types 
of existentialism, may help to ask questions; it gives no 
adequate answers. Phenomenological analysis is unsatis-
factory as a method to reach the being of the ;,,Iexican. 
'rhe being of the Jy;exican is a being in relation to environ-
ment, and empirical observation and scientific interpreta-
tion of the environment are as necessary as the analysis 
of the ~,lexican's being as such. 
The writer believes that Zea 1 s philosoPhy has its 
principal root in Samuel Ramos and the psychological, 
antlU'opological study of Mexican culture. Other roots 
include Heidegger•s philosophy, other types of existen-
tialism, Dilthey's historicism, Ortega's perspectivism, 
Caso•s personalism, and other currents of contemporary 
philosophy in J,;exico. It is not possible to affirm that 
the major inspiration for Zea•s philosophy comes from 
Heidegger, although Zea•s study of Heidegg2r may have 
been one of several formative influences. 
With regard to the other nenbers of the Hyperion 
Group, their relation to Heidegger is indirect, through 
French existentialism. Emilio Uranga is the nost vocal 
and the most belligerent of the group, as illustrated 
by his polemical attitude in the Third Inter-American 
Congress of Philosophy in 1950. His orientation is 
much closer to Sartre than to Heidegrer. Ricardo 
Guerra and Joaquin Macgregor also take their orienta-
tion from Sartre, whereas Jorge Portilla and Luis Vi-
lloro are theistic in their positions. 1 
2. Edmundo O'Gorman. 
Edmundo O'Gorman is a young ;,;exican historian. 
He has used Heidegger's philosophy in a critique of the 
science of history, in his Crisis and Prospect of His-
. 1 s . 2 torJ.ca cJ.ence. O'Gorman studied philosoPhy as well 
as history, and has applied philosonhical criteria to 
the ideas underlying the task of the historian. Several 
ideas from Heidegger are used extensively in his work. 
In an order of decreasing import~nce, the ideas are: 
the distinction between authentic and inauthentic modes 
of being, the secondary or derived nature of scientific 
objectivity in historical investiration, and the danrer 
of changing human activity (historical reality) into a 
thing in order to treat it objectively. 
1. Luis Villoro, "Genesis y proyecto del existencialismo 
en Lexica," Filosof1a i( letras, 18( julio-die., 1949) , 241. 
2. Edmundo O'Gorman, CrisJ.s y orvenir de la ciencia hist6-
rica {r.iexico: Imprenta Universitaria, 194? • 
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O'Gorman•s polemic is directed against the natural-
istic, rationalistic ideal of history as an objective, 
disinterested science. The "elevation of history to the 
rank of science" and the ideal of disinterested, objective 
research, in order to portray "what really happened," are 
illustrations of the inauthentic mode of writing history. 
The scientific question, "How did it happen?" takes the 
nlace of the deeper, ontological question, "What is it?" 
Scientific, naturalistic, objective historiography (the 
writing of history) is an attempt to escape from personal 
responsibility and from the recognition of one's ovm cir-
cumstances, prejudices, and interests. The desire for 
indubitable sources and hitherto unpublished documents is 
a flight fron decision, with responsibility, to anonymous 
objectivity (Heidegger's Das Man). 0 1 Gorman e;oes so far 
as to oppose the application of the logical nrinciple of 
non-contradiction to historical reality, on the ground that 
this anplication is a "perfectly arbitrary, interested, 
and partial procedure."1 
AS will be noted in this analysis, the method of 
scientific historiography is founded upon the a 
nriori of a preference for the abstract over the 
concrete, the quantitative over the qu~litative, 
the consistent over the contradictory. 
l. Ibid., 71. 
2. Ibid., 71. 
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Heidegger's polemic against science and against 
naturalistic, substantive, and logical traditions is 
used by O'Gorman in his attack upon the technical and 
mechanical devices which serve as a fotmdation for the 
modern scientific historian: files, docRsents, libraries, 
archiYes, and catalogues. 1 o•Gorman is perhaps not so 
much opc)osed to these devices in themselves as to the 
type of historical thinking which substitutes such de-
vices for the personal, responsible judgment of the 
historian. 
o•Gorman attemnts to bring the writing of history 
back from technical accuracy on details to its concrete 
relations to man. History, for 0 1 Gorman, is always writ-
ten for a purpose' ·with s orne interest in. mind' from a 
given circumstance and Perspective, ~nd is the product 
of the creative judgment of the historian. These are, 
in synthesis, the results of applying Heidegger's con-
cept of authentic existence to the problems of w:riting 
history. The debt to Heidegger is explicitly acknowledged. 
Coming to the problem of an authentic science of 
history, the positive part of this treatise begins. 
As is well known, this is one of the great themes 
of contel'lPorary thought, and, consequently, we must 
start fron the r1ain conclusions which present-day 
philosouhy has att~ined in this regard, recognizing 
once again the debt we ovre to Heidegger, the prin-
cipal exponent of existentialism. Personally, I 
wish to extend the recognition to Dr • .Jose Gaos to 
1. Ibid., 264-265. 
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whom I owe, along with other invaluable teaching,. 
what I have been able to grasp o1_ the thought of 
the German philosonhical genius. 
O'Gorman•s use of Heidegger•s ideas is apparent in 
the entire work. Nevertheless, o•Gorman makes some 
nrofoundly critical remarks about Heidegger~s philosophy 
and its relation to the science of history. 'I'hree of 
his criticiwms are worthy of mention. 
In the first nlace, the distinction between the 
authentic and inauthentic modes of man's existence (and 
of writing history, for o•Gorman) is an ethical or value 
distinction, despite Heidegger•s attemnt to l~it it to 
ontology. The ethical lianlications must be accepted, 
although not on the level of rewards and punishments •2 
A second criticism which O'Gorman brings against 
Heidegger is on the relation between historical science 
and philosophy. Heidegger follows Hegel, according to 
O'Gorman, in making history-writing dependent unon phi-
losophy for its formal a priori as its point of departure. 
O'Gorman does not object to an a nriori forr•lality from 
which the historian proceeds to his task. He does ob-
ject to accepting it, ready-made, as a result of exis-
tential analysis, from Heidegger (or Hegel, or any other 
thinker). In brief, O'Gorman thinks that philosonhy 
1. Ibid., l8ln. Cf. also 134-136, 202, 282. 
2. Ibid., 219-222. 
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can learn something from an independent history, just as 
history can benefit from autonomous philosophy. Further-
more, O'Gorman suggests that even Sein und Zeit is not 
untouched by the benefits of historical research. 
In the third nlace, o•Gorman criticizes Heidegger 
for the finality with which being-unto-death is nrc-
claimed as the unique possibility (a certainty?) of man. 
o•Gorman suggests that being-unto-reason and being-unto-
God are also radical possibilities for defining the na-
ture of man. "ust as Descartes' rationalism is an at-
temnt to escape being-unto-death, for Heidegp;er, so 
Heidegger•s finitism would be an attempt to escape 
being-unto-reason, for Descartes. The same absurdities, 
on either side, arise in the consideration of being-unto-
death and being-unto-God. 1 In brief, Heidegger's finitism 
is a possibility, but not the only one. 
The limits of this dissertation do not uermit a 
full critique of o•Gornan's use of Heidegger for the 
foundation of an authentic science of history. It is 
interesting and instructive, however, to note that despite 
an alnost conplete acceptance of Heidegger's nhilosophy, 
there are certain limitations. The question of autonomy 
is central. O'Gorman balks at making history just a 
1. Ibid., 311-312. 
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detailed afterthought to philosophy. There is also a 
hint of Spanish-• .merican independence of the European 
situation. o•Gorman•s concluding illustrations of an 
authentic science of history are taken from Sor Juana 
Ines de la Cruz, a r.;exican mystic, and the usual Sutiday 
activities of Spanish culture, Mass in the morning and 
the bull fight in the afternoon. Heidegger•s philosoPhy, 
O'Gorman suggests, is a theoretical formulation of the 
bull fight. Something more is needed for l:.tass and Sor 
Juana. 
This chapter on "Heidegger•s Existentialism in Latin 
"illlerica" has been a selected presentation of r1eidegger' s 
positive influence among thinkers in .~gentina, Cuba, and 
l.:exico. Luis Washington, an existentialist fron Brazil, 
includes the n~mes of Vicente Ferreira da Silva, Paulo 
Edmur, and Edmundo Rossi within the existentialist trend 
1 in that country. He also mentions thctt Euryalo Canna-
brava, fornerly much interested in Heidegger, bec~me an 
opponent of Heidegger after becoming interested in logical 
positivism. It has not been possible for the viTiter to 
exar:ine Heidegger's influence in other countries. 
1. Luis 'dashington, A filosofia no Brasil (Sao Paolo: 
Livraria Martins, Editora, 1950), 151-152. 
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Of the philosophies examined, Carlos "\Strada is 
about the only thinker who follows Heidegger comnletely, 
as he understood his teacher's views fror~ student days. 
i.'ost of the rest of the Heidegger existentialists a.re 
young men hardly beyond their student days. Curiosity 
for the "newest" Philosophy may be a significant factor 
in their interest in Heideg.7er. Their desire for a new 
philosonhy may indicate dissatisfaction vrith the old. 
Even among the young men who accept Heidegger, his phi-
losophy is insufficient for their needs. Leopoldo Zea 
and the Hyperion Group in Eexico find Eeidegger•s q_ues-
tions stimulating. '£hey find in Heidegger few, if any, 
answers to their problems. 
ClLll'TEit VI II 
SUH.: .. iliY .Jill EV.lLU->.TION OF HE:IDEGGER 1 S 
INFLUENCE I~i L,THJ-.iilliERIC.,.E PHILOSOPHY 
In this chapter the writer will atte;;1pt to pre-
sent a sur~ary and evaluation of Heidegger•s influence 
in Latin-.werican philosophy. The tentuti ve, specula-
tive nature of the conclusions reached is recognized. 
In the three preceding chapters of the dissertation, 
Heidege:er' s influence has been described. .ill explana-
tion, in contrast to a mere description, is a matter of 
speculative interuretation. In regc~rd to any individual 
thinker, the atterc:pt to explain Heidegc:er•s influence 
is possible only on the basis of a specub. ti ve hTlOthesis • 
• .ut explanation of Heidegger' s influence in the entire 
range of philosonhe:cs presented in this dissertation is 
even r~ore speculative. 
In brief, this chapter represents the thinki:1g of 
the writer upon concluding the investigation. Other 
students of the Latin-.tincrican situation r.kiy or II1dy not 
find some truth in tho ·writer's tentative conclusions. 
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~-~.. The Climate of Lut in-"unerican Philosophy. 
Since colonial ti12os che major ohiloso'lhicctl tra-
dition in Latin "unerica has been .Scholasticism. The 
Thomistic, "perennial" position has been the core of 
Schola,,ticism, IJ.lthough lesser currents have provided 
sone internal tensions. External attacks upon the 
major tradition were relatively unsuccessful until the 
advent of positivism in the la-te nineteenth c,:;1Lcry·. 
Positivism helped Latin ~~ericans to liberate philosophy 
from ecclesiastical control. Yfuen positivism itself was 
later seen as authoritarian in its denial of speculative 
metaphysics, there was need for a new liberation. 'rhe 
renevml of speculdtive philosophy in the edrly part of 
the twentieth century vras a new freedom fron the limita-
tions of positivism. Throughout these changes, the 
Scholastic tradition has reDained strong, especially in 
Roman Catholic universities and seni:J.ctrios. 
Euryalo Cannabrava of Brazil laments the lack of 
technical discipline in Latin-."l.illerican philosophy. 
In Lcttin "llnerica, thinkers, with fev; e::ceptions, 
become interested in philosophy via hwnanistic 
studies, aesthetics, and literature. Philosophy, 
there, has been IJ. sort of cultural science at its 
best, with no bearing whatsoevlr on the field of 
e:mct and objective knov:ledge. 
1. Euryalo Cannabrava, "Present Tendencies jn Latin 
~~erican Philosophy',·" J"ourna.l of Philosonty, 46 ( 1949), 
117. 
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Cannabrava names ideulism, neo-Thomism, phenonenology, 
ctnd existentialist metaphysics as the le--ld ing tendencies •1 
Ee attributes the popularity of Bergson's vievrs early in 
this century and of German philosophy in the pn;sent 
generation to the Latin--illlerican reluct<J.nce to learn 
the difficult disciplines of correct thinking. 
The late Professor Brightman saw in Lutin-.illlerican 
philosophy tendencies toward an idea.listic personalism. 
Looking at contemporary Latin-"..:~cerican thought in 
the large, v;e find three nain trai t3 characterizing 
it, namely, its social interest, its concern Yli th 
personality, and its spiritual idealism •..• In a 
sense, as Professor Cornelius Kruse has pointed out, 
philosophy is a sort of religion for cultivated 
Latin _'1lJlericans. It enables theH to escape from 
the spiritual rigors of ecclesiastica.l authority 
without forcing a.n open break with the Church. It 
affords them some of the inner advantages of freedom, 
yet without <.J.dequate outer expression. Such a pur-
suit of spiritual idealism is in unstable equilibrium; 
it is both tragic and hopeful. It is novr too abstract 
and almost unreal; it gives promise of a concrete per-
sonalism tho.t will relate the highest idea.ls to the 
social, economic, a.nd religious conditions v,hich now 
prevail.2 
In the light of the history of Latin-&!lericcm phi-
losophy and the cho.racterization of present tendencies 
given by Cannabrava a.nd Brightman, it is possible to see 
some of the major tensions in Latin-•• mericun thought. 
1. Ibid., 118-119. 
2. Edgar s. Brir:htman, "South of the Border," Religion 
in Life, 15{1945-1946), 200, 201. 
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There is a dominant, authoritarian, doctrinal systen, 
on the one hand. There are, on the other hu.nd, tendencies 
tovrard free inquiry, individual speculation, u.nd cultural 
pluralism. 'rhere is tension between philosophy as a sys-
te:"r of Christian doctrines and philosophy us free inquiry. 
There is tension between an authoritarian tradition and 
individual s:oeculation. The::e is tension betv1een philos-
ophy as a system of ideas and phUosophy as personal, 
active speculation. There is tension between the ided 
of a society based u:oon a fixed, hierc1rc:1ical pdttern and 
the concept of socfuty based upon individual liberty. 
The tens ions VIi thin philosophy correspond rouc:hly 
to the tensions within Latin-• .merican culture. On the 
one hand, there are tendencies tovrard dor.lination and con-
trol by an authoritarian Church und totctlitarian govern-
ments. On the other hand, there are r~bid, atheistic 
individualists u.nd violent political revolutions. There 
is a trend tovrard standardization of industrial ilnd eco-
nonic procedures. There is a deep dislike of any system 
which destroys individual initiative cmd creativity. 
Latin ".merica hcts not undergone a Protestant Reforma-
tion in religion. The religious clL'Jate is belsic to the 
entire culture, both in its history and in the present 
situation. In general terms, relic;ion in Latin "'Derica 
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means the acceptance of a doctrinal system of beliefs, 
and the authoritarian control of social institutions by 
the Church. Protestantism in Lutin &.lerica is a r1ovenent 
tovrard cultural :oluralism and toward individualism, but 
naintains authoritarian tendencies in its doctrinal sys-
tem. The numerical strength of Protestantism is insig-
nificant, in comparison with the Ror:Jan Catholic Church. 
Nevertheless, the latter sees in Protestantism a formidable 
challence to the principle of authority. In brief, Prot-
estd.ntism is a challenge to Ro::1an Catholicisa on the 
principles of hierarchical social control and of insti-
tutional authority in religion, but similar to Ronan 
Catholicism in its basic accept-mce of traditional 
Christian doctrines. 
The spiritualistic, personalistic idealism of such 
thinkers as Jos~ Vasconcelos, .-mtonio Case, c.le J.tndro 
Kern, and Francisco Romero, despite their individual 
differences, is a philosophical trend ay;ay from tra.-
ditional reli.e;ious doctrines, CJ.nd at the same til"..e a 
support of spiritual values popularly as •ocia.ted \'lith 
religion. Philosophy for these r:Jajor thinkers becomes 
a personal religion, allied to traditional religion in 
some vrays, but also a challenge in other vrays. 
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The writer believes thdt Heidegger•s philosophy 
becoaes r:1eJ.ningful in Latin _-~..merica when it is seen 
in contrast to traditional, authoritJ.rian "Christian 
philosophy." Heidegger calls "Christian philosophy" a 
"wooden iron." Philosophy, for him, is pure inquiry, 
the elaboration of questions, ·which ultimately seem to 
have their answers only in more questions. This is the 
opposite extreme to philosophy as a doctrinal system. 
Heidegger calls into question the capacity of redson 
to think being. "Right reason," for Scholasticisn, is 
ul:-.10st identicdl with philosophy as <i syster1 of coherent 
beliefs. For Heidegger, being may not be expla5ned by 
reference to any entity. Consequently, his philosophy 
is "God-less." In Scholasticism, as well as in many 
other 1)hilosophies, the dependence of being upon God is 
basic. 
RoF1an Catholic thinkers have studiously exa;.lined 
Ee iclegger • s philosophy. They find in it a challenge to 
their position. The v.Titer believes that Eeider:;ger•s 
philosophy is best seen as a challence to "perennial" 
philosophy and to any other systematic position. In 
relation to Latin--""TiericCill culture, in the broad sense, 
this view ne<J.ns t!wt I~eidegger' s spirit and ideas are 
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nost useful as a challenge to systen, in both the negative 
sense of destruction and the positive sense of radical 
freedom. In the negative sense, iieidegger' s views ap-
proach closely to revolution, destruction, chaos, und 
absolute freedom fron any fixed :oatterns or structures. 
In the positive sense, Heidegger•s spirit ~nd ideas en-
large the free range of philosophical inquiry by calling 
into question not only authoritarian positions, but also 
any systematic position in philosophy, in the ser.se of 
a constructive system of belief. 
Heidegger's philosophy seems to harr:onize Tlith the 
individualistic revolt aguinst the systematic aspects 
of Latin-AJnericd!l culture. The Spanish idea of freedom 
is almost caprice, to do as one pleuses, rather than a 
patterned choice among fixed possibilities. 'l'his radical 
i:cdividualism may be seen in the Lo.tin-,unericun hdtred 
of standardized procedures in education, governJwnt, and 
industry. The vrhole trend of Eeidegger•s thought is 
individuulistic. It is a revolt ae;ainst system, aeainst 
fixed patterns, against clasEificdtion, against uuthority. 
There is a sense i!l '/Ihich Eeidegger' s thoucht is a phi-
losophy of the "against," as such, a kind of negcltivisn 
that feeds on all opponents Uc'ltil tLeTo cLe no op>onents 
left dild it nus t tuTn against itself. 
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B. Sur:llYlary of He idegger' s Influence. 
'l'he question of philosophical h:fluoncos ;,Jdy be 
con pared to a network of :--,odern hi;o:iT<rdys, ovor ·,!hich 
individual vehicles r.1ove, each with its o·:m route und 
destination. There was a day when illl ro"-dS led to 
Ro;':le, but in the modern world roads le,"d c;.l:.cost any-
v.t:tere, and each road is a tv10-vray thorouc;hfc.re. Sea 
and air travel, through Eedia vrhich are d]J'ost entirely 
uldstic, r.;uke the :::odern "lanes" lart~ely a. nutter of 
nan-nude conventions. Space travel stagr;ers the inag-
ination, especially an imagination fouEded upon the 
idea that all roads lead to Rome • 
It is practically iE1:oossible to truce c:nd evaluate 
the i».fluence of a philosophy in the nodern world. "" 
few pieces of evidence, a few direct relations such as 
study ·,:ith an inquiring thinker, c:.nd u fevr references to 
Bajor vrorks c<.in not be put into a s:mthesis ctnd evuludted 
v:ith nore than a lovr degree of probubility. ITo single 
:orinciple wEl account for all of tiw r"actions to ~;:ei­
det':ger and his philosophy. l~evertheless, so:.:ot~ling can 
be le~rned fro'.! the atteLpt. The co:otinuation of !:lei-
dogger's spirit of inquiry and the use of :'is ide::ts by 
other thinkers is cenuine evidence of his influence. 
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Chiipter V of this dissertation is a present<.ition 
of the ae"ns by ':lhich Eeidegger•s :ohiloso:phy v.·u.s nu.de 
available to La.tin .cnerica. The wor~c of Ortec;a. y GcJ.sccet 
:i;-, l: is Revistc;. de Occidente helped to :.·lu.l:e conte:·:·ooru.ry 
Ge;"r:Ja.n philosophy avu.ilable to the ::Jpa.nish-spe."::ir:g •.mrld. 
'l'he transplanting of the best eler.J.ents of Spu.nish cuc.ture 
u.nd philosophy to the .iestern helilisphere, on ctccount of 
Frunco and the Spanish Civil WJ.r, brought con tc::)orcJ.ry 
Europe'-in philosophy r'.irectly into local situations in 
Latin "'·merica. Jose Gaos und Juan David Gcircia Bo.ccu 
are :·:a,jor exan:oles, •.:·ith reference to the philosophy of 
;-:e idegc;er . 
Students froJ _ Lu.tin ... ~1e.rica vrho stu(lied ·\".'ith ~::iei-
derc•:er in Gerr.:J.ny brought his ideu.s '"'nd inquisitive s:0irit 
back to tho ir loco.l situ'"' t ions. Carlos .cstradu o.nd .Qberto 
\-lugner de Reyna are outstclnding exu:mles. Hoideu;er •s Llain 
vrork und nlLr:lerous ninor vmrks have been tr..:.:1slu. ted into 
Spu·1ish. Introductory expositions of i:e idee;cer a.re .J.lso 
u.vailable in Spanish. 
In the li-'"ht of the u.n.:..:.logy oi' 0.. not·;.rork of .:·.~ocJ.crn 
hi')1':r-lys, =~eideg._-~er' 2 i:::-)_fluence in I_,..J.t:i.n-..,J.2:1ci"·ic-__:n ~Jhilos­
o:pl~y c-.:.n not be seen ne:::ely ...... s :.1 current of ideas cor:inc 
fro._ '-;eideg"er md reacl:ing their c'ec:ti 'cJ.t:!.ons il1 L"'tLc 
., .. l.:',J.erica.. If every roc..d is a t·:.~o-rruy thorou~_~h:i:'"\ire, then 
the que::tion of )hiloso-ohic-ll i:1i'J.uence Tl.=iy perh.J._9S be 
464 
seen ~-: ... ore cle'-'-rly fro~··~ tb.e other directj_on, t~:t._..t is, in 
the usefulnes2 of ideci.s for t!wse r;ho l'eceive tllC:l. 'the 
utte ·.pt to exyldin positivisr:1 in L-J.tin ,;:_:.;.~ric-.::. in t:-}"~e 
ld.t~nr y.:.;.rt of the n.j_!J.eteenth centu::-y c-..<.n ~:ot :Je re~tlly 
cue ce ssful by looking backnci:rd to Co.::te ~nO. .Sxmce :r. 
Positivism Ilust be seon fron the po in.t of viev: of -'che 
t~:~in~:ers ,-,rho used it. Positivisr:: ~_-,'..lS useful i·~or "'c!.1e 
t'isks v.rhich Lu.tin--:.2."-eric~n thin~·~ers sot for th.c:~lr~elvos 
in t!~cir ov1n situ-..Ltions. l'hc e:xploit.:....tion of n..:.~.tur~l 
resom'ces, ~~1s ~~i ht to liberi:lte thought fr8_:·l theolot;icul 
0.nd ecclesic~sticdl COl1trol, the need for educut:to~ of the 
~-:l,:.:. ses, .;.n-' the nec:c~ fo:r social re.f'or:.~ '/..'ere prossing ::;rob-
lees. European positivism rr.ls a.d0.ptcd ~o .::~::.::st. -~ll::; ::--~::c:ds 
of p~~rticulo.r situcitions in Lo:~in--:.illC;I'j_cc..J.n count:_., iss. 
T:1e s ... '.I,le ~-:.lrJ..nncr· of tl~Li:'l..lcing o._~plies to 3crc;son ...:.nd 
t}-_G i:r_fJ.ucnce of ~'lis t~ought. Pos itivis:,l •.-:.J.s too nJ.rro-vi, 
too s2:"::c.ll ct philosoyhy for t,he L-ltin-" . .:-jer:i.c-:;.~: r:::itu~ltion. 
~~ehc pioneer thinkers of the f'i::st }1,.;.1:2 o:i -~J-:is cs1:~tury 
used De~sson, -ilon~; -.- ith 3::-utroux _end J,___._l~le:s, to ~put 
specul~~tive l··1et...:..)hysics buc~: into p~--~i1osophy. DeTgson 
.... .,rus j_!1?lue:.:tial becc.use his idc;J.s filled ci ~~peci:Cic need. 
'l'l12 uttercpt to interpret the inl'Iuence of lie ide seer 
in Lu tin "'mericct LUSt :::'in.ully turn from "- center of interest 
in Heidegcer und his philosophy to the needs ~nd nurposes 
of the thinkers ~.:-Tho use his ideas. In brief, ·,·,-}1-.:..t 
use is 1;1u.de of ~(feidec~ser t~-:_:ro,~·,s lic~ht u~Qon. the in-
fluence of ::-rsidegger. 
I:-t Cha..pter IJI of this disse:rt:.:;,:t:;j_o~, t~·te ;:.rriter 
presents the reactions to ~eidegrer's D~_ilosoplly in 
-~-.he J..'"'o:-cn of opposition to his ide.J.s, criticisn, ... nd 
t:i:zturss of rejection .... nc~ w..ccopta.nce. '..L~~e ':~~~itel"' 
beJ.ieves t1Lis ch...:..pte:.c to be ,l richer source of in-
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:"o:rr:cc::.ticn u.bout Lc-ti'.l-"'me:ric'"-n pl1ilosophy thc1n either 
Ci1cc·otcr V or ChJ.pter VII. 
_-l_lcj'-.indro }(orr;t, Jose va..~concelos' LiD.d ,.:J.tonio 
Cc1so ~.·.-ere 1-l.:cccly be;:?oncl -~~e rorLlu.tive st.;.:~:o iE t~1cir 
o-:::.n thouc;ht be:::'ore 8:1COUll ter ing Ec iC.cc[~er. r.:L·: _e y four:_d 
ir: ~lirn. un o~J":)onent, r0..t.her -t.h..1n w.n -..:..1ly. T:---_cey hc:.."'~'e no 
re.-::.1 need for "'"-Te idegrTr, -.n-::-;_ they ~-lJ...~(e ~:o u;::e ol' ~;,is 
ideu.s. Francisco Ho!:lero is ;~luch hu..rdc=- to cl-:.;.ssify. 
~<is supposedly for~:_:.J. ti vc yeriod -o;-'hL: ·:J...t..'~ .sed before t:1e 
a.dvent of -~-Jeiclecr:cr c..nd 2Xiste:n.ti<.:J..lis;.l. ~~8vert~:-_c}..css, 
!1or:~cro is e.n inq_uir'S.!".[; :ot .. iloso:pher, . .:..:1.(~ ss;:;s ~Lr: ~-~8 idog-
r::ur's t;:.nur::';ht SO:lile truth--but not tt.:.e ~:.·h~lc tiuth. In 
~p~:rticu_,_..:.;_r, Reo. ~cro finds truth in Eeide:-:;cer' s te~ <~ori.:.ilisi;: 
~nd ''process'' uh~losophy. ~o ·ero sees tie l~ck or struc-
ture us o. :·1..1jor 6cfcct of Feidegf_er's t:J.Oll[__;h.t. In b.is 
rectct~on to --'"ei'J.Ggf3cr, .Ro::·£ro -.J.d;_~liT·.:~b1y co~ .. bi::.-:_es ~...1. s ::~irit 
of ill,J..Uiry ~nd S·J.i~e )Ositive COUViCt~.OllS c~S founcl in his 
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Frc..;.ncisco L--~.rl"'o:ro, _-J..ndr8s .- ... vclino, ~::d .1nto~io 
GC-1aez Robledo reprsscnt v ~ried l)Ositio~_-,_s in )h~_J.:=;sop~y. 
'l·hey c.L:'8 ~li~:e, llo•::ever, in their ~-ejection of J-~3ide£;£8T'S 
The l:'eo-Schol.J.stic thiEkers V.}..J.:'y :t:-: th2 ir 22t i --...:. tes cf 
th,c ofi'iciul vievr, re:9re sz-::ted by IsLuel ,uiles. .iagner 
Unit'-'tions' to a ph'clOSO'".!hiC.il )OSit:on '.:hich c.:o.;ld be 
in hd.rr:~ony ~.}i th Christian c~octri:.1e. Osv:aldo .dobles, fol-
lovri!lg the s":Jirit of inquiry found j_n .:..ur;ust1r:.e ·...'.Ed St. 
Thor1u.s, 
c::ith·ut o.ny rea.l d'-'ncer of beinc; seduced. Robles '-'Sks 
questions in order to find ansv;era, but he ·-:no'.'is f ....... irly 
v:ell in ddVct~ce 1::hu..t those ~nsv·lers ~ ... :il1 be. F.:..t.ther 
.iUiJ.es h-.1.::; C.lUS'sers i'ii·st, -. .. nd quest:::.ons l-:.1. ter. 'The 
-=-.tuestj_ons, in this cJ.se, a·oyear closer to inc:tu5_:::::ition 
th:J..n to i.n.quiry. 
In the cour2e of this investic,,tj_on, t' e 11ri tor 
h.J.s cone to d. cre..;.tcr a.p:proci<-<.tion of nye::-e::~ni.:.l.ln nhi-
l'Jso~ohy, 0specially -;.r~lere it is el~.1..stic e~ouc;h ~o in-
clu~J.e v<:tried positions .. '}th rsg:..trd to '-' )lliloso;Jhy c.s 
rJdical ~s Reidegger's. 
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8'-lnuel Rccos utilizes so::;e of ;·oideg::c·er' s ide .s 
as an ~xior;: ..... tic found6.tion for :r1is philoso<:-h icul :... .. nthro-
?JOlogy, or nevr htm:<.:inisrn. j_lhe ndtu:"e of :r.u.n is te~.~--~oorc.l 
succession "'nd teleologicdl project. ...nxiety is 2.xiomutic 
of b.U.:Tin existence, bec'-'.use de .. th is ul·c1ays a possibility. 
1{U.::Jan existence is personal, dif:"'erent in 'dr d. fron the 
existence of tJ;ings. Rar:os also criticizes ''eidec:f_: _r• s 
philosoDhy as alr'ost barrer.., •:.chen strip;Jed of its novel 
ter:::.inology. lfurtheT::!lo:re, he finds it necessa.ry to use 
"'n e::wirical method in his philoso:obical '"nthropology. 
Concrete, experienced duta ure necessary for u neri hwnan-
ism; the analysis of nan's peculictr uode of being is not 
in itself adequate to provide a theory of nan. 
Jos~ Ror:w.no ;.,ttfioz utilizes Heideg,ccer' s C. is tinction 
betr:een authentic and inauthentic selfhood, in contrast 
to S<irtre' s freedom r:i thout patterned 2.1 ternu. t ives. 
Ronano I.iUcioz also uses a personulisti c point of d.e]J.J.rture 
.J.nd the "existential" title for his philoso·:Jlly. In fuct, 
'1owever, his point of view is rc.dicully o1nosed to the 
e;dstentiulist position. Romano Lufioz is a philosooher 
of VCJ.lue, following Scheler -no ;":artnann :··wre thecn Ee i-
d.et;r:er. 
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Chapter VII of this dissertation is a presentation 
of Heidegger 1 s existentialism as found in Latin-,J,lerican 
thinkers. Despite Heideg·-er•s objections to being classi-
fied ·;:ith existentb.lists, his influence in Latin . .merica 
cctn not be separuted froT,l such a classification. Eis phi-
losophy has its influence as an existentialist philosophy. 
Carlos ,!Strada is the outstanding example of a fol-
lower of Heidegger. He follows, in fact, alr:ost too liter-
ally, with too nuch ir.litation and too nuch repetition of 
Heidegr;er, ulthough with considerable imacination. 'I'he 
fact that he criticizes severely Vllwt he thought ·,;u.s a 
turn in his tectcher's views toward a "mythology of being" 
shows that ->Strada follows his own understandi!:g of Eei-
degper from student days. ">.Strada finally defends one 
Heidegrer und attacks another. The Heidegger whom he 
defends is subjectivistic; the Eeidegger he attacks is 
a "mythologist of being." 
Carlos .• lberto Erro found in He idegeer' s thousht a 
phil.osophica.l formulation of Kierkegaard' s unxious, an-
guished thinking. Erro vrcts looking for ci philosophy that 
would provide new foundations for :·.:odern culture, soLle-
thin,c· to renew the spirit of the tir:1e s. The writer 
believes that Erro was disillusioned after his personal 
visit vrith Heidegger. Erro•s experience illustrates the 
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popular confusion on the relation between Kierkee:aurd 
..ind Heidegger, as ·well as the difficulties involved in 
a.ny attenf[Jt to solve the problem. 
J. Sala.s Subirat uses Eeidegc:er•s ideus to fight 
ecclesiastical authority "'nd to propose utheistic self-
realization in morals. Lorenzo Carnelli uses Heidegger•s 
tenporctlism in his theory of Right. The lack of a thorough 
consideration of the relation between Right ctnd law is a 
major defect in his subjectivistic theory. Salas Subirat 
u.nd Carnelli have little significance for philosophy, but 
they illustrate the populal' confusion about the inter-
pretation of Eeidege;er and the v-aried ways in vr'!ich his 
thought is being used. 
Humberto Piiiera Llera of Cuba finds new hope for 
epistenology in Eeidegger•s interpretative existentials 
or "categories" of the human entity. In kexico, Leopolda 
Zea ctnd the Hyperion Philoso:phical Group htcve ezistentialist 
tendencies. "·c close examination of their views, however, 
reveals alrrost no direct dependence upon Heidegger. Ed-
mundo o•Gorman applies Reidegger•s ideas to the task of 
the historian. He attacks the ideal of an objective sci-
ence of history, and favors the authentic !Jade of writing 
history, in which the personal judgment of the historian 
is the :ost significant factor. 
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A cohere':lt interpretation of Heidegt;er•s ir;fluence 
(or usefulness) in these varied thinkers is not an easy 
task. Each thinker has his ovm purposes in L:ir:d vrhen he 
util_izewHeideggcr•s ideas. The VITitcr suspects that 
scn'e of the aims of these thinkers "-re not entirely clear 
to them, rauch less to an observer. Jl'or extll!:ple, the over-
tones of Carnelli•s apc;liciltion of Eeidee:;e:;er's ideas to 
a theory of Right sugrest an attitude of revolt against 
the fixed patterns of constitutional und stutute l-1w. 
0' Gorman is r,wst ardent in his negi.ltive attitudes toward 
the r.le chanical and technical disciplines of historical 
research. Other followers of Heideg;;:er seem to have nega-
tive attitudes toward fixed patterns in reli~:;ion, in social 
philosophy, L: political theory, i.lnd in the various tech-
nical disciplines of philosophy, such as episte;-::ology. 
It is not possible to take these overtones and attitudes 
as an adequate basis for a coherent interpretation; they 
are too vague ~nd too varied to provide a basis for in-
ference. nevertheless, the writer believes t:nut there is 
a recurring pattern of negcttive attitudes in thG followers 
of Heidegrer. 
Leopoldo Zea and the Eyperion Group in Lexico are 
deeply interested in social reform, in chunges in the 
politica.l and economic structures of ;,_exico. They are 
close to the snirit of the Le::ican Revolution ( 1910), 
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vvhich has been continued i::-t the Institutional Revolutionary 
Party in politics. Their existentialist lectnings have an 
overtone of revolt against fixed patterns and a desire for 
rctdica.l reform. Fevertheless, they do not succ=b to the 
tenptation to be negative only. They are not r<Jvolutionists 
in the radical sense of destruction. The vrriter believes 
that the maturity of these young thinkers in philosophy 
and in social reform is exemplified in their ability to 
surmount the negative attitudes of existentialist ques-
tioning in philosophy and of revolution in social reform. 
In the light of the preceding sunm1a.ry of B:eidegeer' s 
usefulness for Latin--~erican thinkers, it is possible 
to arrive at a fev1 general cor..clusions. On the positive 
side, Eeidegrer has fostered the spirit of inquiry in 
Latin-A'llerican philosophy. His ideas have challenc;ed 
the "perennial" systera and other systems, on a profound 
level. The spirit of inquiry has been widened, a.s viell 
as deepened. There is much talk about Heideggcr, a rela-
tively t;ood raarket for tra.nslations of his vrorks, c1nd 
nuch curiosity about his thought. _u_ though talk and 
curiosity are tv;o of his targets in Sein und Zeit, his 
philosophy has become the object of much talk and curiosity. 
"l.lso on the positive side, Samuel R&ms uses Heideg-
ger1s ideas sparingly but constructively, as an dXiomutic 
472 
basis for his philosophical anthropology or new hUllkJ.nism. 
He idegger' s thought is useful in keeping TJhilosophy focused 
unon the probleli'.s of man, rather them things. Tho spirit 
of inquiry and the personalistic emphc~sis seen to be two 
major values of Heidegger's philosophy in Latin "~erica. 
on the negative side, thu.t is, the deficiencies of 
Heidegger's usefulness in Latin "cjJ]lerican thinkers, there 
appears to be no sircnificant novement toward a construc-
tive position in relation to Heidegger. In the course of 
this i!'.vestigCJ.tion, the writer found no school of nhilos-
ophy that follo•·1s Heidegger. There is no journal like 
Philosophy o.nd Phenomenological Research or 'The Personalist. 
The 'hTiter found no Heidegger societies, as sue:,. 'l'he Hy-
perion Group, in its forr:tative period, was close to uh;;.t 
could be called an existentialist society, but certainly 
not a :-:eidegger society. The v.Titer believes it kprobable 
thdt any najor rcovenent, like the KantLm Societies, will 
be build upon Eeidegger•s philosophy. Heidegger' s spirit 
of jnq_uiry is stiinulating, but c1is philosophy lacks sub-
stance in;;. body of doctrine. It forms no constructive 
syster:; of ideas. 
Eeidegr·er' s Latin-.merican adr.lirers have a.l3o used 
his ideas to challence traditional CJ.uthorities in religion, 
morc'-ls, and socictl J.nd political life. In one sense, the 
challenge to authority is a necessary stc'-ge in social 
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reforrr:. Old authorities rn.ust be rer":oved, if nev: ones 
~re to take their places. But the challsnc;e to authority 
can easily dec;enerate into t;1e pure YJee;:J.tivism of revolu-
tion. ,;.n evaludtion of the challenrie to authority depends 
upon the evaluation of the t1ut:1ority being cl:allenged. 
The writer believes that B:eidegPer' s philosophy has been 
used to challenee both bad and c;ood authorities. ~"or 
exa:,nle, the v,Titer believes that philosonhical irquiry 
nust not be subjected to ecclesiasticdl control, Ho :an 
Catholic or Protestant. Cn the other h"'nd, the nhilos-
opher must face the implications of social anarchy, es-
ne ciall:r if his ideas tend to destroy all 9"' tterns of 
control. He idege;er 1 s La tin--.;meri cun acJDirers have devel-
oped only one side of the problem. 
Feidegger•s lone-term infl_ue"ce can not yet be ovu.l-
uated. The peal: of interest, like a fad in dress or nan-
ners, vra.s app'"rently ut the r.;id-century Yln'k. In l\?49, 
at the First ?.futional Congress of Pl::ilosophy in . .rc:sntina, 
interest in He idee;· er c.nd in e:xistcnti.o.lism vrds high. 
Existentialism was a :0rincipal the!:,e of the l'hird Inter-
,;.r::ericdn Concress of Pl::ilosonlly in L.exico City, in 1950. 
Interest in Eeidegrer hds continued, but uith les:o intensity. 
It will dke another decade or nore to deter i:w the long-
term influence of Heide(', -er in Lcitin- .. .;:;er iccin ph~losophy. 
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Be idegyer' s constructive i"lfluence rcx..y be seen in the 
later yec:.rs of so:"e of the young thi'ckers w:w l:ave 
learned to sharpen their tools on his grindstone. 
Leouoldo Zea and the aenbers of the yyerion Group in 
;;exico :nay see in another deco.de or tvm hov.· ::uct they 
owe to Heidegger. 
C. Evo.luation of the Principal Objections to ;.:e idegger' s 
Philosophy. 
,Jthoufh there are :::any critical objections to Eei-
degcc:e:.:' s philosouhy, four recurrent c.r:·iticisr::s vijll be 
cotl.sidered in this section. Eeider,ger's philoso:ohy is 
criticized for its ner,c:.tive bias, its analytic method, 
its barren conclusions, and its lack of structure. 
~~e ne~utive bias in Heideg 'er i~ sh~rply criticized 
by _>J::tonio Co.so. _.lbe:c-to 'Jo.gner de ;qeyno. brines a s iJrrilo.r 
i:1co: ulete. Significant positive factors h~ve been oiilitted 
fror:. the acco;·nt of the n'"ture of man. Cuso c,"lls :-:ei-
degger 1 s viev1 a "let-dovm" philosophy, re .J.dy-:;;ade for the 
find their nlaces in "-:eidegger' s thour·ht; but tl-:e 'Jocdtive 
se:c.ti~>ents of joy, satisfdction, pe;.1ce, .J.nd hc.._r:;·::ony are 
l:ctrdlJ r;:::ntioned. '""lxiov.s loneliness is tl1e :.ood of 
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;-:~ej_def:?er's philosoyhy. Tl:.e probler:J. _r:::_ay be st.J.tsd jn 
si:_'.:ple ter:·,s. Is .:.1u.n b<i.sici.illy u.nxiety or sc.:;.tisf._,_ction? 
Do,:-:s care or yur~ose best define ~.:an? Is ':.rorJ.."Y oT joy 
the :::e,1ning of life'? 
e:, ~ot }_ens. '.'lorry is the ::_Lood of the negd t i ve el _·_ot icns ; 
joy is ti:e l-~~ood of the 2_:>osi ti -ve eJ:~otions. Both sec:u. to 
be neccssar:.:-· to the fLJ.ll develo:pr.-;.ent of ~:~:.dn. _-_.-evert;leless, 
L1 t>e ouirjon of the 'crriter, IC:sidec:-·er is probdbly rie;ht 
in rsgcJ.rding the neg~tive Load dS tl":e ~--_li~~.i~-~lu~ definition 
of being hu.Ll<.J.ll, L-u.n C;..tn be both preoccu_picd __;:!J.G jo~tful, 
beth :..tr::xious c~nc sJ.tisfied, both S(.id .__..nd }l _ _;_.o~.Jy. uu.ch is 
t~e f::"'_lnE~ss of life. But life c~t.r, be lll.L.-~:..n, on .__,_ r:~ini-
o~.l7 sor-:e achieve the )OS i ti ve v..:::.lucs of liJ:-.e. 
Care and anxiety "'re civen '.'Iith beircc:; :km; t;, :r 
c-:-:1J.y one ~;ide of -'chc truth. 'fhe otJ:~or 2ide is t>~ .. t if 
t~ere ~reno Vdlues, no purpose, no destiny, ~o rc~l 
~J02E.:ib1lity of joy, -~::en tJ::_ere should De no ~eed for 
C a~e ''Orry -.-1" ,-,v-iety, Tf life is re"li_y -. 'fi tlwut value, 
- ) \, ' -..~c ·-'- v.-.~..1~-- • - -
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'-e ideg:.:eT 's service tc 
is to l1--tve cur~·: ied 02:10 2ic~_e of t:1e -;Jictu:ro to it:: t;::tro.cJe 
c::;:::c!_usion, in t?loory. The co::clusio:1. :'L:::. :J:-:." ~.ct~~ ce , __ ,o-;_lld 
be s\~icide. If life is only c~re _n( :orry, i·r life is 
only J. trip to tl:.e e:r'.ive, Vlithout .rne_:_~1iEG or va.J.ue J.s 
co:: only understood, then bull fichting '"ncl a.uto rc.cing 
are the :-::ost thril.lir.:.g snorts. ~=-.in i,s concerr-:ed J.Oo'J.t 
'liE being, beca.use the va.lue of life itself is 0.t stccke. 
' second :~:J.jor criticism of ic~eidegcer is directed 
concelos calls :-:!:eide~s0:er a tangle. ~:is basic objection, 
ho-.. rever, Cilong ~::ith one r--lised by u.:..tr~usl Rl:.:os, i:: ·CtuJ..t 
::~ust ~e doi'1Led i1~, .J. systo.t.1 of rel~tions. ri"~e "-"'elf does 
~ot 1_ose itself in tJ1o ~-;orld ~nd in a·t~ers; it finds it-
self in roL.-'-t~_on to .... ,,. __ ·c_,~ld th'-'-t is ub~c~c-~j_vely otl:sr, d 
"Gse ~:-~:o j.Ciegcer' s term. . ..ill rj_dy lose h~_icSClf i~1 tte ..... :1011-
~o2iti>re rel~tio:::s to .J.TI extcr::~l, ob,ject:ive environ..:-:~errt. 
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n~ture. If :~dn dsfines objects, it is ~lso true t~-t 
w..:n. C-J..:n ·n.ot be de-
fined in terr.l.s of l1ir::.self .:.tlone. 
~>e ~,..Titsr believes t~-:is ..lT£lli:ler~t V\_, Os c:rv.cL . ll 
for :-::cideg,--;·;T' s t•~:~:clency to, .. ·:u..rd subjectivis~n. -.-is dp-
)Jic:J.tion of -~2le :;llH:::-::.o~ ~enolo: .. ic--J..l _ .:.e"c i-:ocl, . ...;.:_) ~r.:.:..i.l:·_72 is, 
to tte Droble~ of i.~n's beinz, in or~or to ~iscoveT the 
___ eaning of bsing :l.n :·-_u.n _,_nd, su~Juosedly, -::.s ·;1,_.·-:_:, :;d, the 
;:~e~-~nin.~-: of be~ :lf~- ... ts sEch, cu.n only f~il, ur.le ss :--:cr·.e 
s~{nt~le2-is is brou"~ht b--<.c~-c ir:..to ths schcne. 
be t-,rr~_ed _:._rcnnd, G.n-2_ t>; j_r-"f:S ~nu.lyzed 2·.:ust bt~ "b:::-our·ht 
b-lck toscther. ;i'he :~~~ethod of .J..n..J.lysis <~·/j_ll L-~lti;::G.tely 
redUC'::' to bits T· • .-Lu.tever it touches, if Lot co: .. _r:ts::ed by 
e:{u~·~::;-~e, in the n.~t1..:re cf cu.re ...i.S inc.l_udi~LC ti~-~e t2."_,_z:.scend-
once, or the unity of the ten_~.)oral ecst._~siss. ;J.1J-_:_e n.;.ture 
of tl:is unity u..:Hl ho1:.; it is possible -.ire di:c-·:cicuJ.t ~orob­
lel~s in ~ei~e3 er's ph~loso)hy. ~cid~gger J]_so ~ffirLls 
t:L:..t ~-·-c.n finds l1i.L1sslf in (.., ·,::orld -~nd i~1 rei0.t1_on to others. 
'J.''.le st~'ucture of those relations in T'ciclec er is ct ::,-"jor 
:JI'obler::. j_n his thou-sht. 
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he used Fcideccer's ids~s ~~ ~ set of ~xioss for 11is new 
~_:_UI.:.a.Eism, criticized I-~eideg:·er 1""or tr~.c: barren results of 
quest:_ons, but :r_o dnsv.rers, in e:xis-~enti ...... lisli:. 
criticis:1s ;J.dd up to -~-he ch..:trc;e u.ga..inst :·-Tcj_de~~r~er's :1hi-
loc;o:ohy thu.t it 1.1as ]JLccticully :1othLt<: to offer jrt posi-
tive conclusio~s. 
Carlos ~l...st::. ... ~dct ::..:..ve v:ha.t he considered ~ tost:l.,_ony 
h "l 1 ' 1 ' . . " . )-.J-~son~y seens ~o ~c~ pos1~1ve ca~c~usJ_ons. It is un-
fi::ti2hed bus:2.ness, in the b.J.d as well :..tS thG c od 2ense. 
Pure inquiry is, in ane sense, the essence of phil.osophy. 
neideg-·-·er ~sks se~rch2-ng, u1tinate q_ueEtions. But l~e 
loso2JhY ce.i.ses to be -:Jbilosoyhy r:hun it reaches eit!lcr 
ext rene of :10 J.Uest ions or no answers. .,uthori tctriun 
dof.;r0..tisn is t:~e extre:~:e of no questio:-1s, th._:._t is, no 
rrcnu~.~e 1.nquiry. Skeryticul 1uestioning is t~e sxtre~e 
of no unswers, that is, no :oositive co::clusions. 
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Fruncisco Ro.c,ero criticizes the :Jl::'.losoohy of Jure 
process for its L .. ck of structure. This I.e_,_n8 a l'"ck of 
any fixed noints of reference (such .~itehe~d's eternal 
object8). J"o2e Gaos brings the same criticisl:: a:;o_inst 
Eo idegcer, in S-"Ying th'" t •:.ure exi stance, \'ii thout reference 
to essences, :_Lakes ~hiioso-·Jhy ii:.:?ossj_ble. Pure 0roces.s 
or nure existence, ~ithout uny structure, le_,_ds to chaos. 
He ideg?er' s vioYi of the hw:'J.o.n entity ""s phcno;:lt:onul sue-
cess ion is ul tir: .. ately alnost chaotic, e::cu ·0t insof'J.r ilS 
the Lcdividuo.l can, in sor.ce nysterious way, •.:ctke c! unity 
of his tennoral succession. It is difficu 1 t to sec how 
unity is nade, unless somet:J.ing of unity is fom1d. 
The proble: !8y also be seen in relation to the 
nature of freedor'. ">Strada, in utilizing ::::eidec er•s 
ideu.s, :makes d child t s ~-;la.y pure phdnt,;..sy. 1Ihere J..re 
no fixed lir.:i ts to freedom. ~"'or -c..stru.dc<, V1e gc.U:<C of 
philoso:ohy lKis no rules. There is no nhiloso:ohy of g~e, 
:r..oti~in.g to give structure to risk. The1~·e o..:::'e no ciltcrna-
tives in choice; freedom is apparently absolute. 
In tr~ditional philosophy the validity of rectcon 
.o.nd the belief in an objective reJ.lity of sorco.e ldnd thJ.t 
is found, not made, :uve been cllmost a:xioll.J.tic. '1';-,e denial 
of these two basic postul.J.tes of philosophy, or, in Fei-
dege;er, the failure to m"-ke the positive as; u: pt iO'' of 
therrc, is thought of us so ubsurd thd t the view need not 
be refuted. Perhaps it is i.r.lDossible to refute such u view. 
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Fevertheless, evCJ.luu tion is possible, fror~ ou tsic\e the 
system. The writer believes this criticisn of J'eidegr·er 
b:l Hor:,ero c~nd Gctos to be the nost profound objection to 
:"eideg ·er' s philosonhy. 
D. The Writer's Evuluc:ction of Eeideg•:er•s Fhilosoohy. 
The 17riter wishes to begin t?lis concluding section 
·:1ith two anctlogies, one t.~t:en from cor•te; oor,iry ..trt "-Tid 
the oth"r from conteLpora.ry psychoibogy. 
In dll expositio~l of conte."~Lporary painti~:.g, it is 
eusy to reve"l one• s old-fciYhioned criterion by loo.'·:ing 
• . t" . d 1.. 11'"-·t. ·t~" tl '] t cec a pdln 1ng u.n ctc:,:lng, ·,lad. lS 1 ., .,poarcn y c 1a 
is the •1:rong question. ·Jhat, then, sl:ould be asked? 
·.:I:o did it? How? 'dhen? 'Nhere? Why? Eov! docs it im-
press ne? Whut is it, for me? How long vrill it lc.st? 
To •n·ha. t school docs it belong'? 
Philosooher·s a::.·e ::wre old-fdshioned a'Jout o':ilos-
oohies than picture lovers ure a.bout conten:Joro.ry paintings. 
The inevituole question about He idegr:er' s philcsophy is, 
"'i<hat is it?" The question becor~.es doubly hcird to "'-llSVler 
\'ihr:n seen in reldtion to Heidegger' s revolt ci{':dinst the 
"who. t" of philosoohy itself. "Whdt" ;ueJ.ns de fi.ni tion, 
logic, subject-object relc..tion, structure, :•:euning, con-
elusions. In Hcidege;cr•s lungua.r:e, the "·:rhat" is the 
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dominution of objectivity over essential thinking, of 
logic over being. 
Eistoricists und perspe ctivists, following Dil they 
and Ortega, hci ve a ready uns\·rer for classifying ::eidagger. 
,fuo he is becor£s a study of his ''uuthentic genealogy." 
The "v1hat" of his philoso')hy is answered by cevoiding 
the question, und replying thdt it is the nenest of the 
new school (existentialism), with the insinuc-tion tlldt 
it, too, will puss, perhups soon. Lost thinkers caup:ht 
in the intrigues of contenporary existentiulism finally 
answer the question of "what" with the subt;:rfuge of 
"v,rhose." 
The \\Titer has been impressed by tvro recurrent ut-
titudes in philosophers and students who have exCJ.ninod 
Fe idegc'er' s philosophy. The first is an uncertdinty 
about v;hu.t it is. :E'er the v1riter, as for ~::a.ny others, 
Heidegger is an enigmu. The second attitude is the pro-
found challence of this philosophy, "-S reC)ortetl oy critics 
,md stuaents. The nri ter, dlso, hus experienced deep 
quc:ndries in the stud:/ of c:!e idegcer. 'rhere appectrs to 
be in Reidegger a tendency toward ultiuate skepticism, 
Yl':lich corcstitutes a chullenge to any positive co"viction. 
;:ost nhilosophers seek truth in order to find it. 
'l'hey ask questions to find sene answers. .Lhey ure un-
satisfied until. they can reach sor::.e tentative J.nswers. 
The \',Titer often v:onders whether Reidegger does not 
seek truth in order not to find it. 
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~illother analogy, from "depth" psychology, mo.y c'"!elp 
to gain a different perspective on Ee idegger. Lost 
philosophers would rec.lct ner,o.tively to the suggestion 
that a psychologist could give a philosopher a "better" 
perspective, but philosophy itself is a type of psychic 
reaction, fro:. the psychologiccJ.l point of view. 
Psychologicul testing ho.s tcJ.ken o. str"'nce turn 
ire the present century, especially in the form of thenatic 
apperception tests, of which the nost fcllcous is probably 
the one bc1sed on inkblots. 'lhe person be inc tested looks 
at appcerer::tly meaningless blotches or V'-lgue pictures, and 
then rectds out of (into\) the objective J:nterictl his ovm 
subjective stc1tes. ~':oparently the theory is that nithout 
a facade of objectivity, a person is Ul1cible to loo\: into 
hinself. The ae<lning of the test is not to be found in 
the objective material of pictures or blotches, but in 
the type of reo.ction to thd t Laterial. Often tlw rec::ctj_ons 
appeur chaotic und irro.tional, without patterr::s, '::ithout 
r· yn:e or reds on. Yet, from the point of viec;; of the 
psychologist or psychiatrist, these rec1ctions reveal 
supposedly hidden depths of personality. 'rhe individuo.l 
::;ay use these revelations to go.in a better understcJ.r.di-:;g 
of himself. 
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From the varied reactions to Eeidegger' s phj losophy, 
the v1ri tcr infers that it coc:st i tutes an excellent the-
matic <!.pperception test for philosophers. Lost philosophers 
find i:1 Heidegp,er either a challenge to their ovm vievrs 
or an instrument for challene;ing the views of others. In 
Lcitin .unerica, the philosophers vrho huve developed a sys-
temcttic :Josition of their ovm "'nd those who have uccepted 
the "perennial" system, largely ready-r:ade, find in He i-
degwor an opponent. So:ne philoso:Jhers Cd.ll their op-
nonents names; some ridicule a position tho.t is obviously 
one-sided. Some phi oosophers rc~spect the views of their 
opcJonents, and recognize sir'lil'"ri ties and differences. 
So:~e accept the challenge of strong opposition, on the 
theory thut a wise enemy is better t;~,dn a drovrsy friend. 
On the other hand, some philosophers, like nersons 
in other occupdtions, are largely bent upon destruction. 
;:;eidegger' s philosophy is for some <m instrm:ent to be 
used agctinst systems, usuttlly the dominunt one. The 
;,:ore authoriturian the system, the nore l'Of,E.c.ltic it is 
in its affirna tions, the greater use is :<:<ide of IIe idegger 
and other iconoclasts in fi(Shting the system. 
In the cou-cse of this investigation, the ·;rriter hus 
found himself on both sides of Heide,c;ger' s chcillenge, 
sometimes using Heidegr:er to challenge otl1er views, sorJe-
tL:es defending his ovm viev.'s against ;-reidegger. 
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There are son:e internd.l tensioEs in Eeidegc·er•s 
thouc;ht, for ex£:role, between Dasei n as ulv;clys c:'line 
c<nd Dasein as such or in general (Uberhauut), ,,nd between 
the strictly ontological :r;]e<-'.nings of terms '"nd t:neir ordi-
nary meaning~ in psychology, religion, and ethics. Lack, 
debt, guilt (Schuld) is an example. Eeidegr::er gives this 
term an ontological definition, but it is extreTiely doubtful 
that any reader could avoid letting the term slip back into 
its norc.l, psychological, and relic; ious r;le-tnings in ordinary 
usage. 'I'hel'e is constant tens ion between actuality ( Nil:k-
lichkeit) and possibility (L~glichkeit). 
'l'he writer finds in iieidegger :r;]UCh convincine; evidence 
for tenporalism, that is, for a vision of the hu an entity 
as tenporal succes··ion of modes of consciousness. 7:cow 
these successive modes recognize or r.:c.ke V·eir unity is 
11 difficult problem. :?urtherr::ore, there is tension within 
Eeideg13er•s temporalism of the human er.tity. On the one 
hand, human existence is te:rooral in the sense thu. t ternuo-
r"lity is a :::ode of being, a function of Dasein. Teuporality 
is not sor:wtJ::i:1g externu.l to being human, but is inherent 
in the n0.ture of being human. The cont'ron concept of til:le 
is il derived, secondary concept. The deepest, or Dost 
original, time is, in ordb.ary languu.ge, tir:;e as exneri-
enced by Dasein. 
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Cn the other hund, there is at least one function 
of tice in rele1tion to Dasein that has an objectivCJ char-
acter. The 1~wst proper possibility of Dasein is itl!l' ovm 
r]oath. 
die. 
Once hu ving been born, Dase in is old enour·h to 
Death is alwuys a nossibility. 
Cn the b·-'2is of possibility alor.e, hovl'ever, there 
should be no need or necessity of death. 0o;,ething aore 
than possibility is neede6 to Dluke death rcecessury. The 
irreferuble n<J.ture of death and the eissumed necessity of 
de"'th see':l to ::::c:ke Dasein' s time in sone vruy de:;:;condont 
unon an objective time. If time is ulth1.1tely rooted in 
Dasein alone, :t-Ieidegr;er's theory would seem to cake every 
death voluntary. 'l'he tension between tenporality as a 
function of Dasein and an objective time that makes death 
necessary is not adequately clarified in 3ein und Zeit 
or in I-Ieidegger's later works. The v.Titer sees this 
tension between subjective i.tnd objective time as one of 
the difficulties in a tenporalist view of reality. 
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dlSTRACT 
The :ourpose of this investigCJ.tion is to cleter"'i?J.e 
the nature and extent of tte influel'.ce of :~urtin Heideg-
ger in conte :oor,iry Lo.tin-~meric"'n :?hilosophy. l'o.rt I 
is an e;;:oosition of ':eidee;;-cer•s :philoso:phy. Part II is 
a survey of his influence in selected Lo.tin--"nericdn 
tb.inkers. 
1-'he aim of Sein und Zeit (1927) is a universal :phe-
nonenol·::gical ontology, by means of a concrete elaboration 
of the problem of being. 'rhe method is a corr.bination of 
:ohenor.1enol.ogic"'l d!1dlysis and her;,Jeneuticctl inter:oretcition. 
Cntology, or the question ctbout being, is cJ.:oproache d through 
fundcii:lental ontology, or the ana. lysis of :oersonal existence. 
'I'his e::istential analysis shows Irtan as being-in-the-vlOrld, 
being-<:rith-others, -'-nc being-unto-dedth •.. o.n•s beine is 
care, c1nd the J.lectnir.g of care is finite te:.'!lorcility. "·n 
i:~port"-nt projected section of Seb. urd Zeit bas not been 
published. 
In lesser viorl\:s, Heidegger examines such thenes as 
ti1e Ectture of truth, the nature of ground (reclson, c,mse), 
:aet<l:ohysics, aesthetics, nothing, freedom, cmd ir;terpretu-
tions of other :ohiloso:ohers. He atte· '!lts to go beyond 
conce:otual thousht to trut~ as the o:oenness of :oersonal 
existence to being. The priccciple of ground ( c-.mse, 
reason) is itself without ground. Trcldi t ionc1l c'•eta-
yllysics hus been clomic:Clted by logic, c.nd is to be sur-
passed. Heidegger sees his p~ilosochy in ccntrc1st to 
\;hcit he c.1lls Hegel's "Onto-Theo-Loe;ical Conce·Jtion of 
L:etaphys ics. n 
He idegr"_sr' s ph:_loso:ohy is unfinished; his e .. lp~1a..sis 
is unon questions rctther than ansVTers. ;uch controversy 
hue arisen over the correct interpretation of his t~oue;ht. 
:;e o~moses ;:c.ost chd.rclcterizations of it, such as e:dsten-
tialism, hur::anism, atheism, irratior.d.lism, necativism, 
and subjectivism. 
Part II of the dissertc1tion begins v:ith a description 
of the introduction of Heidegr,er•s philosophy to Lc1tin 
~:.Llericct in translations and ex~Josi tory ~~-varies. Philosophers 
froE S:ouin, seecdng refuee after the S:oanish Civil .. ar, 
helped to 1r~ke conte;:t1Jorary Europetl.n philosop'ties '·:nown 
in Latin .;~nerica. Gern•an pheno>•Jenology, incl.udi:cg Hei-
Criticul evaluation of Heidegger•s thoue;ht is exill~ined 
in severdl Ldtin-~ii•lel'ican thini,ers. J!'or ezcL·.:ple, .<lejandro 
Kern found in Ee idegr:er' s Cdpi tulaticn to Nazism dn indica-
tion that his philosophy v;as barren of values. Jose Vas-
concelos objects to the "tangle" of che!lo:.wnoloe: ic,;.l anal-
yses. .>c'lto!lio Case calls the array o:t' negative senti:1ents 
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a "let-dovm" philosophy, sui table for the '-'fterm"th of 
war. Francisco Romero finds truth jn treidegcer' s te!,lpo-
rdlism, but opnoses pure process without structure -J.nd 
the srbordin<cJ.tion of rs.tio;'lal thought to a "handling" 
coT.rprehension of utensils. cswaldo Robles ;:_;_nd "illtonio 
G6mez Robledo, representc. tive ;;:-eo-Thomists, find in 
Heidegger 1 s ulti.'Ilate questioning a challen~:e to "ueren-
nial" philosophy. Ss.muel Rar:·_os finds tha.t He idege;er 1 s 
novel terninology contdins some coLlr,conplace truths, nhich 
Rumos uses ds axiomatic base.s for 1-ds philosol'C:lical 
anthropology or nev! humanism. 
Eeidegn:er 1 s students and followers in Latin -u2erica 
accept i:is nhiloso:phy as existentialism, despite objections 
to thu.t term. _elberta ',iagner de Reyna el:lphasizes the per-
sonalistic aspect of fur_ddmental ontology in the aunroach 
to ontology, u.nd seeks to acco:rrinodate Reide,c;;·er' s idects 
in a ;reo-Scholastic position. Carlos "cstrada stresses 
subjectivism, hwmmis;n, finitism, and Lu,lanence (tilis world 
only) in Heideg~:;er. Carlos _-J.berto Erro found in Eeidegger• s 
thourht a philosophical fornulation of Xierksc;aard's anxious, 
anguished thinking. J. Salus Subirdt uses e:xistentidlism 
as an argument cigctinst theolocical author i turianisr~ ctnd in 
favor of atheistic hur,kmism. Lorenzo Cc:.rnelli atte:.mts to 
estiiblish a philosoCJhy of Right upon 1Ie idegf-:er' s sub je c-
tivistic te··:mor-.ilisr;, in opuosition to fi:xed forms. Leopolda 
Zea uno the Hyperion Philosoohical Grou:o in :.exico find 
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chal}"enge in existentialist queEtions but no a.de~~u.J.te 
anEvrerE in existentialism. Zea is nore indebted to 
Samuel Ra:,os und other Lexican thinkers thetn to :Cieideg-
[;er. Other members of the r;yperion Group follov; dartre 
and ::-!reel r::ore than Eeidegger. Ed:,;und o 0' Gornan, in 
his theory of the science of history, uses Yeidegger's 
concept of authentic, subjective resPonsibility, in op-
position to history as an objective, ciisi"Cterested science. 
The climd.te of :9hilosophy in Latin "~:1erica is :oer-
mect ted by the tens ion between dogma. tic system "-lld free 
inquiry. There has been much talk abot:"t Eeidegger a.nd 
r:mch curiosity about his views 1 but lectd ing thinkers are 
not following Heidego:er. Two conclusions of tlw dis serto.-
tion are as follows: The najor influence of :'Ieidegger•s 
philosouhy in Latin ".unerica is its usefulness in c!:dllenging 
"Perennial" philosophy ctnd other syste;::cttic positions. 'l'he 
writer found little significant ic1fluence of Feidegger a.t 
uresent in the fornJ.tion of a constructive systeTl. 
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